USA > Vermont > Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825 > Part 13
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What the Allens did not wish the British to permit others to do, they wished to do in secret. In March, Ira communicated with Haldimand on commercial matters. On the twenty-fourth, he re- quested a loan from Montreal merchants, offering land as se- curity.12 A month later, Ethan sent a verbal message to Haldi- mand proposing that loyalists who did not choose to return to the American States be permitted to settle in the northern part of the Champlain Valley, and saying that the private cabinet of Ver- mont would offer every inducement for those still living in the states to move to Vermont. Sherwood wrote Haldimand that Ethan hoped thereby to build a party sufficiently strong to swing Vermont over to the British13 If Haldimand had not objected to Ethan's proposal, many loyalists might have remained in Vermont. In May of 1783 he wrote Sherwood that it was impossible for him, in view of the approaching peace, to take such a step.14 Haldi- mand had been determined to prevent all settlement of the Ver- mont frontiers north of Otter Creek.15 In May he relented, how-
10. Ibid., CLXXVII, pt. 2, 630.
11. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 6-14.
12. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 363-364.
13. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 185-186.
14. Ibid., CLXXIX, pt. 2, 185-186.
15. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 155-158.
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ever, to the extent of exempting settlers on the Onion River and in June he ordered that settlers on Grand Isle were not to be molested.16 The reason Haldimand gave for permitting these set- tlements was his desire to express, as long as possible, his friendly disposition towards Vermonters.17
The arrival of definitive terms of peace and the collapse of the Allens' political negotiations with Haldimand changed the attitude of many Vermonters towards the British. "I never was at any time", wrote Sherwood to Haldimand's secretary, April 27, 1784, "so much embarrassed as I have been since the declaration of peace." He said that loyalists and rebels were arriving at the Blockhouse in order to trade or to secure the release of relatives in the British Army. These persons, he continued, boasted that they were independent, that the ground upon which the Block- house stood was American and that it would soon be in their pos- session. When Sherwood refused to permit trade, they said, "that it would not be a month before they will trade, and no thanks to me, and that they will take good care that no Dam'd Tory shall have the Liberty of trading ... [and] that they will soon have a merchant of their own in this Blockhouse etc. etc."18
The Allens were more circumspect and diplomatic in their deal- ings with the British than were these Vermonters. Although the Treaty of 1783 had nullified their efforts to reunite Vermont to Great Britain, they trusted that commercial concessions might be forthcoming. On May 29, Ira and Jonas Fay wrote Haldimand re- questing a contract to supply beef to the British troops. Neither wished to discuss politics. On July 10, Ethan offered to sell young cattle which he claimed would make good beef.19 Haldimand re- plied that if the terms of the peace permitted free trade he would be happy to purchase food in Vermont, adding that his only rea- son for not accepting his proposal was that his stores were plenti- fully stocked.2º Shortly thereafter, George Smyth wrote Ethan that Haldimand was willing to allow him to drive milch cows into the province and to forward beef "to take the Chance of the Mar-
16. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 203-204; CLXXIX, pt. 2, 274-276.
17. Ibid., CXXXVIII, 255.
18. Thid., CLXXVIII. 187-188.
19. Ibid., CLXXV, 200-201, 202.
20. Ibid., CLXXV, 203.
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ket .... "21 Taking advantage of this information, Jonas Fay left Crown Point with a drove of cattle.22
Thus far Haldimand had permitted a limited trade solely as an indulgence on his part. He had indicated clearly that trade would be legalized only if his instructions permitted. Nevertheless, a dif- ferent reason was given by the loyalist, William Marsh, at that time in Vermont. "Many leading Gentlemen, in this part," he re- ported, "often inquire of me the Reason Why the Commerce be- tween the Province of Quebec and the State of Vermont is not open; my answer is that his Excellency General Haldimand wishes to see whether the American States comply with the articles of the treaty."23 Marsh knew that Haldimand had discovered the utility of continuing to hold the western posts extending from Lake Champlain to Detroit, as a means of forcing the American States to comply with the articles of the treaty by which loyalists were permitted to return in order to secure the restoration of their property and to collect debts. According to the historian, A. L. Burt, Haldimand had found a plausible reason for retaining the western posts until the American government would accept the British contention that the treaty did not give the Americans ex- clusive title to Indian lands but only the exclusive right to treat with the Indians for the cession of their lands. He was em- barrassed because his government had overlooked its pledges to the Indians by turning them over to the Americans by the Treaty of 1783. Haldimand apparently feared that the evacuation of the posts without an American promise to treat with the Indians would cause an uprising similar to Pontiac's Rebellion of a genera- tion before.24
In Vermont, the Allens were prepared to make the necessary sacrifices-short of restoring confiscated property-to secure com- mercial concessions. According to William Marsh, the Vermonters would court British favor because the best part of their state was commercially dependent upon Quebec.
21. Ibid., CLXXV, 205-206.
22. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 253.
23. Ibid., CLXII, 187-188.
24. Burt, A. L., The United States, Great Britain and British North America ( New Haven, 19440), 82-140.
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The first public sign since the peace that the Allens wished to encourage the return of loyalists, came in a letter signed "Spec- tator" which was published in the Bennington Gazette on July 24, 1783. Spectator was undoubtedly Ira Allen.
The people of Vermont would be wise to consider their peculiar situation, it being very different from any State in the Union ... first from its lying contiguous to Canada, and the extensive Connection which must un- avoidably take place in commerce with that state: & secondly because it has not the advantage of allies to call to its aid in case of invasion. Vermont must re- main at peace [and] ... regulate internal government and study best mode to obtain peace & honor & be at peace with them all. It is a God-like attribute to forgive the repentant, & no less honourable to treat an enemy with humanity, & consequently politic for any power, to admit the restoration of subjects when it appears evident that by such admittance strength and wealth is added to the State.
This was one of two letters which Ira had written on this sub- ject. In answer to one of them, a Vermonter published an anony- mous letter in the Gazette on August 21 which refuted the argu- ment advanced by Ira in his first letter in favor of permitting the return of loyalists. Spectator, he said, contended that because Ver- mont was adjacent to Quebec its trade must necessarily be with Canadian merchants and, unless Vermont permitted tories to re- turn and become citizens of Vermont, the British would take affront and prohibit trade between Quebec and Vermont. To this argument the Vermonter replied erroneously that it was generally known that, before the Revolution, merchants in the Champlain Valley purchased most of their goods in New York. Even if one were to admit that all of Vermont was dependent solely upon the Quebec market, the unalterable determination of Vermonters that loyalists should never return to their state and become citizens would not necessarily cause the Canadian government to retaliate because he did not believe that loyalists would be the only or leading merchants in the province. Furthermore, he did not be- lieve that loyalists were held in higher regard in Quebec than
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were Vermonters. In closing, he charged that Spectator owned large tracts of land near the forty-fifth parallel which loyalists had offered to purchase if they could be admitted as citizens of Ver- mont.
After the failure of the political negotiations with the Allens, Haldimand became aware of their attitude of realpolitik tempered with friendship which they adopted towards him and his province. He had already analyzed the political temper of the Vermonters in a letter to Lord North of October 24, 1783. "They make no scrupel of telling me," he wrote, "that Vermont must either be annexed to Canada or become Mistress of it, as it is the only channel by which the Produce of their Country can be conveyed to market; but they assured me that they rather wished the for- mer." 25
It was largely in this spirit that the Allens set an example for other Vermonters by acts of friendship to loyalists. In the winter of 1783-1784, the youngest son of George Smyth stayed in Ver- mont where he was entertained by Chittenden, the Allens and the Fays.26 Similarly the Allens treated kindly the loyalist, William Marsh. "Many of those whom had of late been my Greatest Enemy," he said on November 4, 1783, "Ware amongst the first to take me by the hand & bid me Wellcome." He declared that not a single unpleasant incident had marred his visit to Vermont.27
The return of Marsh was followed by that of other loyalists. Simon Stevens returned to take an honorable place in Vermont's political life by attending the Vermont Convention which ratified the American Constitution in 1791.28 Likewise, Abel Spencer re- turned to become a candidate on the Federalist ticket for United States Senator.29 Other loyalists who rose high in Vermont after the Revolution were Luke Knoulton, Samuel Wells and Micah Townshend. The latter was actually Secretary of State from 1781 to 1789. Loyalists even sought and received grants of land. Luke Knoulton obtained Bakersfield and Samuel Wells secured a tract
25. B., LVII, pt. 2, 574-579.
26. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 324.
27. Thid., CLXXXI, 309-311.
28. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, III, 466.
29. Ibid., IV. 169.
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of several thousand acres. So long as the Allens were in sub- stantial control of the government of Vermont, loyalists, Yankee and Yorker, were permitted to return to Vermont and to partici- pate in its politics.30 Samuel Wells' dislike of the republican form of government did not deter him from lingering there. So friendly was the attitude of some Vermonters towards the British that two who were not loyalists named children after the British hero, Guy Carleton. John Spafford named a son born in 1778 Horatio Gates; one born in 1787 Guy Carleton.31 The other Vermonter, Noah Lee, named a son born in 1787 Guy Carleton, and a son born in 1807, George Washington!32
All was not smooth sailing, however, for loyalists who returned to Vermont. James Rogers, whose wife was living on a farm to which the Assembly had permitted her to return, met with rough treatment. He said that he had returned to the state after re- ceiving assurances from some of the leading Vermonters that he would not be insulted or otherwise maltreated by the populace, assurances not wholly warranted either in his case or in that of other loyalists. Rogers was chagrined by his reception in Ver- mont.33 Asa Porter, a Yankee loyalist, said that two loyalists who he indicated might have been residents of Newbury had been roughly treated after they had returned to dispose of their property and to move with their families to Quebec. They were caught, Porter claimed, by a party consisting of General Bayley's family, "whipped, thrown into gaol ... taken out, clubbed, re- leased & told not to come back."34 The reason for such treatment was obvious to loyalists. One of them, Rannah Cossit, a preacher, declared flatly that Colonel John Peters "might return to his home without giving offence to anyone but Gen. Bayley, Thomas John- son and a few others who have got his estate." 35
The failure of many Vermonters to welcome returning loyalists was the chief obstacle to the realization of the plans of the Allens.
30. V.H.S., Collections, IT, 159-162, 166-167; Manuscript Assembly Journals, 1781-
1785, 180. 31. A Genealogical Record of the Descendants of John Snafford ( Boston, 1888), 76-77. 32. John Lee of Farmington, Connecticut, and His Descendants ( Meriden, Conn., 1897), 220-221.
33. B., CLX. 160.
34. Ibid., LXXV, pt. 2, 38.
35. Ibid., CLXXVIII, 136.
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On June 28, 1784, William Marsh reported that some Vermonters wanted to obey articles five and six of the treaty which provided that no obstacles should be placed in the path of loyalists desiring to secure the restoration of their property and the payment of debts. He said, however, that the majority of Vermonters was opposed to these articles because so many had purchased con- fiscated loyalist property. Personal property, such as notes, bonds, books and other papers were gone beyond recall. Debts, he said, will be paid only to British subjects and not to American loyalists. As to personal treatment, there was, he maintained "no just cause of complaint, as the principal people in authority have exerted selves in our favour." 36
Loyalists actually approached the Allens to beg their aid in re- gaining their possessions. In September of 1784, the loyalist, Alex- ander Grant, met Ira Allen who told him that his lands were under New York title and that Vermont was determined to sup -. port the New Hampshire title. He said that he might initiate a law suit, but he was fairly certain that it would be decided in favor of the New Hampshire title.37 The loyalist, Samuel Gale, saw Ethan at Bennington in October, 1784, and complained to him of the infamy of the law confiscating loyalist estates. Ethan virtually apologized to Gale, saying that Vermont thought that it was doing "God ['s] Service in seizing properties of the Tories; but that he hoped nothing further than had been done would be done." 38
So favorable for a time were the reports from Vermont concern- ing the possiblilities of securing restoration of loyalist property, that the British Commissioners on Loyalist Claims declared on December 23, 1784, that they would not consider claims for losses in Vermont.39 The failure of the Allens' policies forced the Com- missioners to make a new statement regarding these claims. Per- ceiving that the optimism of earlier reports had not been justified, they stated in their twelfth report that they would now entertain
36. Ibid., CLXII, 318-320.
37. Ibid., LXXV, pt. 2, 185.
38. N.Y.P.L., Transcripts of Loyalist Claims, I, 193.
39. Ibid., XI, 26-27.
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claims for losses in Vermont.4º One hundred and fifty-two persons eventually presented claims for losses sustained in Revolutionary Vermont prior to 1781. Of this total approximately sixty were former residents of the state who put in claims for compensa- tion totalling 100 & more or less. The remainder were absentee owners of Vermont lands.
Both resident and non-resident loyalists endeavoured to secure the restoration of their property.41 Timothy Lovell, who had lived in the Grants before the Revolution, returned to bring suit against the persons who had purchased his lands. They retaliated by de- nouncing Lovell to the Assembly, declaring that he had boldly returned to Vermont and that he had "used all the arts that false- hood and dissimulation could suggest" to regain possession of his property, and had "endeavoured by every fallacious gloss & shew of evidence to excuse and extenuate his Conduct .... " 42
That arch-foe of Vermont, William Smith, believed for a time that he had not lost all his lands in the state. He placed in the hands of the Loyalist Commissioners several claims at different times. On July 28, 1786, he waived all claims to his Vermont lands because he believed that they would be restored, except such lands as were held under New Hampshire title. In testifying to Tryon's losses before the Commissioners on December 5, 1786, Smith said that his own lands in Vermont had sold for as much as twenty and for as little as four shillings currency, per acre. He had sold wild lands near the Canadian border for only eight shil- lings per acre. These lands, he testified, had been sold either in 1781 or 1782.43 In 1788, Stephen R. Bradley, a former supporter of the Allens and Smith's attorney, served writs of ejectment on tenants on Smith's lands which had escaped confiscation by Ver- mont. As late as 1792, he was still employed for the same purpose. What happened to his lands after 1792 is not wholly clear.
Other loyalists did not lose their property because they had friends who were willing to hold the deeds to the lands while the actual owners were absent from Vermont. Samuel Gale, for cx-
40. Ibid., XI, 58.
41. Nye, Sequestration, Confiscation and Sales of Estates, 171-173.
42. Ibid., 124.
43. Transcripts of Loyalist Claims, XLIV, 622-626; XLV, 133-134.
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ample, admitted that his Vermont lands had not been confiscated because his politically influential father-in-law, Samuel Wells, had held the title in his absence. Gale's losses arose wholly from his failure to pay land taxes after Wells' death.++ Other loyalists never released their hold on their real estate because it had never been listed for confiscation by the Assembly or, if so listed, had been overlooked by sequestration authorities. Lands not libelled, or libelled and not sold by the state were claimed by loyalists upon their return. They resumed possession of their lands or hailed into the Vermont courts persons who had purchased their lands illegally. Whitehead Hicks, for example, sued to secure the re- storation of property which had never been libelled.45 To loyalists whose property had been legally confiscated and sold, Governor Chittenden very obligingly gave certificates of confiscation which they could present to the Loyalist Commissioners.46
The certificates which Chittenden signed were not prompted entirely by genuine friendship for loyalists. They were only one of several means which Vermonters employed in order to con- ciliate the Canadian authorities and make them more receptive. to their proposals to admit Vermonters into the Quebec market and sources of supply. After championing the return of loyalists, the Allens and Chittenden endeavoured to secure a commercial pact in Quebec. On March 24, 1784, the Council swung into action by sending to the Assembly a bill to empower the Governor to make treaties of amity and commercial intercourse. The Assem- bly balked at this proposal, rejecting it on April 8. Two days later, the Council, without authority from the Assembly, delegated Ira Allen to proceed to Quebec to negotiate a commerical treaty. In July, Ira prepared to go to Quebec by providing himself with a letter for Haldimand which was signed by Chittenden but obvi- ously written by himself. The letter was a typical Ira Allen pro- duction. He restated the theme which almost obsessed him. He referred to the "contiguousness of this Government" to Quebec, the convenience of water-carriage to lower Canada, and for these
44. Ibid., XLIII, 487-493.
45. Nye, op. cit., 147.
46. Transcripts of Loyalist Claims, XXVII, 435, 324-327, 318-323.
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reasons requested a reciprocal free trade treaty between Quebec and Vermont.47
Delayed some months by what he described as pressing busi- ness, Ira did not arrive in Montreal until early in September. On the tenth he wrote Haldimand that the Vermonters desired a trade pact which could be made because Vermonters considered themselves unconnected with any power and inclined by geogra- phy to trade with the Province of Quebec.48
On the seventeenth, Haldimand replied to Ira's letter. He stood firmly by his instructions, stating that he was not empowered to open trade. Yet until he received specific instructions from Great Britain, he would permit the importation into Quebec from Ver- mont of a number of articles including grain and beef, and the exportation to Vermont from Quebec of necessities. Governor Chittenden, he trusted, would take steps to prevent "on the part of His people an Illicit Trade from being carried on, which in- terested people have already found the means in some degree to introduce." 49
Although Haldimand's concessions fell short of Ira's expecta- tions, they helped to meet his and other Vermonters' immediate needs. Ira believed that Haldimand's failure to place the trade upon a permanent and legal basis was due to the fact that he had gone to the Canadian province without the authorization of the Vermont Assembly. After his return he redoubled his efforts to secure the Assembly's approval of his going to Quebec to resume negotiations. On October 28, 1784, the Assembly, reversing its former stand, empowered Ira and Jonas and. Joseph Fay to go to Quebec to secure a commercial treaty. Of the three men ap- pointed, only Ira made the trip. When he arrived in Quebec, he found that Haldimand had returned to England and that he would have to confer with Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamil- ton. Ira requested free trade for Vermonters, upon the same foot- ing as British subjects, and financial aid to build a road from the boundary to St. Johns. Soon afterwards, Hamilton convened his council. After deliberation, the council gave its opinion, as Ira
47. B, CLXXV. 277-278.
48. Ibid., CLXXV. 278.
49. Ibid., CLXXV, 278-281.
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reported, that it did not have sufficient power to open a trade upon the terms which he requested, but declared itself willing to do all in its power to facilitate the making of a treaty. The council agreed to permit the export of goods to Vermont, peltries ex- cepted, and the import of food and other produce into Quebec.50
The refusal of Haldimand, Hamilton and their councils to put the Vermont-Quebec trade on a permanent and legal basis was due to their responsibility as British officials to enforce the British Acts of Trade and Navigation. These acts prohibited, by and large, trade between British colonies and foreign countries except through the British entrepôt. The purpose of these acts was to build a self-sufficient empire, based on ships, colonies and com- merce which would sustain, in the last analysis, the naval power necessary to maintain Britain's world position. British mercan- tilism had, in part, enabled Great Britain to win her uphill com- mercial and naval struggles against all rivals prior to 1783.
After the Revolution the vision of building a self-sufficient em- pire was apparently shattered. Britain, so said critics of the Acts of Trade and Navigation, must espouse the free trade policies as . advocated by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations. This war and post-war reaction from mercantilistic restrictions was, how- ever, brief. It was swiftly succeeded by an almost evangelical movement led by Lord Sheffield, William Knox and British ship- builders, in support of the Navigation Acts. The arguments Shef- field used to convince the British public of their continued utility were ingenious, and in the long run they proved to be false. Ac- cording to him, the self-sufficient empire could be restored by stimulating the economic development of the remaining British North American colonies which could in time fill the gap created by the withdrawal from the empire of the richer, more highly developed American colonies. Quebec and the Maritime Provinces could supply the British West Indies with lumber, flour, fish and other provisions and articles so essential to the prosperity and productivity of these staple-producing islands. He maintained that the Americans, if excluded from the West Indian trade,
50. P.A.C., O, XXIV. pt. 2. 281-285, 289-290; Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, III, 398.
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would not be able to retaliate by laying prohibitive duties upon the importation of British manufactures because the immaturity of their economy would make them dependent upon British manu- factures for many years to come. His arguments, rather than those of Adam Smith, as espoused by Lord Shelburne, formed the cornerstone of the post-revolutionary commercial policy of Great Britain.51
While Sheffield and other British leaders were debating the commercial future of the empire as a whole, Canadian merchants were discussing the commercial potentialities of their province. The American Revolution presented serious problems to Cana- dian merchants no less than to their British fellows. The newly- established boundary, by cutting across the natural avenue of trade provided by the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu, excluded Canadians from the rich sources of supplies and rich markets which were developing on the north-western American frontier.
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