Vermont in quandary, 1763-1825, Part 7

Author: Williamson, Chilton, 1916-
Publication date: 1949
Publisher: Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society
Number of Pages: 702


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Until the spring of 1777, independence was supported only by land speculators, a few Yorkers and the more radical factions, while the faction led by Jacob Bayley refused to commit itself to independence because it was waiting to see what kind of a con- stitution revolutionary New York would write. The event which threw them all into each others' arms was the constitution adopted at the New York Constitutional Convention of April, 1777. This constitution, framed by John Jay, was wholly unacceptable to the majority of the Grants inhabitants. New York could not have deliberately designed an instrument of government more repug- nant to the political ideas of the Grants folk. They were outraged by the perpetuation in the revolutionary constitution of those grievances which had been a chief cause of their mounting hos- tility to New York. Prior to the adoption of this constitution, many Yorkers in the Grants could declare with some truth that much of the agitation against New York had been artificially stimulated and that "many wicked and disaffected and turbulent Persons for the Promotion of their own private interest and other sinister and base Designs have artfully fomented the said Animosities falsely alledging ... that this state and Government ... are determined to oppress harass and impoverish the Inhabitants of the said Counties .... "21 Henceforth, the protests of the inhabitants of the


20. Ibid., 38-39.


21. O'Callaghan, E. B. ( ed. ), Documentary History of the State of New York ( Albany, 1850-1851), 4 vols., IV, 925.


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Grants could no longer be deemed wholly false. New York's Con- stitution was sufficient proof that seaboard New York was bent upon exercising an arbitrary and discriminatory authority over the backcountry-including the Grants.


The New York Constitution provided for a bicameral legisla- ture with property qualifications for the suffrage and it perpetuated primogeniture and entail. The Grants inhabitants were allotted nine of the seventy seats in the Assembly and three of the twenty- four seats in the Senate. From the point of view of the Grant's folk, these provisions of the Constitution, as well as many others, made it clear that New York, although more conciliatory than it had been before 1777, did not propose to remove all those inequalities upon which the Grants folk placed a large share of the blame for their difficulties.22 The constitution was the last straw for the Bayley faction. It was now willing to throw in its lot with the set- tlers and speculators west of the Green Mountains, a few Yorkers and the Jones-Spaulding factions east of the mountains. The indeci- sion of 1776-1777 gave way to a newly-found decision after the New York Constitutional Convention. Bayley wrote on February 19, 1777, that most people in Cumberland County were rallying around those disaffected from New York, "none from us, but which way for us to steer, I know not."23 Then came news of the contents of the conservative instrument of government of New York. Bayley now declared that New York had an arbitrary gov- ernment. The inhabitants, he said, before they saw the constitu- tion were not willing to trouble themselves about a separation from the state of New York, "but now almost to a man they are violent for it." 24


The disadvantages of continued union with New York were greater than the risks of joining the truly revolutionary move- ment in the Grants from which Bayley had hitherto remained aloof. In future, the Allens could, in varying degrees, count upon the cooperation of all factions, except that of die-hard Yorkers, in writing a constitution which would endeavour to end, once and


22. Spaulding, E. W., New York During the Critical Period, 1783-1789 ( New York, 1932). Ste 94, passim.


23. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 373-374.


24. Ibid., 1, 375.


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for all, the grievances which they had so long endured .under New York. That Vermont would emerge with a more democratic form of government was a foregone conclusion.


The Allens had but to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the New York Constitution to show them what kind of a docu- ment the Grants people would accept. The constitution soon to be written expressed the Allens' political theories, yet their theories were undoubtedly those of a majority of the frontiersmen of the Grants.


Thus, in the heat of common hostility to "revolutionary" New York was forged the fundamental instrument for the government of the new state. On June 4, 1777, there met at Windsor a con- vention composed of seventy-two men representing all factions. Heading the list of tasks to be performed by this convention was that of selecting a different name for the new state because it knew that a settlement of the name of New Connecticut had been established in the Susquehanna Valley. The convention finally chose Vermont. This name had been suggested by Dr. Thomas Young who had been an intimate of the Allens during their Con- necticut days and who now lived in Philadelphia. Having de- cided upon Vermont the convention drew up once more a list of grievances against New York and after designating Wednesday, the eighteenth of June "as a day of public fasting and prayer throughout the state," it appointed June twenty-third as the day for each town to select representatives to meet on July 2, 1777, at Windsor to "choose delegates to attend the general Congress, [to choose] a Committee of Safety and to form a Constitution . . . . " 25


On the appointed day, the convention met at Windsor and began immediately to write a constitution. The document which emerged from this convention was the opposite in most particulars from that of New York. The emphasis in the Vermont Constitution was, in theory at least, on majority rule and supremacy of the legislative branch. The emphasis in the New York Constitution was on separation of powers, a strong governor and a powerful judiciary. Above all, Vermont granted universal manhood suffrage whereas New York maintained property qualifications for the


25. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 52-61.


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suffrage. Vermont's Constitution was an experiment in political democracy within the framework of the compact theory of gov- ernment.


Under the constitution, the freemen in every town of less than eighty persons were to elect one representative (two if more than eighty) to the Assembly, which was granted the power of legis- lation and of the purse, and the power of appointment and im- peachment. The freemen were also to elect the Governor and twelve persons to comprise the Governor's Council which was to exercise the executive powers. Lastly, the freemen were to elect thirteen persons every seven years who would form a Council of Censors empowered to "inquire whether the Constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part, and whether the legisla- tive and executive branches of government have performed their duty as guardians of the people; or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution."26 In short, the Vermont Constitution, unlike New York's, was representative of the most advanced social and polit- ical ideas of the revolutionary generation. In one particular only were the two constitutions identical, both established a Council of Censors.


Although this constitution fitted the needs and embodied the political ideas of a majority of the settlers and many speculators, it was not an original creation. The Allens used as their model the radical first constitution of revolutionary Pennsylvania. That fundamental law had been written in response to forces very similar to those which had set the Grants folk against New York. Backcountry Pennsylvania labored under similar grievances and wrote into its first constitution provisions which were intended to safeguard majority rule against courts, governors or aristocratic senators. Its provisions were already at hand, thanks to Thomas Young, and with a few changes and amendments were put into operation in Vermont. The person who claimed to have written the preamble and compiled the constitution was Ira Allen.27 Ex- cept for the provision granting one representative to towns of


28. The Constitution is printed in Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 90-103.


27. Wilbur Library, Wilbur Photostats, no. 3102.


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eighty or less persons and two to towns of more than eighty, the provision granting universal manhood suffrage, and the addition of ten articles comprising a Declaration of Rights, the instrument closely resembled the radical Constitution of Pennsylvania.


Such was the democratic character of the constitution launched on the wave of reaction against revolutionary New York. Ira's comment on the reasons for framing such a document was simple: "As the people seemed inclined for a popular government, the Constitution was so made."28 He actually invited the Vermonters to compare the constitutions of New York and Vermont. "I there- for expect the Inhabitants here," wrote Ira to the inhabitants of Putney on August 13, 1777, "will content themselves Untill our Constitution can be Printed and sent thro the several Towns; that the People may Compare the Constitution of New York & this to- gether & then Candidly Determine whether it is Best wisest and Cheapest for those Inhabitants to govern themselves or pay foreigners for doing." 29


Ira went farther than to seek support solely on the grounds that Vermont's constitution was an improvement upon New York's. In May of 1777, in anticipation of the constitution, Ira wrote a pamphlet entitled Miscellaneous Remarks on the Proceedings of the State of New York against the State of Vermont. In this pamphlet he drew whatever arguments he could from politics, economics and geography in favor of independence. The courts, he hinted for the eyes of debt-harassed folk, will meet for short sessions and the few salaried officials appointed by the state will have their fees set at modest and reasonable rates.30


Not only did Ira appeal to the tax-payer, but he appealed also to Vermonters who were convinced that Vermont interests would not be properly recognized by the New York legislature. He maintained that the legislature would be dominated by Yorkers because of New York's greater area and population. In these cir- cumstances not even the most equitable system of representation could guarantee that the interests of Grants inhabitants would


28. V. H. S., Collections, I, 319.


29. Wilbur Photostats, no. 3227.


30. V. H. S., Collections, I, 130-131.


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not be neglected or sacrificed by the legislature. In short, New York's area was so great, its population so large and varied, its interests so complex, that its government could be neither efficient nor equitable. Many Yorkers, he said, were as ignorant of Ver- mont and its needs as were Londoners. "The great distance of road between this district and New York," he added, "is alone a convincing argument that the God of Nature never designed said district should be under the jurisdiction of said State." 31


Furthermore, Ira stated that independence would not destroy landlocked Vermont's trade with other states and with foreign countries. It had never been presumed, he said, that the colonial boundaries had been drawn so as to give each colony an outlet upon the sea. People have traded with the nearest seaports re- gardless of boundary lines. He continued by saying that he had overheard the objection that it would be inconvenient for the New Hampshire Grants to be a state because it would not have a seaport. He frankly acknowledged that the Grants had none; but retorted that annexation to any state could not possibly bring a seaport nearer the Grants. The Grants, he maintained, enjoyed the great advantage of lying adjacent to Lake Champlain by which they could be supplied with goods at a reasonable price. "In some parts of the world," he exclaimed, "there are inland kingdoms, & why not inland States?"32


His enemies could and did retort that the Lake Champlain- St. Lawrence outlet to the ocean was still in British hands. Ira anticipated this argument by declaring that he was confident that this outlet would soon be controlled by Americans. "We have the greatest reason to believe," he said, "that, in the sequel of this war, all the American ports will be cleared of those Cormorants that now infest them, & that the Province of Quebec will become one of the United States of America. . . . "33


The impact of these arguments was so great as to leave patriotic Yorkers in the Grants almost inarticulate. They did not choose to answer the charge that New York's Constitution was undemo- cratic. Instead, they made much of the charge, in part true, that


31. Ibid., 130-131.


32. Ibid., 128.


33. Ibid., 128-129.


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the leaders of the movement towards independence were land- speculators who were motivated solely by self-interest and who publicly appealed to the self-interest of others. At any rate, they and their arguments were rejected and repudiated at the Consti- tutional Convention of July, 1777.


In later years, Yorkers in the Grants charged that the Allens had obtained popular support by assuring the inhabitants that the new state would dispose of lands not yet granted and that the revenue from the sale of loyalist estates would be sufficient to pay all the costs of Vermont's participation in the war.34


Yorkers living in Guilford, Brattleborough, Putney, New Fane, Hinsdale, Rockingham, Westminster and Weathersfield declared in 1780 that they refused to acquiesce in independence, not from "motives unfriendly to the American Cause (which some ignorant or malicious people have without Foundation asserted)," but upon other grounds. They declared that Vermonters should draw a distinction between the royal government and the revolutionary government of New York. This new government, they said, had offered in 1778 to compromise the land title dispute and to reduce the burden of the quitrents. Time, they said, would lessen or re- move the inconveniences of distance, because the New York As- sembly would be dominated by up-state counties which would endeavor, probably successfully, to move the capital of New York considerably northward of its present seat.35


Perhaps the most thoughtful objection to the independence of the Grants from New York came from John Rodgers, an obscure but nonetheless brilliant and discerning citizen of New York who resided near the Vermont border. Unlike the Allens, he was, so far as can be determined, a democrat wholly by conviction. He expressed regret in 1781 at the separation. If the Grants had re- mained a part of New York, he said, it would have strengthened the "Democratic Spirit" of the state and provided an effective guard against the aristocracy which the unequal distribution of property in the state had inevitably begotten.36


34. N. Y. S. L., Stevens Miscellaneous, "Sundry Grievances," Feb. 5, 1782.


35. Wilbur Photostats, No. 3233.


36. N. Y. S. L., Isaac Tichenor Papers, Rodgers to Tichenor, Sept. 28, 1781.


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CHAPTER SIX


Revolutionary Vermont


The independence of Vermont and the writing of a democratic constitution brought to fruition two of the major aims of the Allens. They had doubtlessly hoped that independence would have been preceded or accompanied by the collapse of British power in Quebec; but in the spring of 1776 and throughout 1777, the British instead of the Americans were on the offensive in the Champlain Valley. Obviously, the state had been established at a critical time. It had been organized to support property rights under a democratic form of government, as opposed to property rights supported by conservative, though "revolutionary" New York. At the same time Vermont participated as a "co-belligerent" of the other colonies in the larger struggle to eliminate British authority from the continent. On these two objectives, if none other, the four factions which joined in supporting the indepen- dence of Vermont from New York and from Great Britain were in overwhelming agreement.


.


As quickly as possible, Vermont took measures to defend itself against the British offensive during 1777. The invasion of the American colonies via the Champlain Valley took place after the failure of Montgomery to capture the citadel in Quebec in the winter of 1775-1776 and was made possible by the arrival of re- inforcements in Quebec during the ensuing spring. By the autumn of 1776, the Province of Quebec had been cleared of American troops and Guy Carleton appeared in force on Lake Champlain. In the spring of 1777, General Burgoyne invaded the American colonies via the Champlain Valley.1 To meet this invasion re- quired hasty improvisation by the new state. The Allens rose to the crisis. They postponed the immediate organization of a gov- ernment, as required by the constitution, and set up a Council of Safety which was granted large powers over military and civil affairs. On July 8, 1777, the members of this Council were ap-


1. Burt, The Old Province of. Quebec, 233-241.


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pointed by the Windsor Convention. Its membership was drawn from most of the factions represented at the convention, con- servative ex-Yorkers and the Allen and Bennington factions, with the Allen faction in control. The President of this Council was Thomas Chittenden who, after moving from Connecticut to Ver- mont in 1773, had settled upon and invested in Onion River lands. Under his nominal leadership, the Council put up the stiffest re- sistance possible to Burgoyne, appealed for aid from the other colonies, financed the purchase of stores and provisions and exer- cised control over the loyalists in Vermont.2


At the time of its appointment, the fortunes of the struggle against Great Britain were at a low ebb. Seth Warner had suf- fered his defeat at Hubbardton, Ticonderoga had fallen and Bur- goyne was advancing southward. In this critical moment, the Council appealed to New Hampshire for aid and attempted to solve the problem of how best to stimulate enlistment, to finance its own military operations and to contribute to the support of the "General Cause". The fertile brain of Ira Allen found a solution for the financial problem. The Council, despairing of securing funds from New York or New Hampshire, did not know what to do. Ira was given overnight, so he later wrote, to hatch a scheme to finance the raising of a regiment. "Next morning," he said, "the sun-rising, the Council met, and he reported the ways and means to raise and support a regiment. viz., that the Council should ap- point a Commissioner of Sequestration, with authority to seize goods and chattels of all persons who had or might join the com- mon enemy, and that all property so seized should be sold at public vendue, and the proceeds paid to the Treasurer of the Council of Safety for the purpose of paying the bounties and wages of a regiment. .. . "3 This proposal was adopted immedi- ately. It provided the infant government with funds which would help tide it over during the dark days ahead. Well might one loyalist exclaim, "the Revolution and the formation of the State of Vermont very nearly reduced me to nothing."4


The origins of the impulse towards loyalism, of which the Allens


2. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 108, passim.


3. V. H. S., Collections. I. 384-385.


4. V. H. S., Newbury Manuscripts, Samuel Stevens to (?), Feb. 19, 1799.


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made such good use, were many. Although sincere attachment to King and Country played a part in the decision to turn loyalist, other influences were at work. The exposed situation of Vermont and its proximity to the Province of Quebec, for example, exer- cised a decisive influence over many. "There are on both sides of the Lake," reported Will Gilliland in 1775, "a number of persons who seem to hear of the success of the American arms with pain, and speak of them with Contempt, others there are that are cold and indifferent to either side .... " He recommended to General Philip Schuyler, in command of the American forces in New York, that the Association of the Continental Congress be immediately subscribed by those people, "Especially by those Contiguous to this Lake that we may be purg'd of Rottin sheep, who by carrying on secret correspondence with the Enemy (which they can very easily do) may thereby defeat American measures at least may injure them much and greatly endanger the other Inhabitants on the American side." 5


On the British side, it was anticipated that many Vermonters would actually support them. Burgoyne wrote that he hoped to raise three battalions in Vermont, Skenesborough and Albany.6 The advance of his army up the lake did indeed, in some measure, fulfill his hopes. Many Vermonters, over-awed by the formidable character of his army, went over to the British lines, among them local leaders, including Justus Sherwood and William Marsh. If local histories are to be trusted, a handful of Vermonters actually fought with the British against the rebels at the Battle of Ben- nington. Others, less warlike in temperament, rendered valuable service to Burgoyne by acting as spies or by helping to disarm rebel townsfolk in Vermont as the British forces advanced. Some of these persons repented of their rashness in supporting Burgoyne after he had marched beyond Vermont and surrendered at Sara- toga. When they returned to Vermont, the Council of Safety was surprisingly lenient. Many of them were permitted to remain. One of them was told by the Council that he might stay if he would not seek to regain his property which had been confiscated .? After


5. N. Y. P. L., Schutter Papers. XXXIX, Gilliland to Maj. Samuel Elmore, July 24, 1775. 6. P. A. C., Q, XIII, 282-286.


7. Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, I, 164.


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Vermont had successfully weathered the blows aimed at it by Burgoyne, the Council recommended that loyalists be released on the grounds that the patriots must "consider the weak Capacities of many who have been affrightened into a Submission to General Burgoyne, etc., after which seeing their error confess their fault and are willing to defend their Country's Cause at the Risque of Life & Fortune."8


A second reason for loyalism in Vermont undoubtedly lay in the Allens' rough treatment, for some time previous, of their op- ponents in the Grants. Who can blame someone like the Yorker, Dr. Samuel Adams, for loyalism after he had been hoisted above a tavern in Bennington in 1775 by the Green Mountain Boys, now the leading "patriots"?" The most famous of these Tories was Levi Allen. His loyalism was immediately occasioned by a family quar- rel. According to him, Ethan had promised to pay in hard money for certain lands, but had broken his promise by tendering paper money which Levi would not accept. "The consequence was, in my absence, without delay of Law or Equity, which is hardly mature in the new district," alleged Levi, "he contrived the sure and convenient remedy of confiscation; an excellent institution for a blooming State!"10 .


A third reason for loyalism lay in the inability to reconcile or compromise the interests of conservative Yorkers and radical Yankees in Vermont. Conservative Yorkers, including Samuel Wells and Crean Brush who had represented the Grants in the New York Assembly prior to the Revolution, turned loyalist. They were loyal to pre-revolutionary, royalist New York and remained so to Great Britain. They temporarily disappeared or went under- ground with the outbreak of the Revolution.


In a different category were Yorkers who had benefited by the establishment of New York control in the Grants and who wished to be neutral not only in the quarrel between Vermont and New York but also in that between the colonies and Great Britain. One of these, John Peters, tried to ride out the storm of the Vermont revolution, but failed to do so. He complained years later that he


8. Ibid., I, 196.


9. Ibid., I, 167n.


10. Connecticut Courant, March 30, 1779.


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had been given the alternative of taking up arms against King and Country or quitting Vermont. His great enemy was Jacob Bayley. "I endeavoured to be quiet," he related, "but it would not do. . . . "11


Similar treatment was meted out to Yorkers who warmly em- braced the cause of revolutionary New York against both Britain and Vermont. In particular, the Allens did not believe that one could oppose Vermont without being a loyalist. On more than one occasion, men whose loyalty to the American Revolution was not questioned in New York were either tossed into jail or driven from Vermont. Ethan, especially, was guilty of this practice, after his return in the spring of 1778. In July of that year he took to Albany, as he alleged, "seventeen wicked Tories" to be thrown into jail.12 At the first opportunity, the poor wretches petitioned Governor George Clinton to be immediately released. "Your petitioners," they said, "have never acted unfriendly to the American cause altho' it is alleged or expressed in the Sentence of banishment, that they stand charged with inimical conduct against the United States of America" and they concluded by saying that "the true and real Cause of their severe and unparalleled Treatment of us is owing to your Petitioners acknowledging themselves to be sub- jects of the State of New York, and not recognizing the validity and existence of the State of Vermont. . . . "13




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