USA > Idaho > History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana : 1845-1889 > Part 20
USA > Montana > History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana : 1845-1889 > Part 20
USA > Washington > History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana : 1845-1889 > Part 20
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Informing his officers that they should be com- pelled to fight, Steptoe turned aside to avoid the dangerous pass of the ravine, and coming in about a mile to a small lake, encamped there, but without dar- ing to dismount, the Indians having accompanied them
22 Letter of Steptoe to Gov. McMullin, July 16, 1858, MS .; letter of Lieut Gregg, in Ind. Aff. Rept, 1858, 272.
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STEPTOE'S CAMPAIGN.
all the way at a distance of not more than a hundred yards, using the most insulting words and gestures. No shots were fired, either by the troops or Indians, Steptoe being resolved that the Spokanes should fire the first gun; and indeed, the dragoons had only their small-arms, and were not prepared for fighting Indians. 23
Toward night a number of chiefs rode up to the camp to inquire the occasion of the troops coming into the Spokane country, and why they had cannon with them. Steptoe replied that he was on his way to Colville to learn the causes of the troubles between the miners and Indians in that region. This the Indians professed to him to accept as the true reason, though they asserted to Father Joset that they did not believe it, because the colonel had not taken the direct road to Colville, but had come out of his way to pass through their country-a fact of which Steptoe was himself unconscious, having trusted to Timothy to lead him to Colville.24 But though the chiefs pro- fessed to be satisfied, they refused to furnish canoes to ferry over the troops, and maintained an unyield- ing opposition to their advance into the Spokane country. Finding that he should have to contend against great odds, without being prepared, Steptoe determined upon retreating, and early on the morning of the 17th began his return to the Palouse.
In the mean time the Cœur d'Alenes, who were gathering roots in a camas prairie a few miles distant, had been informed of the position of affairs, and were urged to join the Spokanes, who could not consent to let the troops escape out of their hands so easily. As they were about marching, Steptoe received a visit from Father Joset, who was anxious to explain to him the causes which led to the excitement, and also a slander which the Palouses had invented against himself, that he had furnished the Indians with
23 Steptoe's Letter to Gov. McMullin, MS.
24 Statement of Father Joset, in Mrs Nichols' Ind. Affairs, MS., 7; report of Colonel Steptoe, in Clarke and Wright's Campaign, 17.
·
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INDIAN WARS.
ammunition. It was then agreed that an interview should be had with the principal chiefs; but only the Cœur d'Alene chief Vincent was found ready to meet Steptoe. In the midst of the interview, which was held as they rode along, the chief was called away and firing was commenced by the Palouses, who were dogging the heels of the command. What at first seemed an attack by this small party of Indians only soon became a general battle, in which all were engaged. Colonel Steptoe labored under the disadvan- tage of having to defend a pack-train while moving over a rolling country particularly favorable to Indian war- fare. The column moved, at first, in close order, with the supply train in the middle, guarded by a dragoon company, with a company in the front and rear. At the crossing of a small stream, the Indians closing in to get at the head of the column, Lieutenant Gregg, with one company, was ordered to move forward and occupy a hill which the Indians were trying to gain for that purpose. He had no sooner reached this po- sition than the Indians sought to take possession of one which commanded it, and it became necessary to divide his company to drive them from the new posi- tion.
By this time the action had become general, and the companies were separated, fighting by making short charges, and at a great disadvantage on account of the inferiority of their arms to those used by the Indians. As one of the dragoon companies was en- deavoring to reach the hill held by Gregg's company, the Indians made a charge to get between theni and the hill to surround and cut them off. Seeing the movement and its intention, Lieutenant Gaston, who was not more than a thousand yards off, made a dash with his company, which was met by Gregg's company from the hill, in a triangle, and the Indians suffered the greatest loss of the battle just at the spot where the two companies met, having twelve killed in the charge.25
25 The Indian loss in the battle of Steptoe Butte-called Tehotomimme
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A BLOODY FIGHT.
Among the killed were Jacques Zachary, a brother- in-law of the Cœur d'Alene chief Vincent, and James, another headman. Victor, an influential chief, also of the Cœur d'Alenes, fell mortally wounded. The rage of the Cœur d'Alenes at this loss was terrible, and soon they had avenged themselves. As the troops slowly moved forward, fighting, to reach water, the Indians kept up a constant raking fire, until about 11 o'clock, when Captain Oliver H. P. Taylor and Lieu- tenant William Gaston were killed.26 To these officers had been assigned the difficult duty of flanking the column. Their loss threw the men into confusion, harassed as they were by the steady fire of the enemy, but a few of them gallantly defended the bodies of their officers and brought them off the field under a rain of bullets. 27
It now became apparent that water could not be reached by daylight, and though it was not much past noon, Steptoe was forced to remain in the best po- sition he could obtain on the summit of a hill, on a small inclined plain, where the troops dismounted and picketed their animals. The men were then ordered to lie down flat upon the ground, and do their best to prevent the Indians taking the hill by charges, in which defence they were successful. Toward even-
by the Indians-a place about seven miles from the present town of Colfax, was estimated by the Indians at 9 killed and forty or fifty wounded; but Steptoe in his report mentions that Lieut Gregg had seen 12 dead Indians together at one spot, and that many others were seen to fall. Clarke and Wright's Campaign, 18.
26 Mrs Nichol's Indian Affairs, MS., 9. Taylor was a graduate of West Point of 1846, and only a few weeks previous to his death had brought out his wife and children to the Pacific coast. Gaston was a graduate of 1856, and an officer of great promise. Ind. Aff. Rept, 1858, 274.
27 First Sergeant Wm C. Willams, privates R. P. Kerse and Francis Poisell, were honorably mentioned for this. Williams and another sergeant, Edward Ball, were wounded and missing afterward. They succeeded in eluding the Indians, and reached the Snake River crossing alive. Williams was then killed by the Indians, who permitted Ball to escape and return to Fort Walla Walla. Kip's Army Life, 11. This book of Lieut Lawrence Kip, 3d artillery, is like his Indian Council at Walla Walla in 1855, a small volume containing his personal observations on the operations of the army in the In- dian country of Washington. It embraces a number of subjects-the origin of the war, the inarch from The Dalles, and the various incidents of the cam- paign of Col Wright following the disaster of Steptoe's expedition-very pleasantly written.
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INDIAN WARS.
ing the ammunition, of which they had an insufficient supply, began to give out, and the men were suffering so severely from thirst and fatigue that it was with difficulty the three remaining officers could inspire them to defend themselves.28 Six of their comrades were dead or dying, and eleven others wounded. Many of the men were late recruits, insufficiently drilled, whose courage these reverses had much dimin- ished, if not altogether destroyed.
Nothing remained now but flight. The dead officers were hastily interred; and taking the best horses and a small supply of provisions, the troops crept silently away at ten o'clock that night and hurried toward Snake River, where they arrived on the morning of the 19th. Thence Steptoe re- turned to Fort Walla Walla.
One of the reasons, if not the principal one, assigned by the Cœur d'Alenes for their excitability and pas- sion was that ever since the outbreak in 1855 they had said that no white settlements should be made in their country, nor should there be any roads through it; and they were informed a road was about to be opened from the Missouri to the Columbia by the United States government in spite of their protest.20 They were opposed, also, to troops being sent to Col- ville, as they said that would only open the way for more troops, and again for more, and finally for the occupation of the country.
General Clarke, learning from Father Joset that the Cœur d'Alênes were penitent, offered to treat
28 ' To move from one point to another we had to crawl on our hands and knees, amid the howling of the Indians, the groans of the dying, and the whistling of balls and arrows.' Letter of Lieut Gregg, in Ind. Aff. Rept, 1858, 274.
29 This referred to the wagon-road afterward opened by John Mullan, Ist lient 2d art., in charge of the construction of a military road from Fort Benton to Fort Walla Walla. See Mullan's Military Road Report. The only point on which Steptoe could congratulate himself in his report on his expe- dition was that it had undoubtedly saved the lives of Mullan's whole com- mand, who, had they proceeded into the Spokane country as intended, with- ont being warned of the hostility of the Indians, would have been slaughtered. As it was, they remained at The Dalles. Letter of Wright, in Clarke and Wright's Campaign, 22; Report of the Secretary of War 1858, 351; letter of Steptoe, Id., 350.
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WRIGHT AND GARNETT.
with them on easy conditions, considering their con- duct toward Colonel Steptoe; he sent their priest back to them with passports, which were to conduct their chiefs to Vancouver should they choose to come.
But the Cœur d'Alênes did not choose to come. True, they had professed penitence to their priest, begging him to intercede for them, but as soon as his back was turned on them, they, with the Spokanes and Kalispels, led by the notorious Telxawney, brewed mischief. The Cœur d'Alênes openly denied consent- ing to Father Joset's peace mission, and were incensed that he should meddle with things that did not con- cern him. After this, attacks on miners and others continued.
In June General Clarke held a consultation of offi- cers at Vancouver, colonels Wright and Steptoe be- ing present, when an expedition was determined upon which should not repeat the blunders of the previous one, and Colonel Wright was placed in command. Three companies of artillery were brought from San Francisco, one from Fort Umpqua, and Captain Judah was ordered from Fort Jones, in California, with one company of 4th infantry. The troops in- tended for the expedition were concentrated at Fort Walla Walla, where they were thoroughly drilled in the tactics which they were expected to practise on the field, the artillerymen being instructed in light infantry practice, with the exception of a single com- pany, which practised at artillery drill mounted. No precaution was neglected which could possibly secure discipline in battle.
At the same time that the expedition against the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alênes was preparing, another against the Yakimas was ordered, under the command of Major Garnett, who was to move, on the 15th of August, with 300 troops, northward toward Colville, thus assisting to drive the hostile Indians toward one
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INDIAN WARS.
common centre. Before leaving Fort Walla Walla, on the 6th of August, Wright called a council of the Nez Percés, with whom he made a 'treaty of friend- ship,' binding them to aid the United States in wars with any other tribes, and binding the United States to assist them in the same case, at the cost of the gov- ernment; and to furnish them arms whenever their services were required. The treaty was signed by Wright on the part of the United States, and by twenty-one Nez Percés, among whom were Timothy, Richard, Three Feathers, and Speaking Eagle, but by none of the greater chiefs already known in this his- tory. The treaty was witnessed by six army officers and approved by Clarke.30 A company of thirty Nez Percé volunteers was organized under this arrange- ment, the Indians being dressed in United States uni- form, to flatter their pride as allies, as well as to distinguish them from the hostile Indians. This com- pany was placed under the command of Lieutenant John Mullan, to act as guides and scouts.
On the 7th of August Captain Keyes took his de- parture with a detachment of dragoons for Snake River, where, by the advice of Colonel Steptoe, a fortification was to be erected, at the point selected for a crossing. This was at the junction of the Tu- cannon with the Snake River. It was built in the deep gorge, overhung by cliffs on either side, 260 and 310 feet in height. The fortification was named Fort Taylor, in honor of Captain O. H. P. Taylor, killed in the battle of the 17th of May. The place would have afforded little security against a civilized foe, but was thought safe from Indian attack. A reservation of 640 acres was laid out, and every preparation made for a permanent post, including a ferry, for which a large flat-boat was provided.
80 This treaty was the subject of criticism. Mullan attributed to it the good conduct of the Nez Percés, but particularly as preventing a general coalition of the Indian tribes, 'and a fire in our rear, which if once commenced must end in our total destruction.' Ind. Aff. Rept, 1858, 281.
185
AT FORT TAYLOR.
On the 18th Wright arrived at Fort Taylor, and in a few days the march began. The dragoons num- bered 190, the artillery 400, and the infantry 90. The last were organized as a rifle brigade, and armed with Sharpe's long-range rifles and minié-ball, two im- provements in the implements of war with which the Indians were unacquainted. On the 31st, when the army had arrived at the head waters of Cheranah River, a point almost due north of Fort Taylor, 76 miles from that post, and about twenty south of the Spokane River, the Indians showed themselves in some force on the hills, and exchanged a few shots with the Nez Percés, who were not so disguised by their uniforms as to escape detection had they desired it, which apparently they did not. They also fired the grass, with the intention of making an attack under cover of the smoke, but it failed to burn well. They discharged their guns at the rear-guard, and retreated to the hills again, where they remained. Judging from these indications that the main body of the Indians was not far distant, and wishing to give his troops some rest before battle, after so long a march, Wright ordered camp to be made at a place in the neighborhood of Four Lakes, with the intention of remaining a few days at that place.
But the Indians were too impatient to allow him this respite, and early in the morning of the Ist of September they began to collect on the summit of a hill about two miles distant. As they appeared in considerable force, Wright, with two squadrons of dragoons commanded by Major W. N. Grier, four companies of the 3d artillery, armed with rifle mus- kets, commanded by Major E. D. Keyes, and the rifle battalion of two companies of the 9th infantry commanded by Captain F. T. Dent, one mountain howitzer under command of Lieutenant J. L. White, and the thirty Nez Perces under the command of Lieutenant John Mullan, set out at half-past nine in the forenoon to make a reconnoissance, and drive the
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INDIAN WARS.
enemy from their position, leaving in camp the equi- page and supplies, guarded by one company of artillery, commanded by lieutenants H. G. Gibson and G. B. Dandy, a howitzer manned, and a guard of fifty-four men under Lieutenant H. B. Lyon, the whole com- manded by Captain J. A. Hardie, the field-officer of the day.31
Grier was ordered to advance with his cavalry to the north and east around the base of the hill occu- pied by the Indians, in order to intercept their retreat when the foot-troops should have driven them from the summit. The artillery and rifle battalion, with the Nez Perces, were marched to the right of the hill, where the ascent was more easy, and to push the Ind- ians in the direction of the dragoons. It was not a difficult matter to drive the Indians over the crest of the hill, but once on the other side, they took a stand, and evidently expecting a combat, showed no dispo- sition to avoid it. In fact, they were keeping up a constant firing upon the two squadrons of dragoons, who were awaiting the foot-troops on the other side of the ridge.
On this side was spread out a vast plain, in a beau- tiful and exciting panorama. At the foot of the hill was a lake, and just beyond, three others surrounded by rugged rocks. Between them, and stretching to the north-west as far as the eye could reach, was level ground; in the distance, a dark range of pine- covered mountains. A more desirable battle-field could not have been selected. There was the open plain, and the convenient covert among the pines that bordered the lakes, and in the ravines of the hillside. Mounted on their flectest horses, the Ind- ians, decorated for war, their gaudy trapping glaring in the sun, and singing or shouting their battle-cries, swayed back and forth over a compass of two miles.
31 The entire transportation of Wright's command consisted of about 400 mules, 325 belonging to the quartermaster's department, six to each company, and one to each officer. Only the dragoons were mounted. Kip's Army Life, 44.
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THE BATTLE BEGUN.
Even their horses were painted in contrasting white, crimson, and other colors, while from their bridles depended bead fringes, and woven with their manes and tails were the plumes of eagles. Such was . the spirited spectacle that greeted Colonel Wright and his command on that bright September morning.
Soon his plan of battle was decided upon. The troops were now in possession of the elevated ground, and the Indians held the plain, the ravines, and the pine groves. The dragoons were drawn up on the crest of the hill facing the plain; behind them were two companies of Keyes' artillery battalion acting as infantry, and with the infantry, deployed as skir- inishers, to advance down the hill and drive the Ind- ians from their coverts at the foot of the ridge into the plain. The rifle battalion under Dent, composed of two companies of the 9th infantry, with Winder and Fleming, was ordered to the right to deploy in the pine forest; and the howitzers, under White, sup- ported by a company of artillery under Tyler, was advanced to a lower plateau, in order to be in a posi- tion for effective firing.
The advance began, the infantry moving steadily down the long slope, passing the dragoons, and firing a sharp volley into the Indian ranks at the bottom of the hill. The Indians now experienced a surprise. Instead of seeing the soldiers drop before their mus- kets while their own fire fell harmless, as at the bat- tle of Steptoe Butte, the effect was reversed. The rifles of the infantry struck down the Indians before the troops came within range of their muskets.
This unexpected disadvantage, together with the orderly movement of so large a number of men, ex- ceeding their own force by at least one or two hun- dred,32 caused the Indians to retire, though slowly at
32 Wright, in his report, says there were '400 or 500 mounted warriors,' and also ' large numbers of Indians ' in the pine woods. Mullan's Top. Mem., 19. Kip says the Indians ' outnumbered us,' p. 59 of Army Life, but it is not probable. Wright had over 700 fighting men. Subtracting those left to guard the camp, there would still be a number equal to, if not exceeding, the Indians.
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INDIAN WARS.
first, and many of them to take refuge in the woods, where they were met by the rifle battalion and the howitzers, doing deadly execution.
Continuing to advance, the Indians falling back, the infantry reached the edge of the plain. The dra- goons were in the rear, leading their horses. When they had reached the bottom of the hill they mounted, and charging between the divisions of skirmishers, rushed like a whirlwind upon the Indians, creating a panie, from which they did not recover, but fled in all directions. They were pursued by the dragoons for about a mile, when the latter were obliged to halt, their horses being exhausted. The foot-troops, too, being weary with their long march from Walla Walla, pursued but a short distance before they were recalled. The few Indians who still lingered on the neighboring hilltops soon fled when the howitzers were dis- charged in their direction. By two o'clock the whole army had returned to camp, not a man or a horse having been killed, and only one horse wounded. The Indians lost eighteen or twenty killed and many wounded.33
For three days Wright rested unmolested in camp. On the 5th of September, resuming his march, in about five miles he came upon the Indians collecting in large bodies, apparently with the intention of opposing his progress. They rode along in a line parallel to the troops, augmenting in numbers, and becoming more demonstrative, until on reaching a plain bordered by a wood they were seen to be stationed there awaiting the moment when the attack might be made.
As the column approached, the grass was fired, which being dry at this season of the year, burned with great fierceness, the wind blowing it toward the troops; and at the same time, under cover of the smoke, the Indians spread themselves out in a cres- cent, half enclosing them. Orders were immediately
85 Report of Secretary of War for 1858, 386-90; report of Wright, in Mul- lan's Top. Mem., 19-20; Or. Statesman, Sept. 21, 1858.
189
DEFEAT OF THE FOE.
given to the pack-train to close up, and a strong guard was placed about it. The companies were then deployed on the right and left, and the men, flushed with their recent victory, dashed through the smoke and flames toward the Indians, driving them to the cover of the timber, where they were assailed by shells from the howitzers. As they fled from the havoc of the shells, the foot-soldiers again charged them. This was repeated from cover to cover, for about four miles, and then from rock to rock, as the face of the country changed, until they were driven into a plain, when a cavalry charge was sounded, and the scenes of the battle of Four Lakes were repeated.
But the Indians were obstinate, and gathered in parties in the forest through which the route now led, and on a hill to the right. Again the riflemen and howitzers forced them to give way. This was continued during a progress of fourteen miles. That afternoon the army encamped on the Spokane River, thoroughly worn out, having marched twenty-five miles without water, fighting half of the way. About the same number of Indians appeared to be engaged in this battle that had been in the first. Only one soldier was slightly wounded. The Cœur d' Alênes lost two chiefs, the Spokanes two, and Kamiakin also, who had striven to inspire the Indians with courage, received a blow upon the head from a falling tree-top blown off by a bursting shell. The whole loss of the Indians was unknown, their dead being carried off the field. At the distance of a few miles, they burned one of their villages to prevent the soldiers spoiling it.
The army rested a day at the camp on Spokane River, without being disturbed by the Indians, who appeared in small parties on the opposite bank, and intimated a disposition to hold communication, but did not venture across. But on the following day, while the troops were on the march along the left bank, they reappeared on the right, conversing with
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INDIAN WARS.
the Nez Percés and interpreters, from which commu- nication it was learned that they desired to come with Garry and have a talk with Colonel Wright, who ap- pointed a meeting at the ford two miles above the falls.
Wright encamped at the place appointed for a meeting, and Garry came over soon after. He stated to the colonel the difficulties of his position between the war and peace parties. The war party, greatly in the majority, and numbering his friends and the prin- cipal men of his nation, was incensed with him for being a peace man, and he had either to take up arms against the white men or be killed by his own people. There was no reason to doubt this assertion of Garry's, his previous character being well known. But Wright replied in the tone of a conqueror, telling him he had beaten them in two battles without losing a man or animal, and that he was prepared to beat them as often as they chose to come to battle; he did not come into the country to ask for peace, but to fight. If they were tired of war, and wanted peace, he would give them his terms, which were that they must come with everything that they had, and lay all at his feet-arms, women, children-and trust to his mercy. When they had thus fully surrendered, he would talk about peace. If they did not do this, he would continue to make war upon them that year and the next, and until they were exterminated. With this message to his people, Garry was dismissed.
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