USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 14
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The majority of the delegation, including both Adamses, replied that they had consulted the members of Congress individually, and that it was intended that Massachusetts should follow the charter; but that, as a dispute would be dangerous, it was advisable for the Council to allow the House to participate in making the appointments. This policy was adopted.
James Warren was exceedingly bitter in the matter of the right to select officers. He wrote to John Adams: "The Board contend for the exclusive right, plead the Charter, and assert the prerogative with as much zeal, pride, and hauteur of dominion as if the powers of monarchy were vested in them, and their heirs, by a divine, indefeasible right. This is indeed curious to see a Council of this Province contending for the dirty part, of the Constitution, the pre- rogative of the Governor."
MAJOR GENERAL WARREN (1776)
Warren was also a champion of the most extreme claims for equality with the Continentals. He was a major general of the Massachusetts militia. He was ordered to Rhode
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Island, there to be under the command of a Continental gen- eral. As soon as the immediate danger passed, which it did quickly, he resigned in much wrath. He wrote to John Adams: "I know of nothing to determine an officer's rank but this Commission and the date of it. If we have no right to appoint Major Generals we should not have done it. If we have they ought to have their rank, with whatever troops they are called to serve, or at least the depreciation should have been settled prior to the appointment, and they should have known what proportion of one they were to be, when they came within the splendid orb of a Continental Officer. This by depressing that spirit of military pride which alone can make them important to themselves and others, will soon render them of little consequence and make a standing army necessary." Some months earlier he had written to John Adams that the opinion of the militia "runs very low with our Military Gentry, who have forgot from whence they came, and of what materials they are now some of them half formed." A similar situation arose in the District of Maine during the War of 1812.
The State and the Union each had its pressing wants and it was inevitable that there should be friction between them. A few days after condemning the hauteur of the Continental military officers, Warren complained to Adams of civilian interference. "I could wish the agents you may send here to purchase cloathing or other necessaries for the Army may be instructed not to violate our Laws [presumably those regu- lating prices], assume too great a superiority, or interfere with our Board of War, who are really agents for you with- out commissions or pay, and do business for you in the best manner."
SUPPLYING AMMUNITION (1775 - 1779)
Today soldiers receive their ammunition and arms solely from the government; but in the American Revolution this was not the case. There was still much hunting in the country woods, and the farmers who gathered at the news of Lexing- ton and Concord, brought with them firelock or rifle and car- touch box. When enlisting orders were issued, the men were
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directed to bring their arms and ammunition. The supply was inadequate, especially of powder. The colony was accustomed to keep powder on hand, and shortly before the outbreak of the war the amount had been increased. A pamphlet was issued instructing the people how to extract saltpetre from the earth, and an offer was made to buy all that should be delivered. In November, 1776, more liberal terms were offered. The legis- lature directed a committee to discover if possible a sure and satisfactory method for manufacturing saltpetre. In Decem- ber, John Adams obtained a plan for the erection of a powder mill and sent it to Paul Revere. January 9, 1777, the legisla- ture entered into an agreement with Samuel Phillipps, Jr., of Andover for the erection of a mill and the manufacture of powder for the colony. Bounties for the erection of powder mills having produced no result, the legislature (April 5) ordered colony mills to be built at Sutton and at Stoughton.
It was important that the powder should not only be abun- dant but of proper quality. The legislature realized this, but its efforts met with indifferent success, perhaps because of necessary reliance on amateur manufacturers. A year later General Heath, then in command at Boston, wrote to Wash- ington : "A day or two ago the powder made and belonging to this state was found to be bad." Heath earnestly begged that powder for the continent recently brought into Ports- mouth from France be deposited in Massachusetts as no re- liance could be placed on powder of local manufacture. In surprise and alarm Washington replied: "Yours of the 9th is this moment come to hand. There certainly must be roguery or gross ignorance in your powder-makers, because the powder made in the other states is esteemed better than that imported from Europe."
SMALL ARMS (1775-1781)
Massachusetts gave little atttention to procuring muskets. It offered to purchase them from individuals in order to en- courage the manufacture; but it made few or none itself. In time of need it turned to the continent. Washington wrote to Heath his surprise at Massachusetts's demand for powder : "Sorry I am to observe that nothing now will content that government but the new arms lately arrived, which will be
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greatly wanted for troops that cannot otherwise be provided, when I have abundant reason to believe that no state upon the Continent has it in its power to furnish the articles as Massa- chusetts Bay. Indeed I am informed that arms and military stores are hoarded up in that government which makes every- thing of the kind exceedingly difficult to be had for continental use, and has the appearance of a separate provision."
CANNON (1776-1781)
Massachusetts paid considerable regard to what now would seem a duty of the central government, the casting of cannon. The ordinary cannon of that day were small and made in con- siderable numbers, merchant ships often carrying them as a defense against pirates. Many Massachusetts towns were ex- posed to an attack by the enemy's mounted guns. September 16, 1776, the legislature ordered a committee to erect or pur- chase a furnace for casting large cannon ; and on the same day voted that inasmuch as Preserved Clap claimed to have dis- covered a superior method for boring cannon, if he would satisfy the committee of its superior usefulness he should be paid a compensation proportioned to the value of his inven- tion. A French officer was employed by the legislature to manufacture cannon according to a new method and to teach it to such persons as the legislature might designate. Later, rank and a money bonus were given to a French lieutenant colonel of dragoons who had spent much time in instructing Massachusetts artificers in making a gun-carriage of a new construction.
MILITARY SERVICE OF JOHN ADAMS (1775-1778)
The military history of Massachusetts during the Revolu- tionary War includes the part played by its delegates in Con- gress in relation to military matters. The original motion for "adopting" the army before Boston and appointing a general was made by John Adams and seconded by Samuel Adams. John Adams was by nature a vigorous and open fighter; and he was appropriately put at the head of the Board of War and Ordnance, which was in effect a permanent com- mittee of Congress acting as a limited and strictly supervised
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war office. Somewhat later Adams served on a committee for drawing up articles of war. According to his autobiog- raphy, he did most of the work; but he seems to have made little change in the English articles.
PERIOD OF ENLISTMENT (1775-1778)
One of the most serious questions which Congress had to decide was the period for which soldiers should be enlisted. Washington repeatedly advocated enlistments for the war. But throughout America, and in England too, there was a great jealousy of standing armies. The majority of Massa- chusetts Whigs, probably, regarded annual elections as the great safeguard of their liberties in peace, and were inclined to consider annual enlistments as equally precious in war. John Adams wrote to his wife: "For my part I will vote upon the general principles of a republic for a new election of Gen- eral officers annually." Adams, as a matter of theory, favored enlisting soldiers for the war, but feared that the farmers' sons desired for the army would not bind themselves for so long a period. Admitting that short enlistments would prob- ably mean greater expense and more defeats, he believed that the disadvantage would be partly balanced by escaping the danger and violence of a standing army, and affording to the militia "courage, experience, discipline and hardness." Samuel Adams objected to an enlistment for the war as unprec- edented; but advised Congress to consider lengthening the term of service. A compromise was finally agreed to: sol- diers were allowed to enlist for three years or during the war; and an extra bounty in land, which at the price of wild land was not of great immediate value, was offered for the longer enlistment.
APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS BY CONGRESS (1775-1781)
During the greater part of the war Congress left the choice of company and field officers to the States; but it kept the ap- pointment of generals in its own hands and its selections fre- quently gave much offense in camp. Officers felt their honor wounded if others were promoted over their heads, but mem- bers of Congress were anxious to maintain the supremacy of
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the civil over the military power. The honor for which they contended was that of their States, who demanded generals in some proportion to the number of men furnished.
Much friction was caused by the appointment of foreign officers to commands in the American army. The first non- American officers introduced were Gates and Lee, though they were fellow subjects of Great Britain and intended to take up their permanent residence in the Colonies. John Adams wrote to Gerry that he was distracted by thoughts of their "great experience and confessed abilities" on the one hand, and the "natural prejudices and virtuous attachments of our country- men to their own officers on the other." He at last decided in the Englishmen's favor. Opinion in Congress seems to have been much divided. Some wished to make Lee second in command; Adams declared that Ward had an absolute claim to the second place, but both he and Samuel Adams fought their hardest to win for Lee the dignity of second major general.
FOREIGN OFFICERS
Within a year Congress was obliged to decide whether it would confer commissions on strangers who were foreigners in every sense of the word. It was then not unusual for European officers to enter armies other than their own, and many offered their services to the rebellious colonists. Con- gress was much impressed. The first comers were frequently adventurers destitute of ability and sometimes of character, but they were skillful braggarts and they often brought high- sounding recommendations. The Colonies were woefully lacking in men of experience in regular warfare and Congress felt a provincial deference to persons who had moved in the great world. Serious mistakes were made, the Massachusetts delegates erring with the rest.
One of the earliest applicants to arrive was the Baron de Woedtke, who was believed to have served in Prussian and French armies. He brought flattering certificates and claimed to be a Knight of Malta. On the motion of John Adams he was made a brigadier general, and his trustful sponsor wrote to James Warren that he was a great officer. He proved a great failure. He was of dubious courage and a drunkard.
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His one service to America was speedily to die. Later, cer- tain officers were sent over by Silas Deane, American repre- sentative in France. They were of better quality than Woedt- ke, but Adams greatly exaggerated their value. Knox in a letter to Gerry on military matters complained bitterly of the way in which rank was bestowed. Gerry replied that in ap- pointing generals some regard should be paid to the number of troops furnished by each State. Likewise he asked: "Can any person suppose that a year or two in the service of the United States will qualify an officer as well as ten or twenty years service in the armies of Europe?"
MASSACHUSETTS AND WASHINGTON (1775-1777)
At first Massachusetts leaders were very favorably disposed to Washington. Gerry wrote to the delegates in Congress in 1775, urging his appointment as commander-in-chief. John and Samuel Adams took steps to secure it in May, 1775. Later, Samuel Adams was greatly offended by a sharp com- plaint of the Massachusetts legislature made by Washington in a letter to Joseph Reed, and shown to Adams. When Howe evacuated Boston in 1776, John Adams moved that a gold medal be struck and presented to Washington. Congress adopted the motion and put Adams at the head of the com- mittee to procure the medal. In the spring of 1776, Gates appears to have begun his wooing of New England. John Adams expressed an earnest wish that he and Mifflin be sent to command there, with the rank of major general and briga- dier general respectively.
It has been suggested that the contrast between the capitu- lation of Burgoyne in 1777 and the defeats at Brandywine and Germantown was the main cause of the dissatisfaction with Washington, but the disastrous campaign in and about New York in 1776 produced a very unfavorable effect in Congress.
In February, 1777, a bombastic and ridiculous resolution expressing the intention of Congress to enable Washington to annihilate Howe's army was introduced in Congress. An at- tempt to strike it out was defeated, all the New England states voting for it; and a contemporary account written by a mem- ber of Congress says that in the debate the delegates from
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the eastern States showed a great desire to insult the general.
A speech of John Adams in another debate is thus reported in Benjamin Rush's diary: "I have been distressed to see some members of this house disposed to idolize an image which their own hands have molten. I speak here of the super- stitious veneration that is sometimes paid to Genl Washing- ton. Altho' I honour him for his good qualities yet in this house I feel myself his Superiour. In private life I shall al- ways acknowledge that he is mine."
CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON (1777)
In the spring of 1777, Samuel Adams was earnestly desirous that Washington, when reinforced by militia, should attack the enemy. In his letters he expressed a disapproval of a Fabian campaign and pointed out in the fashionable classic style that Hannibal was defeated by Fabius because he could not obtain reinforcements and supplies from home and so could be worn down by local war.
In the years 1777 and 1778 there was a movement to dis- place Washington by Gates or possibly by Lee; it was known as the Conway Cabal from a foreign officer named Conway whom accident made notorious in the affair. It was charged at the time and later, that the delegates from Massachusetts, especially John and Samuel Adams, were leaders of the move- ment against the commander-in-chief. Both denied the ac- cusation, Samuel Adams declaring that it was a political slan- der spread by Hancock and his friends. While it may be true that neither Adams formed a definite and deliberate pur- pose to remove Washington, their record is not clear in his support. Another Massachusetts delegate, James Lovell, was a bitter critic of Washington and would have seen him super- seded with great pleasure.
RENEWED OPPOSITION TO WASHINGTON (1777-1778)
After Burgoyne's surrender in October, 1777, John Adams wrote his wife: "Congress will appoint a thanksgiving; and one cause of it ought to be that the glory of turning the tide of arms is not immediately due to the Commander-in-chief nor to southern troops. If it had been, idolatry and adulation would have been unbounded : so excessive as to endanger our
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liberties, for what I know. Now, we can allow a certain citizen to be wise, virtuous and good, without thinking him a deity or a saviour."
A little later the movement against Washington became publicly known and most of the participants broke for cover. Nevertheless the anti-Washington faction was strong enough in Congress to appoint Conway major general in 1778, en- tirely against Washington's wish ; and to put Gates at the head of a new Board of War created for its purposes. But it was not able to attack the commander-in-chief openly. January 1, 1778, Samuel Adams wrote to Richard Henry Lee, citing Cicero, on the importance of a general being reputed fortunate, and expressing a fear lest Washington suffer from the defi- ciencies of his officers, and he urged that there be an inquiry into the causes of the failure to gain an important success in the campaign of the past year.
In April, Congress rid itself of Conway. He wrote an impertinent letter requesting President Laurens to make his "demission" acceptable to Congress. Congress by an over- whelming majority accepted his resignation. One of the few objectors was Elbridge Gerry. Conway came to Philadephia to explain that he had not intended to resign, but Congress took no action. In a letter to Gates, Conway complained of the coldness of members but exempted from his censure Sam- uel Adams and Richard Henry Lee.
HALF PAY CONTROVERSY (1777-1780)
When the privates were once enlisted into the Continental service, discipline and the provost marshal were relied on to keep them there. The officers however had a right to resign, at least by custom, and they exercised their privilege to an alarming extent. They were paid directly and indirectly much less than were British officers, who also received half pay for life on retiring from the army. The Americans strongly de- sired a like privilege. In the spring of 1777, Congress dis- cussed the matter at great length and with much vigor. Massachusetts spoke in doubtful tones but her final decision shaped the issue.
Massachusetts had at the time three delegates in Congress, Francis Dana, Elbridge Gerry and James Lovell. Lovell was
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totally opposed to giving any additional compensation to the officers. Gerry's course on this as on other occasions sug- gests the comment made on one of the early governors of Maine. "His ex-Excellency has been a fence man all his life." Dana usually agreed with Gerry. A resolution was offered giving half pay for life to officers serving throughout the war.
An amendment was moved substituting a lump sum; but it was defeated, both Gerry and Dana voting in the negative. Dana made an unsuccessful attempt to base the half pay on the lower pay given in 1775. A motion to refer the proposi- tion to the States, which would have been equivalent to de- feat, was lost, Dana and Gerry voting against it. The original motion was then passed, Gerry and Dana assenting. But the members from four States continued to oppose the bill in private discussions and one of its Massachusetts supporters later changed his mind.
Because of a great desire for harmony, the grant was recon- sidered; and all the States agreed to give half pay for seven years. Though the States were unanimous, the delegates were not. Lovell and Wolcott of Connecticut cast their votes in the negative, and probably many of the affirmative votes were given reluctantly. Yet Washington and officers thought that the grant should have been for life.
HALF PAY QUESTION SETTLED (1780-1783)
Discontent and resignations continued; by the autumn of 1780 the feeling in Congress had become much more favorable to the army, and in October, 1780, Congress gave to officers who should serve throughout the war half pay for life. A like provision was made for the widows and orphans of officers dying in service.
The grant however was but a promise; and as peace ap- proached it seemed that it might prove an empty one. Con- gress was dependent on the States for funds for current use, and they had almost stopped the supply. Under these circum- stances the Massachusetts officers resolved to appeal to their own State. Hence in September, 1782, Colonels Brooks, Rufus Putnam and Hull were sent to Boston with a petition that the State would assume or commute the half pay and provide for other claims. Governor Hancock, to whom Knox had written
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a special appeal, gave the deputies fair words; and Samuel Adams told them that he would favor a liberal commutation.
Feeling in the legislature was divided. The Senate and the seaport members in general favored the proposition, the House, which was filled with members from the country dis- tricts, was said to be opposed, four to one. The farmers were hard pressed financially and feared an increase of taxes. They were very democratic and thought that the officers should support themselves by going to work. A Massachusetts dele- gate in Congress wrote that the subject of half pay would soon be considered by that body, and the letter served as a reason for postponing discussion of the officers' petition.
The Massachusetts officers now determined to appeal to Congress. Officers of the different regiments prepared state- ments of their grievances; then it was decided to ask all the officers of the main army to unite. Another memorial was drawn up, and was taken to Philadelphia by General Mac- Dougal of New York and Lieutenant Colonels Brooks of Massachusetts and Ogden of New Jersey. After conferring with a committee of Congress, Brooks and Ogden returned to camp; MacDougal awaited the decision of Congress. A com- mittee proposed a commutation of six years, half pay in six- per-cent securities. New England and New Jersey voted in the negative and the motion was lost, since nine voters were necessary for an appropriation.
Meanwhile conditions in camp were assuming a serious aspect. There a movement was suggested to quicken the action of Congress by a demonstration by the army. Some officers wished merely for a vigorous remonstrance; others for a coup d'état by the army, with Washington as its leader ; still others looked for something between the two. The full history of the affair probably will never be known.
NEWBURGH ADDRESSES (1783)
March 10, 1783, appeared the first of the famous New- burgh addresses, so-called from the place where the troops were encamped. They were anonymous but are now known to have been written by Major John Armstrong, an aide of General Gates. Armstrong called on the officers to refuse
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service and resist disbandment. Washington, who had re- ceived information of the secret plans of the conspirators, for- bade a meeting of representatives of the officers proposed by Armstrong, but called another on his own authority.
The General himself appeared before the officers, and read a paper begging them not to lessen their dignity and sully their glory, and also part of a letter from a member of Congress. He then withdrew. On motion of Knox, seconded by Rufus Putnam, Washington was most affectionately thanked for his address.
A committee of three, Knox, Brooks and a Captain Howard, were appointed to draw up resolutions. They asserted the patriotism of the officers and their confidence in Congress, but pressed their former requests. The resolutions were passed unanimously, as was one condemning the anonymous address.
EFFECT OF THE NEWBURGH ADDRESSES (1783)
Washington sent the resolutions of the officers to Congress, and urgently advised a compliance with their desires. The seriousness of the crisis affected the staunchest opponent of half pay; and, March 22, 1783, Congress voted the officers a commutation of five years' full pay in cash or six-per-cent securities.
Massachusetts men helped Washington to save the country from disaster in the affair of the Newburgh addresses, the last great crisis of the Revolution. They were also prominent in the transition to peace. William Heath, who as ranking officer of the militia present set the guards round Boston in the evening of April 19, 1775, also superintended the fur- loughing of the main Continental Army and was the last "gen- eral of the Day." Henry Knox was in command of the troops who took possession of New York on its evacuation by the British; and when Washington resigned he became com- mander of the American Army. The force was composed of about one hundred and twenty artillerymen and an infantry regiment about five hundred strong, under Henry Jackson of Massachusetts. They remained in service until the follow- ing June, when Congress reduced the United Stater Army to a single company used to guard the public stores.
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