USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 3
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General Howe was in command of the British forces sent to Charlestown. Howe disposed his troops in two divisions. He himself commanded the attack against the American left, in position at the rail fence. General Pigot commanded the division which attacked the American right in the earthworks. The British artillery was in position to move forward with the assaulting troops. Its fire practically put out of action in short order the light Ameri- can fieldpieces, which had been placed in the gap between the breastworks and the rail fence. But the advance of the British artillery was stopped by the miry ground at the base of the hill.
The attacks of both divisions of the British were typical of the artificial tactics of the day. Following the usual prescribed forms, the Regulars were fully equipped for field service-and this meant that they were actually burdened with knapsacks and provisions for three days! This foolish addition to the stiff and cumbersome uniform of the times was an unnecessary handicap for the British Regu- lars, as they plodded through rough fields and long grass under the burning sun of the hot June day, with painful
14 BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
efforts to keep the stiff alignment of their ranks as they clambered over fences. The British troops were formed in close order, widely extended against the whole length of the American positions. They thus offered the best possible target for their enemies, instead of moving for- ward in column with less exposure. As they advanced against the Colonists, they fired formal volleys, unaimed, and ineffective because their "balls passed over the heads of the Americans." All this would be almost inconceivable in these days, but it is a true description of the British array.
On the part of the Americans, their officers were able to restrain them until the British were within sure range, and thus their fire was delivered in the way that would do the most harm.
These causes produced their inevitable effect. The sudden well aimed volume of fire from the Americans was so surprisingly deadly that the disciplined Regulars could not endure it. Both divisions of British broke and re- treated.
They were soon rallied by their officers and for a second time advanced, but in the same ill judged order, against the American front. As was only natural, the result was the same. Again, at the prescribed distance, the British met such a destructive fire that they gave way and re- treated out of range.
After the British had again been rallied, and with a re- inforcement, General Howe resolved upon a third attack in a different manner. He ordered his troops to discard the cumbersome knapsacks and to move forward in column against the redoubt alone. This was a more dangerous method of attack, and the colonists were no longer able to withstand any assault. Their ammunition was ex- hausted, and, as hardly any of them were equipped with bayonets, the British found little difficulty in carrying the redoubt and driving out the Americans. Most of the losses of the colonists came at this stage, but these losses were not so severe as might have been expected (441 killed and wounded). The Americans were favored in their retreat by the dense cloud of dust from the dry dug up
15
LOSSES OF THE BRITISH
earth. The exhausted British did not pursue beyond Bunker Hill. And the retreat of the Colonists was also protected by the men from the rail fence and by tardy re- inforcements, which General Ward had at last been in- duced to send-too late for the event of the battle.
UNPRECEDENTED LOSSES OF THE BRITISH
These were the essentials of the Battle of Bunker Hill, of which the outstanding feature was the awful loss of the British from musket fire, which had repulsed them until the ammunition of the Colonists had failed. The severity of these successive repulses was glossed over in the British reports, and in the letters sent to England. General Gage's official report of the battle is a curiosity of war literature in its bland euphemistic phrases. The version adopted in British reports and letters merely told of a repulse followed by a rally which carried the works impetuously by the bayonet. This is the tenor of the narrative of the battle in Stedman's contempor- ary British History of the American War. And from this account no one would imagine that a third attack was neces- sary. But the author, a British officer who was actually with the British Army during the Revolution, in his eagerness to praise the gallantry of the British troops, broke away from the conventional version to which he had adhered in his ac- count of the battle. On a following page he forgot the measured phrases, and gave a spontaneous description of the difficulties encountered, so vivid that it stands today as prob- ably the best picture of the British attacks :
"If anything had been wanting to show the bravery and discipline of the British troops, the action at Bunker Hill furnished an ample proof of both. Twice were they stopped, and twice returned to the charge. In the midst of a hot summer day, incumbered with three days provisions, their knapsacks on their backs, which together with cartouche-box, ammunition, and firelock, may be estimated one hundred and twenty-five pounds weight, with a steep hill to ascend, covered with grass reaching to their knees, and in the face of a hot and well-directed fire, they gained a complete vic- tory over three times their own number (for such was the
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BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
British general's estimate) of provincials strongly posted be- hind a breast work, and defended by a redoubt."
The strongest testimony of the effect of the unexpected losses on the British was the foregoing exaggerated estimate of the numbers of the colonists. This report from General Howe reflected the first impression among the British, de- rived from the idea that there must have been great numbers to inflict such great losses. But soon the truth as to the inferior numbers of the Americans became a matter of com- mon knowledge, even in Great Britain. The narrative in the British Annual Register for 1775 stated that the numbers of the Colonists "was not probably so large as it was made in the Gazette account."
The British official return of losses was 1,054. But it is known that this return did not tell the tale, which was softened as much as possible. The History of the British Army has explained that the wounded of one regiment "were accidentally omitted from the official list," and that "these probably num- bered at least 100." Taken altogether it is evident that it was very nearly a case of each American musket putting an enemy out of action. Such a loss was unprecedented, and the moral effect lasted throughout the Revolution. The same British authority has stated: "The combat produced a re- markable effect on the future operations of the war. It shook the nerve of Howe, and showed the British that subjugation of the Colonies would be no child's-play."
There is no mistaking the effect upon the British of this knowledge, that a small force of Americans had proved able to inflict such unprecedented losses. In his report of the action General Gage wrote: "The trials we have had show the rebels are not the despicable rabble too many have supposed."
THE AMERICANS AFTER THE BATTLE
On the side of the Americans there were two circumstances which increased the effect of the battle. In the first attack the British had been annoyed by the shots of the Colonists from the buildings in Charlestown. Howe reported this to Boston, and the British burned the town, by means of in- flammable "carcases" from the Copp's Hill battery and firing parties from the British shipping. This retaliation was
17
THE AMERICANS AFTER THE BATTLE
justified by the usages of warfare: but the burning of the town aroused great indignation throughout the Colonies. It was natural that this act of destruction of homes and belong- ings made a strong appeal to public opinion and intensified the feeling against the British.
The other event which strongly moved the public imagina- tion was the sacrifice of the life of Joseph Warren, who was killed in the retreat from the redoubt. He had been a leader among his countrymen in devotion to the cause of their liber- ties. He was President of the Provincial Congress, and was esteemed and loved by all. The comments at the time made it evident that his noble death had an influence which kept him a leader in the path of liberty, as he had always been when alive.
The whole effect of the battle on the Colonists was to unite them in the conviction that this was war, and that it must be fought out. Nothing could have been more dramatic than the action and its surroundings. It was an arena with thou- sands of spectators, and a scene that imprinted itself on the minds of those who heard its story. Yet it cannot be said that the Colonists appreciated what had been accomplished -the profound impression made upon the British, which was the all-important result of the battle. On the contrary, the prevailing feeling among the Americans was censure for the lack of leadership and support, which had left the detachment at Charlestown exposed to the full force of the British. There was anger at the incompetence and apathy, which had been in evidence everywhere. In fact, many American officers were punished for failing in their duty on June 17. The trouble was not on the field of battle, where all behaved wonderfully well, but a wretched state of affairs elsewhere. One of the verdicts against an officer expressed the true situa- tion by citing "the great confusion that attended that day's transactions."
The History of the British Army has stated that the battle "not only elated the Americans, as was but natural and just, but encouraged them" to over-confidence. However, this must be considered as a British authority reading into the minds of the Americans the strong impression made upon the minds of the British. It did not portray the actual state of mind
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BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
among the Americans, which, on the contrary, reflected gen- eral dissatisfaction.
WASHINGTON IN COMMAND (JULY, 1775)
However, the confused situation, which was responsible for the helplessness throughout the American army on the day of Bunker Hill, was soon a matter of the past. June 15, Congress made George Washington Commander-in-Chief. His journey to Boston was marked by popular demonstra- tions and he was met by a committee of the Provincial Con- gress at Springfield. On July 3 he formally took command of the army.
Washington's general order of July 4, 1775, at once put everything on a new basis: "The Continental Congress hav- ing now taken all the troops of the several colonies which have been raised, or which may hereafter be raised, for the support and defense of the liberties of America, into their pay and service, they are now troops of the United Provinces of North America; and it is to be hoped that all distinctions of colonies will be laid aside, so that one and the same spirit may animate the whole, and the only contest be, who shall render, on this great and trying occasion, the most essential service to the common cause in which we are all engaged." These high ideals remained the guiding influence of George Washington from the beginning to the end of his command of the American Army.
The new Commander-in-Chief left a written record of the military situation he found at Boston. The British had re- tained possession of the Charlestown peninsula, and had built a strong intrenchment on Bunker Hill, "with their sentries ex- tended about one hundred and fifty yards on this side of the narrowest part of the Neck." They had three floating bat- teries in the Mystic and a warship in the Charles upstream from the battery on Copp's Hill. "Upon Roxbury Neck, they are also deeply intrenched and strongly fortified . . The bulk of their army, commanded by General Howe, lies on Bunker's Hill and the remainder on Roxbury Neck, except the light horse, and a few men in the town of Boston."
On the side of the Americans, there had been apprehensions of British activities after the Battle of Bunker Hill. These
19
DIFFICULTIES OF THE BESIEGERS
had been groundless, as, with the exception of skirmishes, there had been no more fighting. Yet the fear of British attacks stimulated the Colonists to work on their intrench- ments about Boston. General Washington described these as follows: "About two hundred rods below the college we have a redoubt, which begins the line; then about sixty rods from that another redoubt, and the lines continued near an hundred rods; then, at Charlestown road, at the foot of Pros- pect Hill another redoubt and strong fortification; then on Prospect Hill is Putnam's Post, a very strong fortification ; then between that and Winter Hill a strong citadel and lines over Charlestown road to Mystic; then in Mrs. Temple's pasture (Ten Hill Farm) a strong redoubt that commands the Mystic River; so that we have a complete line of cir- cumvallation from Charles River to Mystic River. On Rox- bury side the enemy have dug across the Neck and let the water through ; and our people in turn have intrenched across the outer end of the Neck, and are strongly fortified there, and on the hill by the meeting-house."
DIFFICULTIES OF THE BESIEGERS (1775 - 1776)
As has been described, the force of Colonists gathered about Boston was not in any sense an organized army. Gen- eral Washington wrote: "I found a mixed multitude of people here, under very little discipline, order, or govern- ment." It was his impossible task to attempt to organize this "multitude" into an army. It was necessary to remodel the whole mass, and Washington's effort was one constant struggle against jealousies, quarrels, avarice for private gain, in addition to the general disorder and laxity of a people un- used to being ruled or controlled. These adverse elements were always obstacles with which Washington was forced to contend throughout his command. It was only his extra- ordinary personality and genius that accomplished results against such great difficulties.
There can be no question of the effect of Washington's greatness of character upon all with whom he came in con- tact. The testimony to this is universal; and even these ill cemented forces felt from the first that here was a Com- mander-in-Chief in very fact. There was no longer any ques-
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BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
tion of divided command. Instead of the separate groups of Colonists, the army was organized in three grand divisions of two brigades each. General Ward commanded the right wing at Roxbury and its vicinity; General Putnam in Cam- bridge was in command of the center. General Lee commanded the left wing, of which the main positions were Prospect Hill, held by Brigadier General Greene, and Winter Hill, under Brigadier General Sullivan. Washington's pres- ence pervaded the whole array, and he was indefatigable in strengthening the intrenchments of the besiegers.
In spite of all his exertions, there was still the strange anomaly of a besieging army that was unable to carry on be- sieging operations. There was not yet even a pretense of siege artillery. Worse than this, early in August, Washington was obliged to write to Congress: "Our situation, in the article of powder, is much more alarming than I had the most dis- tant idea of." In fact, the besieging American General was not only unable to attack his enemy, but he was in constant anxiety lest his ill-equipped army should be attacked by the British.
CONDITIONS IN BOSTON (JULY - OCTOBER, 1775)
General Gage did not venture any such attack. On the contrary, he was so discouraged that he had despaired of re- sults in Massachusetts. At the last of July he was already urging the Ministry to abandon efforts in New England and transfer operations to New York. Far from any attempts against the weakness of the Americans, the British were only apprehensive of American attacks. Even after being rein- forced there was no thought in General Gage's mind of attack- ing the Americans.
As was natural, many of the inhabitants had left Boston. In the last week of July the inhabitants were stated at 6,753, the troops, with their dependents, women, and children, at 13,600. The British showed but little enterprise in procuring fresh provisions, and there was sickness in consequence of too much salted food. In October, General Gage was recalled, and General Howe assumed command. Howe was as pessi- mistic as his predecessor, and did not delay in urging the Ministry to abandon Boston, although he felt assured that
21
WASHINGTON'S FLEET
the town "would be in no danger from the enemy during the winter." In this half-hearted spirit the British prepared only to hold Boston, against besiegers who had no means of attack.
BLOCKADE THROUGH THE WINTER (1775-1776)
These attendant circumstances, the pessimism of the Brit- ish and the lack of strength of the Americans, had decreed that the ensuing winter was to see merely a blockade of Bos- ton. Congress had grown impatient for action, and a delega- tion was sent to Washington's camp. They found that the American commander, although eager for an offensive, lacked all means of carrying out his desires; and it was evident there was no chance for an active siege. All that was possible for the zealous Washington was to strengthen the American posi- tions, in constant apprehension that Howe would find out the weakness of the Americans. Instead of being able to fight his enemy, Washington was compelled to fight against deser- tion, which threatened to disperse his army; and it was not until December that he could write that "things wear a better complexion here."
WASHINGTON'S FLEET (1775 -1776)
At the end of the summer of 1775, Congress was still undecided as to the expediency of fitting out armed ships. However, as all the British supplies were brought by sea, Washington soon saw the importance of cutting off these sup- plies. For this purpose he resolved to create a force of armed ships, and he accomplished this in a novel and ingenious way, which was typical of the resourcefulness of Washington. He actually gave Army commissions to the commanders of ships and put on board detachments from the American Army as crews.
This extraordinary process for procuring a naval personnel would have been impossible in any other army. But Wash- ington had found in his own army a regiment which was made up of trained sailors. This was the regiment of Colonel John Glover of Marblehead, which was well called "amphib- ious." With this element to draw upon, Washington fitted out his armed ships, manned, as he himself wrote, by "soldiers who have been bred to the sea."
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BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
The results of this novel method are set forth in detail in a later chapter of this volume. The first of this fleet was the schooner Hannah, commanded by Captain Nicholson Brough- ton of Marblehead and manned by a detachment from Colonel Glover's regiment. The status of this vessel was fixed beyond any question, by Washington's orders to Captain Broughton (September 2, 1775) as "fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunitions, and provisions, at the Continental expense." This was altogether different from anything that had hitherto happened in the Revolution. Vessels had been armed against the British by authorization from a Colony; this was the first warship regularly commissioned by the authority derived from the United Colonies of America, and given a definite mission against the enemy.
Moreover, the sequence of events made this the actual be- ginning of the United States Navy: Washington kept on and commissioned other warships in the same way. Congress was aroused, and, on October 5, 1775, instructed Washington to fit out armed vessels. In addition, a committee of Congress was appointed, called the "Naval Committee," consisting of John Adams, John Langdon, and Silas Deane; and there was such a rapid march of events that, in February, 1776, it was a matter of record that Congress provided an increase of "the pay of Joseph Reed, Esq., Secretary to General Washington, on account of the extraordinary services attending the office by reason of the direction of the Navy Department." From the foregoing it is evident that this project of Washington developed into a real naval organization for the United Colonies.
This little fleet was of great value throughout the siege of Boston. Its armed ships captured over thirty prizes, and thus did much to increase the hardships of the British Army in Boston. The schooner Lee, commanded by Captain John Manley of Marblehead, was the most successful of these ves- sels. His ability won the approval of Washington, who made him commodore of his fleet, January 1, 1776. The British showed little energy in protecting their supply ships, by means of their naval forces, against the depredations of these weak enemies. In November, 1775, the Lec actually was al- lowed to capture the Nancy, a large brigantine loaded with
23
OCCUPATION OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS
ordnance supplies for the British Army in Boston. This was the most important prize of the siege, and the capture was hailed with rejoicings throughout the camp.
A SIEGE TRAIN AT LAST SUPPLIED (1776)
These accessions, and all Washington's exertions, did not give him the necessary strength in ordnance to press the siege. And thus the winter passed, with the British inactive, and the eager Washington too weak to undertake any real attacks against the British garrison. At last this lack of ordnance was remedied by the extraordinary enterprise of General Knox, who brought down from Ticonderoga and Crown Point a train of heavy ordnance. These were pieces captured from the British when the British forts were taken by the Ameri- cans. It was an accomplishment worthy of all praise, for Knox overcame difficulties that seemed prohibitive, over trails that could not be called roads, and rendered almost impassable by snow and ice.
The success of this undertaking brought to Washington's army over fifty heavy cannon, mortars, and howitzers. A supply of shot had been procured from the King's store house in New York. The ordnance captured from the Nancy eked out this supply, and the Americans were thus able to increase their store of powder. Consequently, in February, 1776, Washington possessed the strength of artillery he needed to take the offensive.
OCCUPATION OF DORCHESTER HEIGHTS (MARCH, 1776)
There was no doubt in the mind of Washington as to the choice of the best move against the British in Boston. In fact, he had decided in advance that the occupation of Dor- chester Heights would be undertaken as soon as the Americans were well enough supplied with munitions. Washington did not delay in using his new strength to carry out this project; but it must be understood that this occupation of Dorchester Heights was altogether different from the rash occupation of the Charlestown heights on the night of June 16, 1775.
This time, in contrast to the unsound plan of sending the isolated American force to the position on the Charlestown
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BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
peninsula, there were well devised and well coordinated plans for a general action against the British. On the night of March 4, 1776, Washington sent an American force of 2,000, under General Thomas, to take position and intrench on Dor- chester Heights. Not only on the morning of March 5 was General Thomas already in an intrenched position and well supplied, but he was also reinforced on that day by an addi- tional 2,000 troops. Moreover, 4,000 chosen American troops were held prepared to make an attack from Cambridge upon the British, under the cover of floating batteries, and with the cooperation of the American troops from Roxbury.
This design had been a well kept secret, and its execution had been covered by severe cannonades from the American positions for three days, to divert the attention of the British. As a result, the movement of the Americans to Dorchester Heights was not discovered. For the British, the revelation of the American works was as much of a surprise as had been the sudden apparition on the heights of Charlestown in the morning of June 17, 1775. Howe wrote: "It must have been the employment of at least 12,000 men."
THE DECISIVE RESULT (MARCH, 1776)
The measures undertaken by Howe against these works can only be called half-way and half-hearted. Instead of any adequate preparation to cope with the situation, 2,400 British troops under Lord Percy were put on board transports to attack the intrenched Americans. The idea can now be dis- missed, as a military impossibility, that this number of Brit- ish troops would have been able to accomplish anything against the strongly posted force of Thomas on Dorchester Heights. The question as to whether the British might have attempted an assault was never put to the test, as there was a storm with strong winds and a high surf, which kept Lord Percy's troops in their transports.
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