USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 45
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Secretary of War Monroe, who followed Armstrong in 1814 (Sept. 27), believed that a regular army of one hundred thousand men was essential to success. Since no such numbers could be furnished by voluntary enlistments, he proposed a draft or generous bounties; but Congress would do nothing. Senator Varnum, of Massachusetts, was a strong supporter of the war and was the highest authority in the Senate on matters pertaining to the militia. He was opposed to drafting men from the militia for the Regular Army, which was one of the proposals. Finally, in January, 1815, Congress authorized the President to receive into the national service a certain proportion of State troops, not exceeding forty thousand in all. This legislation was favored by the Federal- ists because it secured national support for State troops. Meanwhile the Massachusetts Legislature had voted to raise an army of ten thousand men for defense.
The time was approaching when defensive measures must be adopted, since by a British proclamation of April 25, 1814, the coast of New England was included in the blockade, and invasion of Massachusetts territory followed. The exorbi- tance of the terms of peace offered by England at this time was too much even for Federalists. As affecting the interests of Massachusetts in particular, England proposed to exclude Americans from the fisheries altogether and to take all of Maine east of the Penobscot.
The militia could rarely be depended upon and were very prone to give way in a panic at critical moments when their services were most needed. Under exceptionally good officers they occasionally behaved well. General Jacob Brown seemed to have the faculty of holding them steady in the face of the enemy, especially on the occasion of the sortie at Fort Erie.
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At various times in later years, when their own officers have been well trained, militiamen have stood the test.
The militia of Massachusetts were the best equipped of all and were well armed and well drilled, but had not been tested in battle. When it became necessary in 1814 to prepare for defense, a large force was organized. In 1913, the State pub- lished the records of the militia in the War of 1812 by regiments, battalions, and companies, with presumably com- plete rolls. From a rough, though conservative, estimate, allowing for repetition and reenlistment, it would appear that probably thirty-five thousand or more men were enrolled.
The number under arms and in active service at any one time can be only conjectured. They were recruited in every part of the State, much more than half of them in Maine; but most of the service was performed, as would be supposed, in the seacoast towns, from New Bedford to Eastport. Some of the troops were designated as artillery and some of the Maine troops as cavalry, but no doubt most of them were infantry, though used for manning fortifications. Most of the companies were small, some of them very small, and the terms of enlistment were very brief, seldom more than two months and often much shorter. Among these rolls a few are dated in 1813, but the great majority in 1814, nearly all after the first of June. . With few exceptions, the enlistments expired not later than the end of November.
THE BRITISH INVASION (1814)
During 1813, British men-of-war appeared off the New England coast in a threatening manner from time to time, but did not begin their depredations until the next year. In June, 1814, two British vessels at anchor in Buzzard's Bay sent six boats with two hundred men on a marauding expedition to Wareham, where shipping and buildings were destroyed to the value of forty thousand dollars. New Bedford and Fair Haven were blockaded and an attack on these places was planned, but on a false alarm the British withdrew. At another time Falmouth was bombarded for two hours and considerable damage was inflicted on the town. Colonel David Nye called out the militia, but the enemy did not land. Attacks . were made at Scituate and Orleans, and at the latter place the
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THE BRITISH INVASION
raiders came in contact with the militia. A sharp skirmish followed, in which the militia had rather the best of it. About the middle of June, a British seventy-four sent a boat expedi- tion up the Saco River, in Maine, which destroyed much property.
In September, another boat party attacked a battery at Sandy Bay, Gloucester (now Rockport). On this occasion, several small companies of militia were engaged with the enemy; and the British, favored by fog, were able to take some prisoners from the company of Captain Benjamin Haskell. Half of these were recaptured, however, when one of the British boats swamped; and many of their men in turn fell into the hands of the Americans.
The Massachusetts authorities were at last aroused to the necessity of defensive measures, and a public war meeting was held in Boston, August 30, 1814. Many forts and batteries along shore were repaired and strengthened, and new ones built. Fort Strong, an important work at East Boston, was soon begun. Hundreds of volunteers from all classes of people worked with pick and shovel, and the fort was finished late in October. A fort was built on Dorchester Heights, and the harbor defenses were strengthened. Fort Pickering at Salem, Fort Sewall at Marblehead, and others at Newburyport, Port- land, and various other seaport towns were put in a state of defense.
An attack on Boston was fully expected, especially after the bombardment of Stonington, Connecticut, by the British early in August. It was thought that the moral effect of capturing the State capital and largest town in New England would induce the enemy to make the attempt. Therefore, on September 6, four thousand militia were ordered to Boston, and all the militia in the State were held in readiness for the defense of the town if necessary. About five thousand men were kept on duty in Boston and its defenses until the middle of November. Preparations were made to destroy the bridges at short notice, in case of attack by land ; also to sink obstruc- tions in the harbor channel, if the enemy should pass the forts.
. The chief effort of the British was directed against Maine. It was their intention to subdue the eastern half of Maine and annex it to Canada or New Brunswick. With a small squadron, Admiral Hardy sailed from Halifax July 5, 1814,
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR OF 1812
and entered Passamaquoddy Bay six days later. He anchored off Eastport, where Fort Sullivan was held by Major Perley Putnam, of Salem, with fifty men and six guns. The town was promptly surrendered, the British took possession of the shores of the bay, and the people were forced to take the oath of allegiance to the king. Putnam wished to resist, but was overruled. Leaving eight hundred men to hold Eastport, Hardy sailed away.
Another and much larger fleet, consisting of three seventy- fours, two frigates, two sloops-of-war, and ten transports, sailed from Halifax, August 26, under the command of Rear Admiral Griffith, with four thousand troops. Lieutenant General Sherbrooke, Governor of Nova Scotia, commanded the expedition. It was his intention first to take Machias, but having learned that the U. S. frigate Adams was in the Penob- scot River, it was decided to occupy the bay and blockade the river. The Adams, under the command of Captain Charles Morris, had recently arrived in Penobscot Bay from a success- ful cruise. Unluckily, she struck on a rock, and it was neces- sary to heave her down for repairs. She was accordingly taken up the river to Hampden, a few miles below Bangor. Having learned of the proximity of the British fleet, Morris determined to defend his ship as long as he could and then destroy rather than surrender her. He landed his guns at a wharf, dragged nine 18-pounder carronades up a steep bank and placed them in battery there, and mounted the rest of his guns on the wharf. He notified Brigadier General John Blake of the situation; and Blake called out the militia under his command, the Tenth Massachusetts Division. He consulted with Captain Morris, who expressed little confidence in the militia.
Meanwhile the enemy's fleet entered the bay and appeared off Castine, September 1. A half-moon redoubt, Fort Porter, was held by Lieutenant Lewis, United States Army, with forty regular soldiers. The fort was armed with four 24- pounders and two field pieces. The British demanded the surrender of the fort. Lewis gave them one volley; then spiked the heavy guns, and fled up the river with his men and field pieces. General Sherbrooke thereupon landed six hun- dred men and took possession of Castine, which controlled Penobscot Bay. Belfast was taken a little later. From Cas-
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tine a detachment was sent up the river in pursuit of the Adams, and landed at Frankfort, about ten miles below Hampden.
General Blake posted his force of six hundred raw militia in a good position at Hampden, where he was joined by Lieu- tenant Lewis and his forty regulars and two field pieces. The militia had an 18-pounder carronade and four light guns. Captain Morris advised attacking the enemy at their landing- place, but was overruled. He had two hundred seamen and marines, and several guns at the wharf for the defense of the Adams. On the morning of September 3, which was foggy, the British moved cautiously towards Hampden. Although hidden by fog, Blake opened on them with all his guns, and then waited for their nearer approach before ordering musket fire. The suspense was too much for the militia, who broke and fled in a panic when the enemy came up on the run. Blake and his officers were left standing alone.
Morris saw the danger of his position, and ordered his guns in the battery to be spiked and his men to retreat. The Adams was set on fire; the captain spiked his guns on the wharf and retreated with his men. He joined Blake and the other officers, and all retreated to Bangor. General Blake was captured and obliged to give his parole for the duration of the war. Blake was much blamed for his conduct of affairs, but did the best he could under the circumstances ; he was merely incompetent. Captain Morris escaped across country to Portland. The enemy took possession of Hampden and Bangor, but promised to respect private property. They made no attempt to protect it, however. Plunder was freely indulged in and much prop- erty destroyed. Leaving a garrison at Castine, the main body of the British left the bay, took Machias, and then returned to Halifax.
The inhabitants of eastern Maine were obliged to take the oath of allegiance and of neutrality. They submitted quietly and tamely. Castine was strongly fortified. But the enemy's triumph was of short duration. The treaty of peace, which soon followed, restored eastern Maine to the United States. The town was evacuated, and the British fleet sailed out of Penobscot Bay, April 25, 1815, to the great relief and joy of the people.
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR OF 1812
PRIVATEERING (1812 - 1814)
There were not nearly so many American privateers in the War of 1812 as in the Revolution. The number given by Emmons is 529, of which 159 were from Massachusetts, 30 being from Boston and 40 from Salem. Of these Massachu- setts vessels 9 were ships, 32 brigs and brigantines, and 96 were schooners, the others being small vessels and boats. Cap- tain Coggeshall, himself a privateersman, wrote a book containing a list of only 250 for the whole country, 87 of them hailing from Massachusetts. Privateering was opposed by the strict Federalists, especially in New Bedford.
When war broke out, many merchant vessels and seamen, having put to sea to elude the embargo, were in foreign waters and ports, where they were laid up during hostilities. These ships and crews, therefore, were not available for privateering. On the other hand, those homeward bound merchantmen which escaped British cruisers and reached port early in the war were dismantled and laid up, if not suitable for conversion into privateers, and their crews furnished recruits for this peculiar service.
At the outset there were in Atlantic ports a few fast-sailing brigs and schooners suitable for the purpose, which were rapidly fitted out and became the first privateers to get to sea. Pilot boats also were used in the beginning. Many of them carried one large gun in the middle of the deck, commonly called "Long Tom," in addition to their ordinary battery. There was a crew of fifty or sixty men, and plenty of muskets, cutlasses, and boarding pikes. They made short cruises along the coast of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and in the West Indies. They were often successful and took many prizes.
Later on, vessels in large numbers were built for the service and great proficiency was developed in turning them out in remarkably short time. The places of those captured were therefore rapidly filled. The schooner was a favorite rig, and brigs were also very common. They were fast sailers as a rule, some of them remarkably so. The ship America, a Salem merchantman built in 1803 and converted into a privateer, had a record of thirteen knots with all her guns and stores on board. American privateers made many remarkable escapes from British cruisers, and the English were forced to concede
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the Americans' superiority in building, rigging, and sailing small vessels.
Because of concentration of the British blockading fleet on the American coast, the privateers cruised in foreign and distant seas after the early months of the war. They were particularly active in the last year of hostilities. They suc- ceeded in running the blockade and soon spread over the oceans, penetrating as far as the China seas. Until then, England's East India and China trade remained safe from all enemies. Now the Rambler, the Hyder Ali, and the Jacob Jones, of Boston, sold their prize goods in Canton and other oriental ports. The Americans infested the English Channel and adjacent waters and blockaded British ports. It was unsafe for merchantmen to cross from England to Ireland. Insurance rates rose to great heights. Privateers cut vessels out of convoys in sight of escorting warships, and the British navy seemed powerless to afford adequate protection. Hence a great outcry on the part of merchants and the press. The Admiralty made what excuses they could, and British naval officers suffered the extreme of mortification at their failures to catch the privateers and at their great losses; in some instances, they made bungling and unsuccessful attempts at boarding and boat attacks.
Estimates of the number of prizes taken by American privateers during the war range from 1300 to 1600. As might be supposed, the Navy made fewer captures than the privateers, which were so much more numerous; although ship for ship the naval cruisers took the larger number. A large proportion of the prizes, however, were recaptured, because the desire of the privateersmen for prize money induced them to risk attempting to get their prizes into port. American privateers in the War of 1812 were probably the most suc- cessful commerce destroyers in nautical history, yet still more injury would have been done the enemy if a larger number of the captured vessels had been destroyed.
Notwithstanding the great success of these enterprises in the aggregate, many of the cruises were unsuccessful. Privateer- ing had its drawbacks. It took great numbers to man the private ships, which interfered seriously with recruiting for the Navy. It would perhaps have been better if the National Government had fitted out forty or fifty small vessels for the
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same sort of work, and had issued no letters of marque. But that would have been contrary to the spirit of the age and the experience of a century.
NOTED PRIVATEERS
It may not be out of place to take a closer view of two or three of the Massachusetts privateers. The ship America, of Salem, was a vessel of 473 tons, 114 feet long, with 30 feet breadth of beam. She had been built for the merchant service in 1803, and was one of the fastest ships of her time. In preparation for her warlike service, her upper deck had been removed, her sides fortified with oak, and her yards and royalmasts lengthened. She carried twenty guns and a hundred and fifty men. She made five cruises in all, and her favorite cruising ground was from the English Channel to the latitude of the Canaries. On the first cruise she was com- manded by Captain Joseph Ropes, a son of Captain David Ropes, a noted Revolutionary privateersman. During the war she took 41 prizes, 27 of which reached port safely and 6 were recaptured; the others were destroyed. The net profits of her cruising amounted to $1,100,000, of which her officers and crew took more than half a million as their shares. She fell in with several armed vessels first and last, and fought a number of engagements.
The Salem brig Grand Turk, of 310 tons, 18 guns, and 150 men, was fast and a successful prize taker. Two British frigates were sent out expressly to capture her, but she escaped by skillful seamanship after a long chase. Another Salem brig, the Montgomery, of 165 tons, 18 guns, and 100 men, had a desperate battle with a large English packet brig transporting troops. After exchanging many broadsides the brigs came together alongside, the Englishman's anchor catching in one of the Montgomery's ports. A fire of musketry ensued between the American crew and platoons of soldiers on the packet. This continued for fifty minutes, when the Mont- gomery filled her fore-topsail and managed to break away, with four of her crew killed and twelve wounded. Both ves- sels, apparently, were glad to separate. Great numbers of other privateers had similar or still more interesting experi-
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ences. It was a picturesque and romantic form of adventure and belongs to an age that has passed.
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY (1812 - 1814)
In spite of blockades and embargoes, the American merchant marine was not wholly unoccupied during the war and mer- chantmen sailed the seas in considerable numbers. Probably the greater part of the commerce they engaged in was trading with the enemy. This shameful pursuit was followed by the merchants and shipowners of every seaboard State, and Massachusetts doubtless took her full share in it. Distance alone prevented the farmers of the State from participating in the trade across the Canadian border already mentioned.
In 1812 the war in Spain and Portugal was still going on, and the British troops in the Peninsula depended on America for food, which had long been supplied by enterprising American merchantmen. After war with the United States began, the trade continued. It was carried on under licenses issued to American ships by the British Admiralty in large numbers. These licenses were openly bought and sold by brokers in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston and often brought high prices. They passed ships through the blockade and exempted them from capture by British cruisers on the high seas. Trade with Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the British West Indies was also carried on under licenses issued by British admirals and governors. The manufactures of England were imported in large quantities through these channels. The British blockading fleet and the squadrons occupying Chesapeake Bay and other American waters were supplied with food and other necessaries by Americans who were willing to engage in this trade.
The bitter opposition to the war on the part of many people, not only in New England but in other States, no doubt made this commerce appear less unjustifiable. In a way, it acted as a sort of safety valve and perhaps had an influence in pre- venting New England from going to extremes in the direction of disunion. President Madison wished to stop this business by an embargo, but did not succeed in getting Congress to pass a bill until December, 1813. The embargo did not stop trading with the enemy-vessels still managed to elude the
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authorities and get to sea; but it made it more expensive. The Embargo Act was repealed in April, 1814.
GENERAL CONDITIONS (1811 - 1815)
In 1811 the Republican party was strong enough in Massa- chusetts to reelect Elbridge Gerry governor, to dominate both houses of the State legislature, and to elect Joseph B. Varnum to the United States Senate. This power was soon lost, how- ever, and the Federalists had full control during and for a time after the war. The arguments of the peace party were plausible and must have had a strong influence on public opinion during the exciting period of the war. This is shown in the proceedings of the State legislature and of the town meetings. Undoubtedly, however, the mass of the common people, especially in the larger towns, though often misled and confused by the issues, were loyal and patriotic at heart. After it was all over, perhaps many of them realized that there was little reason for pride in the stand their State had taken.
As to economic conditions, Massachusetts was prosperous during the war. Before it, interference with ocean commerce by embargoes and other hindrances had begun to turn men's thoughts to manufacturing. This continued to increase during the war, although injured by the illicit importation of British goods just alluded to. Manufactured goods were sent south in large quantities and brought much specie into the State, for Southerners could not exchange their goods, which were too bulky for transportation by land. The Massachusetts farmers also prospered during this period.
This happy situation, however, was not appreciated by the people. They were in ill humor and discontented. Their gloomy frame of mind found expression in political action; and just about at the end of the war the Massachusetts legis- lature took the first action which led to a convention of the New England States for the purpose of discussing their grievances and seeking remedies.
The conclusion of peace was followed by reaction, by a subsidence of favorable economic conditions and a general decline. Shipping and manufacturing both suffered, at least temporarily. There was lack of employment, a great exodus of people from the State to the West, and the rate of increase
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
of population fell below normal. This state of things for a time prevented the full enjoyment and hearty participation of the Massachusetts people in the Era of Good Feeling, which followed the War of 1812.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADAMS, HENRY .- History of the United States from 1801 to 1817 (9 vols., N. Y., Scribners, 1891-1901)-Volumes VI, VII, VIII, and IX make up perhaps the best account of the War of 1812 that has been written.
BABCOCK, KENDRIC CHARLES .- The Rise of American Nationality (N. Y., Harper, 1906)-Very useful for events and conditions preceding and during the war.
BOWEN, ABEL .- The Naval Monument, Containing Official and Other Ac- counts of all the Battles Fought during the late War; and an Account of the War with Algiers. To which is Annexed a naval Register (Boston, Clark, 1830).
BRANNAN, JOHN, compiler .- Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States, during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15. With some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of that Period (Washington, 1823).
CHANNING, EDWARD .- A History of the United States (6 vols., N. Y., Macmillan, 1919-1925)-The best known recent general history. CHANNING, EDWARD .-- The Jeffersonian System (N. Y., Harper, 1906).
COGGESHALL, GEORGE .- History of the American Privateers and Letters-of- marque, during our War with England in the Years 1812, '13 and '14. Interspersed with several Naval Battles between American and British Ships-of-war (Privately printed, N. Y., 1861).
COOPER, JAMES FENIMORE .- History of the Navy of the United States of America. Continued to 1856. From the Author's Manuscripts and other Authentic Sources (N. Y., Putnam, 1856).
EMMONS, GEORGE FOSTER .- The Navy of the United States, from the Commencement, 1775-1853; with a brief History of each Vessel's Service and Fate. To Which is Added a List of Private Armed Vessels, Fitted out under the American Flag (Washington, Gideon, 1853).
FORCE, PETER .- American Archives (Fourth Series, 6 vols .; Fifth Series, 3 vols .; Washington, 1837-1858)-Authentic reports and documents concerning the English colonies in North America 1774-1776.
HART, ALBERT BUSHNELL .- Formation of the Union, 1750-1829 (N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1897)-An excellent brief summary.
INGERSOLL, CHARLES JARED .- Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States and Great Britain (2 vols., Phila., Lea and Blan- chard, 1845-1849)-Treats of events of 1812-1814.
INGERSOLL, CHARLES JARED .- History of the Second War between the United States of America and Great Britain. Second Series (2 vols., Phila., Lippincott, Grambo, 1852)-Embraces the events of 1814 and 1815. The author was a Republican Congressman during the war and gives the point of view of the war party.
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