USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 36
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Subsequently another concession to the Nationalists, which apparently originated with Gerry, was incorporated in the "Great Compromise," namely, that each State should be rep- resented by two Senators and that each Senator should have a separate vote. This made it somewhat less unpalatable to the larger States than in its original form, but it was still far from satisfactory. In short, the "Great Compromise" was no compromise at all, but a triumph for the Confederates and small-state Federalists, and a crushing defeat for those who had hitherto led the Convention.
On the morning of July 17 the opponents of the "Great Compromise" met before the opening of the Convention for the purpose, according to Madison's notes, "of consulting on
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the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the vote in favor of an equal representation in the second branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point." Some of them despaired of any useful result from the labors of the Convention and wished to quit, as the New York Con- federates had already done; and try to form a more perfect Union composed in the first instance of the larger States and such smaller States as should care to join them. Others saw no prospect of reconstructing the Union by that method with- out war, and preferred to stick to the Convention. It is likely that Washington's influence was thrown in favor of the latter policy. Some at least of the younger Nationalists fa- vored the more desperate plan. But no course of action could be agreed upon. So the Nationalists and their allies among the Federalists submitted, and the crisis was passed.
The division of opinion in the Massachusetts delegation, which contributed heavily to the defeat of the Nationalists, compelled its members to justify themselves. Gerry "was utterly against a partial confederacy" and advocated the com- promise as the lesser of two evils. Strong seized the occasion to make his principal speech in the Convention. "If no ac- commodation takes place," he said, according to Madison's notes, "the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the principal States may form and recommend a scheme of gov- ernment. But will the small States in that case ever accede to it? Is it probable that the large States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and ratify it?" He thought the small States had made a considerable concession in the matter of money bills, and that the compromise as a whole should be adopted. King, on the other hand, was decidedly of a dif- ferent opinion. He preferred doing nothing, to giving the small States an equal voice in the Senate. "It would be better to submit to a little more confusion and convulsion than to submit to such an evil." Gorham thought a "rupture of the Union would be an event unhappy for all," but that "the large States would be least unable to take care of themselves and to make connections with one another."
The "Great Compromise" involved a lesser compromise with respect to the representation of the negro population. This
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was settled without great difficulty by adopting the ratio al- ready recommended by the Congress for the apportionment of taxes among the States.
The Massachusetts delegation took advantage of this discus- sion to propose that the number of representatives from the new States, which would be formed in the western territories, should be so limited as never to exceed the number from the original thirteen. Gerry, who seemed most concerned at the danger from the expected growth of the West, feared that the Westerners, if they acquired the power, would "like all men" abuse it. "They will oppress commerce," he declared, "and drain our wealth into the Western country." When Sherman pointed out that the western settlers would be their own children and grandchildren, Gerry replied that "there was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to the Western country and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of the emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take there." Gerry was supported by King, but his motion was rejected by the Convention, five States against four. The States south of the Potomac were solidly against the proposal, evidently expecting to gain more than they would lose by the expected emigration. And so the frontier was happily left to exert whatever influence in American politics its inhabitants might fairly claim.
CLASH OF SECTIONAL INTERESTS (JULY - AUGUST, 1787)
Acquiescence in the triumph of Federalism, as Federalism was understood in the smaller States, ended the second period in the history of the Convention. The jealousies between the large and small States were not entirely allayed, and controversies flared up from time to time; but in the main they were subordinated to the clash of interests between the different sections of the country. It was the struggle over the distribution of power between the Federal Government and the States, especially the power to tax and to regulate commerce, that chiefly animated the debates of the Convention during the third period.
From July 26 to August 6 the Convention adjourned, while the Committee of Detail prepared the first draft of the Con-
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stitution in accordance with the resolutions already agreed upon by the Convention. The resolution concerning the pow- ers of the Congress, as referred to the committee, provided that the Congress should have power to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union. This, however, was too vague and uncertain. It was necessary to give it more specific and precise meaning. The draft of the Constitution, as reported by the Committee, provided that the Congress should have power, among other things, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. Several important limitations were placed upon this grant of power. In the first place, the Congress was to have no power to tax exports, while the States were to retain that power and also the further power to tax imports with the consent of the Congress. Secondly, the Congress was to have no power to prohibit the slave trade or even to tax the importation of slaves. Thirdly, the Congress was to have no power to pass a navigation act except by a two-thirds vote in each house.
In all sections strong opposition appeared to the report of the Committee of Detail, especially to these provisions con- cerning the tax and commerce powers. Massachusetts in particular was far from satisfied with an arrangement which made a navigation act dependent upon a two-thirds vote, and also crippled the power to regulate commerce by taxation. Further objection was made on humanitarian grounds to the continuance of the slave trade under the protection of the Constitution, and in the Middle States and Upper South there was even more objection to an unregulated slave trade.
The debate became almost as heated as that which had gone before on the equal voice of the States in the Senate. Gorham who, as a member of the Committee, bore the brunt of the discussion, when Massachusetts interests were con- cerned, remarked on one occasion that he desired it to be remembered that "the Eastern States have no motive to Union but a commercial one." They were able to protect themselves, he declared, without a Union. "They were not afraid of ex- ternal danger, and did not need the aid of the Southern States." Again, when it was proposed that the Congress should not exercise the commerce power except by a two-thirds ma- jority in each House, he reiterated this opinion, saying omi-
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nously that, "if the Government is to be so fettered as to be unable to relieve the Eastern States, what motive can they have to join it and thereby tie their own hands from measures which they could otherwise take for themselves." He depre- cated the consequences of disunion, according to Madison's report, but if it should take place, it was the southern part of the Continent that had the most reason to dread them. Continuing in a more conciliatory vein, he urged the im- probability of a combination of the majority in the Congress against the Southern States, the different interests of the New England and Middle States being a security against it. Gor- ham at best was not sanguine concerning the future of the Union. On another occasion be put the question (manifestly expecting a negative answer) : "Can it be supposed that this vast country, including the Western territory, will 150 years hence remain one nation?" But his ready allusion to the prospect of disunion, if the commerce power were too much fettered by limitations and restraints, reveals the intensity of the feeling which these sectional controversies provoked.
MASSACHUSETTS INTERESTS SAFEGUARDED (AUGUST, 1787)
The Convention did not accept the report of the Committee of Detail without important modifications of these provisions relating to the commerce and tax powers. The States, as well as the Federal Government, were forbidden to tax ex- ports, and the power of the States to tax imports was re- stricted to such rates as would merely cover the expense of inspection. The prohibition on the power of the Congress to abolish the slave trade was restricted to a period of twenty years; and power to impose a limited tax on the importation of slaves was granted. The limitation on the power of the Congress to pass navigation acts was stricken out and un- limited power over that subject granted. The general grant of power to regulate commerce was left unchanged, despite a strong attempt by delegates from the tobacco and rice-grow- ing States to add the requirement of a two-thirds majority for the adoption of commercial regulations. Thus the changes made by the Convention were all in the direction of enlarging the authority of the Federal Government over commerce and all in accord with the interests of Massachusetts.
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The result would have been less favorable to New England but for an understanding that was effected between the New England delegates and the delegation from South Carolina. The latter were very eager to secure the protection of a more perfect Union, not only against foreign invasion but also against domestic insurrection. The great planters of the Lower South were especially anxious over the possibility of insurrections by their slaves. They also desired to keep the slave trade open as long as possible. Hence they were willing to give New England a better prospect of navigation acts and other favorable commercial regulations than were the tobacco growers of the Upper South or even the grain growers of the Middle States. General Pinckney on one occasion declared that it was the true interest of the Southern States to have no general regulation of commerce; but, he added, "consid- ering the loss brought on the commerce of the Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal conduct towards the views of South Carolina, and the interest the weak Southern States had in being united with the strong Eastern States," he thought it proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making commercial regulations.
He believed that his constituents, "though prejudiced against the Eastern States," would be reconciled to this liber- ality. He had himself, he confessed, prejudices against the Eastern States before he came to the Convention, but would acknowledge that he had found their representatives "as lib- eral and candid as any men whatever." Madison, commenting on General Pinckney's reference to the liberality of the New Englanders, remarked that an understanding on the two sub- jects of navigation acts and the abolition of the slave trade had been arranged between New England and the Lower South, "which explains the action as well as the language of the gentleman from South Carolina."
Thus the second of the "great compromises" was arrived at, by which the two sections which were parties to this bar- gain made their interests prevail to a greater extent than would otherwise have been possible over those of the Middle States and Upper South. This time, the Nationalists did not have to bear the responsibility of the defeat. On the whole
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the bargain between Massachusetts and South Carolina ad- vanced rather than retarded the Nationalist program.
REVIVAL OF NATIONALIST ASCENDANCY (AUGUST - SEPTEMBER, 1787)
On the last day of August the Convention entered upon the final stage in its proceedings by appointing a Grand Com- mittee of eleven to consider all matters which had been post- poned or not yet acted upon. The principal unfinished busi- ness relating to the frame of government was the organization of the executive department. Members were growing impa- tient and eager to end their work as quickly as possible. Yet more than a week passed before final agreement could be secured upon a plan for the election of a President and Vice- President, and for the distribution of the executive power between the President and the Senate. The principal difficulty related to the election of the President. It was desired to make him as independent as possible of the Congress and yet not so independent as to be likely to get out of all control. The plan finally adopted was supported by the majority of the Massachusetts delegates.
September 8, a Committee of Style and Arrangement was appointed, consisting of five members, to arrange the articles agreed upon and revise their style. Rufus King was the representative of Massachusetts on both these committees. Throughout the Convention he had been the most consistently nationalist member of the Massachusetts delegation, and his appointment to these important committees at this juncture reflected the growing influence of the nationalist point of view.
The leading issues in the last period of the Convention, besides the organization of the executive department, related to the mode of putting the new Constitution into effect and of amending it thereafter. The Nationalists were determined that the adoption of the Constitution should not be dependent upon the favor of the existing Congress, whose incapacity had made the Convention necessary; nor upon that of the existing state legislatures, which were to be reduced to a greatly inferior position by the proposed Constitution. Nor did they intend that a few recalcitrant States should have the
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power to prevent the formation of the more perfect Union by declining to ratify the work of the Convention. They were convinced that the new Union would be more perfect than the old, even if not all the States should join it, provided it were formed upon the plan embodied in the new Constitu- tion. Nevertheless, the remnants of the original Confederate party in the Convention, reenforced by certain others who were dissatisfied with the form the new Constitution was tak- ing, insisted that the Convention had no right to put the new Constitution into effect except in the manner provided for the amendment of the existing form of government under the Articles of Confederation. Any other procedure they denounced as a revolutionary destruction of the existing Un- ion. The controversy was further complicated by differences of opinion concerning the mode in which the new Constitu- tion, if adopted, should be amended. The Nationalists wished the new Constitution to be easily amended, since they too were greatly disappointed in certain of its features; while their opponents desired to retain the existing rule which would prevent all changes except by unanimous consent.
In all these controversies the Nationalists had their way. It was settled that the new Constitution should be submitted to the Congress for reference to special ratifying conventions in the States; and that it should become effective when ratified by nine States. It was settled also that subsequent amend- ments should be effective when ratified by three fourths of the States which might compose the Union at the time.
GERRY'S OPPOSITION (SEPTEMBER, 1787)
The majority of the Massachusetts delegation firmly sup- ported the Nationalist program. Gerry, however, opposed it. Indeed, he became one of the principal leaders of the opposi- tion at this stage of the proceedings. He declared that the Constitution should not go into effect without the positive ap- proval of the existing Congress and also of all the existing States. He declared further that no amendments should be adopted without the unanimous consent of the States.
He succeeded in raising the requirement for the ratification of amendments from two thirds, as once adopted by the Con- vention, to three fourths of the States, but he failed to secure
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acceptance of the rule of unanimity. He failed also to per- suade the Convention that the adoption of the Constitution should be dependent in any way upon the consent of the exist- ing Congress and State legislatures. He also failed in the opposition which he made to the provisions for a standing army, for Federal control of the State militia, and for appro- priations for military purposes for periods as long as two years. He failed finally in his efforts to secure the addition of a bill of rights to the new Constitution, or at least of provisions which would give greater security to the liberty of the press and to the right of trial by jury in civil cases. This last failure occurred on September 15, on which occasion both of Gerry's remaining colleagues, Gorham and King, ar- gued against him. And so he announced his refusal to sign the finished Constitution. Two days later thirty-nine of the forty-two delegates then present put their names to the pre- cious document. Out of the number remaining in the Con- vention, besides Gerry, only Mason and Randolph of Virginia withheld their signatures.
Gerry's reasons for not signing the Constitution were stated by him in the Convention September 15, and again a month later in a letter to the Massachusetts legislature. On the former occasion he set forth eight specific objections, all of a minor character, which, however, he said he could overlook but for three other defects which seemed to him to render the rights of the people insecure. One was the general power of the Congress "to make what laws they may please to call necessary and proper." Another was the power to "raise ar- mies and money without limit." The third was the power "to establish a tribunal without juries, which will be a Star- chamber as to civil cases." Holding these views, he declared in favor of calling a second general Convention.
In his letter to the Massachusetts legislature he omitted most of the minor objections, set forth in his statement to the Convention, and added some new ones. He particularly emphasized the lack of a bill of rights. The proposed Con- stitution, he declared, possessed few federal features and pro- vided rather for a national system of government. He con- cluded, however, that "in many respects. ... it has great merit,
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and by proper amendments may be adapted to the 'exigencies of government and preservation of liberty.'"
And so the struggle for a more perfect Union was trans- ferred from the Federal Convention to the state conventions, since neither the Congress nor the state legislatures ventured to insist on strict adherence to the letter of the Articles of Confederation. The Nationalists had been forced to sacrifice a portion of their program, but they had carried its essential parts. In order to do this, however, they had to surrender their Nationalism and become Federalists. In all this the Massachusetts delegation played an active and influential part. But by a strange perversity the delegate who contributed most to the final result was the one least satisfied with that result.
STRUGGLE FOR RATIFICATION (1787 - 1788)
Though Massachusetts was one of the first States to feel the need for the more perfect Union and one of those which contributed most to the actual framing of the new Constitu- tion, it was also one in which the struggle for ratification was sharpest. The General Court met October 18 to consider whether the Constitution should be referred to a special con- vention. Governor Hancock opened the session with a non- committal address; and on the 25th the call was issued for a convention to meet the following January (1788).
On the appointed day 364 delegates from 318 towns ap- peared; 46 towns (mostly in the District of Maine) sent no delegates. Immediately it was apparent that the Convention was closely divided between the friends and foes of the Con- stitution, and that ratification could not be obtained without a severe contest. Gorham, King, and Strong were present to support their action at the Philadelphia Convention. Among the other active leaders in the campaign for ratification the most notable were former Governor Bowdoin, Generals Heath and Lincoln, Theophilus Parsons, Theodore Sedgwick, and Fisher Ames. The opponents of ratification lacked expe- rienced leadership. Governor Hancock, who was supposed to sympathize with the opposition but had not publicly declared himself either for or against the Constitution, avoided taking sides as long as possible. Samuel Adams did likewise, so far
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as his public utterances went, though in private he seems to have thrown his influence at first against ratification. Nathan Dane, who with R. H. Lee of Virginia had led the movement in the Congress to amend the Constitution before referring it to the States, was defeated for the State Convention; and Gerry also failed to secure a seat. Samuel Holten was the only Antifederalist delegate who could show a conspicuous record of public service. The other Antifederalist leaders were obscure men, mainly from the small towns and country districts.
The character of the opposition to the new Constitution was revealed in the debates in the Convention. It sprang from a deep-rooted distrust of delegated authority, which made many a plain farmer regard the proposed general government al- most as a foreign power. Agricultural prejudices against the commercial classes strengthened the distrust of a plan which seemed to be supported most energetically by urban and mon- eyed interests. Democratic sentiment, which associated these interests with the idea of class-rule in politics, transformed this distrust into a veritable aristocracy-phobia. Moreover, it was clear that under the new Constitution there would be an end of State paper money, legal tender laws, and the re- pudiation of debts, while it was not so clear that there would be no impairment of valuable civil rights, such as trial by jury, liberty of the press, and liberty of conscience.
RATIFICATION WITH AMENDMENTS (1788)
The Federalist leaders soon perceived that they could not obtain ratification without making some concessions to the opposition. They accordingly proposed that the Convention ratify the Constitution, and at the same time recommend the adoption of certain amendments thereto at the earliest opportunity in the manner provided in the Constitution itself. One of these proposed amendments provided that all powers not expressly delegated to the Federal Government should be reserved to the States. Others safeguarded the rights of trial by jury in civil suits and of indictment by a grand jury in criminal cases. The Federalist leaders were then able to make an arrangement with Governor Hancock, who had been elected
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president of the Convention, by which he threw his great in- fluence in favor of ratification upon these terms and in return received Federalist support for his own political ambitions. On January 31st Hancock brought in the motion to ratify and subsequently to amend. This compromise was the turning point in the struggle for ratification. Sam Adams promptly endorsed Hancock's proposal, and several former opponents of the new Constitution announced their conversion.
When the final vote was about to be taken, however, Sam Adams proposed several additions to Hancock's list of desir- able amendments; notably, that provision be made for pre- serving the liberty of the press and of conscience, the right of petition and of keeping arms, and immunity against un- reasonable searches and seizures. The Convention was thrown into great confusion and the defeat of the whole proposition seemed imminent. Adams, who seems by that time to have been earnestly desirous of promoting the ratification of the Constitution, hastily withdrew his proposals, and Hancock's motion was at length adopted by the close vote of 187 to 168.
The distribution of the vote for and against ratification reveals more clearly than the debate the true character of the contest over the new Constitution in Massachusetts. The
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