USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 6
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The amount of dried cod, for export or home consump- tion, was limited by the amount of salt available for its curing. Before the war Americans drew most of their supply of salt from Spain, and during the war they con- tinued to receive certain amounts from that and other countries. Salt works were established in the early months of 1776, at Dennis, Cape Cod, and all along the Massa- chusetts coast salt was manufactured in small quantities by the evaporation of sea water through solar or artificial heat. Certain amounts of salt were also received from the West Indies, Bermuda and Nova Scotia. The trade with Bermuda was a legitimate one, as a resolution passed by the General Court in 1777 exempted Bermudian vessels from capture and gave them free entrance to our ports with salt and naval stores, the embargo to the contrary notwithstanding.
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR
NOVA SCOTIA TRADE (1775-1781)
The trade with Nova Scotia was carried on under a fraudu- lent pretext, but with the connivance of the British and Massa- chusetts authorities. The towns of Barrington and Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, were largely settled by people from Barnstable and Essex Counties, Mass .; and their trade and interests be- fore the war had been chiefly with the Bay State. During the war, up to 1781-1782, they continued their trade with Massa- chusetts under two pretexts : the first, based on the pretention that they wished to remove their families to Massachusetts; the second, on the relief and transportation of escaped or paroled American prisoners.
For example : May 14, 1777, Daniel Corning petitions the General Court that he may be permitted to remove his family from Yarmouth to Beverly and also sell 200 quintals of fish which he has brought with him from Nova Scotia. Corning made a number of these voyages and as late as August 30, 1780, petitioned for leave to sell 150 quintals of fish and carry back to Nova Scotia a certain amount of flour and rum. In- cidentally, he states that he has not yet found time to trans- port his family to this country.
Another frequent visitor was Thomas Flint of Yarmouth, who writes the Council that he has arrived at Beverly bring- ing a number of escaped American prisoners; also ten hogs- heads of salt and a quantity of dried fish which he wishes to dispose of and invest the proceeds in supplies, that he may be able to continue the good work and bring his family to Beverly. The real object of these petitions was the trade, and no removal of families took place; but the aid to prisoners was real and we needed dried fish and salt. So the trade went on.
INSURANCE (1775-1781)
Before the war it was possible for our merchants to in- sure their vessels in English companies, but most of the in- surance seems to have been done through private individuals, for limited amounts and at rates agreed on between the insurer and insured. In the Nathan Dane papers is preserved an original insurance policy, taken on the schooner Friendship for a voyage to the West Indies and return: "Know all men
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EFFECT OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE
that Ebenezer Ellingwood of Beverly, Merchant, as well in his own Name and Names of all and every person or persons, to whom the Town, doth, may or shall apportion a part or in all, doth Make, Assure and Causeth himself and them and any of them, to be Insured, lost or not lost, the sum of 200 pounds from Beverly to Any or All the ports in the West Indies, and from them to Beverly again, upon the Schooner Friendship and Cargo, Stores, Boats and appurtances, where- of is Master, Under God, Eleazer Giles. To continue and Endure the Voyage Aforesaid and until Said Vessel shall be assured and Moored at Anchor 24 hours in safety in the har- bor of Beverly. Insurance at the rate of 8 pounds per cent."
Insurance on armed vessels during the war is quoted all the way from 35 to 65 per cent. The rate on privateers was so high that many owners carried their own insurance. At times, in order to split risks, owners of private armed vessels agreed to pool the prizes or divide the profit on cargoes carried. After all, a fast ship and a good captain seem to have been the best insurance.
EFFECT OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE (1778-1781)
February 6, 1778, France signed a treaty with the United States, acknowledging her independence, and May 4, 1778, a treaty of alliance and commerce was ratified by Congress. The arrival of the French fleet at this country was greeted with enthusiasm and much was expected of it; but when D'Estaing sailed from Boston, November 3, 1778, he left be- hind only disappointment and apathy.
In June of the next year Spain joined France in the war with England; the ports of the two countries were now open to us, and our prizes could be legally condemned in their courts of admiralty. The good news, which seemed to assure the independence of the United States, failed to lighten the gloom which had settled over the merchants of Massachusetts. They had lost their finest privateers at Penobscot, an expedi- tion which yielded neither honor nor profit; and now the competition of French and Spanish armed vessels made priva- teering in the West Indies unprofitable.
The year 1780 opened with pessimism still rampant. The cost of fitting out a privateer was so large, the chance of cap-
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR
ture so great, that most merchants preferred to commission their vessels as letters of marque. British commerce, at this time, was carried on by vessels under convoy or by heavily armed letter-of-marque ships; and an armed vessel carrying a cargo offered a greater chance for profit to American own- ers than a privateer. Some of the richer merchants of Massa- chusetts, however, built a type of vessel that in speed, size and armament was capable of meeting on equal terms any British ship except a man-of-war. Then they obtained a letter-of-marque commission for what was really a disguised privateer. There seems to have been no real reason why a privateer should not carry a cargo; but, either from jealousy, or on account of the scarcity of mariners in the State, the Committee of Correspondence of the town of Salem asked the General Court to take some action in the matter.
A committee of both houses, to whom the matter was re- ferred reported a resolve which allowed crews to letter-of- marque vessels only in proportion to tonnage: eight men for every 100 tons the vessel registered, including master and mate, and the same proportion for larger vessels. The resolution was intended to restrict letter of marque vessels to merchant voyages and was absurd on its face; of what use were letter of marque papers if the vessel had not sufficient men to man her guns or provide a prize crew for a captured ship. As a matter of fact the resolution was unnecessary and often evaded.
CREWS NO LONGER STRICTLY AMERICAN (1780-1783)
From 1780 to the close of the war not only was it difficult to ship a crew but the character of the crews shipped, altered and deteriorated. Few vessels now sailed with a distinctively American crew and even the State navy was enlisting foreign sailors. September 30, 1780, the ship Viper sailed from Salem with a crew consisting of two merchants, four ship- wrights, one joiner, one farmer, one cooper and 18 foreigners. The privateer ship Pilgrim, of 18 guns and 160 men, was one of the best equipped vessels that sailed from Massachusetts during the war. She carried a full complement of American officers and petty officers, including a surgeon, master of mar- ines and, rarest of all, a chaplain. Aboard were ten boys : one,
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TREATMENT OF NOVA SCOTIANS
eleven years old; two, twelve; two, thirteen; and five, seven- teen years or younger ; but the crew were almost all of foreign birth.
TREATMENT OF NOVA SCOTIANS (1781-1782)
The year 1781 opened under brighter auspices. The arrival of the French fleet and army, and the consequent influx of gold, served to steady the currency and improve trade; but the en- trance of Holland into the war proved of little service, and in its inception was actually disastrous to our commerce. The island of St. Eustatius was the great neutral port of the West Indies and was captured by Lord Rodney before news of the war between England and Holland had reached the island. The governor of St. Eustatius made no resistance, although 600 American seamen, the crews of American vessels in port, offered their services in defence of the place.
Besides our losses at St. Eustasius, privateering proved un- profitable during 1781-1782; and the inhabitants of the Massachusetts towns, in a very sullen state of mind, began to question whether the visiting Nova Scotians were not really British spies and a menace to the country. It was probably true that they gave information to the enemy, just as they gave information of the enemy to us; and most of the Massa- chusetts shipowners believed that the balance of gain was in our favor ; but the popular feeling was against their presence in the Colony, and the hitherto pleasant relations with Nova Scotia came to an end.
In several instances during the war the smaller Massa- chusetts privateers committed petty robberies on the helpless Nova Scotians, but in these cases the General Court had com- pelled restitution. In the summer of 1782 five small Massa- chusetts privateers, taking advantage of changed relations with Nova Scotia, united in an attack on the town of Lunen- burg, N. S. Ninety-two men were landed under cover of the guns of the privateer Hero; two block houses were stormed, and the little town was ours.
The Americans, says a British account of the affair, "now fell to plundering with a pleasing and natural vivacity." The grocery stores were emptied of their contents and barrels of beef, sugar, pork and rum were run down to the wharves.
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR
The shelves of the clothing stores were rifled, and when every thing of value had been looted and the house of the British commander burned, the town was ransomed for £1000.
"On the side of the brave sons of liberty," says a Boston paper, "three men were wounded. On the side of the abettors of despotism and oppression, one man was killed." Goods to the amount of £8000 were brought away and libeled in Boston.
PRISONERS OF WAR (1775-1783)
July 22, 1776, Congress voted to allow General Washing- ton to exchange prisoners with the British, soldier for soldier, sailor for sailor, and officer for officer of equal rank. August 1, 1776, General Howe, in a letter to Washington, agreed to this offer of exchange. From this time on, prisoners cap- tured by the British from American vessels and carried into British ports in North America were treated as prisoners of war and exchanged as agreed on. American prisoners carried into English ports and confined in English prisons, however, did not receive the benefits of exchange, with a few exceptions, until 1779.
The treatment of American prisoners by the British dur- ing the War of the Revolution has been stigmatized as unne- cessarily cruel and contrary to the law of nations. Close examination of the facts, however, shows that the treatment was not very different from that received by the French or Dutch prisoners of war, whether soldiers or sailors. It was · usually harsh, but might be cruel or lenient according to the personal character of those in charge of the prison, and the peculiar condition of the prison itself. Most of the prisoners captured on American armed vessels were confined at Hali- fax, Nova Scotia, at New York and at Mill prison, Plymouth, England. At Halifax the prisoners seem to have been loosely guarded and fairly treated. Mill prison was a military prison under stern discipline, with all the discomforts and petty tyrannies which are apt to accompany the herding together of large numbers of prisoners of war. In the prison ships at New York the treatment was at times brutal and attended with a disgraceful and unnecessary mortality.
Most of the stories of British cruelty in the treatment of
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PRISONERS OF WAR
American mariners hang about the prison ship Jersey. The Jersey was originally a line-of-battle ship but was dismantled in 1780 and converted into a prison hulk. She was at first anchored in the East River but later was taken to Long Island and anchored in Wallabout Bay.
There was no distinction on account of rank aboard the Jersey; officers and men occupied the same quarters and received the same rations. Each prisoner received two- thirds of the regular allowance given the British sailors in the navy, which was one pound of beef or pork, one pound of bread and a half a pint of peas; with butter, suet and oatmeal, occasionally. The quality of the food was usually poor.
Infractions of discipline seem to have been punished with unnecessary severity and the sufferings of the prisoners were aggravated by the cruelty of Jacob Strout, the commissary of prisoners, who was detested. Overcrowding and poor ventilation were the worst features of the prison ships of New York, and small pox and typhus fever were endemic.
That the prison ships were overcrowded was partly the fault of the Americans themselves; had our private armed vessels been induced or compelled to bring back to America the crews of captured British vessels, the balance of naval prisoners against us would not have been so great; but the bonds given by our privateers that they would bring back such prisoners were so trivial, the bonus offered for such return so petty, that both bond and bonus were often ignored. On the other hand, most of the American armed vessels cap- tured by the British were taken by men-of-war and delivered at English ports, together with their full crew.
Occasionally, on complaint of sufferers in British prisons, retaliation was practiced by the Americans, and English prisoners were ironed and treated with considerable severity. January 2, 1781, the Massachusetts Council ordered that the Naval Board be requested: "To order the Commissary of Prisoners to remove the prisoners from Noodle's Island, on board the prison ship in the harbor of Boston, and all marine prisoners that are at large in the town of Boston, and con- fine them in the hold of Said Ship and treat them in a similar
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR
manner as the American prisoners are treated in the Prison Ships of New York, until a different conduct is observed by the enemy."
In 1775 an act was passed by the British Parliament, author- izing the capture and condemnation of all American vessels, with their cargoes, and authorizing the impressment of the crews of such vessels, to serve on British ships, even against America. Although the British do not seem to have used this permission to any great extent, still, there were cases where Americans were impressed and compelled to fight against their own country, and such cases were a just cause of complaint against England. It must be allowed, how- ever, that more English prisoners were always voluntarily serving on American armed vessels than the number of American prisoners impressed on British ships.
MERCANTILE CONDITIONS (1782-1783)
The year 1782, though offering bright prospects for Ameri- can liberty, brought little comfort to the owners of private armed vessels. The surrender of Cornwallis meant ultimate triumph for America, but general bankruptcy seemed still more imminent. Privateering had turned out badly and many merchants could match the experience of George Williams, who wrote to Colonel Pickering: "I have lost two ships and a brig at St. Eustasia by that old Rodney and now I am reduced to a brig." The cordon of British cruisers along the coast of America became very effective; and the shipowners of Massachusetts found it safer to keep their vessels abroad, as much as possible, and send their prizes into friendly foreign ports. During the year 1782, Massachusetts issued commis- sions to 130 private armed vessels and there were still other vessels sailing under commissions of the preceding year. Many of these vessels were captured by British cruisers dur- ing the year; and by 1783 the list of Massachusetts armed vessels was sadly depleted.
Still, though lessened in number, American ships were by no means swept from the seas. Letter of marque vessels still brought salt, cordage and wine from Spain; brandy, silks
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MERCANTILE CONDITIONS
and cloth were imported from France and trade with the West Indies, though sadly hampered, still went on. Privateers from Massachusetts cruised on the coasts of France, Eng- land and Spain, making the English Channel almost as danger- ous for British commerce as their navy made the American coast for our vessels. During the first nine months of 1782, thirty-two rich prizes were sent into the port of l'Orient by American privateers. The letter of marque Cicero and the pri- vateers Revolution and Buccanier, all owned by Andrew Cabot of Beverly, during the year 1782 sent into France nine prizes captured from the Jamaica fleet, laden with 4000 hogsheads of sugar; and they continued to send in prizes until peace was declared. The Buccanier on her last cruise in 1783 sent eight prizes into l'Orient.
Although the financial condition of Massachusetts mer- chants was impaired and their credit strained, when the war ended, there were still shipowners in the State who had con- served their resources and invested part of the profits from privateering in the purchase of real estate and investments in France and Spain. It was not alone from the loss of their vessels that so many less provident merchants were in bad financial condition. Extravagant living and reckless ex- penditure had characterized the owners, officers and crews of our private armed vessels during the whole war. The de- moralization attending all wars and the doubtful result of the struggle in which we were engaged, led men to anticipate the constant fall in the value of our paper currency and spend their money before it depreciated.
The definitive treaty of peace was signed at Paris, September 3, 1783, and was ratified by Congress, January 4, 1784. With the advent of peace, trade reasserted itself. As one reads over the arrivals and clearances of the ports of Salem and Boston, from April 4, 1783, when Captain Derby in the Astrea brought the first printed copy of the declaration of the Cessation of Arms, to August 6, 1783, it seems as though all the vessels lost during the seven years of war had sprung to life and assumed a peaceful guise. During that period 48 vessels arrived and 67 cleared from the port of Salem. From May 19, 1783, to September 1, 1783, 147 vessels entered the port of Boston.
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE WAR
PRIVATEERING TOWNS (1775-1784)
Out of a confused, defective and often contradictory list of private armed vessels, commissioned from 1775 to 1783, as given by different authorities, we get some idea of the part our larger Massachusetts ports took in the warfare on the seas.
The reported number of private armed vessels commissioned from Newburyport during the War of the Revolution varies, 69 being the lowest estimate, and 90 the highest. It seems probable that even the latter estimate is too small, as from 1780 to 1783 she commissioned 61 privateers and letters of marque, carrying 518 guns and 2045 men. In 1780 the town is credited with 8327 tons of shipping, only a little less than the town of Salem at that time. Her great shipowner, Nathaniel Tracy, is said to have been the principal owner in 110 vessels. From 1780 to the close of the war, either by accident of the sea or capture, Newburyport lost most of her armed vessels.
Salem probably sent out during the war a larger tonnage of private armed vessels than any other Massachusetts port. In 1780, her total tonnage, including merchant vessels, is given as 9000 tons. From 1780 to 1783, Salem commissioned 113 armed vessels, carrying 1234 guns and 4108 men. From 1775 to the recall of privateers in 1783, she is credited with 158 armed vessels, carrying 2000 guns and 6000 men. These vessels are said to have captured 445 prizes.
Marblehead, at the commencement of the war, is credited with 12,000 tons of shipping. During the war she probably lost more vessels in proportion to her population than any other Massachusetts town. By 1781 her tonnage had shrunk to 3006 tons. When the war ended she possessed only 1309 tons. From 1780 to 1783, she commissioned 9 armed vessels carrying 90 guns and 265 men. The total number of priva- teers commissioned during the war is said to have been thirty.
Gloucester's contribution to warfare on the seas was, in proportion to population, large, but unfortunate. Her first important privateer, the brig Gloucester, of 18 guns and 130 men, after taking two prizes was never again heard from. Her largest privateer, the General Starks, was captured and taken into Halifax. From 1780 to 1783, Gloucester commis-
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PRIVATEERING TOWNS
sioned 24 armed vessels carrying 280 guns and 852 men. When the war ended she had lost almost all her armed vessels and one third of her poll-paying population.
Boston was not evacuated by the British until March 17, 1776, so that her part in warfare on the seas began much later than in other Massachusetts coast towns. Including State, Continental, private armed and merchant vessels, it is probable that more vessels entered and sailed from Boston than from any other Massachusetts port. Boston. was the sailing port for most of the Cape Cod vessels and also for many owned in Maine and from States as far south as Vir- ginia. One authority gives 365 as the number of vessels that sailed from Boston during the war. While Salem com- missioned more and heavier armed vessels from 1780 to 1783 than Boston, yet the latter town during the same time com- missioned 136 armed vessels carrying 967 guns and 3759 men, almost as many as Salem.
Beverly, when the war broke out, stood third in wealth and fifth in population in the county of Essex. Her shipping, partly fishing and partly registered vessels, amounted to 2406 tons. In 1780 it was 2844 tons. When the war ended Beverly had some 1600 tons. During the war Beverly sent out 59 vessels carrying 575 guns and 2975 men.
A few private armed vessels also sailed from Dartmouth, Plymouth, Ipswich, Salisbury and the Eastern Coast of Maine. In comparing the part taken by our larger coast towns in the warfare on the seas, we must not forget that while the port furnished the vessels, the crews were drawn from all parts of Massachusetts. So few private armed vessels were commissioned in 1783 that no account of them has been taken in the above statistics.
INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE ARMED VESSELS ON THE WAR.
It is the opinion of Captain Mahan that privateering as a means of injuring the enemy is inferior in its results to the use of State and national vessels. This is probably true, but it presupposes that the amount of money spent in equipping private armed vessels would be expended on the navy; and that the men enrolled on the vessels would have enlisted in the State or national service. As a matter of fact, in the
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War of the Revolution, it would have been impossible to raise by taxation a tithe of the money available for private armed vessels; and had the State owned the vessels they could have been filled by impressment only.
The merchants and seamen of Massachusetts were highly patriotic, but that patriotism was alloyed by personal interest ; taxation and impressment to the degree required would have aroused such resentment in the State that its enforcement would have been impolitic and not to be thought of. There was little of that intense, bitter feeling against England which might have led the inhabitants of Massachusetts to sacrifice all personal interests in the pursuit of retaliation and revenge. Their patriotism needed the stimulus of some personal ad- vantage and this they found in privateering. It appealed to the spirit of gambling, always a ruling passion in men; it offered a congenial employment to mariners, who were neither fit for nor content in land service; it afforded merchants a chance to employ their capital and ships in a speculative but alluring business; while all engaged in it could feel that they were doing their bit for the best interest of State and country.
The service rendered by Massachusetts armed vessels is not to be measured by the loss or gain of their owners, but by the damage they did the enemy and the help they gave in carrying on commercial intercourse with other nations. The ultimate freedom obtained by the United States was due to several factors and it is hard to differentiate the value to be attached to each; one of these factors, though not per- haps the greatest, was the service rendered by our private armed vessels.
DISTINGUISHED MASSACHUSETTS NAVAL OFFICERS
The record of Massachusetts services on the sea during the Revolutionary War would not be complete without a brief mention of some of the more distinguished men who gained renown in that service.
Moses Brown was born in Salisbury, but was a resident of Newburyport. When 17 years of age he was present at the siege of Louisburg. In 1778 he commanded the privateer General Arnold. Later he was in command of the letter of
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