USA > Massachusetts > Commonwealth history of Massachusetts, colony, province and state, volume 3 > Part 2
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The finality of this situation has not been made suffici- ently clear in most histories, but the above is a true description. General Gage might still count on adherents in Boston, but throughout the country no bodies of Loyal- ists appeared to dispute the issue with the revolting colonists-and all New England was suddenly in rebellion. Yet this complete change was not brought about by a defeat that crippled the British army under his command. The Lexington and Concord Fight could not thus be described. On the contrary, the Colonists had not killed or wounded any heavy total of British troops. As has been shown in the accounts of the events of April 19, this running fight was an unorganized scramble of the American companies, hastily gathered from all parts of the countryside. The pursuit of the British Regulars was almost a case of each man for himself. Of the many groups summoned from the different towns, there was never at any one time an overpowering force imposed upon the retreating British. Consequently the unexpected result of the defeat was not due to any proportion of heavy British losses. It was the way the thing was done that demoralized the Regulars. They had met something so different from anything they had imagined that they were dazed.
3
DECISIVE RESULT OF APRIL 19, 1775
REASONS FOR THE DECISIVE RESULT OF APRIL 19, 1775
The conduct of the British upon that day, and on many other occasions in the American Revolution, showed that they had not learned their lesson from the "French Wars." Montcalm's error, in fighting the formal battle on the Plains of Abraham, had given to the British a final victory which made them forget their many blunders against the French and Indians. To the minds of the British, Wolfe's victory at Quebec had thus summed up the whole French and Indian War as a triumph for the Regulars.
In contrast, the American Colonists had received from these wars a schooling which was a better preparation than has been generally appreciated. From Washington down through the personnel of the American Army, this was a benefit of the greatest value. And many of these Americans had derived their knowledge from their own bitter experience when serving with the British Army. They had then been given object lessons which taught them that irregular tactics would be the most effective against the British Regulars.
As a result of all this, it was not the professional British soldier who was prepared for the fighting of the American Revolution-it was the American Colonist who was pre- pared. This was always in evidence when the British attempted to carry the war into the open country. With their superiority in arms and equipment, the Regulars were able to win formal battles and to hold cities on the coast, where their supplies were assured by sea ; but they were unable to go out and subdue the country. Every time this was tried, the people rose against them, and the British troops were mobbed and harassed by irregular warfare, against which they were unable to contend. Saratoga was merely a repetition of the day of Lexington and Concord. Consequently, in this sense, the first twenty- four hours of the Siege of Boston may be said to have been decisive of the whole war.
The underlying cause of this unexpected state of affairs was the now evident fact, that the irregular warfare which the British encountered on April 19, 1775, was actually
4
BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
a forecast of modern open order fighting. The tactics of the Americans were modern in the sense of fighting in extended open order and taking advantage of every natural shelter. On the other hand, the British tactics were those of the stiff ranks and formal evolutions, which made every European battle of the time a matter of parade- ground manoeuvres. The proof of the matter has been that those European tactics have been discarded as useless in favor of open order tactics akin to the tactics of the Americans on April 19.
When we consider this contrast, there can be no ques- tion of the fact that the retreat from Concord became a military test, which at once proved that the British Regu- lars, drilled in the formal tactics of Frederick the Great, were pathetically helpless in the open country against the tactics of the Americans. To the British mind this one experience was so convincing that no other test was ever attempted in the Siege of Boston. Never again did the Regulars venture out into the open country around Boston. But even this fact does not tell how absolutely the British had accepted the one object lesson as final. For they not only made no attempts to sally forth against the Colonists, but they made no efforts to push back the Americans from the positions they had occupied so near Boston.
THE CLOSE SIEGE (APRIL, 1775)
Thus General Gage not only conceded that he was to be cut off from the surrounding country, but he also per- mitted himself to be hemmed in closely. This is the measure of the effect of the Lexington and Concord Fight. For the American forces that hastened to Boston could never have enforced so close a siege. They were utterly unorganized, and were lacking in all supplies, ammunition, and artillery. In regard to this last, the Americans were so deficient that they were not only unable to threaten the British garrison, but they could not have offered much of a defense in the positions they had occupied. Yet it is a fact that General Gage did not even undertake to seize any of the commanding points surrounding the town, and retained his whole army in the peninsula of Boston.
5
GATHERING OF THE AMERICAN FORCES
General Gage's quick and complete acquiescence in this shut-in situation was strikingly shown by the fact that, as early as April 22, he was negotiating with a Town Meeting in Boston as to passing people in and out of the town. Nothing could be a more definite proof that the British General admitted a state of siege. Consequently, we must regard the events of April 19, 1775, as decisive in the modern military sense of the word, and as changing the whole situation in New England.
GATHERING OF THE AMERICAN FORCES
The response to the "Lexington alarm" had been general throughout New England. April 19, the pursuing Colonists had gathered about Boston, and they received accessions from all sides. General Heath had been in charge, until the arrival of General Artemas Ward who assumed com- mand on April 20. The first council of officers was held on that day; and Colonel William Prescott was given command of the first placing of guards. On April 20, also, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety sent circulars to the Massachusetts towns calling out the militia. This was soon followed by an appeal to the other New England Colonies for troops. But accessions from these Colonies had already begun to join the forces around Boston. New Hampshire troops were in Medford under Colonel John Stark; and Connecticut troops, with General Israel Put- nam, were in Cambridge. The Rhode Island troops were under General Nathaniel Greene at Jamaica Plain.
At first each Colony maintained its own establishment, provided its own supplies and issues of ammunition, such as they were, and exercised direction over its own troops. The command of. General Ward was almost nominal. There was great confusion as to rank and commissions. In fact it could not be considered an organized army at all. The only thing that held the American forces together was what General Gage in his report called "a military spirit encouraged among them for a few years past, joined with an uncommon degree of zeal and enthusiasm." These years had given to the Colonies the beginnings of military
6
BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
organization. Consequently there was something to build on, in forming this first American Army.
It grew to about 16,000, of which the proportions were: Massachusetts, 11,500; Connecticut, 2,300; New Hamp- shire, 1,200; Rhode Island, 1,000. As might have been expected, its personnel was constantly changing, with men drifting back and forth between home and the camp, and with enlistments and commissions on no regular basis. It might be said that the only real strength of this army lay in the object lesson of April 19, and in its moral effect upon the British Regulars. Yet its prestige had been sufficient to establish and maintain a siege.
THE ISSUE DEFINED
The news of the first sacrifice of American lives proved also to be the torch which spread the flames of revolt throughout all the American Colonies. And the news had a marked effect in Great Britain. In this respect, the Americans had been far-seeing in taking precautions that the truth as to the situation should be known to the British people. The Provincial Congress met in Concord, April 22, and promptly appointed a special committee to take depositions as to the events of April 19 in Lexington and Concord. These affidavits were collected with a letter "To the Inhabitants of Great Britain" (composed by Dr. War- ren, Mr. Freeman, Mr. Gardner, and Colonel Stone), and these papers were given to Captain Derby of Salem on April 27, with instructions to transmit them to London as soon as possible. Captain Derby made such a good pas- sage in the fast sailing Quero of Salem that he arrived in London, May 29, eleven days before General Gage's ac- count of the action. Upon receiving these papers, Arthur Lee, the agent of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress in London, at once had the letter published with its ac- count of the battle, and announced : "I desire to inform all those who wish to see the original affidavits which contain that account, that they are deposited at the Mansion House with the right honorable the Lord Mayor for their inspec- tion."
By this means all the circumstances and events of the
7
THE SITUATION BEFORE BUNKER HILL
fateful day of April 19 were known in Great Britain, with the true facts as to the British reverse. As a result, in Parliament, the opponents of the Ministerial policies in regard to the American Colonies were given a true basis for their opposition. And this was a factor of increasing importance for the Americans throughout the Revolution.
In America it was soon proved that the outbreak was no matter of Massachusetts alone, or of New England, but of all the Colonies. The General Congress of the representatives of the American Colonies assembled at Philadelphia on May 10, and they made the quarrel their own by formally voting to adopt the army besieging Boston, and to raise troops for it from the other Colonies. This was the origin of the Continental Army.
The issue had thus been clearly defined, at home and abroad, as not being in any sense local or of factions, but as an armed revolt of all the American Colonies.
THE SITUATION BEFORE BUNKER HILL (MAY - JUNE, 1775)
At Boston there was almost no fighting until the middle of June. The British remained passive within the limits of their lines drawn across Boston Neck. In May the Colonists made a beginning of fortifying their positions, but, as they had absolutely no siege train, they were not yet able to make any serious attack upon Gage's army. The only clashes were on the harbor islands, and were skirmishes over livestock.
General Gage's apathy, in failing to seize any of the commanding positions in the vicinity of the town, remained unchanged. But in June information was received by the Americans that he might take possession of some of the heights about Boston, and the Provincial Congress decided to forestall him. Consequently, on June 15, the Committee of Safety passed a resolution "that possession of the hill called Bunker's Hill, in Charlestown, be securely kept and defended." Possession of Dorchester Neck was also men- tioned in this resolve, but this was left indefinite.
This resolution, communicated to the Army, brought on the Battle of Bunker Hill, the only other actual battle of the siege. Again it was a case of the European formal
8 . BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
tactics of the day, meeting tactics which were far ahead of the times. It was only this attribute which redeemed the battle from being an inexcusable blunder. For the occupation of the Charlestown heights on the night of June 16, 1775, was foolhardy in the extreme on the part of the Americans, from every point of view. The official account of the Committee of Safety (July 25, 1775), after stating that this was in anticipation of an attempt by General Gage to occupy Bunker Hill, stated : "Accordingly, on the 16th ult., orders were issued, that a detachment of 1,000 men should that evening march to Charlestown, and intrench upon the hill. Just before nine they left Cam- bridge, and proceeded to Breed's Hill situated on the farther part of the peninsula next to Boston, for, by some mistake, this hill was marked out for the intrenchment instead of the other."
In the confusion among the unorganized groups of troops from the various Colonies, which made up the besieging force, there were no plans whatever for the support of this detachment, which was sent to Charlestown under the command of Colonel William Prescott. In a military sense, therefore, it must be regarded as an isolated force, and this isolated American force was wretchedly equipped for the task it was ordered to perform. It had no heavy artillery, and only six small field pieces which proved to be of little use. It was ill supplied in every way, and especially short of ammunition.
To send such a weak detachment to the exposed position on the Charlestown peninsula was to court disaster.
BRITISH DECISION FOR A FRONTAL ASSAULT (JUNE 16, 1775)
A glance at the map of the environs of Boston will show at once the dangers of the situation. There was a flood tide on the morning of June 17, and, if the British had taken advantage of this to move heavy guns in their shipping into the Mystic River, the position of the Americans would have become impossible. Instead of anything of the kind, General Gage decided to make a frontal attack upon the intrenched Americans, and this decision transformed a
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9
UNEXPECTED FACTORS IN THE BATTLE
precarious situation for the Americans into a scene of disaster for the British.
The reason for this costly error on the part of the British is to be found in what has been stated as to the effects of the Lexington and Concord Fight upon the British Regulars. They had been exasperated at being driven to shelter by tactics which did not offer a set battle. But a different situation was at once created by the sur- prising apparition of the American troops on Breeds Hill, which met their eyes on the morning of June 17, 1775. It was true that the Americans had been able to throw up their intrenchments without being discovered; but their presence meant that this time the Americans were in a fixed position, and were not the elusive enemies of April 19. To the minds of the British this situation implied, in itself, a set battle that must be fought in their own way. They had no idea that they were destined to encounter at Charlestown another situation as novel and disconcerting as that of April 19.
UNEXPECTED FACTORS IN THE BATTLE (JUNE 17, 1775)
On any European battlefield of the times this frontal attack of the British Regulars, with their superiority in numbers, would have been an easy charge-and the British had no suspicion of any other result. But there were two novel elements in the situation which made the Americans unexpectedly formidable. In the first place, although they were not at all marksmen of the Leatherstocking type, these American colonists were used to handling firearms and aiming to kill. In addition, they were commanded by a remarkable group of officers, who had gained experience in the "French Wars," and knew how to control their men to get the best results against the tactics used by the British Regulars. Consequently the British were about to attack what was actually, in the modern military sense of the term, an intrenchment defended by instruments of precision.
At that time no such thing had ever been encountered on a European battlefield. Precision in drilling and execut- ing all movements had been rigidly taught-but precision
10
BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
in shooting had received no attention whatever. The strict game laws kept firearms out of the hands of the common people. It followed that the recruit, totally unaccustomed to handling firearms, was given a strange implement which he must handle according to the prescribed movements of a manual that actually did not include aiming at any par- ticular object.
It is enough to give the following from the British Manual Exercise of the Foot: "V. Present 1 Motion: In presenting, take away your thumb from the Cock, and move your right Foot a little back, the toe turned a little to the Right, the body to the Front, and place the Butt- end in the Hollow between your Breast and Shoulder, keeping your fore-finger before the Tricker (but without touching it) and the other three behind the Guard, the Elbow, in an equal Line (which is called Square) the Head upright, the Body straight, only pressing a little forward against the Butt-end of the Firelock, the right knee stiff, and the left a little bending: The Muzzle should be a little lower than the Butt, in order to take Aim at the Center of the Body. VI. Fire: As soon as the Word of Command is given, draw the Tricker briskly with the fore-finger which was placed on it before : and though the lock should not go down with that Pull, you are not to attempt it a second Time, being only to draw the Tricker but once at exercise."
With "the head upright" and aim only secured by hold- ing the firelock with "the muzzle a little lower than the butt," anything like accuracy in shooting was impossible for the Regular soldier. And it is not surprising that musketry had not hitherto been deadly, in the modern sense, on European battlefields.
When we realize these contrasting conditions, which unquestionably were the controlling factors at the Battle of Bunker Hill, it becomes evident that again something was happening quite outside the ordinary course of events. In fact, here again the old order was arrayed against the new, which was destined to supersede it.
11
ON THE HILL BEFORE THE BATTLE
ON THE HILL BEFORE THE BATTLE (JUNE 16-17, 1775)
The Americans were well used to work with spade and shovel, and were able to accomplish in the night what seemed a miracle to the British. The intrenchment marked out by the engineer, Colonel Gridley, was de- scribed in the account of the Committee of Safety as "a small redoubt about eight rods square." There was also a breastwork beginning a short distance from the redoubt, on a line with its eastern side and extending about one hundred yards north. These earthworks were sufficiently completed on June 17 to be a good protection for the defenders. As it soon became evident to the Americans that this intrenched position could easily be outflanked by the British, the American line was extended to the Mystic River by making use of a fence about six hundred feet in the rear of the redoubt. This was the "rail fence," so called because it consisted of two wooden rails on top of a low stone wall. Parallel to this another fence of rails was built, and the space between was filled with newly cut hay which was lying in the fields. This improvised defense was only a flimsy protection at the best. It was described, in Stedman's contemporary British account, as "nothing more than a breastwork of rails and hay easy to be scrambled over."
The leisurely preparations of the British delayed their assault against the Charlestown heights until afternoon. For the Americans this was a period of actual suffering, after their exertions of the night, as the day was hot and they received very little to eat and drink. The British had bombarded the redoubt from Copp's Hill battery and from their shipping in the Charles, as shown on the map. Fortu- nately for the Americans the British shipping did not go into the Mystic, and the vulnerable positions on that side of the Peninsula were not subjected to bombardment. It was while the redoubt was under fire by artillery that Colonel Prescott walked around the top of the parapet, to encourage his men, and was recognized by his brother-in- law Counciller Willard, who was in Boston with General Gage watching the Americans through glasses. Willard
12
BUNKER HILL AND SIEGE OF BOSTON
had then told General Gage that Colonel Prescott was an old soldier and would fight hard-a prediction which the British commander was to find true.
Prescott had sent to General Ward for reinforcements, and Putnam had also urged that more troops should be sent to Charlestown. But, in addition to the utter lack of organization of the Americans, General Ward was re- luctant to weaken his main body, as he feared British attacks against Cambridge. It was only after a consulta- tion with the Committee of Safety that he sent the New Hampshire troops of Colonels Stark and Reed to reinforce the Americans in Charlestown.
With these accessions, the Americans awaited the British attack. General Warren and General Pomeroy had come to the redoubt to serve as volunteers. The case of Joseph Warren was an eloquent example of self-devotion. He had recently been commissioned a general by the Provincial Con- gress, but he refused to take any command and declared that he only desired to share the dangers of his country- men. This heroic example of their beloved Dr. Warren had an inspiring effect upon the Americans, and did much to counteract the feeling in their ranks that they were being abandoned by their countrymen to the dangers of their exposed position. He remained at the redoubt throughout the assault.
In the American dispositions to resist the British, Colonel Prescott was in personal command at the redoubt and breastwork. At the rail fence were the New Hamp- shire troops of Stark and Reed, with the Connecticut troops of Knowlton. These last had been in Prescott's original force. The troops in the earthworks and those at the rail fence were respectively the right and left of the American line of defense; and the circumstances of the action made each of these practically an independent force. Putnam was with the left, and on horseback. He was zealous and tireless in bringing troops into the battle and directing the fighting on that part of the field. Straggling reinforcements arrived at different times during the action, but there was also a proportion of men drifting away from the field. A true estimate of the American strength in the
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SOUTH CHANNEL MYSTIC RIVER
OF BRITISH
BATTLE
HOWE
BUNKER
CHILE
BREASTWORK
FLINE OF
LANDING O'
BRITISHS
REINFORCEMENTS
BRITI
FLOATING BATTERIES
RIVER
CHARLESTOWN
SOMERSET
BATTERY
UTCOPPS HILL
BOSTON
MAINE
Mi
-HIVER
TRANSPORT
CHARLES-1
CAMBRIDGE
Drawn by Thomas G. Frothingham, Captain, U. S. R., June, 1925
THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL
Showing the positions of the American and British Forces on June 17, 1775
-
FIRST POSITION
-
.......
RAIL FENCE
FALCON
BREEDS
"HILL
PIGOT
------ > ---- LIVELY
DOTTED LINE INDICATES ORIGINAL PENINSULA OF CHARLESTOWN ...... BRITISH TROOPS == AMERICAN TROOPS M M
LITIVELY
ARMED
13
THE BRITISH ASSAULTS
battle can be given by stating that there never were more than fifteen hundred muskets available for the defense.
THE BRITISH ASSAULTS (JUNE 17, 1775)
The British troops had been ferried across from Boston and landed on the present site of the Charlestown Navy Yard. Their main body formed at Moulton's Point and waited for reinforcements. These last were landed on the left of the main body. The British dispositions took a great deal of time, and it was nearly three o'clock when the whole British force was assembled. At that time about 2,500 British had been landed in Charlestown. Thereupon, a heavy bombardment of the American intrenchments began from the British batteries and shipping. This was intended to cover the advance of the British. There was also a can- nonade directed against Roxbury from the British lines- and this was the only other demonstration against the American army, instead of the British attacks anticipated by General Ward.
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