USA > Ohio > Historical collections of Ohio in three volumes ; an encyclopedia of the state : with notes of a tour over it in 1886 contrasting the Ohio of 1846 with 1886-90, Vol. III > Part 27
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A Retreat Unsafe .- In pursuance of this decision the general immediately despatched the order to Major Croghan, directing him immediately to abandon Fort Stephenson, to set it on fire and repair with his command to headquarters-cross the river and come up on the opposite side, and if he should find it impracticable to reach the general's quarters, to take the road to Huron, and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and despatch. This order was sent by Mr. Conner and two Indians, who lost their way in the dark, and did not reach Fort Stephenson till eleven o'clock the next day. When Major Croghan received it, he was of opinion that he could not then retreat with safety, as the Indians were hovering round the fort in considerable force. He called a council of his officers, a majority of whom coincided with him in opinion that a retreat would be unsafe, and that the post could be maintained against the enemy, at least till further instructions conld be received from headquarters. The major therefore innmediately returned the following answer: "Sir, I hare just received yours of yesterday, 10 o'clock P.M., ordering me to de- stroy this place and make good my retreat, which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to maintain this place, and by heavens we can."
In writing this note, Major Croghan had a view to the probability of its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on that account made use of stronger language than would otherwise have been consistent with pro- priety. It reached the general on the same day, who did not fully understand the cireun- stances and motives under which it had been dictated. The following order was therefore immediately prepared, and sent with Col. Wells in the morning, escorted by Col. Ball, with his corps of dragoons :
"July 30, 1813.
"SIR-The general has just received your letter of this date, informing him that yon had thought proper to disobey the order
issued from this office, and delivered to you this morning. It appears that the informa- tion which dictated the order was incorrect ; and as you did not receive it in the night, as was expected, it might have been proper that you should have reported the circumstance and your situation, before you proceeded to its execution. This might have been passed over ; but I am directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver that he has made his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition to the orders of his general, can no longer be entrusted with a separate command. Colonel Wells is sent to relieve you. You will deliver the command to him, and repair with Colonel Ball's squadron to this place. By command. &c.
"A. H. HOLMES, " Assistant Adjutant General."
Colonel Wells being left in the command of Fort Stephenson, Major Croghan returned with the squadron to headquarters. He there explained his motives for writing such a note, which were deemed satisfactory ; and having remained all night with the general, who treated him politely, he was permitted to re- turn to his command in the morning, with written orders similar to those he had re- ceived before.
Refusal to Surrender .- A reconnoitering party which had been sent from headquarters to the shore of the lake, about twenty miles distant from Fort Stephenson, discovered the approach of the enemy, by water, on the evening of the 31st of July. They returned by the fort after 12 o'clock the next day, and had passed it but a few hours when the enemy made their appearance before it. The In- dians showed themselves first on the hill over the river, and were saluted by a six-pounder, the only piece of artillery in the fort, which soon caused them to retire. In half an hour the British gun-boats came in sight, and the Indian forces displayed themselves in every direction, with a view to intercept the garri- son, should a retreat be attempted. The six- pounder was fired a few times at the gun- boats, which was returned by the artillery of the enemy. A landing of their troops with a five-and-a-half-inch howitzer was effected abont a mile below the fort ; and Major Chambers, accompanied by Dickson, was dis- patched towards the fort with a flag, and was met on the part of Major Croghan by Ensign Shipp, of the 17th regiment. After the usual ceremonies, Major Chambers observed to Ensign Shipp, that he was instructed by General Proctor to demand the surrender of the fort. as he was anxious to spare the effu- sion of human blood, which he could not do, should he be under the necessity of redneing it, by the powerful force of artillery, regulars and Indians under his command. Shipp re- plied, that the commandant of the fort and its garrison were determined to defend it to the last extremity ; that no force however great could induce them to surrender, as they were resolved to maintain their post, or to bury themselves in its ruins. Dickson then
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said that their immense body of Indians could not be restrained from murdering the whole garrison in case of success, of which we have do doubt, rejoined Chambers, as we are amply prepared. Dickson then proceeded to remark that it was a great pity so fine a young man should fall into the hands of the savages -Sir, for God's sake, surrender, and pre- vent the dreadful massacre that will be caused by your resistance. Mr. Shipp replied, that when the fort was taken, there would be none to massacre. It will not be given up while a man is able to resist, An Indian at this mo- ment came out of an adjoining ravine, and advancing to the ensign, took hold of his sword and attempted to wrest it from him. Diekson interfered, and having restrained the Indian, affected great anxiety to get him safe into the fort.
The Enemy Open Fire .- The enemy now opened their fire from their six-pounders in the gun-boats and the howitzer on shore, which they continued through the night with but little intermission and with very little effect. The forces of the enemy consisted of 500 regulars, and about 800 Indians, com- manded by Dickson, the whole being com- manded by General Proctor in person. Te- cumseh was stationed on the road to Fort Meigs with a body of 2000 Indians, expecting to intercept a reinforcement on that ronte.
Major Croghan through the evening occa- sionally fired his six-pounder, at the same time changing its place occasionally to induce a belief that he had more than one piece. As it produced very little execution on the en- emy, and he was desirous of saving his am- munition, he soon discontinued his fire. The enemy had directed their fire against the northwestern angle of the fort which induced the commander to believe that an attempt to storm his works would be made at that point. In the night, Captain Hunter was directed to remove the six-pounder to a block-house, from which it would rake that angle. By great industry and personal exertion, Captain Hunter soon accomplished this object in secrecy. The embrasure was masked, and the piece loaded with a half-charge of pow- der, and double charge of slugs and grape- shot. Early in the morning of the 2d, the enemy opened their fire from their howitzer and three six-pounders, which they had landed in the night, and planted in a point of woods, about 250 yards from the fort. In the evening, about 4 o'clock, they concen- trated the fire of all their guns on their north- west angle, which convinced Major Croghan that they would endeavor to make a breach and storm the works at that point ; he there- fore immediately had that place strengthened as much as possible with bags of flour and sand, which were so effectual that the picket- ing in that place sustained no material injury. Sergeant Weaver, with five or six gentlemen
of the Petersburgh volunteers and Pittsburgh blues, who happened to be in the fort, was intrusted with the management of the six- pounder.
Assault and Repulse of the Brittish .- Late in the evening, when the smoke of the firing had completely enveloped the fort, the enemy proceeded to make the assault. Two feints were made towards the southern angle, where Captain Hunter's lines were formed ; and at the same time a column of 350 men was dis- covered advancing through the smoke, within twenty paces of the northwestern angle. A heavy galling fire of musketry was now opened upon them from the fort, which threw them into some confusion. Colonel Short, who headed the principal column, soon rallied his men, and led them with great bravery to the brink of the ditch. After a momentary pause he leaped into the ditch, calling to his men to follow him, and in a few minutes it was full. The masked port-hole was now opened, and the six-pounder, at the distance of thirty feet, poured such destruction among them that but few who had entered the ditch were fortunate enough to escape. A precipi- tate and confused retreat was the immediate consequence, although some of the offices at- tempted to rally their men. The other col- umn, which was led by Colonel Warburton and Major Chambers, was also routed in con- fusion by a descrnetive fire from the line com- manded by Captain Hunter. The whole of them fled into the adjoining wood, beyond the reach of our fire-arms. During the assault, which lasted half an hour, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from their howitzer and five six-pounders. They left Colonel Short,* a lieutenant and twenty five privates dead in the ditch ; and the total mimber of prisioners taken was twenty-six, most of them badly wounded. Major Muir was knocked down in the ditch, and lay among the dead, till the darkness of the night enabled him to escape in safety. The loss of the garrison was one killed and seven slightly wounded. The total loss of the enemy could not be less than 150 killed and wounded.
Retreat of the British .- When night came on, which was soon after the assault, the wounded in the ditch were in a desperate situation. Complete relief could not be brought to them by either side with any de- gree of safety. Major Croghan, however, re- lieved them as much as possible-he contrived to convey them water over the picketing in buckets, and a ditch was opened under the pickets, through which those who were able and willing, were encouraged to erawl into the fort. All who were able, preferred, of course, to follow their defeated comrades, and many others were carried from the vicinity of the fort by the Indians, particularly their own killed and wounded ; and in the night, about three o'clock, the whole British and Indian
* "Col. Short, who commanded the regulars composing the forlorn hope, was ordering his men to leap the ditch, cut down the piekets, and give the Americans no quarter, when he fell mortally wounded into the ditch, hoisted his white handkerchief on the end of his sword, and begged for that mercy which he had a moment before ordered to be denied to his enemy."
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force commenced a disorderly retreat. So great was their precipitation that they left a sail-boat containing some clothing and a con- siderable quantity of military stores : and on the next day, seventy stand of arms and some braces of pistols were picked up around the fort. Their hurry and confusion were caused by the apprehension of an attack from Gen. Harrison, of whose position and force they had probably received an exaggerated ac- count.
Gen. Harrison's Movements .- It was the intention of General Harrison, should the enemy succeed against Fort Stephenson, or should they endeavor to turn his left and fall on Upper Sandusky, to leave his camp at Seneca and fall back for the protection of that place. But he discovered by the firing on the evening of the 1st, that the enemy had noth- ing but light artillery, which could make no impression on the fort ; and he knew that an attempt to storm it without making a breach, could be successfully repelled by the garrison ; he therefore determined to wait for the arrival of 250 mounted volunteers under Colonel Rennick, being the advance of 700 who were approaching by the way of the Upper San- dusky, and then to march against the enemy and raise the siege, if their force was not still too great for his. On the 2d, he sent several scouts to ascertain their situation and force ; but the woods were so infested with Indians, that none of them could proceed sufficiently near the fort to make the necessary discoveries. In the night the messenger arrived at head- quarters with intelligence that the enemy were preparing to retreat. About 9 o'clock, Major Croghan had ascertained from their collecting about their boats, that they were preparing to embark, and had immediately sent an express to the commander-in-chief with this information. The General now de- termined to wait no longer for the reinforce- ments, and immediately set out with the dra- goons, with which he reached the fort early in the morning, having ordered Generals
M'Arthur and Cass, who had arrived at Seneca several days before, to follow him with all the disposable infantry at that place, and which at this time was about 700 men, after the numerous sick, and the force neces- sary to maintain the position, were left be- hind. Finding that the ememy had fled entirely from the fort, so as not to be reached by him, and learning that Tecumseh was somewhere in the direction of Fort Meigs, with 2,000 warriors, he immediately ordered the infantry to fall back to Seneca, lest Tecumseh should make an attack on that place, or intercept the small reinforcements advancing from Ohio.
Gallant Soldiers. - In his official report of this affair, General Harrison observes that- "It will not be among the least of General Proctor's mortifications that he has been baf- fled by a youth, who had just passed his twenty-first year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, Gen. George R. Clarke."
Captain Hunter, of the 17th regiment, the second in command, conducted himself with great propriety : and never was there a set of finer young fellows than the subalterns, viz. : Lieutenants Johnson and Baylor of the 17th, Mecks of the 7th, and Ensigns Shipp and Duncan of the 17th.
Lieutenant Anderson of the 24th, was also noticed for his good conduct. Being without a command, he solicited Major Croghan for a musket and a post to fight at, which he did with the greatest bravery.
"Too much praise," says Major Croghan, "cannot be bestowed on the officers, non- commissioned officers and privates under my command, for their gallantry and good con- duct during the siege."
The brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel was immediately conferred on Major Croghan, by the president of the United States, for his gallant conduct on this occasion. The ladies of Chilicothe also presented him an elegant sword, accompanied by a suitable address.
. We take the above from Dawson's " Life of Harrison," where it is quoted from some other source. In defending Gen. Harrison from the charges of cowardice and incompetency in not marching to the aid of the garrison previous to the attack, Dawson says ;
Unjust Criticism of Gen. Harrison. - The conduct of the gallant Croghan and his garri- son received from every quarter the plaudits of their countrymen. This was what they most richly deserved. "There was, however, some jealous spirits who took it into their heads to be dissatisfied with the course pur- sued by the commanding general. The order which was given to Colonel Croghan to evacu- ate and destroy the garrison previously to the attack, was loudly condemmed, as well as the decision of the council of war, to fall back with the troops then at Seneca, to a position twelve miles in the rear. Both these meas- ures, it has been said, were detirmined on by the unanimous advice of the council of war.
It is not to be presumed that sueh men as composed that board, would have given advice which was in any way derogatory to the honor of the American arms. Every individual among them either had, before or afterwards, distinguished himself'by acts of daring courage and intrepidity. We do not profess to be much acquainted with military matters, but the subject appears to us so plain as only to require a small portion of common sense per- feetly to comprehend it. At the time that the determination was made to withdraw the garrison from Sandusky, it must be recollected that the general had only with him at Seneca about 400 infantry and 130 or 140 dragoons. The enemy, as he was informed by General
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Clay in the letter brought by Captain M'Cune, amounted to at least 5,000. With such a disparity of foree, would it have been proper to have risked an action to preserve the post of Lower Sandusky, which of itself was of little or no importance, and which, the garri- son being withdrawn, contained nothing of any value ?
Important Posts. - The posts of Fort Meigs and Upper Sandusky were of the utmost im- portance ; the former was amply provided with the means of defence, and was in no dan- ger ; but the latter, weak in its defenees, and with a feeble 'garrison, containing many thousands of barrels of flour and other provi- sions, the sole resource of the army for the ensuing campaign, was to be preserved at any risk. The position at Seneca, was not in the direct line from Fort Meigs to Upper San- dusky. The enemy, by taking the direct route, would certainly reach it before General Harrison, as several hours must have elapsed before he could have been informed of their movement, even if it had been discovered the moment it had been commenced, a eireum - stanee not very likely to happen. It there- fore became necessary for the security of Upper Sandusky, that a position better adapted to that purpose should be assumed. There was another and most important reason for this movement : twelve miles in the rear of Seneea, towards Upper Sandusky, the prairie or open country commences. The in- fantry which the commander-in-chief had with him were raw recruits ; on the contrary, the squadron of dragoons were well disciplined, and had seen much service. In the country abont Seneca, this important corps could have been of little service : in the open country to the rear, they would have defeated five times their number of Indians. It was for these reasons that it was determined by the council of war, to change the position of the troops at Seneca. If this movement did take place, the propriety of withdrawing the garrison of Lower Sandusky was obvious. The place was extremely weak, and in a bad position, It was not intended originally for a fort. Before the war it was used as the United States' Indian factory, and had a small stockade around it, merely for the purpose of keeping out drunken Indians. It was, more- over, commanded by a hill, within point blank shot, on the opposite side of the river. "The School of Experience." -To those who
suppose that Gen. ITarrison should have ad- vanced upon the enemy the moment he diseov- ered that Sandusky was attacked, we must, in the language of the general and field officers who were present on the occasion, " leave them to correct their opinions in the school of ex- perience." Gen. Harrison had been reinforced a day or two before the seige of Sandusky, by the 28th regiment, raised in Kentucky. After having reeeived this corps he could not have marched more than 800 effective men with- out risking his stores, and, what was still of more consequence, 150 siek at Seneca, to be taken by the smallest party of Indians. The scouts of the army brought information that the Indians were very numerous in the direc- tion of Fort Meigs. The general conjectured that a large portion of the Indians were then ready to fall on his flank or rear, or the de- feneeless camp at Seneca, should he advanee. The information he received from the British prisoners confirmed this opinion ; a body of 2,000 being there under the command of Tecumseh. At the moment of which we are speaking the volunteers of Ohio were rapidly approaching.
Wise Course of Gen. Harrison,-Now, under these circumstances, does any reason- able man believe that Gen. Harrison should have advanced with his 800 raw recruits against a force in front which he knew to be so mueh superior in numbers, and with the probability of having one equally large hang- ing on his flank ? What would have been thought of his abilities as a general, even if he had been successful against Gen. Proctor (of which, with his small foree, there was little probability), if in his absence Tecumseh, with his 2,000 warriors, had rushed upon Camp Seneea, destroyed his stores, toma- hawked his siek soldiers, and pursuing his route towards Upper Sandusky, defeated the Ohio volunteers, scattered as they were in small bodies, and finally ending his career with the destruction of the grand magazine of his army, upon the preservation of which all his hopes of future success depended ? In all human probability this would have been the result had Gen. Harrison advanced to the relief of Fort Stephenson sooner than he did. It was certainly better to risk for a while the defence of that fort to the talents and valor of Croghan, and the gallant spirits who were with him, than to jeopardize the whole prospects of the campaign.
About one and a half miles above Lower Sandusky, at the falls of the river, in the manufacturing village of Ballsville, containing one cotton and one woollen factory, two flouring mills, and about thirty dwellings. It was about half a mile southwest of this village, that Col. Ball had a skirmish with the Indians a day or two previous to the assault of Fort Stephenson, There is, or was a few years since, an oak tree on the site of the action, on the road to Columbus, with seven- teen hacks in it to indicate the number of Indians killed on the occasion. We have an account of this affair derived from one of the dragoons present .- Old Edition.
The squadron were moving towards the fort when they were suddenly fired upon by
the Indians from the west side of the road, whereupon Col. Ball ordered a charge, and he
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and suite and the right flank being in advance, first came into action. The colonel struck the first blow. He dashed in between two; savages and ent down the one on the right ; the other being slightly in the rear, made a blow with a tomahawk at his back, when, by a sudden spring of his horse, it fell short, and was buried deep in the cantel and pad of his saddle. Before the savage could repeat the blow he was shot by Corpl. Ryan. Lieut. Hedges (now Gen. Hedges of Mansfield) fol- lowing in the rear, mounted on a small horse, pursued a big Indian, and just as he had come up to him his stirrup broke, and he fell head first off his horse, knocking the Indian down. Both sprang to their feet, when Hedges struck the Indian across his head, and as he was falling buried his sword up to its hilt in
his body. At this time Capt. Hopkins was seen on the left side in pursuit of a powerful savage, when the latter turned and made a blow at the captain with a tomahawk, at which the horse sprang to one side. Cornet Hayes then came up and the Indian struck at him, his horse in like manner evading the blow. Serjt. Anderson now arriving, the Indian was soon dispatched. By this time the skirmish was over, the Indians, who were only about 20 in number, being nearly all cut down ; and orders were given to retreat to the main squadron. Col. Ball dressed his men ready for a charge, should the Indians appear in force, and moved down without further molestation to the fort, where they arrived at about 4 P. M.
FREMONT, county-seat of Sandusky, about ninety-five miles north of Columbus, and eighty-three miles southwest of Cleveland, on the Sandusky river, at the head of navigation. Its railroads are the L. S. & M. S .; L. E. & W. and W. & L. E.
County Officers, 1888 : Auditor, A. V. Bauman ; Clerk, John W. Worst ; Commissioners, James E. Wickert, Joseph Geschwindt, George F. Wilt ; Coroner, Edward Schwartz; Infirmary Directors, Isaac Strohl, Nehemiah Engler, Andrew Kline; Probate Judge, E. F. Dickenson ; Prosecuting Attorney, F. R. Fronizer ; Recorder, II. J. Kramb ; Sheriff, R. W. Sandwisch ; Surveyor, George W. Lesher ; Treasurer, William E. Lang. City Officers, 1888 : Heman B. Smith, Mayor; A. V. Banman, Clerk ; Henry Hunsinger, Marshall ; Lester Wilson, Solicitor ; William E. Lang, Treasurer ; Joseph Rawson, Civil Engineer ; M. A. Fitzmaurice, Street Commissioner ; C. F. Reiff, Chief Fire Department. News- papers : News, Independent, H. E. Woods, editor and publisher ; Courier, Ger- man Democrat, Joseph Zimmermann, editor and publisher ; Journal, Republican, Isaac McKeeler & Son, editors and publishers ; Scientific Weekly, literary, J. C. Wheeler, editor and publisher ; Journal of Dietetics, Medical, Caldwell and Gessner, editors. Churches : 1 Presbyterian, 2 Catholic, 1 African Methodist Episcopal, 1 Lutheran, 1 Methodist Episcopal, 1 Evangelical. Banks : Farmers', O. A. Roberts, president, D. A. Ranck, cashier ; First National, James W. Wilson, president, A. H. Miller, cashier ; Fremont Savings, James W. Wilson, president, A. E. Rice, cashier.
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