History of Benton County, Oregon, Part 40

Author: David D. Fagan
Publication date: 1885
Publisher:
Number of Pages:

USA > Oregon > Benton County > History of Benton County, Oregon > Part 40

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A. G. Walling, Lith. Portland, Or.

STOCK RANCH OF JOHN M. OSBURN. 1004 Acres. 2% Miles West of Corvallis, Benton County, Oregon.

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in the most cheerless days of winter resolutely followed their inveterate foe, and were "in at the death" of the allied tribes.

The formation of volunteer companies and the enrollment of men, began imme- diately upon the receipt of the news of the outbreak. The chief settlements-Jackson- ville, Applegate creek, Sterling, Illinois valley, Deer creek, Butte creek, Galice creek, Grave creek, Vannoy's ferry, and Cow creek-become centers of enlistment, and to them resorted the farmes, miners, and traders of the vicinity, who with the greatest unanimity enrolled themselves as volunteers to carry on the war which all now saw to be unavoidable. On the twelfth of October, John E. Ross, Colonel of the Ninth regi- ment of Oregon militia, assumed command of the forces already raised, by virtue of his commission, and in compliance with a resolution of the people of Jacksonville and vicinity. Recognizing the need of mounted troops for the duty of protecting the settle- ments, he made proclamation calling into service men provided with horses and arms, and in two days had increased his command to nine companies, aggregating five hun- dred men. Several of these companies had been on duty from the day succeeding the massacre, so promptly did their members respond to the call of duty. The regiment was increased by the first of November, to fifteen companies, containing an average of fifty men each, or seven hundred and fifty in all. The initiatory steps of the organiza- tion of the volunteer forces were necessarily precipitous, and in some cases correspond- ingly irregular. This organization was based upon the militia law of the territory, as it then existed, declaring the territory a military district for brigade purposes, of which by authority of the act of congress organizing the territory, the governor was com- mander-in-chief. This law further provided for the appointment by the governor, of a brigadier general, and for the election in subordinate districts, of colonels and other regimental officers. It also embraced the usual departments of the general staff, and provided for the commission of their chief, and subordinate officers.

It is justly thought remarkable that such a force could have been raised in a country of such a limited population as Southern Oregon ; and this fact is rendered still more remarkable by the extreme promptness with which this respectable little army was gathered. If we examine the muster-rolls of the different companies, we shall be struck by the youth of the volunteers-the average age being not beyond twenty-four years. From all directions they came, these young, prompt and brave men, from every gulch, hillside and plain, from every mining claim, trading post and farm of this extensive region, and from the sympathizing towns and mining camps of Northern California, which also sent their contingents. Thus an army was gathered, able in all respects to perform their undertaking of restoring peace, and suddenly too. These troops, as already said, were mounted. Their animals were gathered from pack-trains, farms and towns, and were in many cases unused to the saddle. But the exegencies of war did not allow the rider to hesitate between a horse and a mule, or to humor the whims of the stubborn mustang or intractable cayuse. With the greatest celerity and prompt- ness the single organizations had hurried to the rescue of the outlying settlements and in many cases preserved the lives of settlers menaced by Indians. Captain Rinearson, at Cow creek, enrolled thirty-five men on the day following the massacre, and by night- fall had stationed his men so as to effectually guard many miles of the road, leaving men at the Canyon, at Levens' Station, at Turner's, and the remainder at Harkness 33

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and Twogood's Grave Creek House; and receiving reinforcements, sent thirty men down Grave creek and to Galice creek. By such exertions the enemy were overawed, and the white inhabitants, seeing an armed force in their midst, began to regain calmness and confidence.

While the work of organizing the forces was going on, the Indian marauders had retired to the neighborhood of Grave creek, Cow creek and Galice creek, on each of which and particularly the two latter, were important settlements. The country threatened and partially occupied by the hostiles was the northern part of .Josephine county-a land of canyons, narrow valleys, steep mountain sides and thick woods. Into this almost inaccessible retreat they had thrown themselves, and from there they issued forth at will to burn, plunder and murder. On the morning of the seventeenth of October the united bands of Limpy, George, John and Tenas Tyee made an attack on the headquarters of the volunteers on Galice creek, and the fight ensued which has been celebrated since as the "Siege of Galice creek." Captain William B. Lewis, in command of a company of about thirty-five men, was stationed at the creek, where his men were doing picket and garrison duty. On the day mentioned, two men came to headquarters and reported finding Indian signs near by. Directly after Sergeant Adams, who had proceeded out to reconnoitre, was fired at by the hostiles who appeared in strong force on the hill overlooking the houses used as headquarters. Several volunteers who were standing near were also fired upon, and Private J. W. Pickett was mortally wounded by a shot through the body, and died during the day. The headquarters consisted of two board houses, situated some twenty yards apart, and about an equal distance from the stream. Some four or five men took a position in a .ditch which had been cut for defensive purposes; others took shelter within a log corral adjoining one of the houses, while within the latter the remainder were installed. The enemy were hidden behind natural obstructions in all directions from the defenses, which they surrounded. Very soon the men were driven from the ditch, and took refuge in the houses. While retreating toward the house, Private Israel D. Adams was shot and fell, mortally injured, near the house, being assisted into it by Private Allen Evans, who, while thus engaged, received a severe wound in the jaw. The Indians immediately occupied the ditch to the number of twenty or more, and kept up a fire on the houses, within which the volunteers were erecting defences by digging up floors, piling up blankets, etc. The Indians loudly announced their intention of firing the houses, scalping the men, and capturing the provisions and ammunition, and this cheerful talk was translated by the squaw of Umpqua Joe, a friendly Indian who was taking part with the whites, and who, with the squaw, was in the house. Umpqua Joe himself had the misfortune to be wounded; and during the fight a bullet pene- trated the thin walls of the house and struck Private Samuel Sanders in the head, killing him instantly. Considerable conversation of an unfriendly nature passed between the different sides, and a steady fire was kept up by both. Several attempts were made by the enemy to set fire to the houses, and Chief George particularly distin- guished himself by attempting to throw burning faggots upon the roofs. This man, as well as John, Limpy and others, were recognized by the besieged party. The engagement lasted nearly all day, the Indians at nightfall retiring from the scene. When they had disappeared, the volunteers went to work to strengthen their defences

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by extending their ditch, at which they occupied themselves nearly all night. In the morning some Indians appeared, and seeing from the preparations that the whites were well ready to receive them, fired their guns, retreated, and were not again seen on Galice creek. The different accounts of this fight describe it as having been a closely contested affair, and of really important consequences. Three men had been killed or mortally wounded. Besides these, Benjamin Tufts, severely wounded, died on the twenty-eighth of November following. Captain Lewis, First Lieutenant W. A. Moore, and Privates Allen Evans, John Erixson, Louis Dunois, Milton Blacklidge and Ump- qua Joe were wounded. How great the Indian loss was could not be determined, as they carried away their injured, according to custom. The common opinion was that it was about equal to that of the whites. Thus the fight was comparatively desperate and bloody.

A few days subsequent to the fight at Galice creek, and while the whereabouts of the Indians was unknown, an opportune circumstance revealed their place of abode. Lieutenant (since General) A. V. Kautz, of the regular army, set out from Port Orford with a guard of ten soldiers to explore the country lying between that place and Fort Lane, thinking to find a route for a practicable trail or wagon road by which the inland station could be supplied from Port Orford instead of the longer and very diffi- cult Crescent City route. The country proved even more rough, steep and precipitous than it had been reported to be ; and the Lieutenant was many days upon his journey. Leaving the river near the mouth of Grave creek, he ascended the neighboring hills and, much to his surprise, came upon a very large band of Indians. As they proved hostile, there was no resource but to run for it, and losing one man by the savages' fire, the officer made his escape to Fort Lane, fortunate in getting away so easily.

Having now, by this unlucky experience of Lieutenant Kautz, been made aware of the Indians' exact whereabouts, Colonel Ross and Captain Smith, combining forces as well as the mutual jealousies of regulars and volunteers would permit, began to plan an active campaign. All the disposable troops at Fort Lane consisted of eighty-five men and four officers : Captain A. J. Smith, first dragoons ; First Lieutenant H. G. Gibson, third artillery ; Second Lieutenant A. V. Kautz, fourth infantry ; and Second Lieutenant B. Alston, first dragoons. These set out on the twenty-seventh of October, and on arriving at the Grave creek house were joined by Colonel Ross' command, of about two hundred and ninety men, besides a portion of Major Martin's force from Deer creek. From this point the combined forces moved on October thirtieth, to the Indian camp, arriving at daybreak at a point where Captains Harris and Bruce were deployed to the left, while Captain Smith, with the regulars, took the ridge to the right, with the expectation of arriving in the rear of the Indians' position, whereby they might be surrounded and captured. Captains Williams and Rinearson followed in Captain Smith's tracks. The country not being perfectly known by the whites, sev- eral mistakes followed in consequence, and Harris and Bruce came directly upon the Indian encampment, and were in full view of the savages before any strategic move- ment could be made, and no opportunity for surprising the enemy offered itself. The time was sunrise, and Captain Smith had gained his rear position and had built fires for his men's refreshment, at the place where Lieutenant Kautz had been attacked. By these fires the Indians were warned of the party in their rear, and prepared then-

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selves accordingly. The regulars descended into a deep gorge, climbed up the other side and directly were engaged with the Indians, who advanced to meet them. The savages " paraded in true military style," but directly fell back to a ledge of rocks or to the brushy crest of a hill. From the crest of the hill for a mile or more in the rear of the Indians, was a dense thicket; on the right and left were precipitous descents into a gorge filled with pines and undergrowth, in which the natives concealed themselves almost perfectly from the view of the whites, who possessed no resources sufficient to dislodge them. The ridge being bare on top, the men were necessarily exposed to the enemy's fire, and some casualties resulted. Movements were made to get in the Indians' rear in this new position, but such attempts were futile. Several charges were made by the regulars but ineffectually, although the men were for considerable periods within ten or twenty yards of the hostiles. The latter fought bravely and steadily, picking off the whites by a regular fire from their rifles, which were pitied against the inferior weapons of the troops, or at least of the regulars, two-thirds of whom had only the " musketoon," a short, smooth-bore weapon, discharging inaccurately a heavy round bullet, whose range was necessarily slight. About sunset the commanders con- cluded to retire from the field, and did so, first posting sentries to observe the savages' movements. The united commands encamped for the night at Bloody Spring, as it was named, some distance down the hill.

On the following morning Lieutenant Gibson, of the regulars, with ten men, pro- ceeded up the hill to the battle-field, to secure the dead body of a private of his detach- ment, and when returning with it was pursued by the savages, who came down and attacked the camp in force, firing numerous shots. No damage was done by this attack except the wounding of. Lieutenant Gibson, and after a time the savages were driven off. No further attempt against the Indians was made, and after advising with their officers the two commanders decided to remove their troops from the vicinity. Accordingly, orders were given and the retrograde march began.

The total loss was thirty-one, of whom nine were killed, and twenty-two wounded. Several of the latter died of their injuries. The volunteers killed were Privates Jacob W. Miller, James Pearcy and Henry Pearl, of Rinearson's company; John Winters, of Williams'; and Jonathan A. Pedigo, of Harris'. The wounded were Privates William H. Crouch, Enoch Miller and Ephriam Tager, of Rinearson's; Thomas Ryan and William Stamms, of Williams'; L. F. Allen, John Goldsby, Thomas Gill, C. B. Hinton, William M. Hand, William I. Mayfield, William Purnell and William White, of Harris'; C. C. Goodwin, of Bruce's; and John Kennedy, of Welton's. The latter died on the seventh of November, and C. B. Hinton, in endeavoring to make his way alone to the Grave Creek House, lost his road and perished from exposure. This fight, occurring on the thirty-first of October and the first of November, is known by the several names of the Battle of Bloody Springs, Battle of Hungry Hill, and Battle in the Grave Creek Hills.

From these details, and considering that the Indians maintained their position on the battle-field, without great loss, it is evident that the campaign was an unsuccessful one. It is generally admitted by the whites who took part in the engagement, that the affair resulted in a partial defeat, and they ascribe therefor several reasons, either of which seems sufficient. The inclemency of the weather is set forth as a reason, and is

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doubtless an important one. It is known from good authority that one man perished from cold and wet, and that the bodies of those slain in the fight were frozen stiff in a few hours. This would indicate very severe cold, but from independent sources we gather that the weather throughout the winter was exceptionally severe. Troops, ill provided with blankets and clothing, stationed at the very considerable altitude of the Grave creek hills, were under the worst possible circumstances for continuing the attack. Besides, a still more serious reason presented itself. There was not a sufficient supply of food to maintain a single company of men. The commissariat was in chaotic condition, and supplies were either not sent out, or failed to reach the nearly starving troops in time to be of use. This is a notorious fact in Southern Oregon, but, singu- larly enough, fails to appear in the earliest published accounts of the affair. The commissary and quartermaster departments were at fault, nor do they appear to have been efficiently administered at any time during the war, although their expenses (duly charged to the United States) were preposterously great. Figures are at hand to show that the expense of the latter department exceeded, for a time, eight hundred dollars per day! And this for transportation alone. A large number of Mexicans were borne on the rolls as packers, whose daily pay was six dollars, and who had the care and management of about one hundred and fifty pack animals, which were used in carrying supplies from Jacksonville or Crescent City to the seat of war. They belonged to the volunteer service, and were entirely distinct from the trains by which the regulars at Fort Lane were supplied. It was to the mismanagement of the persons in charge of the trains that the failure of the campaign was attributed, and apparently with con- siderable justice. The charge of insubordination made against the volunteers in con- sequence of their conduct at Bloody spring, will be recalled when treating of the later events of the war.

As was customary with the regular army officials at that date, a great deal of blame was cast upon the volunteers for their alleged failure to properly second the efforts of the government troops. This charge is retorted upon Captain Smith's soldiers by counter-charges of similar tenor ; and as neither side in the controvesy is supported by any but interested evidence, we cannot at this date satisfactorily discuss the question. The matter, however, is connected with the invariable tendency to antagonism of the two related, yet opposed, branches of service, which antagonism shows itself on every similar occasion, and is an annoying subject indeed. We see the spectacle of two different organizations, bent upon the same object and pursuing an identical road to the attainment of their object, but falling into bitterness by the way- side and continually reviling each other, and failing to lend their moral support and frequently their physical aid.

The governor of Oregon, George L. Curry, entered considerably into the business of making proclamations during the events of the Rogue river war, and his first effort in that line, bearing upon the prosecution of hostilities in this region, was as follows :

Whereas, By petition numerously signed by citizens of Umpqua valley, calling upon me for protection, it has come to my knowledge that the Shasta and Rogue River Indians, in Southern Oregon, in violation of their solemn engagements, are now in arms against the peace of this terri- tory ; that they have, without respect to age or sex, murdered a large number of our people, burned their dwellings, and destroyed their property ; and that they are now menacing the south- ern settlements with all the atrocities of savage warfare, I issue this my proclamation, calling for

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five companies of mounted volunteers, to constitute a northern battalion, and four companies of mounted volunteers to constitute a southern battalion, to remain in force until duly discharged. The several companies to consist of one captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, four sergeants, four corporals, and sixty privates, each volunteer to furnish his own horse, arms and equipments, each company to select its own officers, and thereafter to proceed with the utmost possible dispatch to the rendezvous hereafter appointed. It is expected that Jackson county will furnish the number of men wanted for the southern battalion, which will rendezvous at Jackson- ville, elect a major to command, and report in writing to headquarters. It will then proceed to take effective measures to recover indemnity for the past, and conquer a lasting peace with the enemy for the future. The following-named counties are expected to make up the number of men wanted for the northern battalion : Lane county, two companies; Linn county, one company; Douglas county, one company ; Umpqua county, one company ; which will rendezvous at Rose- burg, Douglas county, elect a major to command, and report in writing to headquarters. It will then proceed immediately to open and maintain communication with the settlements in the Rogue river valley, and thereafter co-operate with the southern battalion in a vigorous prosecution of the campaign.

Given under my hand at Portland, the fifteenth of October, A. D., 1855. By the Governor, GEORGE L. CURRY.

John K. Lamerick, received the appointment of acting adjutant-general for the volunteers on Rogue river, and was entrusted with the duty of mustering in and organizing the forces. He arrived at the seat of war several days after the fight at Hungry Hill, and immediately proceeded with his duties. Some twelve or thirteen companies, of from twenty to eighty men each, presented themselves and requested to be mustered in. Lamerick demurred to this, however, as under his instructions the services of only four companies could be accepted. He agreed in short, to muster the remaining companies into a separate battalion, who could then elect their own major. This proposition was not acceptable to many, who wished all to be in the same battalion. On the tenth of November the volunteers being encamped at Vannoy's ferry, the com- panies of Bruce, Williams, Wilkinson and Alcorn were mustered in, and organized into a battalion known as the southern battalion, of which Captain James Bruce was elected Major, over Captain R. L. Williams his only competitor. The remaining troops were disbanded by order of Colonel Ross.

At the rendezvous for the northern battalion enlistments began early, and about the twentieth of October William J. Martin was elected Major. Quartermaster-General McCarver occupied an office in the court house at Roseburg, engaged in fitting out the troops. The strength of the companies, set originally at sixty-three rank and file, was increased by Major Martin to one hundred and ten. The Douglas county company called for by the governor, was easily recruited and held its election October 27, when Samuel Gordon was elected captain. The Linn county company was commanded by Captain Jonathan Keeney; the two from Lane county by Captains Buoy and Bailey ; respectively. On the last of November, Major Martin moved his headquarters from Roseburg to a point forty-eight miles south of Roseburg, and seven miles north of Grave creek, calling his new location Camp Leland. Here for a few days the com- panies of Buoy and Keeney lay, while Bailey moved to Camas .valley, and Gordon, dividing his company, posted a part in Cow creek valley and the Canyon, and the remainder on the North Umpqua, where a few stray Indians had made hostile manifes- tations. Some fifty men of the Umpqua company were sent to Scottsburg, near the mouth of the river, where, as before remarked, some anxiety was felt regarding an

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attack by the savages. Major Martin's written instructions to Captain Bailey at Camas prairie, given under date of November 10, conclude thus : "In chastising the enemy you will use your own discretion provided you take no prisoners." Captains Buoy and Keeney received similar instructions, the original order being now on file in the state house at Salem.

The southern battalion had posted at the same time, detachments at Evans' ferry and at Bowden's, and troops were sent to assist Messrs. Harkness & Twogood, who were holding their tavern on Grave creek, and declared their purpose to retain it at all hazards. They had erected a complete stockade of timbers and prepared for a siege, as after the fight at Hungry hill it was supposed that Indian attacks would become frequent. The disposition of the military along the line of communication between the Rogue river and Umpqua valleys, however, effectually prevented the enemy from reaching the more important settlements, and the savages finding all avenues to the eastward closed, broke camp at Bloody spring and went down the Rogue river, taking refuge in the almost inaccessible country bordering that stream. The mountains thereabouts presented almost insuperable obstacles to the transportation of troops and supplies by reason of their steepness, the number of deep gorges which intersect them, and the dense forests by which their sides are clothed. Underbrush of the densest kind abounds ; no roads nor even trails existed then, and scarcely do now exist ; am- bushes might have been easily formed ; and in a word, the Indians' hiding place was perfectly adapted to their security. Having so favorable a country to operate in, and being themselves unequaled as "mountain soldiers" and bush-fighters, through long experience in the woods, and in actual war they were well situated to resist attacks, as we shall see.

The two battalions composing the " army" as newly organized, were expected to co-operate, although their commanding officers were mutually independent. After the mustering in at Camp Vannoy, the two Majors, having discovered through their scouts where the Indians had gone, determined on a plan of united action, in which they were promised the support of all the disposable regulars at Fort Lane. The United States forces in November were seriously curtailed by the withdrawal of Major Fitzgerald with his company of dragoons, ninety in number, who, under orders from Gen. John E. Wool, commanding the Pacific department, proceeded to Vancouver. Captain Judah still remained at the fort, and this officer, who acted under Captain Smith's orders, joined the expedition down the Rogue river-an expedition which we will designate as the First Meadows Campaign.

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History of Benton County, Oregon, Part 40

Author: David D. Fagan Publication date: 1885 Publisher: Number of Pages:

Author: David D. Fagan
Publication date: 1885
Publisher:
Number of Pages: