USA > Pennsylvania > The Register of Pennsylvania : devoted to the preservation of facts and documents and every other kind of useful information respecting the state of Pennsylvania, Vol. XII > Part 112
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The President himself, in his manifesto, is obliged to allow that "the charter to the Bank is to be considered as a contract on the part of the Government-it is not now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipula- tions-and by the terms of that contract the public mo- ney is to be deposited in the Bank during the continu- ance of its charter, unless the Secretary of the Treasu- ry shall otherwise direct,"
It is then admitted on all hands that this is a contract by which the Bank was to pay a sum of money, and to perform certain services, as a consideration for the use of the Government deposits, which the Government stipu- lated should remain in the Bank, unless otherwise direct- ed by a particular officer, the Secretary of the Treasury. The purpose of giving this power was obviously to pre- vent any loss of the revenue, and it was designed exclu- sively to enable the Secretary to protect the interests of the Government if the Bank became unsafe. This was the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Crawford, who, in one of his very first communications to the Bank, in March 17, 1817, declared "that, by the charter, the public money deposited in places where the Bank of the United States, or its Branches, are es- tablished, must be deposited in them, except when there are urgent reasons to the contrary." This was also the opinion pronounced by the Committee of Fi- nance of the Senate, in their report of the 20th of Fe- bruary, 1829. After citing the 16th section, they say :-
"The Commitee see, in the power given to the Sec- retary, a discreet precaution, and the words tliey be- lieve convey only the idea, that if, at any time, the Se- cretary shall be of opinion that there will be a danger of loss to the United States, by its money remaining in the vaults of the Bank, he may remove it for safety, and report his reasons to Congress. No other construction ca 1, in the opinion of the Committee, be given to that part of the 16th section."
This too was the opinion expressed by the President himself in his message to Congress on the fourth of De- cember, 1832, in which he recommends an inquiry, in order to allay "the apprehension that it is no longer a safe depository of the money of the people;" and in the same message he adds:
"Such measures as are within the reach of the Secre- tary of the Treasury, have been taken to enable him to judge whether the public deposits in that institution may be regarded as entirely safe; but as his limited pow- er may prove inadequate to this object, I recommend the subject to the attention of Congress, under a firm belief that it is worthy of serious investigation."
394
DEPOSITS-BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
[DECEMBER
And the Secretary of the Treasury in his report to the same Congress, in 1832, mentions certain things which "have suggested an inquiry into the security of the Bank as the depositary of the public funds."
The subject of the safety of the deposits was thus an object of inquiry by the Secretary of the Treasury, and by Congress-and what was the result? The agent of the Treasury, after a full investigation, reported as fol- lows:
"Thus far I consider my report as complying with that part of your letter directing the investigation 'so as to ascertain the security of the public money, and the solvency of the Bank,' neither of which in my opi- nion, admit of a doubt."
The House of Representatives, after an investigation by the Committee of Ways and Means, resolved by a vote of more than two-thirds,
" That the Government deposits may, in the opinion of the House, be safely continued in the Bank of the United States."
From these it is apparent that, in the opinion of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Com- mittee of Finance, the question of removing the de- posits was' a question merely of their safety:
That the Government, through its proper channels, inquired into their safety :
And that through all these channels their safety was made manifest, and so declared by the highest au- thority.
But supposing this to be less evident than it is-sup- posing that causes other than the safety of the public funds would justify their removal from the Bank after it has paid a full equivalent for them, still one thing is manifest:
That the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secre- tary of the Treasury alone, has the power to remove them -- that officer being specially designated to per- form that specific duty-and the President of the Unit- ed States being, by the clearest implication, forbidden to interfere.
The whole structure of the Treasury shows, that the design of Congress was to make the Secretary as inde- pendent as possible of the President. The other Sec- retaries are merely executive officers; but the Secreta- ry of the Treasury, the guardian of the public revenu e, comes into immediate sympathy with the repre- sentatives of the people who pay the revenue; and al- though according to the general scheme of appoint- ment he is nominated by the President to the Senate, yet he is in fact the officer of Congress, not the officer of the President. Thus:
By the act of Congress, of 1789, it was provided, that
"There shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of War; and there shall be a principal officer therein to be called the Secreta- ry for the Department of War, who shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be en- joined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the United States."
By the same act it was provided, that
"There shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, [afterwards changed by the act of September 15, 1789, to the Department of State] with the same pro- visions as to the principal officer.""
By the act of 30th of April, 1798, it was declared, that
" There shall be an Executive Department, under the denomination of the Department of the Navy, the chief officer of which shall be called the Secretary of the Navy, whose duty it shall be to execute such or- ders as he shall receive from the President of the Unit- ed States.
The bill introduced into the Congress of 1789, pro- vided for the establishment of the three Departments- those of War, State and Treasury-under the name
of Executive Departments But Congress made a dis- tinction between them. On the 2d of July, 1789, as the Journals of Congress show, "An engrossed bill 'for establishing an Executive Department, to be denomi- nated the Treasury Department,' was read the third time, and the blanks therein filled up.
"Resolved, That the said bill do pass, and the title be an Act to establish the Treasury Department."
The same distinction pervades the whole organiza- tion of the several Departments. The Secretary of the Navy, of State, and of War, are to execute the or- ders of the President-but the Secretary of the Trea- sury is not enjoined to execute the orders of the Presi- dent. Not a single word is there of performing the or- ders of the President. On the contrary, the act of Con- gress declares, that it shall be his duty "to make report and give information to either Branch of the Legisla- ture, in person or in writing, (as he may be required) respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office." And the act of May 10th, 1800, directs him to make his annual report, not to the President, but to Congress.
This independence of the Secretary of the Treasury -if it be true in general-is more especially true in re- gard to the Bank. It was in fact the leading principle in organizing the Bank, that the President should be excluded from all control of it. The question which most divided the House of Representatives was whether there should be any Government Directors at all-and although this was finally adopted, yet its tendency to create an executive influence over the Bank was quali- fied by two restrictions-first, that no more than three Directors should be appointed from any one State-and second, that the President of the Bank should not be, as was originally designed by the Secretary of the Trea- sury, chosen from among the Government Directors. Accordingly, by the charter, the Secretary of the Trea- sury is every thing-the President comparatively noth- ing. The Secretary has the exclusive supervision of all the relations of the Bank with the Government. Thus:
By the 15th article of the 11th section, the Officer at the head of the Treasury Department of the United States, shall be furnished from time to time, as often as he may require, not exceeding once a week, with state- ments of the amount of the capital stock, &c. &c.
By the 15th section, "Whenever required by the Sec- retary of the Treasury, the said Corporation shall give the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds," &c. &c.
By the 16th section, the deposits of the money of the United States shall be made in the Bank and its Branch- es, "unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct."
All these the Secretary may do-but from the begin- ning of the charter to the end of it, there is not one sin- gle power over the administration of the Bank assigned to the President, except in the last section, where it is declared that, "whenever any Committee of Congress shall find and report, or the President of the United States shall have reason to believe, that the charter has been violated, it may be lawful for Congress to direct, or the President to order, a scire facias to be sued out of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, calling upon the Corporation to show cause wherefore the charter hereby granted shall not be declared for- feited." The whole function then delegated to the President is a power, concurrently with a Committee of Congress, to issue a scire facias, by which the Court is to try whether his belief that the Bank has violated its charter is well founded. Yet this slender authority is made the pretext for usurping the whole power of the Secretary,and for doing that which the Secretary alone was authorized to do, and which he the President was not merely not authorized to do, but substantially pro- hibited from doing.
395
DEPOSITS-BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
1833.]
For it is manifest that this removal of the deposits is not made by the order of the Secretary of the Treasu- ry. It is a perversion of language so to describe it. On the contrary, the reverse is openly avowed. The Secretary of the Treasury refused to remove them, be- lieving, as his published letter declares, that the remo- val was "unnecessary, unwise, vindictive, arbitrary, and unjust." He was then dismissed because he would not remove them, and another was appointed because he would remove them. Now this is a palpable violation of the charter. The Bank and Congress agree upon certain terms, which no one can change but a particu- lar officer: who, although necessarily nominated to the Senate by the President, was designated by the Bank and Congress as the umpire between them. Both Congress and the Bank have a right to the free, and honest, and impartial judgment of that Officer whoe- ver he may be-the Bank, because the removal may in- jure its interests-the Congress, because the removal may greatly incommode and distress their constituents. In this case, they are deprived of it by the unlawful in- terference of the President, who "assumes the respon- sibility," which, being interpreted, means, usurps the power of the Secretary. To make this usurpation more evident, his own language contradicts the very power which he asserts:
"The power of the Secretary, says he, over the de- posits, is unqualified."
"The President cannot refrain from pressing upon the Secretary of the Treasury his view of the conside- rations which impel to immediate action."
And yet these phrases have scarcely escaped him, when he ends by declaring that he "begs his cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own." "Its re- sponsibility is assumed," &c.
Finally, it was announced in the Official Gazette, that "We know the fact, that if Mr. Van Buren and every personal friend of the President, had united in recom- mending that the deposits should not be removed, the President would have taken measures to remove them notwithstanding."
The Bank, then, has a right to complain:
1st. 'That after paying amply for the use of the de- posits, they have been suddenly drawn from it.
2d. That this has been done without the slightest suspicion of their insecurity, the only ground on which the removal could be justifiable-and
3d. That it has been done, not by the officer to whose judgment it had agreed to submit, but by another offi- cer who had not the slightest right to interfere.
But the wrong done to the pecuniary interests of the Bank, sinks into entire insignificance when compared with the deeper injury inflicted on the country by this usurpation of all the powers of the Government.
By the act of Congress, chartering the Bank, certain specified powers in regard to it are delegated to parti- cular officers.
By the 16th section, and by the 15th rule of the 11th section, the Secretary of the Treasury has a constant supervision of its affairs, and the power of placing the public revenue elsewhere, subject to an immediate and direct responsibility to Congress.
By the 22d section, Congress itself has the power of investigation, to ascertain if there be sufficient ground to justify an appeal to the courts of the United States. to try if it has violated its charter.
Finally, by the same section, whenever the President of the United States shall have "reason to believe that the charter has been violated," he may order a scire facias to be sued out of the Circuit Court of the Dis- trict of Pennsylvania, calling on the said corporation to show cause wherefore the charter hereby granted shall not be declared forfeited.
been violated, bring the Bank before the court for trial. Now, in this manifesto, he distinctly declares that the Bank has acted "in direct violation of one of the most important provisions of the charter." If so, it was his duty to issue the scire facias-to appeal to the Courts and Juries. That was the only legitimate action which belonged to him. But a judicial investigation of his charges is precisely what he dreaded. The more sum- mary and illegal invasion of the powers of others, seems to have more attraction than the legitimate exercise of his own. And making himself accuser and judge- disregarding the vote of Congress, the authority of the Courts and Juries, and the exclusive power of the Se- cretary of the Treasury, he substitutes at once his own arbitrary will. Certainly since the foundation of this Government, nothing has ever been done which more deeply wounds the spirit of our free institutions. It, in fact, resolves itself into this-that whenever the laws prescribe certain duties to an officer, acting under the sanctions of his official oath and his private character, refuses to violate that law, the President of the United States may dismiss him and appoint another; and if he too should prove to be a "refractory subordinate," to continue his removals until he at last discovers in the descending scale of degradation some irresponsible in- dividual fit to be the tool of his designs. Unhappily, there are never wanting men who will think as their superiors wish them to think-men who regard more the compensation than the duties of their office-men to whom daily bread is sufficient consolation for daily shame.
The present state of this question is a fearful illustra- tion of the danger of it. At this moment, the whole revenue of this country, is at the disposal-the absolute, uncontrolled disposal-of the President of the United States. The laws declare that the public funds shall be placed in the Bank of the United States, unless the Secretary of the Treasury forbids it. The Secretary of the Treasury will not forbid it. The President dis- misses him and appoints somebody who will. So the law declares that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, except on warrants for appropriations made by law. If the Treasurer refuses to draw his warrant for any disbursement, the President may dismiss him and appoint some more flexible agent, who will not he- sitate to gratify his patron. The text is in the official Gazette, announcing the fate of the dismissed Secreta- ry to all who follow him. "The Agent cannot consci- entiously perform the service and refuses to co-operate, and desires to remain to thwart the President's mea- sures. To put an end to this difficulty between the head and the hands of the Executive Department, the Constitution arms the Chief Magistrate with authority to remove the refractory subordinate." The theory thus avowed, and the recent practice under it, convert the whole free institutions of this country into the mere absolute will of a single individual. They break down all the restraints which the framers of the Government hoped they had imposed on arbitrary power, and place the whole revenue of the United States in the hands of the President. The power, too, is asserted in a tone fitter for the East, than for any country claiming to be governed by laws. The President declares that, "in his opinion, the near approach of the termination of the charter, and the public considerations heretofore mentioned, are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of the deposits, without reference to the conduct of the Bank, or their safety in its keeping."
The only "public considerations heretofore mention- ed," are his own re-election, and his belief that the char- ter would not be renewed. So that the President here avows that although the last Congress passed a bill re- chartering this very Bank-although the same Congress, a few months ago, at his own invitation, declared that the public deposits might be safely continued in this Bank-although a new Congress, many of whose mem-
This is the whole power of the President in relation to the Bank. He may, if he thinks the charter has | bers are chosen by the people since his own election,
396
DEPOSITS-BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.
[DECEMBER
is about to meet in ninety days, and will continue in ex- istence for two years-although at the end of those two years a new Congress, fresh from the people, will meet before the charter expires -yet, notwithstanding all this, he, the l'resident declares, on his own respon- sibility, that the deposits shall be removed; no matter whether the conduct of the Bank has been good or bad, and no matter whether the deposits are safe or unsafe; and accordingly he dismisses the officer who refuses to remove them, and appoints another who will remove them.
At this moment the process of evading the law is in full practice.
By the Constitution of the United States, (Sec. 9,) "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in con- sequence of an appropriation made by law."
By the act of Sept. 1, 1789, establishing the Treasu- ry Department, the Secretary of the Treasury is autho- rized to "grant all warrants for moneys to be issued from the Treasury in pursuance of appropriations by law;" and the same act further declares, that it shall be the duty of the Treasurer to receive and keep the mo- neys of the United States and to disburse the same, up- on warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by the Comptroller, recorded by the Register, and not otherwise."
But there has been a usage of transferring funds from one branch of the Bank of the U. S. to another, or one State Bank to another, when the public service rc- quired disbursements at remote places. This transfer draught, intended to require an actual transfer, has been converted into a mere check-a warrant in fact, though not in form-and has been applied to the pur- pose of taking the funds out of the place to which they are assigned by law, and transferring them to the oppo- site side of the street. As it was never presumed that such a power would be thus abused, the transfer draft has fewer checks than the warrant for disbursement, the signature of the Comptroller, who is the law officer of the Treasury not being usual; and accordingly by a strange anomaly, although the Treasurer's warrant to pay one hundred dollars to an honest creditor of the Government must go through a great variety of forms, the transfer draught for a million has fewer formalities. By means of these transfer draughts, as will be seen by the annexed correspondence, large sums of money have been withdrawn from the Bank of the United States, and placed in State Banks in the same city, without the slightest reference to the public disburse- ments-and no less than two millions three hundred thousand dollars of the public revende have been plac- ed at the discretion of the officers of the State Banks by transfer draughts privately issued, and without the notice to the Bank of the United States, which the Treasury had promised to give, and had hitherto al- ways given of similar demands on the Bank.
The Committee willingly leave to the Congress of the United States the assertion of their own constitutional power, and the vindication of the principles of our Government, against the most violent assault they have ever yet encountered; and will now confine themselves to the more limited purpose of showing that the reasons assigned for this measure are as unfounded as the ob- ject itself is illegal.
The main purpose in fact of this manifesto, appears to be to prove that the Bank was unfriendly to his own election, and he endeavors to trace this opposition to him and his measures.
1st. In the application to Congress for a renewal of the Charter.
2d. In the extension of the loans of the Bank in 1831 and 1832.
3d. In the claim for damages on the French Bill.
4th. In the circulation of documents vindicating the Bank from the imputations which had been cast upon it.
1st. He first complains that the Bank applied to Congress for a decision in regard to its charter. He says "that there are strong reasons for believing that the motive of the Bank for asking for a re-charter at that session, was to make it a leading question in the election of a President of the United States the ensuing November, and all steps were deemed necessary to procure from the people a reversal of the President's decision;" and again-"the object avowed by many of the advocates of the Bank was to put the President to the test;" and moreover, "it was to compel the Presi- dent to take his stand that the question was brought forward at that particular time." Now the fact is that so far from prematurely hastening a discussion on the part of the Bank, it was he himself who brought this very question before Congress and rendered its discus- sion inevitable Thus,
In his Message of December 8, 1829, he said,
"The Charter of the Bank of the United States ex- pires in 1336, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important principles and such deep pe- cuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the people."
In his Message of December 11th, 1830, he says,
"The importance of the principles involved in the inquiry whether it be proper to re-charter the Bank of the United States, requires that I should again call the attention of Congress to the subject."
In his Message of December 6, 1831, he says,
"Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the Bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty in my former Messages frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably di- rected to that important subject, and that it might be considered and finally disposed of in a manner best cal- culated to promote the ends of the Constitution, and subserve the public interest. Having thus conscien- tiously discharged a constitutional question, I deem it proper on this occasion, without a more particular re- ference to the views of the subject then expressed, to leave it at present to the investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives."
It was under these distinct and repeated invitations by the President himself, that the Bank felt itselfoblig- ed not to decline his call upon Congress, and accord- ingly the subject was brought before that body.
Both Houses of Congress passed the bill renewing the charter. This result was unexpected to him, and al- though he had declared in the Message just quoted, that he meant to "leave it at present to the investiga- tion of an enlightened people and their representatives" -yet the moment the enlightened people and their re- presentatives differed from him in opinion, he treated them just as he has recently done the conscience of the Secretary of the Treasury. He refused his signature to the bill on the 14th of July. 1832, declaring that "had the executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed." As however no such call was made he concluded that "as the charter had yet four years to run, and as a renewal now was not necessary to the successful prosecution of its business, it was to have been expected," &c. &c.
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