USA > Illinois > Illinois, historical and statistical, comprising the essential facts of its planting and growth as a province, county, territory, and state, Vol. II > Part 22
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This reference to the doctrine of state sovereignty was re- garded by the republicans as uncalled for by the situation, but was warmly approved and heartily endorsed by the democrats.
In response to the demand for legislative action on the sub- ject of rates, Senator Fuller, chairman of the senate committee on railroads, early in the session, introduced a bill for "An act concerning railroad rates for passengers in Illinois." It provided, among other things, that no railroad corporation doing business in this State should charge or receive for the conveyance of any passenger over its line of road more than three cents per mile. The bill passed both houses, but was returned to the senate by the governor with his veto, on the following grounds: that the charter of every railroad company constitutes a contract, the validity of which can not be impaired by the legislature-the respective rights of the State and the corporators being fixed beyond recall and the contract being susceptible of interpreta- tion only by the judiciary; the bill as passed, the governor said, was an assumption of judicial powers by the legislative depart- ment. He remarked, in his message: "In fact, the bill is based upon a misconception both of the rights of the corporators and of the public. The rights of all are secured by the contract be- tween the proprietors of the corporate franchise and the state. What is reasonable for the transportation of passengers,
779
TAX-GRABBING LAW.
under any given circumstances, must, in the nature of things, be dependent upon the facts that can only be investigated in tribunals organized for that purpose. * * The bill under con- sideration, then, so far as it proposes to establish a rate of com- pensation to railroad corporations for the transportation of passengers, founded alone upon the authority of the general assembly, irrespective of the exact measure of reason and right, impairs the obligation of the contracts of the State, and if it rests for its support upon any claim of the general assembly of a right to interpret this class of contracts, it invades the consti- tutional power of the judicial department, and would be void even if clothed by my approval with the forms of law."
The senate having refused to pass the bill over the governor's veto, Gen. Fuller introduced a new measure, drafted in accord- ance with the governor's views, which became a law March IO. The first section provided that all railroads in this State should be "limited to a just, reasonable, and uniform rate, fare, toll, and compensation for the transportation of passengers and freight." Other sections provided for establishing, printing, and posting of all railroad tariffs, and fixed penalties for violations. In this shape it simply reaffirmed the principles of the common law on the subject of railroad charges, and came far short of what the people demanded. It was superseded by subsequent legislation under the constitution of 1870.
Other laws of public interest were enacted at this session, as follows: to provide for the appointment of a board of com- missioners of public charities and defining their duties and powers; to erect and carry on an asylum for the insane-the northern; to establish and maintain the southern Illinois normal university; to fund and provide for paying the railroad debts of counties, townships, cities, and towns, sometimes referred to as the "tax-grabbing law." It provided that whenever any county, township, city, or town had contracted a debt to aid in the construction of any railroad running near to, into, or through said locality, the state treasurer should place to the credit of such county, city, or town, annually, for and during the term of ten years, all the state taxes collected and paid into the State treasury on the increased valuation of the taxable property of said county, city, or town, as shown by the annual
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ILLINOIS-HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL.
assessment rolls, over and above the amount of the assessment roll for 1868-excepting the school and two-mill tax-which funds should be "deemed as pledged and appropriated" to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds issued for the payment of said railroad debt.
It was an ingenious, even if questionable, scheme, which was supposed to be destined to benefit counties and towns in their efforts to extend their railroad facilities. The governor inter- posed his veto to the bill, on the ground that it contemplated the assumption by the State of the obligation to pay the debts of counties incurred by individual cities and towns to aid rail- roads already completed; and for the additional reason that it violated the principle of the equality of taxation. The assem- bly, however, passed it despite the governor's protest. The amount of bonds filed under the law amounted to over $15,- 000,000 and the State taxes devoted to their payment amounted to about $60,000 per annum.
The law aroused no little opposition in some portions of the State, and in 1874, the question of its constitutionality having been brought before the supreme court, that tribunal sustained the position of the executive .*
By act of 1875, provision was made for the refunding of the taxes of 1873, illegally collected under the law.
Another law, which attracted a good deal of attention at the time, and the controversy over the subject matter of which has only lately been concluded in the courts, was entitled: "An act in relation to a portion of the submerged lands and lake-park grounds lying on and adjacent to the shore of Lake Michigan, on the eastern frontage of the City of Chicago;" otherwise known as the "Lake-Front bill."
By this act the State ceded to the City of Chicago, in fee, a strip of land in section 15, township 39, range 14, lying east of Michigan Avenue, north of Park Row, south of the south line of Monroe Street, and west of a line running parallel with and 400 feet east of the west line of said Michigan Avenue, being a strip of land 400 feet in width, including said avenue, and comprising about 32 acres-known as the Lake-Front Park. While, however, the city was granted full power and authority
* Ramsey vs. Hoeger, 6 Illinois, 432.
CHAS.E. LIPPINCOTT.
WASHINGTON BUSHNELL
JOHN DOUGHERTY.
ERASTUS N. BATES.
EDWARD RUMMEL.
.
STOR
AHL
NY IBRARI 1
781
THE LAKE-FRONT LAW.
to sell and convey the same, the proceeds of said sale were to be set aside and to constitute what was termed the Park Fund.
The act also confirmed the property rights of the Illinois- Central Railroad Company, under the grant from the State in its charter, and recognized "the riparian ownership incident to such grant, appropriation, occupancy, use, and control, in and to the lands submerged, or otherwise lying east of the said line running parallel with and 400 feet east of the west line of Mich- igan Avenue in fractional sections 10 and 15, township and range as aforesaid." The most important clause in the act, however, was that expressed in the following terms: "All the right and title of the State of Illinois, in and to the submerged lands constituting the bed of Lake Michigan, and lying east of the tracks and breakwater of the Illinois-Central Railroad Company for the distance of one mile, and between the south line of the south pier extended eastwardly, and a line extended eastward from the south line of lot 21, south of and near to the round- house and machine-shops of said company in the south division of the said City of Chicago, are hereby granted in fee to the said Illinois-Central Railroad Company," upon certain condi- tions and uses. Another important clause was as follows: "All the right and title of the State in and to the lands, submerged or otherwise, lying north of the south line of Monroe Street, and south of the south line of Randolph Street, and between the east line of Michigan Avenue and the track and roadway of the Illinois-Central Railroad Company were granted in fee to the Illinois-Central Railroad Company, the Chicago-Burlington-and -Quincy Railroad Company, and the Michigan-Central Rail- road Company," for the erection thereon of a passenger depot, and for such other purposes as the business of said companies might require; in consideration of which grant the said rail- road companies were to pay to the City of Chicago $800,000.
Again the governor interposed his veto. In regard to the lots sold for depot purposes, he claimed that they were worth $2,600,000 instead of $800,000. He further took the ground that the grant to the Illinois-Central Railroad Company of the submerged lands was not sufficiently defined, nor could it be easily understood. The company, he said, should moreover be required to begin the work of improvement within a reasonable
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ILLINOIS-HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL.
time; and the net profits derived from improvements made for the relief of commerce should be limited, and the property made subject to taxation.
Notwithstanding these well-founded objections and despite the strong opposition of citizens of Chicago, the bill was passed over the governor's veto by the constitutional majority.
It was not long before litigation grew out of the enactment of this law. An injunction was granted by the United-States circuit-court, restraining the city from releasing, or the railway companies from occupying, the land granted for depot purposes ; and so determined and aggressive had become the opposition to the provisions of the act, that it was repealed by the legisla- ture of 1873.
The legal controversy was continued in the form of a tri- angular fight, involving the respective rights of the State, the railroad company, and the city of Chicago, until February, 1888, when the same were judicially determined in the circuit- court of the United States for the nothern district of Illinois.
The decision of that tribunal held that the Illinois - Central Railroad, under grants from the State, acquired title in fee to all the water-lots in the Fort Dearborn addition to Chicago north of Randolph Street, and that what had been done by that company in the way of filling in the lake and constructing wharves, slips, piers, tracks, and warehouses between the Chicago River and Randolph Street, as well as its occupancy and use of the two triangular pieces of ground immediately south of Randolph Street, were justified by its riparian ownership, by its charter, and by the city ordinances of 1855-6; that the structures erected by the company east of the exterior line designated by the city ordinance of 1852, granting the right of way, and of those built in 1867-apart from the confirmatory act of 1869-was justifiable on the ground that they were neces- sary for the complete operation of the road for the purpose designated in the charter. Upon the same ground, the court held, that the structures erected by the company south of Park Row and north of Sixteenth Street had been legally built, and its title thereto was confirmed. But the opinion went further, declaring that even if the court was in error in so holding, the action of the railroad company in these particu-
783
DECISION IN THE LAKE-FRONT CASE.
lars had been legalized by the confirmatory clause of the third section of the act of 1869. In regard to the grant of the submerged lands as described in the third section of the act of 1869, the court held that the effect of the repealing act of 1873 was to abrogate the cession of the same to the railway company, and to revoke the additional powers therein con- ferred upon it, by implication, to construct and maintain wharves, piers, and docks for the benefit of commerce and navigation generally, rather than in the prosecution of its business as defined and limited by its original charter; saving to the company the right to hold and use, as a part of its right of way, the small part of the submerged lands, outside its breakwater of 1869, between Monroe and Washington streets, extending eastwardly, which had been reclaimed from the lake in 1873. Such repeal, it was held, was attended by the further result that while the city of Chicago might, under its charter, preserve the harbor, prevent obstructions being placed therein, and make wharves and slips, at the ends of the streets, the exercise of these powers and the whole subject of the improve- ment of the harbor by a system of wharves, docks, piers, and other structures, remained with the State, subject only to the paramount authority of the United States under the power of congress to regulate commerce.
In regard to the lot granted to the railroads for depot pur- poses, it was held that the return to them of the money de- posited with the comptroller as a condition precedent, at their request, deprived them of whatever benefit might have accrued from that tender, "leaving them in the attitude of never having performed the conditions upon which they were to acquire the title to these lands. So that the title remains just where it was before the passage of the act of 1869, namely in the city of Chicago."
During this session, the question of the completion of the new state-house again loomed up into prominence. The first measure introduced making an appropriation for the continuance of the work failed, but a bill was finally passed, amending former laws on the subject and appropriating $650,000 for that purpose.
The fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United
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ILLINOIS-HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL.
States, providing that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," was ratified by a strictly party-vote in each house on March 5.
It having been decided to call a convention to amend the constitution, there was a general scramble to take advantage of the brief period which seemed likely to afford the last oppor- tunity for the passage of private laws and special acts of incor- poration. The "third house" was out in force and its members were influential and aggressive, besides being plethoric of means. The charge was repeatedly made that money was being used to procure the passage of certain bills; and the clerk, James P. Root, reported to the house at one time, that $400 having come into his possession which he "knew of no law which authorizes an action in the name of any party to recover," he had dis- tributed the same among four deserving charities, which he named; and his action was approved by a unanimous vote of the body.
The preceding general assembly, as has been shown, had been by no means backward in special legislation, but the twenty- sixth was conspicuous above all others for its prodigality in the passage of bills of a local and private character "as pernicious in principle, as they were contrary to public policy." They embraced every conceivable subject, from the incorporation of private manufacturing concerns, hotels, and banking establish- ments to the creation of land companies and benevolent loan associations, whose sole aim was to blossom out into huge monopolies, for private gain.
No less than 1700 private laws were enacted at this session, filling four large octavo volumes-so many, indeed, that when the legislature had concluded its business on March II, at the end of the longest session ever held under the constitution of 1848, Gov. Palmer had only been able to examine 300 of them, and a recess, until April 14, had to be taken to give him time to read the remaining 1400. This he did with considerable care, and when the two houses again assembled, he fulminated his veto against eighty odd of these enactments-most of which, nevertheless, were passed. It was in contemplation of the pro-
785
STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
ceedings of this general assembly that the cynical remark was made, that "the legislature meets in ignorance, sits in corrup- tion, and dissolves in disgrace regularly every two years."
A state constitution may be defined to be an authoritative statement in writing by the people in their sovereign capacity of those fundamental principles which shall be the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments of the government in respect to all subjects and matters covered by it, which must dominate and control, subject to the constitution of the United States, until it shall be changed by the authority which estab- lished it .*
As a criminal code, court-houses, and jails are necessary in the most free and enlightened communities to preserve order and secure to the people their personal rights and liberties, so are the permanent declarations and restrictions of constitutions necessary to guard against that hasty, inconsiderate, or corrupt legislation which might arise from the exercise of uncontrolled power.
The first constitution of Illinois, following those of most of the older states, was a brief document, in which the powers, duties, and functions of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments were concisely defined in eight articles, including the bill of rights. With the schedule, it covered only fifteen octavo pages. The law-making power was untrammelled by any restrictive provisions. It was under this constitution that the internal-improvement system was passed, under which the already-recited evils of an enormous state debt were entailed upon the commonwealth, retarding its growth and embarrassing its citizens for more than a decade.
Then came the constitution of 1848, which was adopted dur- ing an era of burdensome public and private obligations, when property possessed but a nominal value, and before the great natural resources of the State had been developed or even imagined. The chief object of its framers was to provide for an economical administration of the government, to render comparatively easy the extrication of the commonwealth from debt, and to guard against the possibility of an increase in the
* Cooley's "Constitutional Limit.," 3; Hitcock's "American State Constitution," 8; Webster's "Dictionary."
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ILLINOIS-HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL.
public burdens by prohibiting the incurring of any indebted- ness on account of the State to an amount exceeding $50,000. It was also deemed best to curtail the power of the legislature in other directions: the granting of divorces except under general law was inhibited; extra compensation to public officers was forbidden; and the creation of state-banks, or of any corpora- tion with banking powers, unless the same should be ratified by the people, was made illegal. Neither was the credit of the State to be given in aid of any individual, association, or cor- poration. It was, indeed, provided,-article X,-that corporations should not be created by special acts, except-and the excep- tion, as has been seen, proved to be the rule-in cases where, in the judgment of the general assembly, the objects of the corporation could not be attained under general laws. The latter provision resembled that other article, which required every bill to be read on three different days in each house before its passage, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house deemed it expedient to dispense with the rule. The cases of urgency were found to be as frequent as were the desires of the members to secure the prompt passage of their private bills.
Perhaps one reason why specific restrictions upon legislative action in the organic law of 1848 were not more numerous was to be found in the confidence felt in the limitation of the time of the session to forty- two days and the small compensation allowed to the members. It was doubtless thought that no very great amount of mischief could be wrought in so short a time and that no one would care to stay longer at one dollar per day for his services.
The reasons for adopting a new constitution at this time, 1869, were obvious and undisputed, if not imperative. The old instru- ment had served its day. Under its operations great abuses had grown up, especially in the direction of special legislation, as heretofore shown, until, in the language of Gov. Palmer, in his message of 1871, "the history of the American States pre- sented no example of a government more defective or vicious than that of the State of Illinois." Under the constitution of 1848, "the limitations placed upon the powers of the various governmental departments had become obsolete, so that there
787
REASONS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION.
remained no effective rule by which their respective responsibili- ties could be defined or enforced." Legislation thereunder had grown to be hasty and improvident and the feeling was general that public and private rights were unsafe. Public officers re- ceived as a compensation for their services, under authority of law, sums which were well known to be inconsistent with, and in violation of, the express provisions of the constitution; and what were intended by its framers as provisions for an economi- cal government became in their administration the source of reckless extravagance. Numerous instances might be cited, but a few will suffice: the governor's salary of $1500, which was not to be "increased or diminished," had, for instance, for many years been made equivalent to $6000 by an appropriation in his favor of $4500 per annum, "for fuel and lights for the executive mansion, to defray the expenses of caring for the same, and keeping the grounds attached thereto in repair." The sum of "two dollars per day and ten cents for each necessary mile's travel," as a compensation for forty-two days attendance by the members upon the sessions of the general assembly, "and no more," was stretched out to a per diem of seven dollars for a seventy-four days' session by the twenty-sixth general assembly; the sum of "$300 for extra expenses" being voted by the mem- bers to themselves in one fell lump. Other equally illegal appropriations followed, so that the legislative and executive expenditures of the State government, which had been $225,12I for the years 1858-60 and $256,878 for 1862-64, had risen to $617,011 for 1864-66; to $740,304 for 1866-68, and to $840,360 for 1868-70.
The legislature of 1867 adopted a resolution recommending that the electors of the State, at the ensuing election of the members of the general assembly, vote for or against calling a convention to frame a new constitution for the State. Although there were but few votes against the proposition, the popular indifference to the subject was such that it only received a majority of 704 of all those cast.
Pursuant to a law passed by the twenty-sixth general assem- bly, the members elect met at Springfield, December 13, 1869 and organized the convention by the election of Charles Hitch- cock, president; John Q. Harmon, secretary; and Daniel Shep-
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ILLINOIS-HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL.
ard first and A. H.Swain second assistants. The roll contained the names of eighty-five members, of whom, although fifteen had been elected as independents, forty-four were republicans and forty-one democrats. It was unquestionably the ablest deliberative body that ever convened in the State, a majority of the delegates being men of ripe experience, some on the bench or at the bar, others in various responsible positions in public life-as congressmen, members of the legislature, and representatives of the press, while there was a fair sprinkling of men who had attained distinction in the walks of finance, agriculture, and trade .*
Where so many were distinguished, it may be invidious to draw distinctions; yet perhaps it is not too much to say that the leaders of the body were: Wm. J. and J. C. Allen, Elliott Anthony, William R. Archer, Reuben M. Benjamin, Orville H. Browning, Silas L. Bryan, Alfred M. Craig, Samuel P. Cum- mings, John Dement, Miles A. Fuller, Milton Hay, S. Snowden Hayes, Jesse S. Hildrup, Joseph Medill, Samuel C. Parks, Edward Y. Rice, Lewis W. Ross, John Scholfield, Onias C. Skinner, William H. Snyder, William H. Underwood, Henry W. Wells, and George R. Wendling.
Naturally, when the convention had fairly commenced work, its attention was primarily directed toward correcting the evils which had grown up in the legislative branch of the government under the old instrument. In this direction, many important changes were effected, which experience had proved to be desirable and many of which have been since adopted in other states. Not only is all special legislation prohibited in general terms where a general law can be made applicable, but in addition to the subjects of lotteries and divorces, which had been the only ones specifically named in the former instrument, twenty-two new items are especially enumerated, in regard to which, no local or special law should be passed. Included among these are roads, names of persons and places; vacating towns
* A complete list of these names will be found with the constitution of 1870 in the Appendix. Occupations: 53 were lawyers, 14 farmers, 13 merchants, bankers, and traders, 4 physicians, I editor. By birth, 19 were from New York, 17 from New England, 11 from Illinois, 11 from Ohio, 12 from Kentucky and Tennessee, 5 from Virginia and Maryland, 4 from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 2 from Indi- ana, and 4 from England and Scotland.
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