USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 12
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"I did not like the attentions I received from some of those who had been my fellow-passengers, so, as they left the cars on the north side, I took the south, and continued my journey on foot heading for Philadelphia. I had a farm about two miles north on the Philadelphia road, and there was living on the place a man by the name of Shunk. I went to his house. He was ab- sent on my arrival, but soon returned. He was not a Northern man in sentiment. I told him that it was important that I should reach Philadelphia that night, and that if he would put me through to Perryville, I would give him $100. He said he could not do it. The truth was, he was afraid to be seen with a Northern man. I then walked out through a lane, leading from my own premises to the Philadelphia Pike. I had hardly entered it, before I was arrested by a half dozen men, some on horseback, who took charge of me as being a suspicious character. Every lane and avenue out of Baltimore appeared to be guarded. I invited my captors to a neighboring saloon, and supplied them plenteously with whiskey, assured them that I was all right, and
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took them back to Shunk, who vouched for me and satisfied them. After they left I arranged with Shunk to wait until mid- night, when he said he would smuggle me through to the head- quarters of an abolitionist named Felix Von Rueth, who lived in the direction of Philadelphia, about ten miles out. Soon after midnight we started on horseback through fields and by-ways, he being familiar with the country. We did not reach our destina- tion until after daylight on Sabbath morning.
" Von Rueth received me kindly. At his house I found three or four wounded soldiers, who had been beaten back from Balti- more. I acquainted him with the great necessity which existed of my arriving early in Philadelphia, for I had learned that it was the intention of the conspirators that evening to burn soine bridges east of Perryville, which would break up communication with Annapolis. Von Rueth gave me breakfast, and placing me in an old-fashioned gig, sent his son Flavius (a dashing young man) to drive me. We proceeded a few miles, when we came to a tavern where there were four or five hundred men assembled, armed with every conceivable weapon, to head back the Northern horde, whom they had been told would attempt to pass to Baltimore on the Philadelphia turnpike. When we came in sight of the house, it was evident that we could not pass unmolested. So we made a virtue of necessity, and drove boldly up to the door. Before we could alight, my name and business were demanded. Von Rueth told them I was a clergyman, whom he was taking to preach at Perryville that night. After satisfying them that I belonged to the Methodist Episcopal Church South, we were allowed to go on our way unmolested. I might not have had any trouble in cros- sing at Perryville, but feared to make the attempt, and kept south a mile or two, where Von Rueth left me. The river is wide at this point, but a man was induced to set me across in a crazy old skiff. I then walked through the marshy ground to the depot. I went at once to the telegraph office, and my heart was rejoiced to find, by the click of the instrument, that I could communicate with Philadelphia. It was about two o'clock Sabbath afternoon, when I telegraphed to General Patterson that I had important communications from the Government, and orders for him to send a strong force of men to guard every bridge between there
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and Philadelphia. A special locomotive arrived in an incredibly short space of time, and I was not only in Philadelphia, but Har- risburg, before ten o'clock that night. I returned to Washington with General Butler on the first train over the road that had thus been so providentially saved for the Northern troops."
On the 16th of April, Governor Curtin had appointed Major- Generals Robert Patterson and William H. Keim to the command of the troops called out by the Proclamation of President Lincoln of the preceding day, and shortly after, General Patterson was appointed by Lieutenant-General Scott, then General-in-chief, to command the Department of Washington, embracing the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and the District of Columbia, with headquarters at Philadelphia. Before the route to Washington through Baltimore had been closed, General Pat- terson, acting upon the advice of Mr. Felton, had selected the Annapolis route, and had sent his aide, Hon. John Sherman, of Ohio, to Washington, to recommend it to the attention of the Government. The dispatches brought through by Mr. Lowry gave him authority to act, and he immediately took measures to make it abundantly secure, placing General Butler with the Mas- sachusetts Eighth, and Colonel Lefferts with the New York Seventh, upon the road, who not only held it, but proceeded to repair the track and disabled engines, skilled mechanics being readily found in the ranks.
The number of troops required from Pennsylvania under this first call was sixteen regiments of infantry, afterwards re- duced to fourteen. When several of the border States refused to furnish men, the number from the States willing to contribute was increased, and twenty-five regiments were finally accepted. "Such was the patriotic ardor of the people," says Adjutant- General Russell. " that the services of about thirty regiments had to be refused, making in all more than one-half the requisition of the President." When the communication with Washington was severed, which remained so for several days, General Patterson was left without orders, and was obliged to act upon his own judgment. Foreseeing the desperate nature of the contest upon which the country was entering, and convinced that the small force called for three months would be unable to effect the pur-
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pose for which' they were summoned, and fearful that at the expiration of their term no troops would be in readiness to take their places, he assumed the responsibility of authorizing the for- mation of an additional force in the following words, addressed to the Governor of Pennsylvania : "I feel it my duty to express to you my clear and decided opinion that the force at the disposal of this Department should be increased without delay. I, there- fore, have to request of your Excellency to direct, thrat twenty- five additional regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry be called for forthwith, to be mustered into the service of the United States." Stepewere immediately taken to raise this force, and considerable progress had been made, when communication with the Capital was restored, and the Government, not feeling itself warranted in calling more troops, revoked the General's order, accompanying the notice of revocation with the statement " that it was more important to reduce than enlarge the number" already ordered.
The first duty after securing the Annapolis route, was to open that by way of Baltimore, and as soon as the troops were organ- ized and sufficiently in hand, it was promptly undertaken. The forces selected for this purpose were the Seventeenth Pennsylva- nia regiment, known in the militia as the First Artillery, T. W. Sherman's Light Battery, and five companies of the Third Regu- lar Infantry, all under command of Colonel Francis E. Patterson, son of the General. By this time, however, the rebellious ele- ment in Baltimore had lost strength and daring, and the Union sentiment had assumed a power and a vitality which made itself felt. Colonel Patterson's force, therefore, marched in without opposition. The National authority thus established was main- tained, and the tide of volunteers, which soon after began to flow towards the Capital, was not again interrupted.
From the first dawning of the Rebellion, it was seen that Pennsylvania, by its long line of border contiguous to rebellious territory, was exposed to the invasion, or sudden sallies of the enemy. Pittsburg was a city of great wealth, and here were cast the heavy guns for the navy, siege guns for the army, and here much of the material for the war was manufactured. It lay, too, upon the track of a great thoroughfare for the passage of troops
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to the Eastern army. It would, at any time, have been an important strategic point for the enemy to have held. But West Virginia proved true to the flag, thus interposing loyal territory, and the city was too far away from the eastern rebellious armies to tempt them to make a difficult campaign to reduce it.
But the Shenandoah Valley, of Virginia, leads naturally into the Cumberland Valley, of Pennsylvania. Indeed, one is but a continuation of the other. A heavy Union force was kept to guard the approaches to the Capital, and consequently the enemy sought to avoid exposing himself to a flank attack from that direction in moving for the invasion of the North, by interposing a great mountain range. The Shenandoah Valley, therefore, became the great natural highway for a hostile advance. How best to shut its mouth, and secure it against egress, was the first care of the Union leaders. Hence, when upon Virginia soil, the armies of Rebellion began to gather, General Patterson was sent into the Cumberland Valley to establish a camp and organize a force to guard the frontier, or if need be, drive back the enemy. His camp was formed at Chambersburg. With the exception of the Fourth and Fifth regiments, which were sent to Washington, the Twelfth, which was employed on the line of the Northern Central Railroad, and the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty- second, which were stationed at Baltimore and vicinity, the entire twenty-five Pennsylvania regiments were gathered in Patterson's column. Upon his staff, and of his brigade and division com- manders, were some of the ablest of the Union soldiers, who sub- sequently achieved a world-wide reputation. George H. Thomas, Abner Doubleday, David B. Birney, James S. Negley, and J. J. Abercrombie were among his subordinates, while Fitz John Porter and John Newton served upon his staff, and Keim, Cadwalader, and Stone led his divisions.
Beauregard, who commanded the rebel army being marshalled on the plains of Manassas, early sent a force into the Shenandoah Valley, under the afterwards famous Stonewall Jackson, who was subsequently superseded in chief command by General Joseph E. Johnston, Jackson remaining with him in a subordinate capacity. Johnston posted his forces at Harper's Ferry, and from that point, as headquarters, held the Valley in his firm grasp. Patterson's
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first care was to drive Johnston back, and after opening the Balti- more and Ohio Railway and Canal, to push forward towards Win- chester. When Johnston discovered that it was the intention of Patterson to cross and offer battle, he evacuated Harper's Ferry. So soon as General Scott learned this, he discouraged an advance by Patterson, apprehending that Johnston would be forced back and form a junetion with Beauregard, thus increasing the com- plications in front of Washington. He accordingly ordered all the available field artillery, Regulars, and General Burnside's fine Rhode Island regiment, to Washington. When this order came, Patterson was already across the Potomac, and advancing confi- dently. Without artillery he could do nothing, and much to his chagrin, he was obliged to retire to the Maryland shore, at the same time remonstrating vigorously against being thus stripped of artillery and trained troops, and pleading earnestly to have them returned to him; but the order was imperative. Referring to this action, Hon. John Sherman, in a letter to General Patterson, said : "The great error of General Scott undoubtedly was, that he gave way to a causeless apprehension that Washington was to be attacked before the meeting of Congress, and therefore weakened you when you were advancing. No subsequent movement could repair that error." And General Patterson, in commenting upon this, says : "This, I venture to say, will be the conclusion of any one who dispassionately examines the subject. I was mortified and humiliated at having to recross the river without striking a blow. I knew that my reputation would be grievously damaged by it; the country could not understand the meaning of this crossing and recrossing, this marching and countermarching in the face of the foe, and that I would be censured without stint for such apparent vacillation and want of purpose."
A few days after this, on the 20th of June, General Scott requested General Patterson to submit a plan of operations. This the latter did on the following day, just one month before the battle of Bull Run, and it was, in substance, to fortify and garri- son Maryland Heights, transfer the depot of supply and reserve force to Hagerstown, and then move with the whole remaining force, horse, foot, and artillery, across the Potomac to Leesburg .- then to threaten the enemy in the Valley should he attempt to
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advance to or cross the Potomac,-or join McDowell at Manassas the moment needed. This plan was rejected, and Patterson was ordered on the 25th to remain in front of the enemy, and if, in superior or equal force, to cross and attack him. As soon as his troops could be put in order he did cross, came up with Stonewall Jackson at Falling Waters, fought and defeated him, and pushed forward to Martinsburg and Bunker Hill. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the Valley by making a demon- stration on the day of the contemplated battle at Manassas. General Scott gave notice that the battle would be fought by McDowell on Tuesday, the 16th of July, and accordingly General Patterson made an active and noisy advance towards Winchester, causing Johnston, who was well entrenched there, to be reinforced from Strasburg, and who, as subsequently ascertained, was expecting an attack, and had his entire force in battle array. General Patterson had received, on the 13th, a telegram from General Scott, in these words : "I telegraphed you yesterday, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, to make demonstrations so as to detain him in the Valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force towards Manassas, and it be hazard- ous to follow him, then consider the route via Keyes' Ferry, Leesburg, etc." Well knowing that he was vastly inferior to Johnston in numbers, who, in addition to being well entrenched, had abundance of field and siege artillery, supposing that the contemplated battle at Bull Run was being fought on the 16th and 17th of July, as he had been advised it would be, and as he had been informed by telegram it had actually been begun on the latter day,* having seen his demonstration successful, he com- menced on the 18th moving towards Keyes' Ferry, as he had been directed to do, and as the best officers in his column, in council of war, had advised.
But the battle of Bull Run was not fought until the 21st, and Johnston, thus left free to join Beauregard, having a direct route open, and a railroad upon which to move, abandoned Winchester, and arrived upon the field of Bull Run in time to take an active
* McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow .- Telegram of General Scott to General Patterson, of July 17.
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part in the fight. It resulted disastrously to the Union arms, and General Patterson was blamed, and charged with the defeat. It was claimed that he should have attacked Johnston, or fol- lowed him, or reinforced McDowell, each of which was impracti- cable. General Abercrombie, a regular army officer, who com- manded a brigade in Patterson's column, in March, 1862, rode over the ground occupied by Johnston, at Winchester, and thus wrote to General Patterson : "I rode over the ground occupied by Johnston in July, and after a careful examination, I found that I had no reason to change my opinion as to the course you adopted. The works themselves were of no great strength, but the judicious disposition made of them, the favorable character of the ground, size, and number of guns, and numerical strength of force, ought to have defeated double the number. I think you may rely on this : Johnston had 26,000 volunteers that were mustered into the service, and between 6000 and 7000 of what they call militia, making some 32,000 or 33,000 men. The trenches extend some four or five miles. They commence at the turnpike leading to Charlestown, due east from Winchester, and run to the base of the hills west of the town, and at every few hundred paces we found platforms for heavy pivot guns, some of them rifled, so I am told. On the hills alluded to, some very heavy guns were admirably arranged, and commanded the whole valley. These, also, were made to traverse in every direction. Most of the earth-works were constructed with regard to the Mar- tinsburg route. On the 16th, Johnston had his whole force under arms in battle order, and waited some hours, under the impres- sion that you were approaching from Bunker Hill to attack him, and has since said he regrets not having attacked you. General Johnston had not less than 32,000 men, a very strong position, and between sixty and seventy guns, eleven of them pivot and of heavy calibre. I have conversed with a number of intelligent persons on the subject, and all agree very nearly as to the strength of Johnston's force and number of guns, and my own observations and personal inspection of the abandoned earth- works satisfy me of the correctness of their statements."
On the other hand, General Patterson was operating with a force much inferior, deficient in cavalry, artillery and transporta-
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tion, a considerable body of men ordered to him, for some cause having failed to reach him. "I was," General Patterson says, "probably operating with a force less by twelve regiments than the General-in-chief intended; a fact sufficient to explain his exaggerated ideas of the strength of my command. My largest force was accumulated at Martinsburg, about 18,200 men. When I marched from there, I had to leave two regiments, taking about 16,800 men with me, and deducting from them the sick, the rear, and wagon guards, I could not have gone into action with more than 13,000 men, and at the time Johnston marched from Winchester I could not have taken into action 10,000 men."
Under these circumstances, to have attacked would have been fool-hardy, and sure to have entailed defeat. To have remained and made more determined demonstrations would have availed nothing, as Johnston could have left his militia to man the intrenchments, and have moved away the moment he was needed, and Patterson would have been powerless to prevent it. It would have been equally impossible for the latter to have attempted to follow, for he could not have known when the movement would take place. Indeed, the advance of so weak a force in the face of one powerful as was that of Johnston, who . could at any moment have been strongly reinforced from Manas- sas, was a most hazardous one, and one which the Government and country should have regarded itself well out of when Patter- son brought off his forces in safety to Harper's Ferry. Another circumstance which made the situation of the Union commander all the more delicate was, that the term of service of nearly his entire command had either fully expired or would expire in a few days. So great was the difficulty of maintaining himself until he could be reinforced by fresh troops to supply the place of those retiring, that he was obliged to appeal to the latter to remain in the field, which they did. But instead of bestowing upon these troops the meed of praise, which by their patriotism they richly merited, and regarding their commander with grati- tude, the vials of denunciation and wrath were opened upon them in unstinted measure.
General Patterson, in 1865, after the war was over, prepared
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a narrative of the campaign, with all the correspondence which passed between himself and the General-in-chief. In one of the opening paragraphs he says: "The arms of the country had recently met with a severe disaster at Bull Run, and the public, whose expectation of success had been of the most sanguine char- acter, were correspondingly depressed. Although conscious that I had executed, as far as lay in my power, every order that I had received, and was in no degree responsible for a disaster that I could not prevent, I was not surprised that I, as well as every other officer holding any command of importance at the time, should be the object of popular clamor. I was quite satisfied, however, to await the returning sense of the people, and to abide by their decision, when the natural passion and disappointment of the hour should pass away, and the full knowledge of the facts should enable them to form an intelligent and dispassionate judgment. ... It was of course desirable for those who had directed the movements at Bull Run to refer their defeat to an occurrence for which they were not responsible, and not allow it to be attributed to any want of foresight or military skill on their part."
The fault of the positions of Patterson's and McDowell's armies in that first campaign of the war is now generally recognized. A hostile army cannot be confined and guarded like a flock of sheep. Instead of stationing forces at various points to check its motion, the true theory is to keep all the guarding forces in one compact body in readiness to move and fight as exigences may require. To get the most power out of an army depends upon bringing the greatest accumulation of strength to bear upon the point of impact. If a stone mason desires to break a tough rock, he selects a hammer of sufficient weight to effect the purpose, and brings it to bear with the requisite force at some one point, instead of employing the same weight of metal in a number of sınall hammers, and applying them in futile attempts in several opposite directions.
The two armies of Patterson and McDowell were separated by the two armies of Beauregard and Johnston, so posted, however, as to be practically one. The latter could, therefore, choose either of the opposing forces for attack, unite their
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strength, and defeat that one, and then turn upon and demolish the other. This is precisely what happened at Bull Run. Beauregard and Johnston formed a junction, and defeated McDowell, and would then have turned upon Patterson, had he not opportunely withdrawn. For this separation of force in the plan of the campaign, neither Patterson nor the troops of Penn- sylvania, who served under him, were responsible.
CHAPTER VI.
THE GREAT UPRISING.
ANGERS now rapidly multiplied, and complica- tions hourly thickened. On the 20th of April, 1861, the day following that in which the Massa- chusetts soldiers and General Small's Brigade of Pennsylvanians were attacked in Baltimore, Gov- ernor Curtin, recognizing the gravity of the dan- gers with which the State was threatened, issued the following Proclamation : " Whereas, an armed rebellion exists in a portion of the States of this Union, threatening the destruction of the National Government, perilling public and private property, endangering the peace and security of this Com- monwealth, and inviting systematic piracy ; and . Whereas, adequate provision does not exist by law to enable the Executive to make the military power of the State as able and efficient as it should be for the common defence of the State and General Government, and Whereas, an occasion so extraordi- nary requires prompt legislative power, Therefore, I, by virtue of the power vested in me, do hereby convene the General As- sembly of this Commonwealth, and require the members to meet at their respective Houses at Harrisburg, on Tuesday, April 30th, at noon, then to take into consideration and adopt such mea- sures in the premises as the present exigences may demand." The seriousness of the situation was greatly enhanced by the fact that on the night previous to the issue of this call, all the lines of telegraph, and also all the great railroad thoroughfares leading to Washington, had been destroyed. The State was thus left open to attack, the General Government being unable to defend even its own Capital.
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In his Message at the opening of this extra session, the Gov- ernor said : "The insurrection must now be met by force of arms; and to re-establish the Government upon an enduring basis by asserting its entire supremacy, to repossess the forts and other Government property so unlawfully seized and held, to ensure personal freedom and safety to the people and com- merce of the Union, in every section, the people of the loyal States demand, as with one voice, and will contend for, as with one heart, and a quarter of a million of Pennsylvania's sons will answer the call to arms, if need be, to wrest us from a reign of anarchy and plunder, and secure for themselves and their chil- dren, for ages to come, the perpetuity of this Government and its beneficent institutions. . . . It is impossible to predict the lengths to which the madness that rules the hour in the rebellious States shall lead us, or when the calamities which threaten our hitherto happy country shall terminate. . . . To furnish ready support to those who have gone out, and to protect our borders, we should have a well-regulated military force. I, therefore, recommend the immediate organization, disciplining, and arming of at least fifteen regiments of cavalry and infantry, exclusive of those called into the service of the United States. As we have already ample warning of the necessity of being prepared for any sudden exigency that may arise, I cannot too much impress this upon you."
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