USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 21
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Thus ended the fighting of the first day. It had proved a sad day for those two weak corps, battling as they had been obliged to against a foe nearly thrice their numbers. The First corps had gone into the battle with 8200 men, and had come out with only 2450. The Eleventh corps went in with 7400, only two divisions of which, however, being actually engaged, and retired with a little more than half that number. But though the losses had been grievous and the survivors were worn out with the severity of the fight, yet was not honor lost. A most heroic and determined stand had been made. Prisoners to the num- ber of 2500 had been taken, and the enemy had sustained a still greater loss in killed and wounded than had the Union side. A position of great natural strength had been gained, and was now firmly held.
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Of the generalship displayed on the first day of fighting at Gettysburg there has been much speculation, and we can only judge by the official records, the dispositions upon the field, and by the results attained. The questions have been raised, was
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the fighting at Gettysburg an accidental collision, unforeseen and unpremeditated ? Was General Reynolds justified in precipitating a battle there, and Doubleday and Howard in continuing it? In one sense the collision was accidental. Not until the evening of the 30th, and after the order for the movement of each corps of the army on the 1st day of July had been issued, was Meade made aware of the purpose of the enemy to let go the Susque- hanna and concentrate. It was not until the morning of the Ist of July that he learned that Lee was marching on Gettys- burg. . It must be borne in mind, in considering the movements of the army, that the orders which were emanating from the brain of the leader had to be communicated to corps scattered over a belt of more than thirty miles. During the day these corps were in motion, and hence it was impossible to arrest and change their courses as the movements of a single person or even a compact body of men could have been. Time thus enters as an important element in the game. A circular had been sent out indicating a cautious policy, and prefiguring what would be the order of the following day,-a concentration on Pipe Creek. But the positive orders for the movement of July 1st carried the First corps to Gettysburg, the Eleventh to Gettysburg or supporting distance, the Third to Emmittsburg, the Second to Taneytown, the Twelfth to Two Taverns, the Fifth to Hanover, and the Sixth to Manchester, and the cavalry to front and flank well out in all directions. The tone of the circular afterwards issued indicated that Meade would not have given the order for the march on the 1st had he known the purposes of the enemy sooner. Hence we must conclude, that though he did not anticipate meeting the enemy when he issued the order, yet he received information on the morning of the 1st, when the movement of the corps was about to commence, that it was likely to result in a collision.
On the side of the enemy, it would appear that General Lce had not expected a battle on this day. He had become aware that the Union army was much scattered, and he did not suppose that a small fragment of that army would dare to bring on an engagement. Lee's own account of it was this: "The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of the Ist of July. Driving back these troops to within
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a short distance of the town, he there encountered a large force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the way of the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement." Moreover, it would appear that if either Lee or Meade had anticipated a battle, he would have been at the front to direct it.
But though Meade was aware before the collision did actually occur, that it was likely to, he seems to have hoped, and indeed have confidently expected that the effect of his cautionary cir- cular would be to induce Reynolds to interpose only such resis- tance as became necessary to enable him to withdraw his corps in safety. To understand why Reynolds disappointed this hope, and by a stubborn stand in an offensive position, brought on a general engagement, several circumstances must be taken into the account. There appear to have been at this time at the head of the several army corps two classes of men, in temper and policy quite opposite to each other. The one class was for pushing forward, and attacking and fighting the enemy wherever ho could be found, and never ceasing to manœuvre and fight until a victory was gained. This party was totally opposed to falling back, but the rather intent on falling forward, and eagerly coun- selled against Pipe Creek, and in favor of Gettysburg. On the other hand, Meade seemed inclined to a cautious policy, in which he received countenance, and was at this moment anxious to take up a defensive position in the hope of inducing the enemy to attack and allow him to fight a purely defensive battle. That Reynolds was of the former class there can be no doubt. "When we crossed the river," says General Doubleday, "at Edwards' Ferry, I rode on to Poolesville, and while waiting for the troops to come up, had a conversation with Reynolds. He was clearly of opinion that it was necessary to bring the enemy to battle as soon as possible. He wished to put an immediate stop to the plundering by the enemy of Pennsylvania farms and cities. He said if we gave them time by dilatory measures, or by taking up defensive positions, they would strip the State of everything. Hence he was in favor of striking them as soon as possible. He was really eager to get at them."
But Reynolds was too true a soldier to disobey orders, however
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much he may have differed in judgment from his chief, and though he must have known the temper and inward wish of that chief, he still had ample authority for pursuing the course he did. In the first place, the circular was only admonitory. The order of march for the day was absolute. That order carried Buford's cavalry, and the First and Eleventh corps to Gettysburg. The cavalry, which reached there first, had positive orders from Plea- santon to hold the town to the last extremity. Reynolds found upon his arrival the cavalry heavily engaged. There was no alternative but to go to its relief; and doubtless believing the position a good one from which to fight, immediately ordered up the three corps of the army under his command, well knowing that there were three other corps within supporting distance. But, besides the order carrying Reynolds to Gettysburg, he had certain discretionary powers as to bringing on a battle, if not directly conferred, at least implied. Among the instructions contained in the very order for the march of the army on this day are these : "The telegraph corps to work east from Hanover, repairing the line, and all commanders to work repairing the line in their vicinity between Gettysburg and Hanover. Staff officers report daily from each corps, and with orderlies to leave for orders. Prompt information to be sent into head-quarters at all times. All ready to move to the attack at any moment." In the circular to which frequent reference has been made, Meade says : "Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions." And in a communica- tion to General Reynolds, dated on the very morning that the battle opened, in which Meade freely unbosoms himself and dis- closes how much trust and confidence he reposes in Reynolds, he says : "The Commanding General cannot decide whether it is his best policy to move to attack, until he learns something more definite of the point at which the enemy is concentrating. This he hopes to do during the day. Meanwhile he would like to have your views upon the subject, at least so far as concerns your position. ... If the enemy is concentrating in front of Gettysburg, or to the left of it, the General is not sufficiently well informed of the nature of the country to judge of its char- acter, either for an offensive or defensive position. .. . The
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General having just assumed command in obedience to orders, with the position of affairs leaving no time to learn the condition of the army as to morale and proportionate strength compared with its last return, would gladly receive from you any sugges- tions as to the points laid down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of the troops in your vicinity and of the country than he does." Thus, in three successive communi- cations that came to Reynolds, the last before opening the battle, and one of these in the form of a positive order for his guidance, Meade urges his troops to be ready to move to the attack at any moment, states that developments may cause him to assume the offensive from the present positions, and finally discloses his inde- cision, and frankly declares that Reynolds is better able to judge of affairs on that part of the field than he is himself.
Reynolds, accordingly, opened the battle in earnest and sum- moned his troops, doubtless with the expectation that he would be promptly supported by all the army as fast as it could be brought up. What the result would have been had Reynolds lived, is impossible to divine. He had scarcely marshalled his first bat- talions before he was slain. The chief command upon the field then devolved upon General Doubleday, which, for upwards of two hours he continued to exercise. It was during this time, and under his immediate direction, that the chief successes of the day were achieved, a large number of prisoners and standards having been captured in successive periods of the fight, and at widely separated parts of the field. To any one who will traverse the ground held by the First corps from ten in the morning until after four in the afternoon, will note the insignificance in the number of its guns and of its muskets, as compared with those of the two divisions of Hill and one of Ewell which opposed it, and will consider the triumphs won, and how every daring attempt of the enemy to gain the field was foiled, it must be evident that the manœuvring of Doubleday was admirable, and that it stamps him as a corps leader of consummate excellence. For, mark how little equality of position he enjoyed, the opposing ridge and Oak Hill affording great advantage for the enemy's artillery, and how his own infantry stood upon open ground with no natural or artificial protection except in a short distance upon
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his extreme' right, where was a low stone wall. Where, in the whole history of the late war, is this skill and coolness of the commander, or this stubborn bravery of the troops, matched ?
The chief losses of the day in killed, wounded, and prisoners occurred. in the act of retiring to Cemetery Hill. In conducting this, General Howard was responsible. . It was a difficult move- ment to execute ... The whole country where the fighting of the first day occured, is so open. that no movement could take place on the Union line that was not plainly visible from almost every part of the rebel line, affording ample opportunity to instantly checkmate any advantage in manœuvre. At twenty minutes past three in the afternoon, about the time that the onset of Rodes upon the point of junction of the First and Eleventh corps had penetrated the Union line and. was carrying back the flanks of - both, Buford, who had been watching everything from the signal-station in the cupola of the Seminary, wrote the following message to Meade through Pleasanton : "I am satisfied Long- street and Hill have made a junction. A tremendous battle has been raging since half past nine. A. M., with varying success. At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy's line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person." And then after his signature, he adds what doubtless seemed to his practical mind the cure-all for this trouble, " We need help now."
To his practised eye the outlook appeared gloomy. The whole rebel army was now rapidly concentrating, and already swarming upon his immediate front, and there seemed wanting a controlling spirit on the field. It was doubtless apparent to him, as it now is to every careful observer, that the time for the prompt action of the commander upon the field was fast passing, if not already gone. If, when Howard found that he was no longer able to hold his advanced position, he had ordered some demon- strations on different parts of the field, and planting some pieces to have commanded the main thoroughfares over which his troops should retire, had withdrawn the two corps before the enemy advanced in overwhelming numbers and compelled him
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to go back, it is probable that he might have rescued the greater portion of his men who were eventually engulfed in the streets of the town, and were swept back as prisoners, and have saved many who were killed and wounded.
Howard is without excuse for holding out so long, when the evidence was spread out on all sides before his eyes, that the enemy was coming down upon him with resistless power. Some time before his forces were driven back, Doubleday sent his Adjutant-general, Halsted, to Cemetery Hill, to implore him either to send reinforcements from Steinwehr's division, or else order the hard-pressed troops at the front to fall back. Halsted pointed out to him the advance of vastly superior forces on all sides, which he could plainly discern through his field glass. But Howard even then refused to order a retreat, and said to Halsted : " You may find Buford and use him," although Buford had been fighting from early morning, and was still engaged. It seems that Howard, at a council of corps commanders held at Chancellorsville just before the army retired across the river, voted to remain and fight, giving as a reason that the misconduct of his corps forced him always to vote for assaulting, whether it was the best thing to be done or not. That senseless policy appeared to influence him here, and the troops of both corps had to pay the penalty of his temerity. The commander of the First corps, according to his sworn statement, never received any orders to fall back, and it is a noticeable circumstance confirming this, that the First corps was the last to leave the ground, and it seems almost miraculous that it was brought off in tolerable order, and with insignificant loss in prisoners.
The idea has been advanced that the fighting on this first day constitutes no part of the Battle of Gettysburg. General Sickles says, " We in the army do not regard the operations of the two corps under General Reynolds as properly the Battle of Gettys- burg. We regard the operations of Thursday and Friday, when the whole army was concentrated, as the Battle of Gettysburg." But wherefore ? Did not Reynolds fall in the Battle of Gettys- burg ? Are the dead who there perished to be despoiled of their part in that great victory ? Shall the works and watchings of Buford be turned into nothingness ? Is the matchless heroism of
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that First corps on that blood-washed field to count for nought in the final winning? Shall Doubleday, and Howard, and Stein- wehr, have no credit for taking and holding that impregnable fortress on Cemetery Hill, where the battle was finished ? Is the taking up and fortifying that ground no part of that great struggle ? Ay! rather was the fighting of that first day, and the planting immovable footsteps on the fastnesses of Ceme- tery Hill, THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. As well might it be said that the fight made by the gallant Sickles himself, and the glorious Third corps, baptized in blood as it was, con- stitutes no part of the battle. As well might the struggles of McCook and Johnson, and Davis and Sheridan, and Rosseau and Negley be gainsayed in the Battle of Stone River; or the opening of the contest by Hooker in the Battle of Antietam. No, no! The glories of that battle cannot be divided, and apportioned, and parcelled. They are parts of one great whole. Who knows of the battle of Oak Ridge! How does it become the mouth to say that Reynolds fell at the battle of Willoughby Run !
Is it asserted that the army was not all up on that first day ? Neither were they all up on the second or the third. That glorious company who had gone down in the fight, and who, could they have been more promptly and cordially supported, might have been saved to come, were not up. Is it said that the leader himself was not present ? His orders had carried those troops upon that ground and involved them in the fight, and any honors which were there finally gained are due to the stubborn execution of those orders. Side by side on the now peaceful hillside, in order indiscriminate, lie the victims of that immortal field, reminding the pilgrim as he treads lightly by, that they are all the slain in the Battle of Gettysburg.
CHAPTER X.
MARSHALLING FOR THE SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
UT where, during all this long day of carnage, was the rest of the army ? Why were these two feeble corps left from early morn, until the evening shadows began to set, to be jostled and torn without succor ? Were there no troops within call ? Was not the very air laden with the terri- ble sounds of the fray? Was not the clangor of the enemy's guns more persuasive than the sum- mon of staff officer ?
The order of General Meade for the march of the several corps of the army on the 1st would carry the Third corps to Emmittsburg. But Gen- eral Sickles says in his testimony, that he had reached Emmittsburg on the night of the 30th. This place is ten miles from Gettysburg. The Third corps had been placed under the command of Reynolds as the leader of the right wing of the army, and he had sent a staff officer on the morning of the 1st, to summon it forward. It had no farther to march than had Howard's corps, and following the course that Howard went- the by-way leading to the Taneytown road-not so great a dis- tance. But Sickles had that morning received the circular of Meade, indicating the purpose to concentrate on Pipe Creek, though containing no order. It was his plain duty, therefore, to have responded, had the message reached him, to the call of Rey- nolds. But to this he seems to have paid no attention. In his testimony, Sickles says : "I was giving my troops a little repose during that morning. . . . Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, I got a dispatch from General Howard, at Gettysburg, informing me that the First and Eleventh corps had been engaged during the day with a superior force of the enemy, and that Gen-
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Ens 4 by J C. Putirs
Photo by Brad ;.
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MAJ. GEN. W'S. HANCOCK.
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eral Reynolds had fallen; that he (Howard) was in command, and was very hard pressed, and urging me in the most earnest terins to come to his relief with what force I could. I, of course, considered the question very anxiously. My preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg were to go there and hold that position with my corps, as it was regarded as a very important flanking position, to cover our rear and line of communication." In this testimony, Sickles ignores the early summons of Reynolds, which a staff officer, Captain Rosengarten, asserts was sent by an aid with great dispatch and immediately after Reynolds had reached the front. But Sickles says, "My preliminary orders in going to
Gettysburg." Is this a misprint in the testimony, and should it read Emmittsburg? If Gettysburg, then to what order does he refer ? General Meade had given no such order. If Gettysburg, he must refer to an order which he had received from Reynolds, which he disobeyed, probably allowing the circular of Meade, which had no binding effect, and which bore that declaration in so many words on its face, to override it. But when, be- tween two. and three o'clock he received the summons of How- ard, he concluded to respond to it. Moreover, it would seem that besides the order of Reynolds and the appeal of Howard, other messages had reached Sickles before he decided to go to Gettys- burg. An article, published in the " Rebellion Record," vol. viii., page 346, contains this statement : " Besides numerous reports, the following brief communication reached him [Sickles], which accidentally fell into my hands : 'July 1, Gettysburg. General Sickles : General Doubleday [First corps] says, For God's sake, come up with all speed, they are pressing us hard. H. T. Lee, Lieut. A. D. C.'"
It is but justice to Sickles, however, to say, that when he had once decided to go, he moved rapidly, and that his character as a soldier, established on many a bloody field, was never to shun a fight. He was among the few officers in the army who evi- dently relished one. He says : "I therefore moved to Gettys- burg on my own responsibility. I made a forced march, and arrived there about the time that General Howard had taken position on Cemetery Hill. I found his troops well posted in a secure position on the ridge. The enemy, in the meanwhile, had
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not made any serious attack upon him during my march." The concluding statement is a mistake, as the time between two and five o'clock marked the most severe and disastrous struggle of the day.
The Twelfth corps, according to Meade's programme, was to march from Littlestown, ten miles from Gettysburg, to Two Taverns, which would bring it within five miles of the battle- field, four and a quarter from Cemetery Hill. The march was commenced at six in the morning, and, after passing Two Tay- erns, a line of battle was formed. The following is from the diary of an officer who commanded a regiment in Kane's brigade : "July 1st, marched at six A. M., a short distance; passed Two Taverns; formed line of battle; heavy firing in front; a report that the First and Eleventh corps are engaged with the enemy." The enemy's Whitworth gun could have sent a bolt nearly this distance. The smoke from the field must have been plainly visible. The roar of the battle was constantly resounding. But here the corps remained idle during the whole day.
It is the first duty of a soldier to obey the orders of his supe- riors. " All inferiors are required to obey strictly and to execute with alacrity and good faith, the lawful orders of the superiors appointed over them." This is the fundamental principle of military discipline, the foundation stone on which the whole superstructure of an army rests. The order was to move from Littlestown to Two Taverns, and, moreover, there was the inti- mation from General Meade that he desired, in case any part of the army was attacked, that it should hold the enemy in check until it could fall back on the line of battle selected.
But notwithstanding all this, there is enough in the orders and circulars of Meade to have warranted General Slocum in moving up to the support of these distressed corps. In his order for July 1st, Meade enjoins upon his officers to be at all times pre- pared, " all ready to move to the attack at any moment." In his circular proposing the concentration on Pipe Creek, he says : " Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions." The order issued to the commander of the Fifth corps, at seven o'clock on the evening of the 1st, is in these words : "The Major-General commanding
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directs that you move up to Gettysburg at once upon receipt of this order, if not already ordered to do so by General Slocum. The present prospect is, that our general engagement must be there. Communicate with General Slocum, under whose direc- tions you are placed by the orders of this morning. The General had supposed that General Slocum would have ordered you up." From all this it would seem that General Meade anticipated, that if the forces in advance were attacked, any corps within support- ing distance would go to their assistance ; that it would act upon the Napoleonic principle, " March to the sound of the enemy's guns." Indeed, the order to the Fifth corps indicates clearly that Meade not only expected that Slocum himself would move up, but that he would have ordered the Fifth corps forward. It appears that Slocum did finally move on his own responsibility. but not until the fighting was over; for Hancock, in his testi- mony, says : "General Slocum arrived about six or seven o'clock. Ilis troops were in the neighborhood, for they apparently had been summoned up before I arrived, by General Howard possibly, as well as the Third corps." But why so tardy in his move- ments ? It is of little moment at what hour Howard summoned him, if he summoned him at all. The guns of the foe had been sounding the call all the day long. A fifteen minutes' ride would have carried him to Cemetery Hill, where he could have over- looked the whole field, or by his staff he could have held almost momentary communication with the front.
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