USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 23
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42 | Part 43 | Part 44 | Part 45 | Part 46 | Part 47 | Part 48 | Part 49 | Part 50
252
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
upon direct lines to Washington, which would have inevitably forced the Union leader into a change of base. No more encour- aging outlook was presented from the left centre. Upon the extreme left was wooded, rugged ground, which also presented obstacles to an attack.
It appears, from the testimony of several officers high in com- mand, that the mind of General Meade at this juncture was much exercised. Ile had concentrated his army within a very small compass. Should he remain inactive the eneiny might, by keeping up a show of strength upon his front, flank him upon the left, and gain a great advantage over him. Indeed the very ex- cellence of his position for defence was in itself a weighty argu- ment for believing that the enemy would decline the offer of battle, and seek by adroit manœuvring, to turn the Union army out of its stronghold. Military critics have descanted with much warmth upon Lee's lack of skill and judgment in making a direct attack upon Meade in this formidable position. "With the groans of the victims of Malvern Hill," says De Peyster, "repeating in thunder tones the condemnation of Magruder, Lee exposed him- self to a severer judgment for a greater act of reckless disregard of the commonest military-and common-sense. He had heard the whole world resound with the censure heaped upon Burnside for giving into his hand to work his will upon it, the army of the Potomac, wasted in attempting to storm the heights of Fred- ericksburg, and yet he imitated the action. The French military critic, Roussillon, remarks, 'Lee, like Burnside at Fredericksburg, committed the fault of attacking in front, a position at once very strong in itself and vigorously defended.' . . . Imagine the effect of a similar turning movement on the part of Lee. It would not only have placed him upon the roads constituting our lines of supplies, and have given him the major part of our trains, but have planted him between the Northern army of succor and Washington and Baltimore. In other words, it would have delivered up everything in the rear of the army of the Potomac into the hands of the rebels."
What these critics censure Lee for not doing, Meade, during the ominous stillness of that long summer day, strongly suspected he was doing. Hence when he found by the report of Slocum and
253
MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
his own observations that he was in a bad position for assuming the offensive, he appears to have been casting about for a more favorable outlook, and, in case he found that the enemy was seeking to turn his position, that he might be in condition to defend himself, and prevent his trains and base from being cut off. Accordingly, as soon as his Chief of staff, General Butter- field, who had been left at Taneytown during the night to hasten the march of the Sixth corps, arrived at headquarters, he was directed to prepare an order for the withdrawal of the army from this position, should circumstances render it necessary. Butter- field objected that he was unacquainted with the location of the different divisions and corps of the army with relation to the roads it would be proper for them to take, and would need to go over the field first. Meade replied that he could not wait for that; and to remove the objection made a draft of the field, showing the position of all the troops, and the roads in their vicinity. With this, and by the aid of maps, Butterfield drew the order, which, on being shown to Meade, received his approval. As it was of the greatest importance that in case it was issued, it should be accurate, permission was obtained from Meade to show it to corps commanders, to solicit any suggestions they might make for improving it. It was shown to General Gibbon, among others. On seeing it, he was struck with astonishment, exclaiming : "Great God ! General Meade does not intend to leave this position ?" inferring that the order had been drawn with the intention of issuing it. The prepara- tion of this order rests upon the testimony of Butterfield. General Meade testified that he had no recollection of directing it to be drawn, or of having seen it after it was drawn, but that he only ordered his Chief of staff to familiarize himself with the location of the troops, so that if in any contingency he should need to issue such an order, it could be readily prepared. That preparations were made for executing this order is sup- ported by the following instructions promulgated by Meade, at or before ten o'clock on the morning of the 2d: "The staff officers on duty at headquarters will inform themselves of the positions of the various corps-their artillery, infantry, and trains-sketch them with a view to roads, and report them
254
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
immediately, as follows: Third corps, Colonel Schriver ; Second corps, Lieutenant Colonel Davis; First corps, Lieutenant Perkins ; Twelfth corps, Lieutenant Oliver; Fifth corps, Captain Cadwal- ader. It is desired to know the roads on or near which the troops are, and where the trains lie, in view of movements in any direction, and to be familiar with the headquarters of the com- manders."
It is, therefore, of small moment whether the order was actually prepared or not. Nor' is it any disparagement to General Meade, if the order was prepared and approved by him. As a precautionary measure it was eminently proper, and instead of being imputed to him as a reproach, should be, in view of the uncertainty as to the designs of the enemy, accredited as an act of wise generalship. That it was merely a precautionary mea- sure is clearly apparent from the following dispatch sent to General Halleck, at three o'clock in the afternoon : "I have to- day, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defence. I am not determined as yet in attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking to allow the Sixth corps and parts of other corps to reach this place, and to rest the men. Expecting a battle I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear, and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster. I will endeavor to advise you as often as possible. In the engagement yesterday the enemy concentrated more rapidly than we could, and towards evening, owing to the superiority of numbers, compelled the First and Eleventh corps to fall back from the town to the heights on this side, on which I am posted. I feel fully the responsibility resting on me, and will endeavor to act with caution."
1
CHAPTER XI.
SEVERE FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG.
HEN, upon the night of the 1st, General Sickles had brought his corps upon the field, he had thrown out the Sixty-third Pennsylvania regi- ment to picket along the Emmittsburg pike, its left covering the cross-road leading from the Peach Orchard to Little Round Top. Early on the morning of the 2d, this regiment was pushed forward upon the skirmish line to a fence running parallel with the pike, in rear of Joseph Sherfy's house. As early as nine o'clock in the morning, fire was opened upon this regiment, and a com- pany of sharp-shooters was sent out to feel the enemy in a piece of wood in front, which soon returned, reporting that it was swarming with the foe. Skir- mishing continued active, until finally the enemy's sharp- shooters crawled stealthily up to a low stone fence just in front of the line of the Sixty-third, when his fire became hot and very destructive.
The order sent to Sickles on the morning of the 2d, was to bring his corps into position upon the left of Hancock, on ground vacated by Geary. As Geary had simply bivouacked in mass without deploying in line, Sickles reported to Meade that Geary had no position, and that there was no position there, meaning that it was low and commanded by ground in its front, rendering it untenable. Meade repeated his general instructions ; where- upon Sickles went to headquarters, and representing the great disadvantages of the position indicated, asked Meade to go with him over that part of the field. This Meade excused himself from doing, nor could he spare General Warren for that purpose ; but General Hunt, Chief of artillery, did go, to whom Sickles
255
4
256
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
pointed out the ground, more elevated and commanding, a half or three-quarters of a mile in front, which he proposed to occupy.
It should here be observed that between Seminary and Cemetery ridges, which run nearly parallel with each other, is a diagonal ridge connecting them, which, touching Cemetery Hill at its northern extremity, and extending past the Peach Orchard, soon strikes Seminary Ridge, and along the crest of which runs the Emmittsburg pike. It nowhere attains to any great emi- nence, but affords excellent ground for artillery. From the Peach Orchard to Round Top is broken, rugged, and in part wooded surface, which it was exceedingly desirable to hold, inas- much as it would have afforded cover for the enemy to have worked his way up very near to the position which is now known as Cemetery Ridge, and from which he could have assaulted with great advantage. In fact, there is a space from a half to three- quarters of a mile to the right of the Little Round Top swell, where there is no ridge at all, but low, swampy ground instead, easily commanded from the Emmittsburg Ridge, with a curtain of woods to the left reaching out in front of the Round Tops. Sickles believed this ground ought to be occupied, and seems to have had the sanction of Hunt in that opinion ; but receiving no direct order from Meade to do so, he held his columns back. momentarily expecting the final mandate of his chief. At eleven o'clock the firing between the skirmishers on the Emmittsburg road being very sharp, General Birney, who commanded the division holding the extreme left of the line, by direction of Gen- eral Sickles, sent a regiment and a battalion of sharp-shooters to reconnoitre. This reconnoissance showed that the enemy was moving in three columns under cover of the woods to the left. At length General Sickles, finding his outposts gradually driven back, determined to await no longer for more explicit orders, and moved out his whole corps upon the advance ground, Birney's division stretching from a point near the Devil's Den, in front of Round Top somewhat en échelon over the rough wooded heights. his right bending back and resting at the Peach Orchard, and Humphreys' division extending along the Emmittsburg pike from Teach Orchard to a point nearly opposite, but a little in advance of Hancock's left, thus leaving a slight break in the line at that
Erz'& J.C Faure
Photo by MB. Brad ;.
D. P. Poney
MAJ. GEN. DAVID B BIRNEY.
257
FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG.
point. Technically, this fulfilled the direction of Meade. His left rested at Round Top, and his right connected with Hancock ; but being so much advanced, it was necessarily very long and presented too much front for so small a corps to cover. Besides, it formed an angle at the Peach Orchard, where was open ground, which was consequently a source of weakness.
He had scarcely got his corps out upon the line he had decided to take, when he was summoned to a council of officers at Meade's headquarters. Perceiving that the enemy was about to attack him, and feeling the necessity of his personal supervision, he excused himself from attending, in the meantime hastening forward his troops and posting his batteries; but he soon after got a peremptory order to report, and turning over the command of the corps to General Birney, he hastened back with all speed. Before he had reached headquarters the battle opened; but spurring on, he was met at the door by Meade, who excused him from dismounting, and said he would soon join him on the field, the council having broken up as the guns announced the opening of the fight. On reaching the ground and hastily examining the position which the corps had taken, General Meade remarked that it was too much advanced, and expressed his doubt about being able to hold it. Sickles observed that it was not too late to withdraw ; but to this Meade objected and said he would send up the Fifth to put in upon the left, and to the right troops could be called from General Hancock, while a free use of the reserve artillery was tendered. General Meade's headquarters were not over a three minutes' walk from a position on Hancock's front, where the whole ground, both the advance and more con- tracted lines, was plainly visible. Why General Meade did not give explicit orders for the formation on the left early in the day and himself see that the proper dispositions were made, seems inexplicable, and can only be accounted for on the supposition that he did not anticipate that the enemy would attack from that direc- tion. In the document above quoted it is reported that in answer to Sickles' urgent need of preparation to meet the enemy, Meade remarked: "Oh! Generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are." No possible business of the Commander-in- chief could have been more important or more pressing than this.
17
1
I
258
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
.. Unfortunately for General Sickles, Buford's cavalry, which had been posted on the left flank of his corps, was ordered away at a time when the enemy was moving in that direction, and its place was left unsupplied until it was too late to be of any use on that day. General Pleasanton in his testimony says : "On the 2d of July, Buford's division having been so severely handled the day before, was sent by me back to Westminster, our depot, to protect it, and also to recruit." These were worthy objects, and Buford had well earned a claim to repose ; but at the moment when the enemy was swarming forth upon that flank which had been reported by Hancock as the one most vulnerable, it is almost beyond belief that General Pleasanton should have ordered the cavalry entirely away, before other and equally reliable troops were ready to relieve them. It left unchecked the whole power of the enemy's force to be employed in turning that flank.
Lee had early seen the importance of the ground which General Sickles had been so intent to occupy, and had deter- mined to make his main attack to regain it. He says in his report : "In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a posi- tion, from which if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to carry the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack."
This plan was studiously carried out, though the attack of Ewell was not coincident with that of Longstreet, being nearly two hours delayed, perhaps designedly, in the hope that troops would be taken from his front to strengthen other parts of the line, and would leave him an easier task in carrying it, an event which did actually transpire. As it was planned that the weight of the attack should be made by Longstreet, he was active all through the early part of the day in getting his troops and his guns upon that part of the field where he could make it with the hope of success. It has been asserted that Longstreet vigorously
.
259
FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG.
opposed the making this attack until his division under Pickett, which was still at Chambersburg, should come up, significantly saying that he did not wish to be compelled to walk with one boot off. But, having been peremptorily ordered by Lee to fight, he did not hesitate. Having only two divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, he led them around upon the extreme Union left. Instead of being able, as perhaps he had hoped, to wedge his way in upon the rear of the Union column, which to him appeared to be holding the line of the Emmittsburg road, he found a line refused, and nearly at right angles to that road stretching away to Round Top. To face that refused line he formed his own line, with Hood upon the right and McLaws upon the left, leaving the front occupied by Graham and Humphreys to be faced by Anderson's division of Hill's corps, and along the commanding ground upon the left he planted thick his artillery. To face these two powerful divisions of Longstreet, Sickles could only oppose the two weak brigades of Ward and De Trobriand. Ward, who was upon Sickles' left, opposite Hood, had posted his brigade across the open ground covering the approach to Little Round Top, his left extending across the front of Round Top, and his right reaching up into the wooded ground beyond the wheat- field. De Trobriand had posted two of his regiments, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania and the Fifth Michigan, upon the front in line with Ward; but with his right refused and reach- ing back towards the Peach Orchard, making it conform to the ad- vantages of the ground. He held two of his regiments in reserve, the Fortieth New York and the Seventeenth Maine, while the Third Michigan was deployed as skirmishers to cover the open ground to his right and connect with the left of Graham.
Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, General Birney, who was in temporary command of the Third corps, having for some time been watching the columns of the enemy, now plainly visible, ordered Clark's rifled battery in position to the left of the Peach Orchard, to open on them. It did so with good effect. The enemy's guns, which had been brought up in large numbers, were wheeled into position, and answered; and soon after, along all that ridge, where he had advantageously posted battery upon battery, seemingly an interminable line, the
260
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
fire was terrific, and the very air was filled with shots and burst- ing shells, like hail in the thick coming storm. The brigade of Graham, in rear of which the Union guns were posted, was fear- fully exposed, as it occupied both legs of the angle.
For some time the fire of artillery was appalling. But this was only the prelude to more desperate work. Longstreet had formed his lines under cover, and was now moving down to strike the extreme Union left a stunning blow and if possible crush it. But he found the troops of Ward prepared. With screeches and yells the foe pressed on; but before the deliberate aim of that veteran brigade they were forced to fall back. Ward realized from the strength of the attack that his weak line would be unable to withstand another, and called for supports. De Trobri- and sent the Seventeenth Maine, which took position behind a low stone wall, to the left of the wheatfield, where its fire would have a deadly effect if the line of Ward should be forced back. Soon afterwards the Fortieth New York, the last reserve, was hurried away to the support of Ward, and took position, on his extreme left and front, so as to block the way to Little Round Top, which was now in imminent danger of falling into the enemy's hands. But the foe did not stop to carry that part of the line at once, but bore down in succession upon one part after another along Birney's whole front, rapidly reach- ing forward towards the Peach Orchard. The front of Ward had hardly been reinforced before De Trobriand was struck. "Allons-y ferme, et tenons bon ! Il n'y a plus rien en reserve," was the word of that well schooled and skilled leader. Knowing full well that the storm would soon reach them, his men had brought together the rocks and trunks of trees which they found lying about, and when the men in grey came swarming on not twenty paces dis- tant, a crash of musketry, like the crack of a thunderbolt, arrested for a moment their progress; but recovering themselves they answered the fire, and the fusilade was rapid. "Des deux côtés, chacun visait son homme, et malgré toutes les protections du ter- rain, morts et blessés tombaient avec une effrayante rapidité." It was an unequal struggle; for the enemy were thrice their strength; but the accuracy of their fire was unsurpassed. "Never have I seen," says De Trobriand, "our men strike with equal
261
FIGHTING ON THE LEFT AT GETTYSBURG.
obstinacy. It seemed as though each one of them believed that the destiny of the Republic depended upon the desperate vigor of their efforts."
But if the assault proved deadly to De Trobriand's men, who had a good position and were shielded by some works, how fared the troops of Graham, who were on open ground, and had no protection except such as accidentally fell to their lot? The position at the Peach Orchard was a commanding one for artillery, and could the pieces have been protected by lunettes, as were those of Steinwehr, they could have defied the whole weight of opposing metal from right to left, that was brought to bear upon them. But they were naked, and were forced to endure the brunt of a concentric fire. As for the infantry, the cut where the roadbed makes up to the Emmittsburg way afforded some protection while the artillery fire was hottest; but when that slackened, and a charge of the enemy's infantry came, there was no alternative but to boldly face it. Then it was that Greek met Greek, and bayonets were crossed in the deadly encounter. The One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania, of Graham's brigade, was posted in support of these guns, facing south, when this charge came. They were lying down, and apparently were not seen by the foe as they swept forward, looking only to the guns, which they confidently regarded as their certain spoil. But waiting until they had come near, the tried men of this regiment sprang to their feet, and pouring in a well-directed volley, dashed at them with the bayonet. Swept down by ranks, and bewil- dered by the suddenness of the apparition, the enemy halted and for a moment attempted to beat back their assailants. But the tide was too strong to stem, and they fled with precipitation. The horses of the Union artillery had all been killed, and many of the officers and men had fallen. The ammunition was well nigh spent. The guns were accordingly seized and drawn back by the infantry to the rear of the road-bed.
Fortunately for the rest of Graham's line, and for that of Hum- phreys, the order of General Lee to Hill was only to threaten the force in his front and watch for a favorable opportunity to attack, and consequently that officer for some time contented him- self with simple demonstrations, and a vigorous fire of artillery.
---
1
1
262
MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
While this wave of battle, commencing at Round Top, rolled on towards the Peach Orchard and dashed with such fearful violence against the faces of that devoted Third corps, the calls for reinforcements were long and loud. Every man of the Third corps was almost from the first put in, making altogether barely one single thin line, and not a musket in reserve. It is no wonder that the time seemed long, and the troops summoned appeared tardy in coming. General Birney says : " I sent a staff officer to General Sykes, asking him to send me up at once the division that had been ordered from his corps to support me; that an attack by the enemy was imminent, and that I thought it would be made at once. The staff officer saw him, and he returned for answer that he would come up in time; that his men were making coffee and were tired, but that he would be up in time. He came up with one of his divisions in about an hour." General Sykes may have made the answer attributed to him; but he was a regular army officer, and he was not the man to disregard an order upon the field of battle, or execute it tardily. He had a long distance to march, and what, in his extremity seemed a full hour to Birney, may have actually been less.
General Warren, after proceeding with Meade to inspect the position of Sickles, just after the battle opened, had, by the direction of the latter, proceeded to Little Round Top. "From that point," Warren says, "I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent, as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once." The first onset, as we have seen, was stayed by Birney's division. But the fiery and impetuous Hood, he who attacked Sherman with such daring before Atlanta, had dis- covered that Little Round Top was not occupied, and that only a thin curtain, composed of the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania, hung in its front. This rocky fortress was the great prize of the day. Could he break through the feeble force which held its front and plant himself amid the rocks and fastnesses of that precipitous height, the whole army of Meade might beat itself against it in
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.