USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 30
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As an offensive battle, Gettysburg will be esteemed as one, on the whole, well fought on the part of the rebel leader. Had Lee, after the first day, sat down upon Seminary Ridge, and manœeu- vred to induce the Union side to have attacked, and have kept a portion of his cavalry busy foraging in his rear, he might possibly have gained such an advantage as to have secured a temporary triumph. It would have been fatal for him to have waited very long, for troops were being gathered up and sent to the Union side from all quarters, and in a few days he would have been too weak to have fought even a defensive battle. On the other hand, had he succeeded in bringing on an immediate battle, and been successful, he could never have long maintained his triumph, or have long remained on Northern soil. It is doubtful if he could have reached either Baltimore or Washington ; for there would have still been an Army of the Potomac, a force at Harper's Ferry of 10,000, 36,000 in the Department of Washington, 25,000
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militia at Harrisburg, an army upon the James, and besides, the whole North was full of men, who at the first tocsin of disaster, would have flocked to the Union standard.
In considering the conduct of the Union commander, many palliating circumstances must be allowed to have weight. He was, in the first place, pitted against a veteran soldier, who had almost from the first commanded the Army of Northern Virginia -an army which had been formed and moulded under his eye, and which he had led to triumph on numberless fields-whose men had implicit confidence in him, amounting to a blind infatu- ation, and who was surrounded by a corps of Lieutenants of rare ability, sincerely devoted to their chief, and impelled by one idea-at all hazards beat the foc. Meade, on the other hand, had only been three days at the head of the army, had never exercised an independent command before, and had only led a division in battle, the Fifth corps at Chancellorsville not having been seriously engaged. His army was dispirited by frequent defeats, and the corps and division commanders, for political and other reasons, were far from being that homogeneous body that clasped hands about the rebel chieftain.
Nevertheless, Meade was a soldier by profession, and it is just that his management of the battle should be subjected to discus- sion upon the principles that govern that profession. The lessons which the battle should furnish can never be appreciated or learned until it be examined without fear or favor, and with a desire to discover what were its real phases.
The first error which Meade committed was in allowing his corps to become so widely scattered, that at the moment of opening the battle the two extremes were over thirty miles apart. In the presence of an enemy, or in close proximity to him, it would have been a sound principle to have kept the infantry in as compact a body as possible. It is true that Meade seems to have been marching under the impression that the enemy was pushing for, or actually crossing the Susquehanna. But he should have held his army so in hand that he would at any time have been prepared for a change in the enemy's plans, and not have been bound to this one theory. Nothing was more likely than that the enemy should do precisely what he did
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do, when he found the Union army moving in close upon his flank, intent on fighting him. It is unfortunate, at the least, that Meade should have been so deficient in scouts and spies as to have been so long ignorant of the enemy's intention to concen- trate at Gettysburg, and to have first learned it through the Vice- President of the Pennsylvania Railroad company, telegraphed from Harrisburg to Washington and from Washington back to the field. Could that knowledge have reached him twelve hours earlier, the order of march would have been essentially modified, and the two corps would not then have been thrust forward into the jaws of the enemy without the power to support them.
On the first day, it was unfortunate that the circular which he sent out was a circular and not an order ; for while he and a part of his corps commanders regarded it as having the force of. an order, others of them understood it to have no effect other than an intimation. It was of so mixed a character that two could scarcely understand it alike. For, while it indicated a purpose to fall back and concentrate on Pipe Creek, it still declared that contingencies might arise in which it would become expedient to fight from the present position. Buford, Reynolds, Doubleday, Howard, and Sickles when he learned that the battle was on, believed that such contigencies had arisen, while Meade himself ignored that part of his circular entirely, and clung to the part which would carry his army back to Pipe Creek, where he could leisurely prepare himself to fight. It would seem that he never forgave Doubleday and Howard for holding on at Gettysburg and fighting the whole day, instead of retiring and allowing him to carry out his preconceived plan. Technically and morally, . Doubleday and Howard were undoubtedly right. In doing as they did, they obeyed the strict orders of Meade, and they avoided the demoralizing effect of running from the face of the enemy. As the battle resulted, it may be looked upon as almost a direct interposition of Providence. Meade was slow in going to the field, because he doubtless believed that the left wing would finally fall back, and then he would concentrate as he had in- tended. Both Slocum and Sickles were morally culpable for not going to the assistance of the forces engaged at Gettysburg on the first day, Slocum having full warrant for doing so in the orders
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and circulars of Meade, and Sickles having early in the day been ordered up by Reynolds, and having no valid excuse for disregarding the summons. But here again that unfortunate circular comes to the surface, and is allowed to outweigh every other consideration.
When General Meade had become satisfied that Gettysburg was a suitable place to fight the battle, he showed great energy and skill in concentrating his army, and bringing up his remote corps. It was not until seven o'clock on the evening of the 1st that he came to this decision. It was after eight before the Sixth corps got the order to move, and having to go from Man- chester by the way of Westminster, had thirty-four full miles to make, and yet it arrived at two of the following afternoon. All the rest of his army was practically on the field at two in the morning.
General Hancock assumed command as the two broken corps came back through the town, and as troops from other corps began to arrive. His dispositions were skilfully made, and it was the firm front he was able at once to present that staid the hand of the enemy and made it impossible for him to push further his advantage.
Meade's examination of the field on the morning of the 2d must have been extremely superficial and partial-a grave error. He appears to have been strongly impressed with the belief that the enemy would attack him upon the right, and to that part of the field he must give his exclusive attention. He, accordingly, put the whole of the Twelfth corps there with orders to fortify it thoroughly, and during the forenoon held the Fifth corps in re- serve near by, intending also to put the Sixth in there as soon as it should arrive. It may be that the experience of other fields had taught him to expect that the tactics of the enemy would bring him upon that flank. At Beaver Dam Creek, Malvern Hill, Bull Run, Antietam, and Chancellorsville, the enemy had moved upon the Union right flank, and he may have anticipated that the same manœuvre would here be repeated. When he found the enemy slow in opening the battle, he himself decided to attack from that side. But after his engineer and General Slo- cum, who was to lead the assault, had reported the ground
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impracticable for an advance, he seems to have become dissatis- fied with the field, and despondent, and the conviction is forced upon us from his own conduct and sayings, and the testimony of a number of his officers, that he meditated changing to ground better suited to offensive operations ; not necessarily to Pipe Creek, but to the first ground which he could find adapted to manœuvring his army.
In consequence of his mind being occupied with this idea, he appears to have neglected to look to his left, or to make the necessary preparations for a defensive battle. According to the testimony of Sickles, he discredited the idea of the enemy attack- ing him upon that side, lightly remarking, when the dangers to which that part of the line was exposed were urged, that Gen- erals always believe that their positions are the ones in most danger, and up to the very moment when the battle opened, he seems to have been busy with other schemes, and to have given little or no attention to preparation for an attack from that quarter. The consequence was, that when the battle opened his troops were not in position, and were actually pushed out to the ground which they occupied under fire. To the repeated importunities of Sickles for orders, and for him to go personally upon the ground, he turned a deaf ear, and even refused to send his engineer, General Warren, who was certainly the person of all others most suitable to represent him in the decision of such a question.
It seems the more strange that he should have neglected to make his dispositions upon the left strong, as Hancock, in making his report upon the advantages of this ground for a battle, had particularly pointed out that, as being the weak part, and liable to be turned. It may be thought that the blame of this unpre- paredness was due to the failure of Sickles to take the position assigned him. But this explanation is in no way satisfactory. Meade was early informed that Sickles was in trouble about his position, and by repeated messages was kept advised that the left of his line was not fixed and in readiness for battle. Sickles was evidently very solicitous about his formation. He saw that the ground in a direct line from the Cemetery Ridge to Round Top was unsuitable, being low and marshy, commanded by
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ground to the front of it, and to the left was a screen of wood and rocky surface that it would be dangerous to allow the enemy to take, the altitude being considerably greater at the Peach Orchard than either Seminary or Cemetery lines opposite. Sickles undoubtedly sincerely desired to get the true position, but still, to satisfy his chief and have his approval of whatever ground he should take. When, therefore, Meade observed the solicitude of Sickles, and knew that he was liable at any moment to be at- tacked, it would appear that as a wise commander, knowing that a great battle was imminent, and intent on gaining a victory, he would not have rested until he had either thoroughly inspected every inch of the ground himself, or through his engi- neers, and have, carly in the day, had his lines accurately traced and fortified, so far as was practicable, and the troops and their supports in position.
But what are the facts ? Until the very opening of the battle, nearly four o'clock in the afternoon, he remained at his head- quarters, situated near the centre of the field, from whence nearly every part was visible, with no preparation made to meet one of the most powerful and persistent assaults ever delivered on any field. His Lieutenant, Sickles, tired of waiting, and learning from his skirmishers, who had been engaged since nine o'clock in the morning beyond the Emmittsburg road, and from his own observation, that the enemy was massing upon his left and evidently preparing for a determined attack, took up the ground which he deemed the best, which with his small corps he was barely able to cover, and the battle opened before he was entirely in possession, the guns having been pushed forward upon that part which was the key to the whole position-the Peach Orchard-after the enemy had opened fire. The responsibility of this delay can never be shifted from the shoulders of General Meade. He had had the whole day until four o'clock, to decide on and fortify his line, and he was fully aware, up to the last moment, that the troops were not in position, and that no works were being thrown up for their protection. If the short line. which he claims he intended Sickles should take, was the one to be occupied, it needed much labor in fortifying through the swampy ground at the head of Plum Run. If the advance, or
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long line, which Sickles did take, then the key to the position- the Peach Orchard-should certainly have been fortified, as it was much exposed, though commanding. A little work with the spade on this knoll would have rendered it impregnable.
But the culpability of the delay in taking and fortifying this line, or whatever one was to be adopted, is more than matched by the failure to hold Little Round Top. It was discovered by Warren, Meade's engineer, sometime after the battle had begun, and when the enemy was rushing with the force of the tornado to seize it, that it was entirely destitute of defenders, and that moreover it was a place of strength and importance. He also, for the first time, now discovered that artillery could be used from its summit to good advantage, and also that it was practicable to bring guns upon it. But why were these discoveries left to be made after the battle had begun? Was not the advantage of that stronghold as apparent at six, or eight, or ten in the morning as at five in the afternoon ? It was finally occupied and held, but more by chance, or the overruling hand of Providence, than by any skill or strategy of the General.
The idea has been advanced that Longstreet, in moving as he did, behind the screen of forest trees on Oak Ridge to the extreme Union left, was not designing to fight, but was, preparing to march away upon the Union rear, to capture Meade's trains, and make conquest of Baltimore and Washington; and that he was arrested by the opportune advance and attack of Sickles. But there is no evidence that such was the design, and every consid- eration of military strategy is against it. Longstreet had but two of his divisions with him, and the other had not been ordered up, and was not soon expected. Lee was too good a general to divide his army in the face of a united opponent, and allow him- self to be destroyed piecemeal. Besides, there were troops enough in Washington to have held Longstreet in check until other armies could come up, if not to have beaten him. No! Long- street was moving to do precisely what he attempted to do, to capture Little Round Top and the wooded rugged ground in its immediate front, and had he not been attacked and arrested by the timely offensive of Sickles, he would doubtless have effected his purpose, and the battle would have been fought out on other ground.
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When Meade finally awoke to the fact that the enemy was determined to fight, he aroused himself to the uttermost, and pushed forward supports with a lavish hand. The Fifth corps, which had been resting since two that morning within a short distance of the field, and had come up in rear of Cemetery Hill during the forenoon, was sent over; portions of the Second, nearly the whole of the Twelfth, and portions of the Sixth which began to arrive at two in the afternoon, were pushed for- ward, and every part of Sickles' attenuated front was strengthened and patched. But now his zeal to establish his left was as exces- sive as in the morning it had been wanting. For when Sickles lost the Peach Orchard, the attempt to hold the parts of the line which were commanded and enfiladed from that key position was futile. With the loss of this, had Meade contracted his line to the ground in front of Round Top held by Crawford and Wheaton, on the night of the 2d, and drawn in Humphreys' to the Ceme- tery Ridge before he was attacked and forced back, and then acted purely on the defensive, thousands of killed and wounded would have been saved, and his position upon the left centre would not have been placed in jeopardy. But instead of this, brigade after brigade, and division after division were thrust out through the Wheatfield and over the wooded ground to the west and south of it, where the enemy rested in ambush to cut them down as fast as they came, and made that ground a slaughter- pen, with no advantage in the end.
Not only was an injudicious use made of the troops thus hur- ried forward, but more than could by any possibility be used were called; and the strange error was committed of stripping the breastworks upon Culp's Hill and entirely denuding his right flank, a vital part of his line, a portion of those very troops, as if in mockery of his infatuation, and impelled by fate, marching far out of their way, and never reaching the field where it was intended to use them. In the presence of the great peril, he seems to have lost the equipoise of his faculties. When, finally, he had the whole of the Fifth and Sixth, all but one brigade of the Twelfth, two divisions of the First, and a considerable part of the Second transferred to the left in support of the Third, leaving but one brigade of the Twelfth,
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and one small division each of the First and the Eleventh north of the Baltimore pike, then it was that the enemy attacked that weak and partially denuded line, at two points, with a fury and a determination almost past belief. The abandoned works where should have been the left flank of the army, fell into the enemy's hands; but, thanks to the intrepid valor of the few troops left upon that line, the foe was bloodily repulsed in his first assault, and held at bay in the other, and a great disaster was averted. And here again the hand of Providence seems to have been inter- posed. For the nature of the ground was such that the enemy could bring no artillery with him upon the right flank, and with- out it he was robbed of his fighting arm. Could he have planted himself upon that rugged eminence with artillery, he might have fought as from a fortress, and bade defiance to his assailants.
The error, we might be pardoned a stronger word, of removing almost the entire right wing, and leaving a strong position, which had been well fortified, and was vital to the integrity of the entire army, does not alone rest with the Commander-in-chief. The responsibility must be shared by General Slocum. Slocum was in command of the right wing. He knew thoroughly the ground, for he had reconnoitred it during the morning hours with a view of making an attack from it, and had regarded it of so much importance as to thoroughly fortify it. He should never have consented to the withdrawal of those troops without remon- strance; and a vigorous protest from him would have prevented it. Or, if they were taken, he should not have rested till he had found troops, even though exhausted ones, to have taken their place. Men were not wanting; for the whole Sixth corps was up and at hand. A single brigade would have held it. But it scemed as though the heads of the army were turned, and all grown giddy together.
But with the setting of the sun on the evening of the 2d, the supremacy in generalship, which had been with the enemy, gravi- tated to the Union side. The dispositions of the artillery on commanding eminences bearing upon the enemy on Culp's Hill, for repelling an advance and driving him out, were admirable, and the marshalling of the infantry was no less judicious and skilful. There was none of that stripping of troops from one
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part of the line and rushing them in superabundance to another, which had so blotted and shadowed the conduct of the preceding day. But there was an equipoise and a self-assurance, as of a General who felt the full command of his faculties, that is refreshing and inspiring to contemplate. The manœuvres for regaining the lost ground were dexterously conducted, and would have soon resulted in the capture of large numbers of the foe had he not made a timely retreat.
During the morning of the 3d, every arm of the service was kept in full tide. The cavalry was in strength, vigilant and active on either flank; the artillery was repaired and posted in abundance, well supplied with ammunition, and the infantry lines were everywhere strong, with ample supports well in hand to meet any emergency. When, therefore, that supreme effort of the foe came on the afternoon of the 3d, it was met and repulsed, without weakening any other part of the line, and in the spirit of a master. Another and another such assault on whatever part it might have come would have been welcomed with as determined a front as was this.
Several Union Generals give it as their opinion in their testi- mony, that if Meade had immediately ordered a countercharge with a strong column, the enemy might have been routed and his army destroyed. But such an opinion is in no case supported by any convincing reasons. The enemy was well prepared to meet a countercharge, in good position and behind breastworks. He had been prodigal of his ammunition ; but Lee and Longstreet were too cool and calculating to have squandered all and not have saved enough te repel any assault that could have been made ; besides, Longstreet expressly testifies that he was in readiness, and would have counted such an assault as a rare piece of good fortune. The very same condition which made it easy for the Union forces to repulse Longstreet, would have been in that officer's favor had an attack been made upon him. It was the fact that the ground between the two lines was perfectly open, enabling either side to see and prepare to meet a charge from the very moment of starting, and that in the whole dis- tance to be passed over the advancing troops would be exposed to a destructive fire, certain to annihilate them, that rendered
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it impossible for either party to make a front attack with any prospect of success.
Maintaining his position firmly during the night of the 3rd and day of the 4th, there was no hope of advantage by direct attack. When the night of the 4th came, Lee was able to with- draw, under cover of darkness, without fear of molestation. There was only left a rear-guard which on the morning of the 6th it was possible to reach. To fight a rear-guard is always a boot- less task ; for while it presents only a small front, it can by falling back gradually, and taking strong positions, inflict great slaughter upon the attacking party, which must expose itself in approaching; and even if it is overpowered and captured, it is in itself so insignificant as to be of small account.
To have followed Lee's rear-guard then would have cost an expenditure of blood not warranted by the fruits which gave promise of being gathered. Having complete control of the two shortest routes to the Potomac, and one night the start, Lee was able to reach it without molestation, except such as the cavalry could interpose, which was inconsiderable. Considering the situation in which the two armies were, relative to the roads leading to the Potomac, it was no lack of generalship on the part of Meade in allowing Lee to make unmolested the transfer; for it was inevitable, one night sufficing to put the major part beyond the reach of the pursuing army. Once safely at the Potomac, Lee might have crossed immediately had the river been fordable, or had his bridges been in position ; but these were gone and the waters were at flood. His only alternative, therefore, was to fortify, which he had ample time to do, the hours of one night being enough. Meade might have followed by the direct roads over which the enemy had gone, whereby he would have saved several days. But it would have been of no avail, as he would have found the enemy fortified, had he made the march with as much expedition as the enemy himself. But he seems to have considered his instructions to cover Washington and Baltimore of as much importance while following a beaten foe, as in facing one in full strength.
When Meade came again to confront the enemy, he found him in strong position and ready for a fight. Had Meade
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attacked, he would have met the fate of Magruder at Malvern Hill or Burnside at Fredericksburg. It has been asserted that Lee was deficient in ammunition at Williamsport, and that a resolute attack would have insured success ; but such was not the fact. Meade says in his testimony: "I had reason to believe that ammunition trains had been brought from Winchester, and crossed on the Ferry at Williamsport for the supply of General Lee's army. . . . I had positive information that ammunition trains had been ferried across at Williamsport; " and General Imboden, in the article above quoted, says: "This would have been fatal to us, but for the opportune arrival at the critical moment of an ammunition train from Winchester. The wagons were ferried across to our side as soon as possible, and driven on the field in a gallop." This was on the morning of the 6th, so that when Meade came on the 12th, there was no lack of ammunition for all arms.
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