USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 22
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The Fifth corps had marched on the 30th through Liberty, Union Bridge, and Uniontown, and had encamped for the night two miles beyond the latter place. It moved at five o'clock on the morning of the 1st, and at two in the afternoon halted near the Pennsylvania State line. At dark the march was resumed. and not until two of the following morning was the column halted, having passed through Hanover, to which place the order of Meade carried it, McSherrystown, and Brushtown, between which and the field it bivouacked. This corps was therefore beyond call, unless it could have been put upon a more direct route than that by Hanover.
The Second corps, General Hancock, rested at Uniontown during the 30th, and on the morning of the 1st moved up to
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Taneytown, arriving there at eleven o'clock, where were General Meade's headquarters. This place was fourteen miles away, and this corps was therefore not available.
The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, the only remaining one, was at Manchester, thirty-four miles away.
Intelligence did not reach Meade of the fighting at Gettysburg until after noon. In his testimony he says: "The moment I received this information, I directed Major-General Hancock, who was with me at the time, to proceed without delay to the scene of the contest; and having in view this preliminary order [circular] which I had issued to him, as well as to other corps commanders, I directed him to make an examination of the ground in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, and to report to me, without loss of time, the facilities, and advantages and disadvan- tages of that ground for receiving battle. I furthermore instructed him that in case, upon his arrival at Gettysburg-a place which I had never seen in my life, and had no more knowledge of than you have now-he should find the position unsuitable and the advantages on the side of the enemy, he should examine the ground critically as he went out there, and report to me the nearest position in the immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg where a concentration of the army would be more advantageous than at Gettysburg." This order was issued to General Hancock at ten minutes past one, P. M., of the 1st. It would seem from the. reference to his preliminary circular that General Meade had been confidently anticipating a mere checking of the enemy's advance at Gettysburg, and a final concentration either upon Pipe Creek or upon some intermediate position, where his army could all be brought up and marshalled before the work of battle should begin. In that circular the details of the whole move- ment were sketched, and that evening would have brought to cach corps an order for the march in accordance therewith. had not the battle been precipitated. For the execution of such a movement, his headquarters at Taneytown were in the right position. It is upon the supposition that he entertained a con- fident expectation that this movement would be finally executed. that we can explain his refusal to go earlier to the field himself. and that he delayed so long the sending any one to represent him.
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MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
To this cherished purpose of Meade, his Chief of staff, General Butterfield, was strongly opposed. Against the original issue of the circular he had exerted his influence both with Meade, and also with officers high in command, who had the latter's confi- dence. And now, as General Hancock was about to proceed to the front, clothed with ample powers to act, Butterfield urged the importance of a forward rather than a retrograde movement. In his testimony he says : " Before General Hancock left for Gettys- burg, I stated to him my views of the matter. I told him that I hoped as he was vested with this authority, he would not, if circumstances were such that it could be avoided, have the army fall back; that I thought the effect upon the morale of the army would be bad." Leaping into an ambulance, that he might have an opportunity to consult his maps, Hancock went forward. Warren, Chief of engineers, upon information received from Buford that the enemy were moving down upon him from the direction of Fairfield, had been sent by Meade, some time earlier to Gettysburg to examine the ground. It appears, besides, that before he started, news had come that Reynolds had been killed. This would indicate that Meade was kept well informed through- out the day of what was passing at the front. As he was only fourteen miles away, an hour and a half would suffice to bring him intelligence, or have carried him upon the field. Warren mistook his road and went by the way of Emmittsburg. He arrived upon the field shortly after Hancock, and they were soon joined by Sickles of the Third corps, and Slocum of the Twelfth. The presence of so many corps commanders was hailed with satis- faction. It gave assurance that their troops were on the way, and that the brave men who had battled heroically through that terrible day were not to be wholly abandoned to their fate.
General Hancock in his testimony says : "I found that, prac- tically, the fight was then over. The rear of our columns, with the enemy in pursuit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg." If such was the fact, it must have been between four and five o'clock when he arrived. By virtue of his order from Meade he at once assumed command on the field, though he was outranked by both Howard and Sickles, and had they resisted his assumption he would have found himself powerless. Upon
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this point General Hancock says: " However, I did not feel much embarrassment about it, because I was an older soldier than either of them. But I knew that legally it was not proper, and that if they chose to resist it, it might become a troublesome matter to me for the time being."
He procceded to post the troops as they came up, accepting the general disposition of Howard. General Geary of the Twelfth corps, who had come on in advance of General Slocum, was posted upon the high ground towards Round Top. " The enemy," says Hancock, "evidently believing that we were reinforced, or that our whole army was there, discontinued their great efforts. . .. There was firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of the day's battle." Soon after arriving, Hancock informed Meade that he could hold the ground until dark, and at twenty-five minutes past five he sent the following despatch : " When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the Cemetery, which cannot well be taken ; it is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the Third corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime, Gibbon [in whose command the Second corps had been left] had better march on so as to take position on our right or left to our rear as may be necessary, in some commanding posi- tion. . .. The battle is quiet now. I think we shall be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops."
Soon after sending this note, General Hancock turned over the command to General Slocum, who had now arrived, who out- ranked him, and to whom he had been instructed before leaving headquarters to deliver it, and returned to Taneytown. Before his arrival, Meade, acting upon the information he had received. had decided to fight at Gettysburg, and had sent out orders to all the corps to march for that place. To Sedgwick, who had the
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largest corps, and was farthest away, frequent messengers were dispatched at intervals through the night, urging him to hasten his march with all practicable speed. His trains he ordered back to Westminster, and here he established his base of supply, a railroad leading to this place being utilized for the purpose. Having thus set his whole army in motion, he broke up his head- quarters at Taneytown at a little before midnight, and pushed forward to Gettysburg. It was one o'clock on the morning of the 2d of July before he arrived upon the field. The centre of the line passed through the Cemetery, and the soldiers who had battled through the fearful day were sleeping amid the graves. As the numerous cavalcade entered the place of the dead, and now of the living also, the sleepers started up as if in resurrected forms, but quickly settled back to their slumbers, overcome by the weariness that was oppressing them.
While these things were passing in the Union camps, what was transpiring in the rebel ? Lce, as well as Meade, had not been present during the fighting of the first day. He also arrived at the front during the night, and vigorously addressed himself to the task of preparing his army to continue the battle. As we have already seen, he had promised his Lieutenants, before leav- ing Virginia, that he would not fight an offensive battle. But the game had been precipitated in his absence, and it was now difficult to decline the wager. The result of that day's work had, on the whole, been encouraging to him. Though he had lost some prisoners he had captured more, and though he had suffered grievously in killed and wounded, he had likewise in- flicted severe losses upon the Union corps, which he had driven from their position. He had also gained possession of the field. and of the town with all its network of ways. He says in his report : "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of the troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the mean time every effort was made to ascertain the number and positions of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy ; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by
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the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a mea- sure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."
· He could not reasonably have expected to invade the North, and make a campaign in an enemy's country without fighting whenever occasion offered. He could hardly have been so credu- lous as to have indulged the hope of moving at his own sweet will to despoil and ravage, of flitting from city to city and mak- ing requisitions upon a defenseless people, unopposed. His army, moreover, was full of fight, and now more than ever believed itself invincible. It is true that it was forced to acknowledge that the Army of the Potomac had never been known to fight so stubbornly before as on this day; but the assurance of all was unshaken. Prof. Jacobs, who was a citizen of Gettysburg, and was at his home throughout the mighty throes of the conflict, in his hand-book of the battle, says : "The portion of Rodes' division which lay down before our dwelling for the night, was greatly elated with the results of the first day's battle, and the same may be said of the whole rebel army. They were anxious to engage in conversation-to communicate their views and feelings, and to elicit ours. They were boastful of themselves, of their cause, and of the skill of their officers; and were anxious to tell us of the unskilful manner in which some of our officers had conducted the fight which had just closed. When informed that General Archer and 1500 of his men had been captured, they said, ' To- morrow we will take all these back again; and having already taken 5000 (!) prisoners of you to-day, we will take the balance of your men to-morrow.' Having been well fed, provisioned, and rested, and successful on this day, their confidence knew no bounds. They felt assured that they should be able, with perfect ease, to cut up our army in detail,-fatigued as it was by long
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marches and yet scattered, for only two corps had as yet arrived. Resting under this impression, they lay down joyfully on the night of the first day."
With soldiers impelled by such feeling, Lee could not well withhold battle when thrust in his face. Besides, his pride as a soldier would not allow him now to show a timid front. Mr. Swinton very justly remarks upon this point: "What really compelled Lee, contrary to his intent and promise, to give battle, was the animus and inspiration of the invasion; for, to the end, such were the 'exsufllicate and blown surmises' of the army, and such was the contempt of its opponent engendered by Fredericks- burg and Chancellorsville, that there was not in his ranks a bare- foot soldier in tattered gray but believed Lee would lead the Confederate army into Baltimore and Washington, if not into Philadelphia and New York. To have withdrawn, therefore, without a battle, though materially easy, was morally impossible ; for to have recrossed the Potomac without a blow, and abandoned the invasion on which such towering hopes had been built, would have been a shock beyond endurance to his army and the South."
The leaders of both armies being now on the field, and both having decided to fight there, we may well conclude that they were deeply solicitous and busy in maturing their plans. Gen- eral Lee established his headquarters at the little stone house of Mrs. Thompson, on the right of the Chambersburg road, where it crosses Seminary Ridge. The rebel army consisted of nine divisions, as already noticed. Of the three under Ewell, two, Rodes' and Early's, had been in the first day's conflict. The other, Johnson's, did not arrive until the fighting was over, and too late to assist in renewing it, which was contemplated. This corps was posted on the rebel left, Rodes' division occupying Middle street, the crest of the eminence on which the town is built, and extending to the Seminary Ridge, Early taking position next, stretching through the eastern part of the town, and upon his left was Johnson. Hill's corps was formed upon the right of Ewell's, the point of junction forming almost a right-angle, with Heth upon the left, Anderson upon the right, and Pender in the centre, Heth and Pender having sustained the brunt of the hard fighting of the first day. Upon the right of Hill, and joining
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Anderson, were two divisions of Longstreet's corps, McLaw's first, and next him Hood's. These two divisions of Longstreet en- camped during the night of the 1st within three miles of Gettys- burg on the Chambersburg road, and hence did not get into posi- tion until late in the forenoon of the 2d. Longstreet's third division, Pickett's, did not come up until the 3d. Thus the entire rebel infantry, with the exception of this last division, was practically on the field ready for action early on the morning of the 2d, and had not been worn by long marches.
The Union army, in this particular, was less fortunate. For two days the corps had been stretching away at their best move- ment to overtake the enemy before he should cross the Susque- hanna, and now they had imposed the added duty of a sudden and unlooked-for concentration upon the very extremity of a line over thirty miles in length. General Meade, soon after coming upon the field, took up his headquarters at a little frame house on the Taneytown road, just in rear of, and to the south of Zeigler's Grove. It was sheltered from infantry fire by the sweil in the ground, but much exposed to artillery, as the sequel proved. As soon as it was light, Meade was in the saddle, and proceeded to examine the ground and to post his forces. Gen- eral Howard, with what was left of his corps, was directed to remain upon the Cemetery Hill to the right and left of the Balti- more pike. His men were sheltered by the stone walls and houses about the foot of the hill, upon the summit of which Steinwehr had planted his guns. Upon Howard's right was Wadsworth's division of the First corps, which held the western section of the wooded, and towards the enemy, precipitous and rocky Culp's Hill. To the right of Wadsworth the Twelfth corps, General Slocum, was assigned, and a portion of it was in position that night. Geary's division had, however, been brought upon the field late in the afternoon, and two brigades of it posted in the neighborhood of Round Top, on the extreme left. Two divisions of the First corps, which had been led in the fight of the previous day with so much gallantry by Doubleday, Rowley's and Robinson's, were held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill. The Second corps, General Hancock, which had been in bivouac three miles from the field on the Taneytown road during the
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MAP OF THE GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD, SECOND DAY. JULY 2:1863.
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MARSHALLING FOR SECOND DAY AT GETTYSBURG.
night, arrived early in the morning, and was placed to the left of Howard, its line stretching along the crest of Cemetery Ridge from Zeigler's Grove, where its right rested, in the direction of the Round Tops.
The Third corps, General Sickles, as it arrived on the evening of the 1st, was massed for the night to the left of the Eleventh corps. Two brigades of this corps and two batteries were left at Emmittsburg to guard that line, but were relieved during the night and arrived at the front at about day-break. A singular adventure occurred to the division of General Humphreys, while upon this march. It was after four o'clock in the afternoon be- fore he started from Emmittsburg. He took the road running nearly two miles to the west of the main road, and moved up upon that flank. Having been cautioned by a note from Howard against running into the enemy as he approached the field, Gen- eral Humphreys, when about half way to Gettysburg, desired to move over to the east, and thus avoid that ground where the cnemy was known to be; but Colonel Hayden, who had been sent as guide, insisted that Sickles had directed him to conduct the column by the way leading to the Black Horse tavern, the very ground where the enemy lay. Humphreys unwillingly consented to move on, but ordered the column to close up, and directed the men to move silently as they approached the neigh- borhood of Gettysburg. At midnight he suddenly found himself confronting the enemy in his camps. " We found," says Hum- phreys, "that the enemy were posted there in force. They were not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked them at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success; but I was three miles distant from the remainder of the army, and I believed such a course would have been inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the Commanding General. As soon as I found what was the exact condition of things, I retraced my steps, and moved my command by the route I have already indi- cated, bivouacking near Gettysburg about one A. M. on the 2d of July. ... It shows what can be done by accident. If any one had been directed to take a division to the rear of the enemy's army and get up as close as I did unperceived, it would have been thought exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to do it."
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In the morning General Geary's division, which had remained during the night near Round Top, was ordered over to Culp's Hill, where the rest of the Twelfth corps was in position, the Third corps was moved out farther to the left to the ground which had been occupied by Geary, and the Second corps was interposed between the Third and the Eleventh.
The Fifth corps as it arrived was held in reserve in rear of Cemetery Hill, but was eventually moved over to the extreme left occupying the Round Tops and supporting the Third corps. The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, not getting upon the march until eight o'clock on the evening of the 1st, coming by the way of Westminster, and having thirty-four miles to move, did not arrive on the field until two in the afternoon of the 2d. It was held in reserve, for the most part, in rear of the left flank.
The general form of the line thus established and which, though varied somewhat in the course of the fight, was finally settled down upon, has been compared by De Peyster to a Limer- ick fish-hook. The head, where the cord is attached, is exactly represented by the Round Tops. The point is at the easterly extremity of Culp's Hill, where is Spangler's Spring. The centre of the curve is represented by the Cemetery Hill, where the dead of the battle now repose, and directly opposite the town. The short curve from the point to the centre of the curve of the hook is one and three-fourths miles; the long curve or shank, two
and three-fourths. Oak, or Seminary Ridge, along which the enemy's right lay, is opposite the shank and at a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half away. Opposite the Cemetery Hill the rebel line left Seminary Hill, passing through the town and resting upon Benner's Hill opposite Culp's Hill. If the position of the cavalry upon the two flanks be included, the length of the Union line was over five miles, and that of the enemy, forming the segment of a concentric circle, over seven.
In rear of the Union line were the Taneytown and Baltimore pikes, connected by cross roads, which afforded admirable means for moving troops and guns quickly from one part of the line to another, thus offering all the advantages in this respect which could have been enjoyed by holding the town itself. On one of these cross roads was parked the reserve artillery. To complete
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the requirements of a fortified camp, in rear of Cemetery Hill, are Power's and McAllister's Hills, gentle eminences, on which were planted powerful batteries to protect the reserve artillery, and which were eventually used to admirable advantage, in driving back the enemy upon the right flank.
After examining the field, General Meade decided to assume the offensive, and to attack from his right. The enemy's position was here plainly visible, and his line at several points appeared to be vulnerable. Opposite the Union left, the enemy's move- ments were screened by a curtain of wood, and to attack directly on that side would have necessitated a movement over a long stretch of perfectly open ground, where the advancing troops would have been raked from front and flanks by interminable lines of the enemy's guns. Meade's intention was to use the Twelfth, Fifth, and Sixth corps for the attacking column. But the latter corps was still upon the march, and would not reach the field for several hours. He accordingly ordered General Slocum, who was to lead the assault, to prepare to move with his own and the Fifth corps.
But to any one who has been on the ground, or who has regarded attentively an intelligible description of it, the difficulty of moving troops, and the impossibility of taking artillery forward from that flank will be apparent, and when once out upon the open ground it will be observed how every rood is commanded from emi- nences on all sides. Slocum, after making a careful study of the position, reported that he did not think that an attack would have promise of success, which opinion was concurred in by Warren, who had been sent by Meade for the purpose of examining it, and the design was abandoned. It is not apparent why Meade should ever have thought of attacking from that flank ; for had he driven the enemy he would have encountered a great obstacle at the town itself; and had he driven him to Seminary Ridge. he would have been attacking him in an exceedingly strong position, thus reversing the Battle of Gettysburg. Besides, had the enemy been driven from this stronghold, he would have been pushed over upon the left flank of the Union army, the most dangerous and menacing position into which he could have been forced, as he would have been nearing his base, and been getting
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