USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 24
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vain attempts to dislodge him. Taking only his most trusted men he formed them for the death grapple and led them forth. He pointed to the dark ground whereon he desired them to plant their footprints. It was enough. Where had their bold leader ever led them, that was not to victory ? But before they had reached the thin line which they thought easily to brush away, supports had come. The Fortieth New York was there, the Sixth New Jersey and the Fourth Massachusetts had been gathered in, and now the path across Plum Run, which they had hoped to stealthily pass, they found closed. But they were des- perate men, formed with ample supports, and as the repeated blows of the battering ram will finally loosen the strongest wall, and topple it down, so did the head of this column by the mere weight of numbers force its way through, and press rapidly for- ward to climb the heights unopposed. But as they dash heedlessly on, suddenly a sheet of flame leaps out from the very roots of the mountain, that sweeps down the boldest and the bravest, and throws back that fiery column in disorder and confusion. Whence so suddenly have come these bold defenders ? Ten minutes before and not one was there; but the hill all peaceful and unguarded was inviting approach.
When General Warren arrived upon this hill, as the battle opened, he found there only some officers who had been using it for a signal station. When these signal officers saw the long lines of the enemy sweeping on, inferring that Sickles would be totally unable to check them, they commenced folding their flags to make way for the men in grey. But Warren, knowing instinc- tively that all was lost if that hill was lost, bade them unfurl their flags and signal on the supports that were approaching. Eagerly he had watched that first assault, and when he saw the enemy's line broken and driven back, he secretly rejoiced ; for now he knew that hope still remained. He saw at a glance, what a terrible effect the plunging fire of artillery would have, delivered from this eminence, if guns could once be got upon its summit. Hazlett's battery in the neighborhood was immediately ordered up, and by almost superhuman exertions was brought upon the glad crest. And now seeing the head of Barnes' division of the Fifth corps approaching on the double quick to reinforce
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the Third, he assumed the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and ordering it upon Little Round Top. Passing rapidly to the rear of the mountain, Vincent hastened his men into posi- tion at its very base; the Sixteenth Michigan, Lieutenant Colonel Welch, upon the right, facing the wheat field; next it the Forty- fourth New York, Colonel Rice, facing the Devil's Den ; by its side its twin regiment, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Captain Woodward, facing the little valley between the two mounts, and not inaptly called the Valley of the Shadow of Death ; and upon the extreme left, looking towards the rear of Round Top, was the Twentieth Maine, Colonel Chamberlain. So hastily had they been brought upon the field that they had not stopped to load. The work of formation was momentary, and before the men had been five minutes settled behind the huge boulders which lie scattered over all its broad breast, away to the left was heard, says Captain Judson of the Eighty-third, "a loud, fierce, distant yell, as if all pandemonium had broken loose, and joined in the chorus of one grand, universal war-whoop." Three lines deep, at double-quick, with bayonets fixed, on came that mass of Hood's impetuous men. It was the supreme moment, and the stoutest held his breath, grasping with firmer grip his trusty piece. Not upon the Old Guard in its most desperate hour ever rested a graver trust. The weight of the shock fell upon the Forty-fourth New York, and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania. The first im- pulse was scarcely broken, ere the line was new formed, and from behind rocks and trees, at close quarters, a most deadly fire was poured in. Again and again with fresh troops and ever increas- ing numbers did the enemy assault; but each time to be thrown back broken and bleeding. "Hundreds of them," says Judson, " approached even within fifteen yards of our line, but they approached only to be shot down or hurled back covered with gaping wounds. It was a death grapple in which assailant and assailed seemed resolved to win or fall in the struggle."
As soon as Colonel Vincent had discovered that this assault was coming, he dismounted, and sent an aid to General Barnes requesting immediate reinforcements. "Tell him," said he, "the enemy are coming in overwhelming force." When the enemy found himself spending his strength in futile attempts to carry
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the centre of Vincent's line, he moved over to the left and attacked with renewed vigor the Sixteenth Michigan. That regi- ment had a weaker position and was less protected than the rest of the line, and when the pressure upon it became heavy, it yielded somewhat to the current and was fast giving way, exposing that flank to sudden turning. At that instant, the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, of Weed's brigade, which had been sent to support and reinforce Vincent, came upon the field, and moved down to the wavering line. In doing so it was much exposed, receiving a volley by which the gallant O'Rourke, who commanded the regiment, was killed, and large numbers of the rank and file were laid low. Confusion followed, and it seemed for the moment that it, too, would give way. But Vincent, seeing the peril of. the hour, rushed from point to point, threatening and encouraging by turns, and by the aid of his officers, finally suc- ceeded in bringing order out of confusion, and the enemy was again foiled. When once the line had become settled, and felt in a measure protected, it was invincible. The personal courage and activity of Vincent saved the brigade from what promised inevitable destruction. But his tireless intrepidity made him a mark for the enemy's sharp-shooters, and he paid the forfeit with his life. He was standing upon a rock part way down the decliv- ity, watching the movements of the enemy, when he was struck in the groin by a minie ball, and was borne helpless and bleed- ing with a mortal hurt from the field. He was succeeded by Colonel Rice, of the Forty-fourth, who on assuming command immediately passed along the line, encouraging the men to strike for their fallen leader a deadlier blow, and insisting that they must hold the position to the very last extremity.
In making his assaults thus far, the foe had done so with a strong hand, his ranks having been well filled. But now they were visibly weakened, many having fallen, and many others having chosen secure positions behind rocks, were loth to leave them; some even climbed into the tree tops, and hid themselves in the thick foliage of the branches, keeping up from their con- cealments a most galling fire. But the enemy had not yet reached the left of the brigade line, and, finding the valley open, he determined to again marshal his forces and make one more
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resolute struggle for the mastery. Forming under cover of the wood, they advanced, and now with a fury apparently inspired by desperation. The Twentieth Maine met them, as had the other regiments, with a volley which had a staggering effect; but though fearful destruction followed the deadly mis- siles, the survivors rushed on unchecked, and were soon upon Chamberlain's men. In the haste of coming into position, they had neglected to fix bayonets; but clubbing their muskets and with the might of mad men, braining their assailants, these hardy sons of the forest beat back the foe, and finally succeeded in shaking them off. But now a new peril threatened. The enemy had been repulsed, though not destroyed. He was still defiant, and the left flank of the Twentieth was entirely unpro- tected and unsupported. Early in the fight, Colonel Chamberlain, seeing the danger to which he was exposed from this cause, had swung the left battalion around until it faced in the opposite direction to the other extremity of the brigade line. The enemy saw his advantage, and, immediately pushing through, vigorously attacked this battalion. Chamberlain called upon Captain Wood- ward for a company to support him in this dire extremity. This the Captain was unable, from paucity of his own numbers, to do, but sent word that he could stretch out his line, which relieved a part of Chamberlain's regiment, and enabled him to maintain his ground and to protect the flank. The enemy's bullets were now falling in the rear of the right of the brigade line, coming from exactly the opposite direction from what they had in the earlier part of the contest. But the force of the enemy's daring was by this time in a measure spent, and in fifteen minutes his fire began to slacken. Chamberlain now saw that his time had come, and ordering his left battalion to fix bayonets, he led it with the greatest gallantry, and with inspiriting cheers-in which the voices of the whole brigade joined-in a counter-charge which swept the dispirited foe back in utter rout. At this juncture, a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, also of the Fifth corps, which had been sent to the support of Vincent, charged up the hill and helped to swell the shout of victory. The enemy, believing that heavy reinforcements had arrived, gave up the. contest, and Colonel Chamberlain, swinging his whole regiment
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around upon the front, cleared the valley between the Round Tops, his left sweeping the declivity of Round Top. Over five hundred prisoners were taken by this brigade alone, including two Colonels and fifteen other commissioned officers, and over a thousand stands of arms. That narrow valley was strewn with the dead and the wounded, mangled in every conceivable way in which relentless battle leaves its victims. Behind one single rock were found, after the battle, twenty-five dead bodies, many wounded, doubtless, having crawled behind it for shelter and there yielded their lives.
The severely wounded, who were taken prisoners, were in the main boastful and defiant. The attacking column was principally composed of Alabama and Texan troops. They spoke in a man- ner dissatisfied with the result, which they had in no way antici- pated. They acknowledged that they had been badly cut up; but said that only one brigade had yet been engaged, while there were two others behind them ready to follow up the assault. One experience, however, of that dark valley was enough, and no further advances were made to enter it.
No prouder victory was achieved on any part of that bloody field, nor one which more largely contributed to the accomplish- ment of the final triumph, than that of this small brigade of Vin- cent, composed of less than twelve hundred muskets, supported and aided by Weed's brigade and Hazlett's battery; but principally fought by this handful of men. No valor could have exceeded theirs. Their spirit is illustrated by an incident which occurred at a moment when the fight was at its climax. An overgrown, uncouth but resolute young man, belonging to company F, of the Eighty-third regiment, who had a sheltered position behind a rock, was noticed to rise up when he fired in such a manner as to expose nearly his whole body. He was repeatedly cautioned, and called to, to "get down." Finally, irritated by the reprimand, he drew himself up to his full proportions, and swaying his brawny arm in an impressive gesture, at the same time calling upon God to witness, he exclaimed : " I am on the soil of old Pennsylvany now, and if they get me down they'll have to shoot me down." The feeling prevailed throughout the army that it was now on northern soil, and to the last man they would fight before they would yield an inch.
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The loss upon the Union side in this struggle, on account of the shelter, was in numbers small in proportion to that inflicted on the enemy. But upon the officers the blow fell with cruel force. General Weed, who commanded the brigade which had come to the support of Vincent, received a mortal wound, and while Captain Hazlett, whose battery had been brought upon the summit with so much difficulty, was bending over his prostrate form, endeavoring to catch his last broken accents, he also was struck by the fatal bullet, and fell lifeless upon the gasping form of his dying chief. Thus fell Vincent, Weed, and Hazlett, the three chief commanders on the hill, and O'Rourke, the leader of a regiment, besides numbers of others of a less degree.
When we consider the small chance by which this hill was saved to the Union arms, and its vital importance to the integrity of the whole army, the inquiry strongly presses itself, Why was it left so late unoccupied, and why was the opportunity of grasp- ing it allowed to remain open all the day long, and until its sum- mit was casting fitful shadows ? Is it answered, that General Meade had given Sickles orders to occupy it, and that he sup- posed it was firmly held ? This can hardly be accepted as a satisfactory answer. For, from the window of General Meade's headquarters, Little Round Top is plainly seen, and by using his glass he could have verified the belief at any moment, or by means of an aid he could have examined each nook and cranny of the hill every half hour in the whole day. But General Sickles says, when he was ordered to relieve General Geary, he proceeded to do so, and notified General Meade that Geary had been simply massed and not in position, that he had executed the first order, and was awaiting further directions. Finally, says Sickles, " Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and ob- serving, from the enemy's movements on our left what I thought. to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point. I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circum- stances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters ;
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and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg."
The testimony of General Meade conflicts somewhat with this statement. He says : "I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the Third corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the Second corps, com- manded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in gen- eral terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock's left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there. I then sent back to him my general instructions which had been previously given. A short time afterwards General Sickles came to my headquarters, and I told him what my general views were, and intimated that he was to occupy the position that I understood General Han- cock had put General Geary in, the night previous. General Sickles replied that General Geary had no position, as far as he could understand. He then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was, some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suita- ble. I answered, 'General Sickles, certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given to you; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you.' And I directed Brigadier-General Hunt, my Chief of artillery, to ac- company General Sickles, and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give Gen- eral Sickles the benefit of his judgment." General Sickles held his corps back until the last moment, and at length, when his outposts had been driven in, and the enemy was about to attack, took what has been called the advanced position, which General Meade expressed his disapprobation of, when he came upon the ground. "I am of the opinion," says General Meade, "that General Sickles did what he thought was for the best; but I
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differed from him in judgment. And I maintain that subsequent events proved that my judgment was correct, and his judgment was wrong."
General Sickles, in his testimony, says upon this point : "I took up that position which is described in the report of General Hal- leck as a line from half to three-quarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he very pointedly disap- proves of, and which he further says I took up through a mis- interpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpreta- tion of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, which- ever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up the line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take-as they would have taken it if I had not occu- pied it in force-would have rendered our position on the left untenable ; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. I think that any General who would look at the topography of the country there would natu- rally come to the same conclusion."
Thus we perceive that in respect to the two positions in general, the opinions of Meade and Sickles are diametrically opposed to each other. But we should recollect that all this is testimony given after the event, when the questions at issue were under sharp discussion, when much feeling on the one side and on the other existed, and when the opinions were naturally colored by prejudice. Enough is however brought to light by the reports made at the time, and by this testimony, to enable us to form an intelligent conclusion concerning the occupation of Little Round Top.
In his testimony, General Meade says "his left [Sickles'] was to extend to Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was prac- ticable, to occupy it." Two facts are deducible from this state- ment; first, that this commanding position was visible from his headquarters, and he was able for himself to have any moment determined whether it was occupied or not; and second, that he was in ignorance whether it was practicable to occupy it.
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There are no principles of military strategy more fundamental, more apparent to even the casual observer, or more vital to the safety of an army when deployed in line of defensive battle, than these : first, that the flanks of the infantry should be firmly posted, with some natural or artificial protection ; and second, that the flanks should be well guarded by cavalry, ready at all times to make a stand and to give notice of the movements of the enemy. Both these principles were violated in this instance. The whole left wing was unstable until the last moment, and the line was actu- ally formed and the position finally taken, after the battle had begun, and Little Round Top, a fortress in itself, formed and fashioned by the fiat of the Almighty, ready for its armament and its defenders, was left entirely unoccupied until after the battle had begun to rage with great fury, and was finally saved from the clutches of the foe by the most determined and bloody fighting of troops which gained their position but five minutes in advance of their assailants. The cavalry, too, was removed just before the battle opened, and was left unsupplied at a time when it was most needed. It would seem as though the gates were swung wide open deliberately and purposely to allow the enemy to walk in.
Is it offered, in defence of the Commander-in-chief, that he had ordered Sickles to occupy this ground? This is not enough. It was his duty to know that it was occupied and made firm. Hour after hour passed, and he knew that it was not occu- pied; for he had the direct testimony of his senses, and Sickles was repeatedly informing him that he was not in position, both by messenger and in person, and begging that the chief, or some member of his staff, would examine the ground and give definite orders. To the last moment no such orders were given, and Sickles was finally compelled to take position upon his own re- sponsibility, and by the testimony of General Meade himself, under a discretion which was accorded him. Sickles' forces were insufficient to cover his line and occupy Little Round Top; but he covered the front of that position and the approaches to it by causing his line to abut upon Round Top, which was imprac- ticable for offensive or defensive purposes. Troops were at the disposal of Meade, with which Little Round Top might have been
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covered early in the day ; for the Fifth corps had arrived at two o'clock in the morning within easy call. The responsibility of the non-occupation of this stronghold, so vital to the integrity of his position and the safety of his whole army, must rest with the Commander-in-chief, and it must ever remain an inexplicable mystery how he could have permitted the hours to pass,-after the bloody experience of the preceding day, knowing that the whole rebel army was close in upon his front,-with his left wing in the disorganized condition in which the opening of the battle found it.
Respecting the ordering away of the cavalry, no question has ever been made in the inquiries into the conduct of the battle. But it was no less a grave violation of principle, and should have received the severest censure. The fault cannot be imputed to General Pleasanton who commanded the cavalry, for having given the order without the knowledge of his chief; for had such been the case, why was not Pleasanton at once cashiered, as he would have richly merited ? As the latter received no censure, we must conclude that it was either the direct order of Meade, or that it received his sanction.
The enemy, in guarding his flank, exercised a commendable care, in marked contrast with the negligence of his opponent. The extreme right of his line was, from the nature of the country, exposed and weak. Accordingly, at the point where the Emmitts- burg pike crosses the Seminary Ridge, which it does about three- quarters of a mile beyond the Peach Orchard, he built, as soon as he felt himself menaced, a strong and quite elaborate fortification with re-entrant angles so as to sweep the ground in all directions, and here he planted his heavy guns.
Leaving the citadel that guards the left of the Union line in the firm grip of the gallant men who so heroically defended it, turn now to the further conduct of the fight on Sickles' front. As soon as it was apparent that the enemy was intent on making a determined fight upon the Union left, realizing the danger which was threatening Sickles' thin line, General Meade exerted himself to the utmost to succor these hard-pressed men. General Hancock, who had been called on for help, promptly sent an entire division composed of four brigades under General Caldwell.
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General Humphreys, though expecting every moment to be him- self attacked, and having a difficult position to hold, detached one of his regiments, having previously parted with one of his brigades, and hurried it away, in response to the urgent appeals of the aids of both Sickles and Birney. The divisions of Barnes and Ayers of the Fifth corps were also brought up.
While Hood was making his desperate onslaught upon the defenders of Little Round Top, McLaws, with the aid of Ander- son's division of Hill's corps, was making a no less determined, and far more successful assault upon Birney's right. It fell with the greatest weight upon that part of the line about the Peach Orchard; and here it was first broken. But the brigade of De Trobriand had originally been formed principally facing westward, and as the enemy advanced to follow up the retiring forces on his front at the Peach Orchard, De Trobriand was still able to main- tain his position, and to do good execution. But the pressure soon became too great for him to withstand, and he was obliged to give ground. The enemy having forced his way in upon the wheat- field, was pressing upon his flank and rear. It was a critical moment. Instantly rallying the remnants of the Fifth Michi- gan, and the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, and by the aid of General Birney, who brought the Seventeenth Maine and a New Jersey regiment under Colonel Burling into line, he made a determined charge, and regained the lost ground and the stone wall which had afforded him protection. This was the last effort of this brigade, for it was shortly after relieved by Zook's brigade of Caldwell's division.
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