USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 29
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spare you as much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I shall need all I have to return to the Potomac by a different route from yours. All the transportation and care of the wounded will be entrusted to you. You will recross the moun- tain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williams- port, by any route you deem best, without halting. There rest and feed your animals, then ford the river, and make no halt till you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you.' As I was about leaving to return to my camp, he came out of his tent and said to me in a low tone :
"' I will place in your hands, to-morrow, a sealed package for President Davis, which you will retain in your own possession till you are across the Potomac, when you will detail a trusty commissioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President. I impress it upon you, that, whatever happens, this package must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If you should unfortunately be captured, destroy it.' . . . Shortly after noon, the very windows of heaven seemed to have been opened. . .. The storm increased in fury every moment. Canvas was no protection against it, and the poor wounded, lying upon the hard, naked boards of the wagon-bodies, were drenched by the cold rain. Horses and mules were blinded and maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanageable. The roar of the winds and waters made it almost impossible to communicate orders. Night was rapidly approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness the confusion would become worse confounded. About four P. M. the head of the column was put in motion and began the ascent of the mountain. After dark I set out to gain the advance. The train was seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road. It was moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails of agony. For four hours I galloped along, passing to the front, and heard more-it was too dark to see-of the horrors of war than I had witnessed. from the battle of Bull Run up to that day. In the wagons were men wounded and mutilated in every conceivable way. Some had their legs shattered by a shell or minie ball ; some were shot through their bodies; others had arms torn to shreds ; some had received a ball in the face, or a jagged piece of
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shell had lacerated their heads. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid. Many had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and hardened with blood, were rasping the tender, inflamed lips of their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons had even straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and rocky. The jolting was enough to have killed sound strong men. From nearly. every wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as these greeted the ear:
""'O God ! why can't I die ?'
... "' My God ! will no one have mercy and kill me, and end my misery ?'
"'O! stop one minute, and take me out and leave me to die on the roadside.'
"' I am dying ! I am dying ! My poor wife, my dear children! what will become of you ?'
" Some were praying; others were uttering the most fearful oaths and execrations that despair could wring from them in their agony .. Occasionally a wagon would be passed from which only low, deep moans and sobs could be heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. On, on; we must move on. The storm continued and the darkness was fearful. There was no time even to fill a canteen with water for a dying man ; for, except the drivers and the guards, disposed in compact bodies every half mile, all were wounded and helpless in that vast train of misery. The night was awful, and yet in it was our safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could not distinguish friend from foc. . .. It was my sad lot to pass the whole dis- tance from the rear to the head of the column, and no language can convey an idea of the horrors of that most horrible of all nights of our long and bloody war. . .. After a good deal of ha- rassing and desultory fighting along the road, nearly the whole immense train reached Williamsport a little after the middle of the day. . .. The dead were selected from the train-for many had perished on the way-and were decently buried. Straw was obtained on the neighboring farms; the wounded were removed from the wagons and housed ; the citizens were all put to cooking, and the army surgeons to dressing wounds."
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Imboden was unable to obey the instructions of Lee, to pause only to feed his beasts at Williamsport, and then ford the rive: and push on to Winchester ; for the sudden rains of the previous day had converted the Potomac into a raging torrent, giving it a tide of ten or twelve feet above the fording stage; and during the absence of the enemy, General French, who was stationed at Frederick, had sent up an expedition which had partially destroyed the pontoon bridge. Imboden, accordingly, parked his train, consisting of ten thousand animals and all the wagons, and disposed of the wounded about the town. Until some portion of the rebel army should come, he knew that his situation was pre- carious. He had twenty-two field guns and one Whitworth siege piece. These he planted most advantageously upon the hills just above the town, and held his troops, about three thousand in number, in readiness to repel an attack. On the morning of the 6th, Buford and Kilpatrick approached, and made vigorous demonstrations, dismounting their men and assaulting with great determination. But Imboden's artillery, which was skilfully- distributed and effectively served, proved formidable, and by con- centrating his forces upon the point attacked, made himself more than a match for the assaulting column. Towards evening Fitz- Hugh Lee with a powerful body came to the relief of Imboden, followed closely by Stuart, and the Union forces were obliged to withdraw. The rebel infantry soon after began to arrive, and all further demonstrations were futile.
As has been noticed, General Meade, the moment the result of the grand charge of Longstreet on the afternoon of the 3d was decided, had ridden to the left of the line, and ordered a demonstration there, with the intent to put in a heavy force and assault the rebel position; but the troops were slow in moving, and before they could be got ready, it was too late to make the attempt. Several officers have since testified, that they favored such an attack, and strongly advised General Meade to make one. General Hancock says : " I think that our lines should have advanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a great victory. I was very confident that the advance would be made. General Meade told me before the fight, that if the enemy at- tacked me he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth corps on the
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THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG.
enemy's flank ; I, therefore, when I was wounded and lying down in my ambulance, and about leaving the field, dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would put in the Fifth and Sixth corps, I believed he would win a great victory. I asked him afterwards when I returned to the army, what he had done. He said he had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in collecting, and moved so slowly that nothing was done before night."
It is possible that an instant advance by a strong column, had one been in readiness, might have broken the rebel line. But the probabilities were against it. There were, at most, but about 18,000 men in the enemy's assaulting column in the grand charge. Where was the rest of the rebel army ? Principally concentrated upon Seminary Ridge, a good defensible position, running over with artillery at every point. The very best dispositions had doubtless been made of all but Longstreet's at- tacking force, that it was possible to make to meet any such counter assault as would naturally be anticipated. Hence there is little doubt that a direct assault upon that line would have proved to the Union side as disastrous as had that of Longstreet to the rebel.
During the evening and night of the 3d, the enemy's line on Seminary Ridge was greatly strengthened. Ewell's entire corps was drawn in and placed behind it, and ample security taken for defending every point. It was a position nearly as strong by nature as that where the Union army was planted. It is true, that the rebel army had suffered severely. But so had the Union. Feeling himself strong in his position, Meade courted attack. May we not believe that Lee, with a similar sense of security, would have welcomed a Union advance ? This view, reasoning upon the knowledge which the Union Commander then had, had a strong warrant, and is doubtless that which influenced General Meade in withholding an attack. By information since obtained, we learn that such was the fact. Swinton, in his "Army of the Potomac," gives the testimony of General Longstreet, who said to him: "I had Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I had a heavy force of artillery ; I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt 21
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I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received."
But while Lee was invincible for the moment, he had no preparation for holding out any length of time. Accordingly, as soon as darkness had closed in on the evening of the 4th, the main body of his army was put in motion towards Williamsport, leav- ing only a strong rear guard, to hold the Union forces in check should they attempt to follow, and before morning was beyond the reach of its pursuers, taking the two shortest roads which he completely controlled. Lee himself, with his staff, had started at a little after midnight of the 3d, breakfasting on the morning of the 4th near C. Mussleman's house on the Fairfield road.
In the Union camp, on the evening of the 4th, a council of war was called, at which the four following questions were pro- pounded : "Shall this army remain here ?" " If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive ?" "Do you deem it expedient to move towards Williamsport through Emmittsburg ?" "Shall we pursue the enemy, if he is retreating, on his direct line of re- treat ? " Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren voted in favor of remaining until there was unmistakable evidence that the enemy was really on the retreat. Newton, Pleasanton, and Slocum were for moving at once; and Howard was doubtful. The council was unanimous in favor of moving by the left flank, instead of following the direct route taken by the enemy, only sending cavalry supported by a small infantry force to operate upon his rear. Two reasons impelled to this last decision : first, the condition always imposed upon the Army of the Potomac, to cover Washington and Baltimore in addition to fighting the enemy; and second, to follow on the track of the foe would have no advantage, as the enemy, having the direct, short route to the Potomac, and having a night's march the start, was sure to reach there before either his flanks or his rear could be attacked to much effect, a strong rear guard being at all times ready to make a stubborn resistance. His trains being already there, or at least well out of the way, and the roads all clear for his infantry, one night's march was ample to preclude all possibility of overtaking it, or of bringing it to bay.
: As soon as it became apparent, on the morning of the 5th, that
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THE RETREAT OF LEE FROM GETTYSBURG.
the enemy was retreating, the Sixth corps, which had been held in reserve, and, so far as fighting was concerned, was fresh, though worn down with rapid marching, was put upon the pursuit on the Fairfield route. At the Fairfield pass the column was halted, as Sedgwick did not deem it advisable to attack here, the enemy holding a strong position where he could easily repel many times his number. Accordingly, Neill's brigade of infantry was de- tached, and, with the cavalry, followed the direct line of retreat by the Fairfield road, as did also another cavalry force by the Cashtown route, while the rest of the Sixth corps moved on through Boonsboro, and after crossing a little stream near the latter place, took up a position near Funkstown.
The main body of the army remained at Gettysburg during the 5th, and large details were made to gather up the wounded and bury the dead. On the 6th the army moved, halting a day at Middletown for needed supplies; and, after crossing South Mountain, and passing Boonsboro, came up with the enemy on the 12th, who had formed upon a line extending from Hagers- town to Downiesville, which he had fortified. Lee had been unable to cross the Potomac, on account of its swollen condition. Finding that his trains and wounded could not be got over, nor moved higher up without great danger, he determined to defend himself there; and though to fight a battle, with a raging and impassable river at one's back, is not an alternative to be chosen, it was one into which he was forced. The ground favored his designs, and immense labor was bestowed to make it defensible and safe. On the evening of the 12th, the Union army having by this time come up, a council of officers was held, at which all voted against an attack except two. Accordingly, the blow was withheld, and the 13th was given to reconnoitring. The result of that examination was such as to induce Meade to order the whole army to move up on the following morning at daylight with a view of assaulting. But, during the night of the 13th, Lee commenced to withdraw. Ewell's corps fording the stream, and Longstreet and Hill crossing upon the pontoon bridge which had been reconstructed from parts of the old one recovered, and others improvised. The stream was still at high tide, and Ewell's men found much difficulty in stemming it; but they "linked
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arms, and thus interlaced and steadied, forded the river in mass, nearly shoulder deep, with the loss of but three men."
Lee says, in his report, that the crossing was not completed until one p. M., when the bridge was removed. If any considera- ble force did remain so late as this, he manœuvred to preserve a strong front, and foiled every attempt of the Union troops to injure him.
The management of the Battle of Gettysburg, on the part of the opposing armies, has been the subject of sharp criticism. It is right, yea, it is the duty of a people who maintain military schools, and pretend to defend their flag by force of arms, to question closely the conduct of every battle, by the light of the established principles of military science, and endeavor to detect the errors committed, as well as the exemplification of meri- torious conduct. It is only by such a critical search, that the useful lessons of the past may be garnered.
"DON'T
GIVE CP TEE
SHIP."
LIVE TEE
Republic
US
CHAPTER XV.
THE CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
HE battle of Gettysburg, as an agency in deter- mining the result of the contest between the Gov- ernment and its assailants was the most important of the war. It was the beginning of the end. That little crown of saplings which Pickett made the mark towards which his troops were to aim, and which a part of them did actually reach, has been styled the " high-water mark of the rebellion." The star which, to that moment, had appeared in the ascendant, began to pale and move to its set- ting. Though in a military view many of its features are open to question, its lessons are not the less important.
Lee has been blamed for being dilatory on the first day. He had undoubtedly sent Hill forward on that morn- ing to seize and hold Gettysburg, and seems not to have been aware that Union troops were there in much force, though he could not have been ignorant of the fact that a corps of the Union infantry was, on the night of the 30th, near at hand. He no doubt anticipated that the arrival of Ewell upon the flank of the Union line would be ample for effecting the complete over- throw of the small Union force assembled. Anderson's division of Hill's corps rested all day at Cashtown, in hearing of, and in plain view of the battle. But Hill no doubt considered that he had as many troops on the field as he could use to advantage. and expected at every fresh onset that the First corps would yield. But the obstinacy of that intrepid body of men disap- pointed his most sanguine expectations, and delayed his progress in possessing the town till near nightfall. The rebel commander seems to have done all that a prudent officer, regarding all the
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chances, could have been expected to do. It was the unlooked- for and unsurpassed valor of that First corps which balked his plans; for how could a body of eight thousand men, reduced finally to less than three, be expected to stand up nearly the whole day against twenty thousand, in an open field fight ?
Lee is also severely censured for not having pressed his advantage on the evening of the 1st, after the First and Elev- enth corps had been driven from before the town. "The attack," says Lee, in his official report, "was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisa- ble to await the arrival of the rest of our troops." But what were the prospects of success, had Ewell attacked ? It is not probable that either Lee or Ewell would have held back, had a flattering promise of victory been presented. A direct assault upon the front and face of Cemetery Hill would assuredly have been attended by a bloody repulse. There was no point, commencing with the Baltimore pike and extending half way around on Culp's Hill, where one could have been made with any better hope of success ; for the guns of Stevens and the division of Wadsworth com- pletely covered that ground, which afforded excellent opportuni- ties for defence. Ewell might have pushed in, past. Wadsworth's right, over Rock Creek and through the dense forest, as he did on the following evening; but it was difficult ground, and entirely unexplored; besides, the Twelfth corps was just then coming up on the Baltimore pike, and could have at once been wheeled into position to have met any advance from that quarter. Were the prospects any better on the Union left? Had Ewell advanced in that direction, he would first have had to encounter the cavalry of Buford, drawn out so as to com- pletely cover that flank, with his artillery admirably posted for terrible execution, his skirmishers dismounted, and line of battle formed in such beautiful order, that it drew forth from that able soldier, General Warren, when he came upon the field, exclama- tions of admiration. He would, in addition, have come immediately under the fire of Steinwehr's guns on Cemetery Hill, which would have completely enfiladed his lines. But had he been successful in passing Steinwehr's guns, and in routing the hero Buford, he would then have found Geary's division of the Twelfth corps
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in position, upon a line stretching away to Round Top, and behind Geary was the balance of the entire Twelfth corps, and the Third corps, General Sickles, already beginning to arrive, So that, on whatever side Ewell had chosen to have attacked, he would have been repulsed.
A criticism is also made against the rebel leader, that his at- tacks on the 2d were disjointed and incoherent, and they have been compared to a balky team swaying back and forth upon a swingle-tree. On the contrary, they seem to have been made with rare skill. It was apparently a misfortune to him, that the day had not been a few hours longer ; but he made his attacks as soon as he could get his troops into position. His first effort was to brush away Ward's brigade, so as to open the way to Round Top. The obstinacy of Ward's men foiled this first attempt. It was necessary, before a second was made, that heavy attacks should be delivered along the whole line to the Peach Orchard, to prevent reinforcements being sent to Ward, which had been really despatched by De Trobriand, and to draw attention from the grand object of the fight, the possession of Round Top. The second attempt was successful, Hood breaking through Ward's line, but only to find Vincent in position on the very mount itself, which he had hoped to seize; and Lee was again foiled. The constant sending of reinforcements into the slaughter-pen above and around the Wheatfield necessitated constant fighting, as he had seized the Peach Orchard, the key to the position, from which he could easily repulse every force sent against him, and where he could inflict far greater loss than he himself sus- tained. Hill withheld his attack until he saw Birney's line crum- ble and Humphreys' division fearfully exposed, and then made his determined assault at the very moment when he could with absolute certainty inflict the greatest damage, and gain the most signal success. Had Wright, at the moment when he made his successful charge, and had a number of Union guns turned upon their former possessors, been supported by the troops which Hill had ordered to go, the result would, without much doubt, have effected the complete rout of the Union army. This should be considered the crisis when the rebel army came nearest to a triumph, and where the failure, at the exact instant, of Posey,
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Mahone, and Pender to advance, cost Lee the battle. As soon as it was discovered that these operations had failed, and before troops could arrive from other parts of the field to stay his course, Ewell attacked on the extreme rebel left, and here delay was not a disadvantage; for the troops which had all the day been in position upon that part of the field, and which would have given him a bloody reception, had, a few moments before, been with- drawn to reinforce other portions of the line, and Ewell was left unopposed to overrun that part of the field; so that the delay was to him a positive advantage. The only part of the line which received any help from timely reinforcement that delay set at liberty, was where Carroll's brigade went to the aid of Howard. But this support would no doubt have been spared to go, if the Tigers had charged at the instant that Hill did on the left. Ewell has been blamed for not pushing his advantage further, on the night of the 2d; but he was unable, on account of the creek, the forest, and the rugged nature of the ground, to take his artil- lery with him, and it would not have been safe to have advanced further without it, as troops could have turned upon him from all quarters, and the reserve artillery on Benner's Hill would have easily reached him the instant he came in sight. The probabili- ties are, therefore, that he would not have got off with his troops without losing heavily in captures, had he done so.
Finally, Lee has been roundly berated for having made the last grand charge at all, and if he did make it, for having made it with so weak a column. It must be confessed that no one of his operations on the Gettysburg field shows so great a lack of insight into the conditions upon which he was acting, and reflects so little credit upon his military skill as this. But he had been led to take a hopeful view of the result of a heavy blow at this point, by the success which had attended the charge of a single brigade here on the day before, that of Wright. If so weak a column can accomplish so great results, what may we not expect from the assault of a body many times more powerful, fresh for the work, ably led, and preluded by an artillery fire that the world has rarely seen paralleled, was the problem that was presented before him; and although he must have been sanguine of suc- cess, or he would never have ordered it, yet he must have con-
,
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templated it with the deepest solicitude, and only adopted it as his last desperate chance. But he failed to appreciate at its full value the fact that the field was nearly a level plain between the two lines, and that the instant his infantry crossed their works they came under view and concentrated fire of a full half of the Union army. Had the column been composed of thirty thousand instead of fifteen or eighteen, the result could not have been other than it was; for before they could have crossed that mile and a quarter of space, and reached the Union lines, they would have been so nearly annihilated as to have had little force remaining; and had any considerable body made a lodg- ment, the major part of the Union army could have been there to meet it, and it would have resulted in a grand hand to hand combat in which the Union men would have sold their lives dearly, and to the last one. Lee put in as many men as he could afford to do, and more would have been of no avail, the whole Union army being within a fifteen minutes' run of the place, most of it within five, and their resolution was beyond parallel in the history of warfare. This last act of Lee must ever be regarded as the one which had the least promise of success, and one the least defensible on sound principles of mili- tary tactics.
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