USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 18
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At about the same hour, July Ist, at a quarter before one in the morning, General Schenck telegraphed from Baltimore : " Lee, I think, is either massing his troops, or making a general retreat towards Cumberland Valley. Most likely the former. They are so near that I shall not be surprised if a battle comes on to-day."
Up to the moment of receiving these messages, which did not reach him until the morning of the 1st of July, General Meade had been moving his army forward by rapid marches towards the Susquehanna under the apprehension that Lee was intent on crossing that stream. It is true that he had obtained reports which induced him, on the evening of the 30th, to issue a circular to each corps commander, saying: "The Commanding General has received information that the enemy are advancing. probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy shall have been more fully developed. . . . Corps commanders will hold their commands in readiness at a moment's notice, upon receiving orders, to march against the
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enemy. ... The men must be provided with three days' rations in haversacks, and with sixty rounds of ammunition in the boxes and upon the person."
It would seem from the following telegram from Meade to Halleck, sent at seven o'clock on the morning of the 1st of July, that Meade had not yet been apprised of the important messages from Schenck and Couch, quoted above, and which were dis- patched to Washington at a little after midnight : "My positions to-day are, one corps at Emmittsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at Two Taverns, one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These were ordered yesterday, before receipt of advices of Lee's movements. . . . The point of Lee's concentra- tion, and the nature of the country, when ascertained, will deter- mine whether I attack him or not."
Thus it will be seen that thirty-six hours had elapsed from the time Lee had issued orders for all his forces to concentrate at Gettysburg, before Meade became fully aware that such a con- centration was in progress, and during all those hours, pregnant with the gravest issues, he was moving on, " fan-shape," as he terms it, by this time sweeping a broad belt of more than thirty miles, intent upon striking the enemy before he should cross the Susquehanna, or while entangled upon the stream. This is evident from his telegram to General Halleck of the 29th, in which he says : "If he [Lee] is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall endeavor to do." The purpose here expressed is confirmed by his testi- mony before the committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War: "I determined," he says, " and so notified the General-in- chief, that I should move my army as promptly as possible on the main line from Frederick to Harrisburg, extending my wings on both sides of that line as far as I could consistently with the safety and the rapid concentration of that army, and should con- tinue that movement until I either encountered the enemy, or had reason to believe that the enemy would advance upon me ; my object being at all hazards to compel him to loose his hold on the Susquehanna, and meet me in battle at some point. It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give
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battle wherever, and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer-that when I came into his immediate neigh- borhood some manœuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him."
As soon, however, as it became evident to him that the enemy had let go of the Susquehanna, and was rapidly concentrating on his flank, he instantly realized that a change of policy was necessary.
He accordingly issued a circular on the morning of the 1st of July, of which the following extracts indicate the purport : " From information received the Commanding General is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz : the relief of Harrisburg and the preven- tion of the enemy's intended invasion of Pennsylvania beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention, after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedi- menta, to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middle- burg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek. For this purpose General Reynolds, in com- mand of the left, will withdraw the force at present at Gettys- burg, two corps [First and Eleventh] by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy towards Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg [Third] will be with- drawn, by way of Mechanicsville, to Middleburg. General Slocum will assume command of the two corps at Hanover and Two Taverns [Fifth and Twelfth] and withdraw them by Union Mills. ... The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances. Whenever such circumstances arise as would seem to indicate the necessity for falling back and assuming this general line indicated, notice of such movement will at once be communicated to these headquarters, and to all adjoining corps commanders. . . . This order is communicated that a general
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plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack if made in strong force upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the Commanding General to assume the offensive from his present positions."
Against the movements contemplated in this circular, which was merely a notification of a purpose which would be followed by an order when the trains of the several corps could be dis- posed of, and the movements of the enemy should make it advisable, some of Meade's officers entered vigorous protests. But to the adoption of this plan he was incited by many weighty considerations. He was convinced, from information hourly reaching him, that the whole rebel army, numerically stronger than his own, was rapidly concentrating, and was probably within striking distance of Gettysburg. Should he push the two corps which he had approaching that place into the town, and attempt to hold it, the probabilities were that they would be fallen upon and annihilated before he could bring up the balance of his army to their support, one corps of which, the Sixth, was over thirty miles away. It was his intention, therefore, that these two corps, instead of resolutely fighting the whole rebel army, should simply hold the attacking force in check, in case the enemy should assume the offensive, sufficiently to bring off the trains, and then concentrate his whole army before engaging in a general battle. He was convinced, besides, that however excellent the position at Gettysburg might be, and however great its strategic value, it was then absolutely beyond his power to keep it from the enemy's grasp. The sequel shows that both these catastrophies, which the quick military eye of Meade saw impending, did actually follow, the two corps being crushed with a loss of 10,000 of their number, and the town falling into the enemy's hands. Meade did not know, having never been at Get- tysburg, nor could any one in his army have known, until he reached the ground, nor does any one now claim to have been aware, that there was a position outside the town which could be taken up after the town itself had fallen, that would prove more favorable for gaining a victory than the possession of Gettysburg itself, though counted upon as of so great value. The whole advantage, to the Union side, of Gettysburg as a battle-ground,
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after the town was lost, consisted in the fact that a position was found near there which proved to be a good one from which to fight a defensive battle. Not knowing that any such ground existed, and not having been advised by any of those who are now most loud-mouthed in claiming the credit of indicating Get- tysburg as a favorable battle-field, the design of Meade to con- centrate, made known in this circular, was a proper one, and dictated by the highest considerations of military policy. Besides, if he could withdraw the isolated wing, now shown for the first time by the telegrams of Couch and Schenck to be threatened with destruction, and take the position a few miles to the rear, which he had selected, he would be brought nearer his own base, at Westminster, which could be held with only slight diminution of his strength for guard. He would at the same time be draw- ing his antagonist still farther from his base, and would thereby make him so much the more vulnerable.
It is true that to that portion of the army which was at the moment in advance of the line he had selected, the contemplated movement would appear like a falling back, and in that view might have a demoralizing effect. General Butterfield says : " When General Meade presented this order to me, which was in his own handwriting, I stated to him that I thought the effect of an order to fall back would be very bad upon the morals of the army, and that it ought to be avoided if possible. General Meade seemed to think that we were going ahead without any well understood plan, and that, by reason of that, we might be liable to disaster." But the effect here deprecated by Butterfield would not have applied to the main body of the army, which was already on or near the line selected, and could have had no seri- ous influence upon the wing touched.
The only fault then that can be imputed to Meade in regard to this order, which was probably more a misfortune than a fault, was that he had allowed his antagonist to be thirty-six hours concentrating, before he discovered the fact, and he, in the mean- time, marching on with corps scattered, and allowing a contin- gency to occur which necessitated such an order.
There was, however, one consideration, which subsequent dis- closures show to have been of the highest importance, that failed
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to impress the mind of the Union leader. Suppose he had fallen back, and found a strong position, and got his army concentrated, would the enemy come forward and attack him in it? General Lee says, in his official report : "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy." Swinton, in his "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," says that after the conclusion of the war he had a conversation with General Longstreet, concerning this battle, in which the latter declared that "General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him." It would seem, therefore, that any strong position selected and fortified by Meade would have been futile, as he would have been obliged, in the end, to have come out from behind his fast- nesses, and have attacked. But this does not militate against the soundness of his order for concentration, as that was impera- tive, before, with the hope of success, he could attack an enemy who had had thirty-six hours the start in drawing in his legions and compacting them for the onset.
But a power above human wisdom was controlling events which set at nought the counsels of the wise. Buford, who had been charged with moving upon the left flank of the Union army, with one of the divisions of cavalry, having encamped at Foun- tain Dale on the night of the 29th of June, started in the morn- ing towards Gettysburg; but unexpectedly coming upon a detach- ment of the enemy's infantry, while on the way, which proved to be a part of Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division of Hill's corps, which recoiled before him, he retraced his steps, not having orders to attack, to Fountain Dale, and thence moved to Emmitts- burg, where he received orders to march to Gettysburg, from Pleasanton, chief of cavalry, and to hold the town to the last extremity, receiving assurance of support from the infantry. On the same morning a portion of Heth's division of Hill's corps, which had crossed the mountains some days before, and had been engaged in gathering supplies of beef, flour, and grain, approached Gettysburg, accompanied with artillery, and a train of fifteen wagons, the whole, several thousand in number, forming a line a mile and a half in length, apparently having been ordered out to
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take possession of the town. The head of this column had reached the crest of Seminary Ridge, and the pickets as far down as Mr. Shead's house, in the outskirts of the place, when it was halted. After the officers, with their field glasses, had ridden back and forth for some time, reconnoitring and conversing with the inhabitants, the column countermarched, and at half-past ten had disappeared. It is not difficult to account for this singular manœuvre, for Buford, with his resolute cavalry division, was rapidly approaching. As the enemy withdrew, they attempted an ambuscade when arrived at Marsh Creek, hiding themselves to right and left of the road, under cover of a wood that skirts the stream, while a minor force was thrown forward as a decoy. But the disguise was too thin for the practised eye of Buford.
In an hour after the rebels had departed, the magnificent column of Buford arrived, and to the gladdened eyes of the inhabitants, unused to gaze on hostile pageants, it seemed indeed " terrible as an army with banners." With firm tread it moved up the main street of the town, and out upon the Chambersburg pike. It-consisted, at the time, of only two brigades, a third under Merritt being at Mechanicstown with the trains, one com- manded by Colonel J. M. Gamble, composed of the Eighth Illinois, Eighth Indiana, and Eighth New York, the other by Colonel Thomas C. Devin, embracing the Sixth New York (Ira Harris), Ninth New York, and the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, and a battery of light guns of the Second Artillery, under Lieutenants Clark and Calef. It was reputed to contain 4000 men, and prob- ably bore that number upon its rolls; but when drawn up for action could only present 2200 muskets. At the distance of a mile and a half from the town it was deployed, Gamble across the Cham- bersburg, and Devin across the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads.
Thus was the column of the enemy, which had approached the town in the early morning evidently for the purpose of taking forcible possession, foiled, and the advantage in the preliminary manœuvre was with the Union side, an augury of ultimate triumph. Gamble threw out his scouting parties towards Cash- town, and Devin towards Hunterstown, which scoured the country, capturing stragglers from the enemy, from whom import-
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ant information was obtained. Buford now became satisfied that the mass of the rebel army was converging towards Gettysburg, and that heavy columns were already in close proximity.
A Lieutenant, who was signal officer of Buford's Division, reports the conversation of the chiefs on the occasion, which is published by General De Peyster in his "Decisive Conflicts": "On the night of the 30th," he says, "General Buford spent some hours with Colonel Tom Devin, and while commenting upon the information brought in by Devin's scouts, remarked that 'the battle would be fought at that point,' and that 'he was afraid it would be commenced in the morning before the infantry would get up.' These are his own words. Devin did not believe in so early an advance of the enemy, and remarked that he would ' take care of all that would attack his front during the ensuing twenty-four hours.' Buford answered : 'No, you won't. They will attack you in the morning and they will come booming- skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until supports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold we will do well.' Upon his return, he ordered me, then First Lieutenant and signal officer of his division, to seek out the most prominent points and watch everything; to be careful to look out for camp-fires, and in the morning for dust. He seemed anxious, more so than I ever saw him."
The judgment of Buford was just, showing that he was pos- sessed of remarkable discernment and penetration. Two divis- ions of Hill's corps were already across the mountains, the last to leave the Rappahannock, and the first to appear upon the front of the new field, while his remaining division and two divisions of Longstreet's corps were already upon the western slope ready to cross at dawn, and the body of Ewell's corps was in bivouac at Heidlersburg, only nine miles away.
The Union army, too, had been moving thitherward, and at the moment when Buford was holding this conversation in the tent of Colonel Devin, Reynolds was bivouacing on the bank of Marsh Creek, four miles away, with the First corps ; Howard with the Eleventh was on the Emmittsburg road
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some miles farther back, Sickels with the Third corps was at Emmittsburg, Hancock with the Second at Frizelburg, Slocum with the Twelfth at Littlestown, Sykes with the Fifth at Union Mills towards Hanover, and Sedgwick with the Sixth at Manchester.
The army was now on Northern soil or verging upon it. As they crossed the Pennsylvania line the fact was announced to the men from the heads of the columns, and the passage was signalized by the wildest enthusiasm, and demonstrations of joy. Caps flew in air, shouts of rejoicing resounded, bands struck up the National airs, and the heavens echoed with patriot songs. General Meade, recognizing the importance of exciting the fervor of his men, and intent on seizing every opportunity to heighten it, issued the following earnest appeal : "The Commanding General requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps, and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil ; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe ; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars are involved. The army has fought well here- tofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps com- manders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour."
General Reynolds, having been kept aware of the movements of the enemy by the ever watchful Buford, had taken up a strong position on the heights beyond Emmittsburg, on which, should he be assailed, he could make a good defence, and here he had passed the night of the 29th. On the 30th he moved forward only a few miles, where he again formed his camp on ground from which he would fight if attacked, until he could withdraw to his position of the night before near Emmittsburg. But the night of the 30th passed peacefully, and on the morning of the Ist-the last of earth's mornings for him-he was early astir, having been apprised of the near approach of the foe.
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Seeing that Buford was about to be attacked, he put Wads- worth's division, accompanied by Hall's Maine battery in motion towards Gettysburg, and sent for Doubleday, who was in com- mand of the First corps. After reading and explaining his tele- grams, he directed Doubleday to move with the remaining two divisions close upon the footsteps of Wadsworth. He then mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards the front.
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CHAPTER IX.
FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
EING well assured that the enemy was about to attack him, Buford was early in the saddle, and had made the most imposing disposition to meet them which his little force would admit. Had he had at his back the half million of troops, that a farmer's wife, in reply to inquiries of rebel officers, had declared were in Gettysburg, he could have scarcely made one more so. But in addition to being imposing it had the virtue of being effective, and when the rebels came on " booming, skirmish- ers three deep," as Buford had predicted, they met a stubborn resistance.
His skirmish line extended from the point where the Millerstown road crosses Willoughby Run, following the some- what tortuous bluff bordering the left bank of that stream across the Chambersburg way, and thence around crossing the Mummas- burg, Carlisle, and Harrisburg pikes, and the railroad, reaching quite to Rock Creek, thus covering all the great highways enter- ing the town from the north and west. In rear of this, upon a ridge running parallel with Seminary Ridge, and a half mile from it, were posted the rest of his forces dismounted. Covering the roads on which the enemy was expected first to advance were planted the guns of his light batteries.
Having every disposition made, he watched eagerly for any indication which could disclose the purpose of the foc. He had not long to wait; for the enemy, being in strong force, and intent on seizing the coveted prize, which he now believed was within his grasp, moved up his skirmishers. The first shot was de- livered by the enemy at a little before ten o'clock, which was responded to on the Union side by three single shots, the signal
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for a general discharge along the skirmish line, and the Battle of Gettysburg was begun.
. As Buford's men for the most part fought dismounted, the enemy at first took them for infantry, and consequently moved tardily, and with much circumspection, giving time for the First corps, which was now rapidly approaching, to come up. So from the opening, fortune favored the Union arms. A constantly in- creasing skirmish fire was continued for half an hour, when the enemy, having brought up his artillery, opened with much spirit. The guns of Buford answered promptly, and maintained the contest gallantly, preserving the delusion that he was well sup- ported. The fury of the fight increased at every moment, and Buford saw that the weight of numbers bearing on him would soon press him off the field; but not an inch was yielded, though he had every preparation made for retiring to Cemetery Hill when he could hold out no longer. It was a moment of gloom and anxiety to that true heart. Would he be left to his fate, and be at last obliged to sacrifice that vantage ground he had striven so hard to hold ?
The signal officer, above quoted, had carly in the morning taken his station in the cupola of the Theological Seminary, whence the country for many miles around lay open to view. " The engagement," he says, " was desperate, as we were opposed to the whole front of Hill's corps. We held them in check fully two hours, and were nearly overpowered when, in looking about the country, I saw the corps flag of General Reynolds. I was still in the Seminary steeple, but being the only signal officer with the cavalry, had no one to communicate with, so I sent one of my men to Buford, who came up, and looking through my glass, confirmed my report, and remarked : 'Now we can hold the place !'" With what joy was the eye of the leader gladdened as he beheld the folds of that flag floating upon the morning air, and read in its bright emblems the assurance of succor ! "General Reynolds," continues the signal officer, " and staff came up on a gallop in advance of the corps, when I made the following con- munication : 'Reynolds, himself, will be here in five minutes. His corps is about a mile behind.' Buford returned and watched anxiously my observations made through my signal-telescope.
Eng 11; AMP
GEN. JOHN F. REYNOLDS
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When Reynolds 'came up, seeing Buford in the cupola, he cried out : ' What's the matter, John ?' 'The devil's to pay,' said Bu- ford; and going down the ladder, Reynolds said : 'I hope you can hold out until my corps comes up.' 'I reckon I can,' was the characteristic reply. Reynolds then said : 'Let's ride out and see all about it,' and mounting we rode away. The skirmish- ing was then very brisk, the cavalry fighting dismounted. Bu- ford said : 'General, do not expose yourself so much ;' but Rey- nolds laughed, and moved nearer still."
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