USA > Pennsylvania > Martial deeds of Pennsylvania, Vol. 1 > Part 17
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But what was his surprise and disappointment to receive at that moment a dispatch from General Halleck, saying : "Mary- land Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us. . . . I cannot approve of their abandonment except in case of absolute necessity." And this, after Halleck had himself placed the troops at this point under Hooker's control in the following words, telegraphed on the 22d : " In order to give compactness to the command of troops in the field covering Washington and Baltimore, it is proposed to place that part
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of the Middle Department east of Cumberland, and commanded by General Schenck, under your direct orders. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable." To this Hooker answered : "Yes, provided the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenck and Heintzelman." To send the Twelfth corps alone to Williamsport, without the addition of French's troops, he did not regard advisable, as the enemy might suddenly turn upon and overwhelm it before he could bring up his supporting forces. He accordingly abandoned the movement, and ordered that corps to countermarch and follow the other troops to Frederick.
He now felt that to have his plans thus interfered with, and his movements in the face of the enemy cut short when in full progress by one far from the field, who could not know the exigences of the moment, would only result in shame and defeat to the army. He accordingly telegraphed, at one P. M. of the 27th, to General Halleck: "My original instructions were to cover. Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with these conditions with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may be at once relieved from the position I occupy." This desire was immediately granted, and at four o'clock on the following morning, Colonel Hardie, a special messenger from Washington, arrived in camp bearing an order relieving General Hooker from duty, and directing him to turn over the command of the army to General Meade, then at the head of the Fifth corps.
Of General Hooker's ability as displayed in the prelimi- nary movements at Chancellorsville, and in the movements up to the moment of yielding his authority, the best mili- tary critics award him very high praise. That he was right in demanding the use of the troops at Harper's Ferry, and in abandoning the post, is undisputed, and was virtually acknowledged by General Halleck himself, inasmuch as he allowed the successor of Hooker to take them. But Halleck,
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it appears, had distrusted the ability of Hooker from the first, and when it was proposed, in September, 1862, to make the latter the successor of General Mcclellan instead of General Burnside, and the President and five members of the cabinet were of that mind, Halleck opposed it, and, with the remainder of the President's advisers, succeeded in defeating him. Of this opposition to him Hooker was aware, when, finally, he was placed in chief command of the Potomac army, and in accept- ing the position, he made but one request of the President, that he would stand between Halleck and himself.
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CHAPTER VIII.
PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE.
ETTYSBURG, upon the slopes and hills around which the great battle was fought, a quiet village of 2500 inhabitants, is the capital of Adams county, Pennsylvania. For miles around, the country is for the most part gently rolling. The soil is fertile, and kept under a high state of cultivation, little timber being left standing. To the northwest, eight or ten miles away, is the South Mountain chain, extending from northeast to southwest, until lost to view in the dim distance. "From an elevation a little below the Monterey House on the summit of South Mountain," says one long schooled by European travel, "the view of the flat lands extending towards the Susquehanna, as far as the eye can reach, is magnificent in the extreme. I have seen few views in Italy which exceed it in romantic beauty."
In the neighborhood of Gettysburg are several minor ridges, parallel to this principal one. That to the west of the town, and but half a mile away, is known as Seminary Ridge, from the fact that upon its brow, where it is crossed by the Chambersburg Pike, are located the buildings of a Theological School of the Lutheran denomination. It is also known as Oak Ridge. Beyond this, at intervals of a quarter of a mile, or less, are two or three other slight ridges, and a mile and a half out is Willoughby Run.
To the east and south of the town is a ridge whose general direction is parallel to the others, but broken and quite irregular, at some points rising into much higher and bolder outline than the opposite Seminary Ridge, and at others falling away to a level, or even lower than the intervening plain. This is desig-
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Photo by Brudy
Csw. En Muade
MAJ. GEN. GEO.G. MEADE.
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nated Cemetery Ridge, from the beautiful Evergreen Cemetery located upon the summit of its nearest approach to the town, and by the side of which is the National ground where now sleep those who there fell. A little to the west and south is Zeigler's Grove, a half acre or more of forest oaks. From this the ridge, which presents a shelving rock on the west of a few feet in height, is well defined for a mile south, when it falls away, and for at least another half mile is low, wet, clay soil, where it is entirely lost, but again suddenly breaks out into bold, rugged, rocky, wooded ground, and terminates in a granite spur known as Little Round Top. Beyond this, and separated from it by a narrow valley, is Round Top, much more rugged and precipitous than its neighbor, and attaining a height of four hundred feet above the waters of neighboring streams. " When the force which folded and raised up the strata," says Professor Jacobs, in his "Later Rambles at Gettysburg," "which form the South Moun- tain was in action, it produced fissures in the strata of red shale, which covers the surface of this region of country, permitting the fused material from beneath to rise and fill them, on cooling, with trap, dykes, or greenstone and syenitic greenstone. This rock, being for the most part very hard, remained as the axes and crests of hills and ridges, when the softer shale in the inter- vening spaces was excavated by great water-currents into valleys and plains."
Science thus renders a reasonable account of the huge masses of rock which are reared in the most various and fantastic shapes upon the sides and summits of these bold mounts, the casting about of which, in a superstitious age, may well have been regarded as the sport of the giants. At a little way beyond the Cemetery, in the opposite direction, the ridge makes a sharp turn nearly at right angles to its main course, and at less than half a mile distant reaches up into a bold and precipitous headland, looking towards the town, known as Culp's Hill; and further to the right is Rock Creek, which stream cuts through the ridge at less than a mile away, separating Culp's from Wolf's Hill, still farther to the right. At the time of the battle, all this beautiful country was clothed in verdure; the fields were covered with waving grain, whitening for the harvest; the flocks and herds,
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revelling in abundant pasturage and sated by cool fountains, rested beneath refreshing shade; the whole presenting with all its innumerable concomitants a rare picture of repose and peace.
General Lee had, for several days, been halting at Cham- bersburg, while the main body of his army was concentrating about that place, and his advance corps under Ewell was reach- ing out towards the Susquehanna, approaching the stream at Columbia and Harrisburg, evidently feeling for a crossing. When his purposes were thwarted at the former point by the burning of the bridge, the division sent in that direction was ordered to march to Carlisle, plainly indicating the intention of moving the entire army that way. General Hooker had concluded, from the fact that he did not take a pontoon train along with him, that Lee did not design to cross the Susquehanna, and so expressed himself to General Meade. But at this season of the year that stream is shallow and fordable at many points. His scouts were already searching for them, as has been shown in the case of the one captured. But of his purposes we are not left to conjecture. In his official report he says : "Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain."
Of Hooker's intention to march upon Williamsport, and break up his communications, or even of the passage of the Potomac by the Union army, up to this time, Lee knew nothing. That he should have so long remained in ignorance of these movements was due to the mishaps which befell the operations of that division of his cavalry under Stuart. When about to cross the Potomac, Lee had ordered that daring cavalry leader to remain on guard at the passes of the Blue Ridge, leading to the Shenan- doah Valley, and observe the movements of the Union forces, and should they attempt to cross the Potomac, he was to make demonstrations upon their rear, so as to detain them as long as possible in Virginia. But, in the event of their passage, he was also to cross, either on the east or west side of the Blue Ridge, as to him should seem best, and take position upon the right flank of the main rebel column. So far south had his demonstrations
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carried him, however, that Stuart determined to cross at Seneca, some distance to the east of the point where the Union army had passed. When once over he found it impossible to reach his chief, and take position upon the flank as ordered, the Union army being interposed. He accordingly kept northward, passing through Hanover, and did not arrive at Carlisle, where he expected to find the main rebel column, until the 1st of July, after Ewell had been recalled from that place and was on his way to Gettysburg. He was at Carlisle met by a messenger from Lee ordering him forward to the scene of conflict, but did not arrive until the result of the battle had been well-nigh decided, and the · star of his chief had gone down in blood. The need of cavalry was sorely felt by Lee in the manœuvres preliminary to the fight, as he was thereby stripped of the means for ascertaining the whereabouts of his antagonist, and his flanks and rear were indifferently protected. Thus are the plans even of great leaders the sport of fortune.
The moment Lee became aware of the position of the Union army he initiated movements to checkmate it. "As our com- munications," he says in his report, "with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point Gen- eral Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle." Thus on the evening of the 29th, orders went out for a concentration, and on the following morning the whole rebel army was march- ing on Gettysburg.
This point had been well reconnoitred by the enemy's forces while on their way to York, Early having passed the night there four days before. It possessed great strategic value. So easily are the rugged features which surround it shunned, that great highways approach it from almost every point of the compass, centring here like spokes in the hub of a wheel, those from Ship- pensburg and Carlisle on the north, from Harrisburg, York, and Hanover on the east, from Baltimore, Littlestown, Taneytown and Emmittsburg on the south, and from Fairfield and Chambers- burg on the west. Several of these roads were macadamized, and
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
there was in addition a railroad leading out to the Northern Cen- tral Road by way of Hanover. Should Lee concentrate his army here, he would secure a route to his base at Williamsport, much shorter than by Chambersburg, over which he could bring up his ammunition, and in case of disaster, hold it for retreat. It would give him the control of a complete system of roads, any one of which, he could move upon at will as policy should dictate. In case of being attacked and forced to fight a battle there, he would have an abundance of good solid ways in his rear, on which to manœuvre his troops, and take his heavy guns from one part of the line to another,-a consideration of great importance, as a battle is not unfrequently lost by the delay imposed in construct- ing a road over some brook or impassable slough, or in cutting through an impenetrable wood for the passage of guns and am- munition.
But it was not alone the rebel commander who had regarded with a soldier's eye the strategic value of Gettysburg. General Pleasanton says : "I may say here that I had studied that whole country the year before very carefully indeed, all its roads and topographical features, and was probably about as well posted in regard to it as any officer in the army. . . . I was satisfied from my general knowledge of the country-and so mentioned to Gen- eral Meade several times-that there was but one position in which for us to have a fight, and that was at Gettysburg."
At the moment when these orders went out from Lee for the rebel army to concentrate at Gettysburg, the Union army was reposing at Frederick, and was upon the eve of marching to find the enemy, under the belief that he was still moving towards the Susquehanna. The 28th was the Sabbath, and " that day," says General Hooker, "I designed to give my army to rest," an ex- ample of regard for the Sabbath as noble as it is unusual in military operations. But at dawn on the morning of that day he was relieved of command. To the army his removal came like a thunder-clap from a cloudless sky. To the rank and file he had become greatly endeared, for he had brought his com- mand from a condition of demoralization to one of great efficiency. To strike down a popular commander in the very face of the enemy, and on the eve of a great battle, was an act, that in
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almost any other country, would have been attended with extreme hazard. But the temper of that army was known to be one of intense devotion to the National cause, and full confidence was felt that it would fight under any commander, or even without a commander if need be. The course of General Hooker at this critical moment was one of most disinterested patriotism and gallantry. In his farewell order he says: "Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devo- tion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support." By the testimony of General Butterfield, General Hooker had advised, in case he was relieved, that General Meade should be appointed in his place, and when the officers who had served under him called in a body to bid him farewell at his departure, he said that "General Meade was a brave and gallant man, who would undoubtedly lead them to success, and that he hoped that all who regarded him, or his wishes, or his feelings, would devote every energy and ability to the support of General Meade."
The new commander had made a good record. He had been with that army from its organization, and at Beaver Dam Creek, at Gaines' Mill, at Charles City Cross Roads, at the second Bull Run, and more especially at Fredericksburg, he had exhibited the qualities of an able soldier. In his order, he said : " By direc- tion of the President of the United States, I hereby assume com- mand of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order-an order totally unexpected and unsolicited-I have no promises nor pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the con- test. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements;
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MARTIAL DEEDS OF PENNSYLVANIA.
but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me."
His first care was to acquaint himself with the late move- ments, and exact position of the enemy, and the plans and pur- poses of General Hooker. To this end he retained the officers who had formed General Hooker's military family-General But- terfield, chief of staff, General Warren, chief of engineers, General Hunt, chief of artillery, and General Williams, adju- tant-general. He himself had a conference with General Hooker, before his departure, respecting his plan of campaign; but that he might be fully assured of the latter's purposes, he requested General Butterfield to have another official conversation with the retiring chief, and make himself thoroughly conversant with the movements in contemplation.
The operations indicated by Hooker were in the main adopted. General Meade very cogently inferred from the movements of the enemy that it was his intention to cross the Susquehanna, a pur- pose which Lee declares he was acting on up to the evening of the 29th. Accordingly, in his telegram accepting the position to which he had been assigned, he said : "Totally unexpected as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy, I can only now say that it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns towards Balti- more, to give him battle. I would say that I trust that every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force." In response to this latter request, not only the garrison at Harper's Ferry, which had been the bone of contention between Hooker and Halleck, and the withholding of which was the immediate cause of the former's resignation, was placed at his disposal, but also the entire force of militia at Harrisburg, under General Couch, and such forces as could be used from the departments of West Vir- ginia, Baltimore, and Washington, from Fortress Monroe, and even the returning troops from North Carolina, were hurried forward to his support, thus proving conclusively that it was not
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PRELIMINARIES TO GETTYSBURG UNDER MEADE.
a necessity of holding the troops at Harper's Ferry, but a distrust of Hooker's ability as a soldier, which made Halleck unwilling to give them to him.
Orders were accordingly issued on the 28th, for the army to move forward on the following morning, in fan shape, in three columns, from Frederick, where it had been principally concen- trated, on to a line represented by the road running from Emmittsburg to Westminster, the First and Eleventh corps being directed to Emmittsburg, the Third and Twelfth to Taneytown, Second to Frizelburg, Fifth to Union Mills, and the Sixth to New Windsor; the cavalry, likewise in three columns, moving upon the flanks of the infantry-Buford upon the left, Gregg upon the right, and Kilpatrick in advance-and this order of march was continued on the 30th. On this latter day Stuart, who, with the main body of the enemy's cavalry, had been hanging upon the rear of the Union army, and having crossed the Potomac at Seneca, was moving up on the right flank, fell in with Kilpatrick at Hanover, and had a sharp encounter, in which the enemy was worsted, and one battle-flag and a number of prisoners were taken.
The order of march issued on the 30th, for the movement of the army on the 1st day of July, was for the Third corps to go to Emmittsburg, Second to Taneytown, Fifth to Hanover, Twelfth to Two Taverns, First to Gettysburg, Eleventh to Gettysburg in supporting distance, and Sixth to Manchester. General Reynolds had been continued in command of what had been the right wing, now getting into position upon the left, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, and the cavalry, and as he was now approaching the enemy, he had turned over the command of his own corps, the First, to General Doubleday, and was himself directing the general movements.
In the meantime, the orders issued by General Lee on the evening of the 29th, for all his forces to concentrate at Gettys- burg, were being executed, but not with the usual enterprise and daring, the rebel commander sorely feeling the need of his cavalry, that which he had depended on having been isolated, as we have seen, and by the fight at Hanover been pushed still farther away towards the Susquehanna. He says in his report :
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" The march towards Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been, had the movements of the Federal army been known." Had his cavalry been present, those move- ments would have been observed, and constantly reported to him. Thus, precisely what had happened to Hooker at Chancellorsville, the absence of cavalry, and which lost him the battle, befell Lee in this campaign. The strategic prize was Gettysburg. Which- ever party should seize that, would strike with great advantages in his favor.
But while the two armies were approaching, each with imper- fect knowledge of the other's movements, for a death grapple, the Union commander was unaware of the change which had occurred in the plans of his antagonist, and supposed him still pushing forward to cross the Susquehanna. Hence, while Lee was making all possible speed to concentrate on the Union flank, Meade, all unsuspicious of danger, was moving, much scattered, to catch Lee before he should get across. But the moment Ewell's forces began to fall back from before Harrisburg, they were followed up by the militia at that place, under General William F. (Baldy) Smith, who had been assigned by General Couch to that duty. As Ewell withdrew from Carlisle, Smith entered it, but, as the enemy thought, in too much haste, and turned upon him. A sharp skirmish ensued, and the solid shot from the enemy's battery, planted upon an eminence to the south of the place, tore wildly through the astonished city. No great injury was done, but the anger of the foe at the obstinacy of Smith, in not again surrendering the town, was vented in firing and utterly destroying the United States barracks, near that place, and the arsenal of supplies. This determination of Smith to press upon the rear of the rebels disclosed their purpose of concentrating, and the intelligence was flashed over the wires to Washington, and thence to Westminster, which had now become the base of intelligence as well as of supply to the Union force. On the 30th, Couch telegraphed to Halleck : " My latest informa- tion is that Early, with his 8000 men, went towards Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there. At Carlisle, they said they were not going to be outflanked by Hooker." No inan was more active or successful in gaining
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accurate information, or divining the purposes of the enemy, than the Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and subsequently Assistant Secretary of War. In this, as in the management of the great corporation with which he is associated, he showed Napoleonic vigor. On the same day, Couch, from information furnished by Scott, again telegraphed : " Lee is falling back suddenly from the vicinity of Harrisburg, and concentrating all his forces. York has been evacuated. Carlisle is being evacuated. The concentration seems to be at or near Chambersburg; the object, apparently, a sudden movement against Meade, of which he should be advised by courier immediately; " and at a little past midnight Couch sent still another telegram : "Information just received, leads to the belief that the concentration of the forces of the enemy will be at Gettysburg, rather than at Chambersburg. The movement on their part is very rapid and hurried. They retired from Carlisle in the direction of Gettysburg, by the way of the Petersburg pike. Firing about Petersburg and Dillstown this P. M., continued some hours. Meade should, by all means, be informed and prepared for a sudden attack from Lee's whole army."
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