History of California, Volume XXII, Part 10

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816

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The support of these men was essential to success, and the circumstances were all favorable for the rev- olutionists. The American settlers of the northern frontier formed an isolated community, coming but rarely and indirectly into contact with the natives, and knowing but little of what was actually occurring south of the bay. News was eagerly sought, and the wildest rumors found ready listeners. Larkin's efforts and prospects were naturally but vaguely known, if at all, to the majority. Long delay in the declaration of war by Mexico had caused fears on the

FALSE RUMORS.

part of some that there would be no war, and that for a long time no aid was to be expected from the naval forces of the United States. The troubles of March between Castro and Frémont were known in the north mainly through false reports of the latter and his men; and it was widely believed that Castro had arbitrarily and treacherously driven Frémont out of the country after having promised hospitality. Castro was known to be organizing a military force at Santa Clara. This organization, with Castro's an- nouncements as a Mexican officer of a determination to defend California against the expected invasion in case of war-an invasion with which he naturally and with much real alarm connected Fremont's return from Oregon at the bidding of an official messenger from Washington-as intrepreted in the north, was readily confounded with hostile preparations against the settlers. That Castro in reality feared Pico and his southern allies much more than he did the Amer- icans was not generally understood by the immi- grants; and some of the revolutionists had the assur- ance even to attribute Pico's hostility to his disapproval of Castro's opposition to Frémont and to the foreign- ers! Finally, just at the most opportune moment for the plans of the filibusters, Castro sent a party of armed men, as will be narrated presently, to bring a large number of horses from the north; and this movement was fully utilized to remove any lingering doubts that yet remained as to the necessity of defensive aggression. That the revolution was to prevent English occupation of the country, and es- pecially to prevent the success of the McNamara colonization scheme, was entirely an invention of later times; but the tenure of lands was a subject on which the settlers were very sensitive, and there are some indications that among the current rumors were some to the effect that the Californian authorities were making hurried grants of all public lands in anticipation of a political change.

CAUSES OF THE SETTLERS' REVOLT.

Eliminating that element which engaged in the revolt honestly as a measure of self-defence, whose fears of danger to life and property though unfounded were to some extent real, we shall find among the remaining filibusters, including most of the leaders and many of the followers, some diversity of motive. There was a class-among the overland immigrants, deserters from vessels who had come up to Now Helvetia from the bay, and Fremont's men-com- posed of adventurers pure and simple. Reckless, daring, and unprincipled men, with nothing to lose, they were eager for a fight with the Californians, partly for the mere excitement of the thing, just as they were always ready for a fight with the Indians. In the turmoil of a revolution, something might occur to their advantage; at least, they could gratify certain personal dislikes; and especially did they have an eye on the herds of the native rancheros. Of another stamp were political adventurers, whose reward was to be, not plunder in the vulgar sense, but glory and office and wealth, under a reformed political system. Some were enthusiastic Americans, who believed in the manifest destiny of their nation to possess this land, and had no doubt of their right to raise the stars and stripes anywhere in America, without regard to the wishes of the natives. They looked upon the Californians as an inferior people, who must be taught by force the beauties of freedom, and who had no right to resist what they chose to regard as their own superior civilization. They regarded independence as but a step to annexation, and they were proud to aid such a cause, even in a struggle which should involve the shedding of blood, and utter disregard of national, departmental, or individual rights. Some of the leaders looked forward to official prominence in an independent Californian republic; others looked further, to the contracting of debts, the issuance of bonds, and to future profitable negotiations with the United States; while still others looked upon the

FRÉMONT'S POLICY.

movement as but the beginning of war in favor of the United States, from the government and people of which nation they expected great honor, and in which war they hoped to secure a more prominent position than if they waited for the naval forces to begin hostilities. They were all mere filibusters, and were entitled to none of the sympathy or honor which the world accords to revolutionists who struggle against oppression.

The revolution broke out soon after Frémont's re- turn from Oregon; and it would not have broken out at all had it not been for the presence and cooperation of that officer and his hardy followers. Consequently his movements and motives have great interest in this connection; and they have been the subject of much speculation and comment in later years. An impres- sion has been prevalent that Frémont engaged in the revolt by reason of secret instructions from the United States, conveyed to him by Gillespie either in writing or verbally, or indirectly through private letters from Senator Benton. Frémont has never stated that he received such instructions: having of course no right to do so even if it were true. On the contrary, he has often denied it more or less directly. But in his testimony and that of Gillespie in 1847-8 room was left, designedly I think, for an inference that they could say more if at liberty to do so; and the spirit of this testimony, given at a time when it was sought to legalize against the United States certain claims for supplies taken by Frémont's men, together with the secrecy observed by the government respecting the written instructions to Gillespie, Larkin, and Frémont, originated, as I suppose, the current theory to which I have alluded, but which, for reasons that will present- ly appear, I regard as without foundation in fact .?

" Frémont testified that Gillespie 'brought me a letter of introduction from the sec. of state and letters and papers from Sen. Benton and his family. The letter from the sec. was directed to me in my private or citizen capacity, and though importing nothing beyond the introduction, accredited the bearer

CAUSES OF THE SETTLERS' REVOLT.

The story of Fremont's return from Oregon has been told in an earlier chapter. The reasons that he gave for that return were the dangers of further ad- vance northward, arising from the depth of snow, lack of supplies, and hostility of the Indians-and the na- ture of the communications received from Gillespie.

to me as coming from the sec. of state, and, in connection with the circum- stances and place of its delivery, indicated a purpose in sending it which was intelligibly explained to me by the accompanying letter from Sen. Benton, and by communications from Lieut Gillespie. This officer informed me that he had been directed by the sec. of state to find me, and to acquaint me with his instructions, which had for their principal objects to ascertain the dispo- sition of the California people, to conciliate their feelings in favor of the U. S., and to find out, with a design of counteracting, the designs of the British govt upon that country.' Fremont's Cal. Claims, 12. And again, in Fremont's Court-martial, 373: 'One of the letters from him [Benton], while apparently of mere friendship and family details, contained passages enigmatical and ob- scure, but which I studied out, and made the meaning to be that I was re- quired by the govt to find out any foreign schemes in relation to the Cal. and to counteract them.' Gillespie said his instructions were 'to watch over the interests of the U. S. in Cal., and to counteract the influence of any foreign or European agents who might be in that country with objects prejudicial to the U. S. I was the bearer of the duplicate of a despatch to the U. S. consul at Monterey, T. O. Larkin, Esq., as also a packet for J. C. Fremont, Esq., and a letter of introduction to the latter gentleman from the Hon. James Buchan- au; the former I destroyed before entering the port of Vera Cruz, having committed it to memory. The packet and letter of introduction I delivered to Capt. Frémont upon the 9th of May, in the mountains of Oregon. . . I was directed to confer with and make known to him my instructions. It was de- irable that we should act in concert, and great vigilance and activity was ex- pected of both. . . I made him acquainted with the wishes of the govt, which were the same as stated above for my own guidance .. . In answer to the first inquiry of the honorable committee, "Were you charged with any verbal in- structions or communications?" etc., I have to state that I was directed by Mr Buchanan to confer with Col. Fremont, and make known to him my own instructions. . . I wasalso directed to show to Col. Fremont the duplicate of the despatch to Mr Larkin. In answer to the 2d inquiry, "You have said that you communicated the wishes of the govt to Col. Fremont; state particularly what you did communicate to him as the wishes of the govt," I beg leave to state that the answer above contains, as near as I can recollect, what I com- municated to Col. Frémont; telling him at the same time that it was the wish of the govt that we should conciliate the feelings of the people of Cal., and encourage a friendship towards the U. S.' Id., 30-3.

That the testimony cited was regarded at the time as evasive and incom- plete, is shown by the following quotations from the report of the house com- mittee in Aug. 1848, denying the validity of all claims contracted before the U. S. flag was raised, on the ground that Fremont and the rest acted without any known authority from the U. S: 'What the purpose was in sending an officer of the U. S. in search of Col. Fremont, with a simple letter of intro- duction, "which was intelligibly explained by the accompanying letter of Sen. Benton," is left to conjecture, except so far as is disclosed by the language of Col. Frémont as quoted; but the effect was to turn Col. Fremont with the men under his command from their exploring expedition to Oregon back into Cal., where they at once "joined the settlers" (or the settlers joined them), and engaged in a revolutionary movement against the authorities of Cal. . . L'p to this time there was and could have been no knowledge in Cal. of the

GILLESPIE'S INSTRUCTIONS.

These communications, as both officers stated, required them "to ascertain the disposition of the Californian people, to conciliate their feelings in favor of the United States, and to find out, with a design of coun- teracting, the designs of the British government upon that country." These reasons, even if the former was

existence of war between Mexico and the U. S. Whether the purpose of the sec. of state, acting as it must be supposed under the direction of the presi- dent, and so "intelligibly explained" by the letter of Sen. Benton, was de- veloped hy the conduct of Col. Fremont consequent therefrom, must be en- tirely a matter of surmise until that "intelligible explanation" shall have been presented to the public; but it is very manifest that much yet remains to be told of this as yet dark and mysterious proceeding.' Thus the opera- tions were 'undertaken either upon individual responsibility and without the authority of the govt or any of its departments, or such authority being given, it is not only not disclosed, but studiously withheld from the public eye.' Frémont's Cal. Claims (House Rept no. 817), 1-5. I do not refer here to all the govt reports on the Cal. claims, and on Fremont's court-martial, though all of them contain more or less repetition of the testimony and com- inents cited.

Senator Clark, in his speech of April 25, 1848, Clark's Speech on Cal. Claims, p. 3-14; also in Cong. Globe, 30th cong. Ist sess., appen., p. 569; sec also, in Id., speeches of other senators on the subject-made a strong argu- ment for the payment of the claims, on the ground that the U. S. govt had undoubtedly instructed Fremont through Gillespie to act as he did, though the speaker by no means approved the policy of the govt. 'Whilst the U. S. were professing to be governed by a spirit of justice and love of peace upon the eastern border of Mexico, different indeed was her course in regard to those states in the west, as shown by the mission of Gillespie early in Nov. 1845, with secret instructions to the consul in Cal., and to call from scien- tific pursuits an officer to foment rebellion and aid in revolutionizing the grovt.'

Jay, Mexican War, 150-4, takes a similar view, and after citing the evi- dence, remarks: 'It is impossible to resist the conviction that Fremont was given to understand, but in a way not to compromit the govt, that the aban- clonment of the exploration in Oregon for the purpose of exciting and aiding an insurrection in Cal. would not expose him to censure.' Edmund Ran- dolph, in his Oration, says: 'But resentment and anticipation of evil were not the sole cause of this movement. There cannot now be a doubt that it was prompted, as it was approved, by the govt of the U. S .; and that Capt. Frémont obeyed his orders no less than his own feelings. . . What Fremont's instructions were is a well kept cabinet secret, which will probably not be di- vulged, at least in our time.' Dwinelle's Address, 1866, p. 19-20. 'There is reason to believe that he was instructed to feel the geographical pulse of the natives as well as the mountain passes.' Wise's Los Gringos, 41. There were some expressions in a letter from Col. Benton that the old senator's son-in-law studied with extraordinary diligence. No doubt the oral communications of Gillespie helped to draw from them a deeper significance than the words con veyed on the first reading ... Fremont determined to become the pursuer rather than the pursued, to turn upon the faithless foe, and revolutionize the govt. This would have been a hazardous course, .. . unless, either in his secret instructions before starting or in the advices conveyed by Lieut Gillespie, he was assured that a successful indiscretion of this sort would be acceptable to his govt. As to the precise plan he adopted, there is no doubt that he con- sulted his own judgment alone. But there is abundant circumstantial evi- dence that he was given to understand that any defensible method of gaining

CAUSES OF THE SETTLERS' REVOLT.

somewhat exaggerated as is probable, were amply sufficient to account for and justify his action in turn- ing back, though he well knew-as the government did not-that his services as a conciliator were not likely to be very effective in California. There is no need of secret instructions in favor of filibusterism to account for his actions so far. Yet were that all, and did the nature of the communications rest solely on the testimony of Fremont and Gillespie, the theory of such secret instructions would perhaps be as fasci- mating for me as it has been for others; but there is other evidence which I deem conclusive. Secretary Buchanan's secret instructions to Larkin as confiden- tial agent-the nature of which has been a matter of surmise to other writers; which are represented to have been in purport identical with Gillespie's instruc- tions; which he was directed to show to Frémont; a duplicate of which he destroyed after committing its contents to memory; but the original of which is in my possession-confirm entirely the cited testimony of the two officers, though not all the inferences they desired to be drawn from that testimony; and contain no encouragement, direct or indirect, for any revolt except by the Californians themselves. Had this document been one written to be seen with intent to mislead those into whose hands it might fall, it would prove nothing in this connection; but its existence, on the contrary, was intended to be kept, and has been kept until now, a profound state secret. It contains a clear presentment of the policy of the United States

Cal. to the Union would be acceptable .. . A hint was enough for one so ambi- tious as Frémont, and if he was not instructed he was most fortunate in his instincts. A different issue might have overwhelmed him with reproach. As it resulted, he had the perfect and flattering indorsement of the sec. of state.' Tuthill's Ilist. Cal., 167 S. As early as 1847, F. D. Atherton, in a letter from Valparaiso to Larkin, expressed grave doubts that Frémont had been turned back by the snows in June. Larkin's Doc., MS .. v. 58.

I might easily extend these citations to show the prevalence of the idea that Fremont acted under secret instructions; but those given are sufficient. Nor do I deem it necessary to cite the opinions of numerous Mexican and native Californian writers to the same effect, because they had in reality littlc opportunity of knowing anything about Fremont's motives, most of them taking it for granted that he acted as a secret agent of the U. S.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON.

-to take possession of California in the event of war with Mexico; to prevent, by force of arms if necessary, any occupation by a European power; but meanwhile to conciliate by every possible means the good-will ot the natives, with a view that the occupation in case of war might be without opposition, or, if there were no war, that the people might voluntarily seek annex- ation a little later. This policy, from an American standpoint, was essentially a sound and prudent one. I have already expressed my opinion that the means adopted to carry it out were not in certain respects honorable from an international point of view; but I am by no means willing to charge the administration at Washington with an action so stupidly inconsistent as to have sent on the same date and by the same confidential messenger, to two different agents in Cali- fornia, two radically different and utterly irreconcila- ble sets of secret instructions. I think there can be no possible room for doubt that Frémont's instruc- tions were identical with those issued to Gillespie and Larkin; and I believe that no doubt would ever have arisen on the subject had the document which I have cited been known to previous investigators.

Assuming, then, that Fremont engaged in a revolu- tionary movement, not in accordance with, but in dis- obedience of his orders from Washington, what were his motives? He claimed to act at the entreaties of the American settlers in defence of their lives and rights. I need not repeat that this on his part, as on that of other leaders, was a mere pretext, Fremont most certainly not being one of those who really be- lieved the settlers to be in danger. I cite in a note his letter to Benton in explanation of his action.3 Clearly

s ' You will remember how grossly outraged and insulted we had already been by this officer [Castro]; many in my own camp and throughout the coun- try thought that I should not have retreated in March last. I felt humiliated and humbled; one of the main objects proposed by the expedition had been entirely defeated, and it was the opinion of the officers of the squadron (so I was informed by Mr Gillespie) that I could not again retreat consistently with any military reputation. . . My animals were in such a state that I could not get out of the valley without reaching the country which lies on the west (?)

CAUSES OF THE SETTLERS' REVOLT.

the retreat from Gavilan in March had been a severe blow to the captain's pride, and the wound still smarted as irritated by the taunts of bold and irresponsible comrades and of filibustering settlers. Yet there can be no doubt that Frémont's strongest incentive was personal ambition. He confidently counted upon an immediate declaration of war between the United States and Mexico; and he believed that by commenc- ing hostilities he might gain for himself a large share of credit for the conquest, which would otherwise fall to the naval commanders. The prevalent rumors among the settlers afforded him a plausible pretext for an action that also offered a remedy for wounded mil- itary pride. Should he err in his expectations of war, there would yet remain a chance of prominence in an independent Californian republic. Young and adven- turous, he resolved to take the risks. From the stand- point of a purely personal ambition, he decided wisely. The result probably surpassed his most sanguine ex- pectations. His decision made him subsequently a popular hero, a senator of the United States, a can- didate for the presidency, a millionnaire ad interim, a major-general; in fact, it gave him greater prominence than has perhaps ever been attained in the United States by any other man of no greater ability. He was essentially a lucky fellow.

Our admiration for Frémont as a filibustero chief- tain-the only admiration due him in this connection -would be vastly increased had he acted with some-

side of them in an entirely destitute condition. Having carefully exam- ined my position, and foreseeing, I think, clearly, all the consequences which may eventuate to me from such a step, I determined to take such active and anticipatory measures as should seem to me most expedient to protect my party and justify my own character. I am well aware of the grave responsi- bility which I assumed; but I also determined that, having once decided to do so, I would assume it and its consequences fully and entirely, and go through with the business completely to the end. .. On the 6th of June I decided on the course which I would pursne, and immediately concerted my operations with the foreigners inhabiting the Sacramento Valley.' Fremont to Benton, July 25, 1846, in Niles' Reg., Ixxi. 191. I have already, in note 1 of this chap- ter, quoted this letter on Castro's hostile preparations; and I shall have oc- casion to refer to it again.

FRÉMONT'S PLANS.

what less of caution after deciding to engage in the re- volt, or had he been somewhat more modest in his subsequent claims. I have already stated that but for his presence and support the revolt would not have occurred. The departure of Hastings and Cly- man for the east, and of others for Oregon in April, shows that there was then but little hope of a success- ful rising. But as to the exact nature of his coop- eration there has been some difference of opinion. William Baldridge attributes the movement of the American settlers, of whom he was one, to Frémont's direct encouragement, believing-though this of course was an afterthought-that that officer's true purpose was to provoke a declaration of war by Mexico;4 and William B. Ide had some theories on the subject, which will be noticed presently; but the weight of evidence, direct and circumstantial, goes to show that Frémont, while holding himself somewhat aloof from the masses, secretly conspired with a few leaders to bring about an ontbreak, and promised the full support of himself and his party in case it should be needed, though as an officer of the United States he desired to abstain from open participation as long as possible. The settlers had no fear of any force the Californians could muster north of the bay; but if Castro were to send soldiers from the south, they might require as- sistance. This assistance Frémont promised, and, as we shall see, proffered later. This was the sum and substance of his cooperation. In the few stirring events of the revolution he personally took no part. He merely held himself in readiness to act when the necessity should arise, and marched against the foe after others had won a victory. Yet in the letter to Benton he clearly gave that gentleman, and through him the people of the United States, to understand that in all that had occurred he had taken an active part, and had been personally in command. In this

" Baldridge's Days of'46, MS., passim.

CAUSES OF THE SETTLERS' REVOLT.

he was guilty of selfish and dishonorable misrepre- sentation.5

There is another version of Frémont's part in the revolution which merits attention on account of its author's prominence in the movement, if for no other

"In his letter to Benton, already cited, Niles' Rey., Ixxi. 191, Fremont says: 'On June Gth I decided on the course which I would pursue, and im- mediately concerted my operations with the foreigners.' A few days later, etc., going on to mention the capture of Arce's horses, taking of Sonoma, capture of Gen. Vallejo, etc., and continuing: 'These enterprises accomplished, I proceeded' (from where?) 'to the American settlements on the Sacramento and Rio de los Americanos to obtain reenforcements'-thus leaving it to be in- ferred that he had taken an active part in all the events narrated, instead of remaining in camp at Sutter's Fort. Then he was called to Sonoma by news of a threatened attack by Castro, and in his narrative of what followed makes no effort to distinguish between his own acts and those of others, implying very clearly that all was done by him, with the cooperation of Gillespie, and continuing: 'We reached Sonoma again on the evening of July 4th, and in the morning I called the people together and spoke to them in relation to the position of the country, advising a course of operations which was unani- mously adopted. Cal. was declared independent,' etc. I do not quote more fully, because the events have to be narrated in the next chapter; but I do not exaggerate in saying that Frémont deliberately conveyed the impression that he was in active command throughout the revolution. Benton so understood it, or at least wished it to be so understood; and he repeated Frémont's ver sion in language similar but more positive in a letter of Nov. 9, 1846, Vilex' Reg., Ixxi. 173, to the president, who, like the sec. of war, repeated the ver- sion substantially in public documents; and thus the ambitious captain ob- tained much popular credit and admiration which by no means belonged to him, even if credit or admiration had been due to anybody for such actions. In his Court-martial, 374, Fremont says: 'In concert and in cooperation with the American settlers, and in the brief space of about 30 days, all was accom- plished north of the bay, and independence declared on July 5th.' In August 1856, Thompson of New Jersey-Speech on the Conquest of California, Wash. 1956, Svo, 16 p. : also in Congress. Globe, 1855-6, p. 2006-9-made a forcible pro- test in the U. S. senate against the claim of Fremont to be considered the con- (meror of Cal., showing in a clear light the misrepresentations made by and in behalf of that officer, though he had to rely mainly for evidence on the document already cited as Hist. Bear Flay Revol., and signed as it appears by Ide, Nash, and Gtrigsby. Thompson says: . In these letters it will be found that Fremont recites various successful military actions. He does not say that he participated in them, but states them in such a way as to leave the inference irresistible that he did so. Mr Benton and Mr Marcy both take such for granted, and so indeed would any one on reading the artful connec- tion in which they are stated. Besides, there are no documents on file in the department from which the sec. could have made up the statement in his re- port, except the letters of Col. Benton and Mrs Frémont. The facts relate to the time when Fremont joined the movement, . . . to two actions in which the Californians were defeated, and the taking of Sonoma. The sec. relates these events so as to produce the impression (no doubt on his own mind) that Fre- mont was among the first to countenance the independent movement; that he took part in the defeat of the Mexicans and the capture of Sonoma. But we have positive proof showing that Fremont had nothing to do with these several events.' And this was true, though in certain respects Thompson over- estimated the value of his proofs. Ide, Grigsby, and Nash being interested persons, like Fremont, and coloring their version accordingly.

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History of California, Volume XXII, Part 10

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe Publication date: 1885-1890 Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers Number of Pages: 816

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816