History of California, Volume XXII, Part 41

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816

USA > California > History of California, Volume XXII > Part 41

Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).

K, U. S. Ist dragoons, united and dismounted, 55 men; Lient John W. Da- vidson. Co. D, musketeers of Cyane, Capt. Edward Higgins, acting lieut U. S. N .; Lieut John Van Ness Philip and Albert Allmand, acting lieuten ants, also Wm Simmons, commodore's clerk. Artillery co. of sailors, 6 guns, 45 men. Capt. Richard L. Tilghman, lieut U. S. N .: Lieut Wm H. Thompson, passed mid.

3d battalion, commanded by Capt. Wm B. Renshaw, lient U. S. N .: Co. B, musketeers of Savannah, Capt. Renshaw; Lient Geo. E. Morgan; Philip H. Haywood and Robert C. Duvall, mid. Co. A, musketeers of Congress, Capt. Jolin Guest, passed mid .; Lient Theodore Lee and Benj. F. Wells, mid. There were 379 sailors and marines in all the divisions.

4th battalion : squadron of mounted volunteers, including 30 Californians, acting as guards or skirmishers on front, rear, and flanks; under command of C'apt. Arch. HT. Gillespie, also captains Samuel Gibson, Sam. B. Hensley. and Santiago E. Argüello; lieutenants Luis Argüello, Hiram Rheusaw, and -. 84 men, besides 3 employés of the topographical engineers. The total force was 607 men, of whom 44 were officers.

The authorities for this list are Stockton's official report in Stockton's Mil. und Nar. Op., 31 et seq .; Emory's Notes, 115; and a MS. list by Brackett, in Miscel. Hist. Pap., 31. The company lettering is from Brackett; according to Stockton's account of later events, companies E, F, and G were respectively Co. A, carbineers of the Cyane, Co. C, carb., and Co. A, carb. of the Con- gress. Lieut H. B. Watson is also named.

"Report of Feb. 5tb, in Stockton's Mil. and Nav. Op., 3).

3 Griffin's Diary, MS., 44 et seq., and Emory's Notes, 116 et seq., are the best original authorities for the march, the former being much the more com- plete. Jan. Ist, J. A. Pico sent word that he had horses for the army, but

387

THE MARCH ON LOS ANGELES.

approaching Los Angeles from the north, and that the Californians had gone to meet him 600 strong under Andrés Pico. Soon after they left Las Flores on the 4th, three men appeared-William Workman, Charles Flügge, and Domingo Olivas-under a flag of truce, bringing a letter from Flores, dated on the 1st. In this communication the general suggested, rather than asked for, a truce to await confirmation of a current report that peace had been made between Mexico and the United States, and thus avoid a use- less spilling of blood.4 But Stockton peremptorily re- fused to enter into negotiations with Flores, declaring him to be a man without honor, who had broken his parole, and would be shot as a rebel if caught.5 The envoys made a plea in behalf of the people; but the commodore would listen to nothing but propositions of unconditional surrender. Workman, however, ac- companied the army to San Juan Capistrano, where on the 5th he induced Stockton to issue a proclama- tion offering a general amnesty to all Californians ex- cept Flores, on condition that he should be given up as a prisoner.6 It was noted that at the pass be-

was distrusted. Jan. 2d, at S. Luis some sailors broke into the church and committed petty thefts. Forster came in with reports. Hensley went to Pico's rancho of Sta Margarita and brought in some horses aud 45 oxen next day.

4Jan. Ist, Flores to Stockton, in Stockton's Mil. and Nav. Op., 19-20, evidently a not very accurate translation. F. says he had been urged by for- eigu residents to communicate with S. through them as mediators for an hon- orable adjustment, but has not felt at liberty to do so until now, when such action is required by the rumors of peace. He denounces S. for the unjust war he is waging, and expresses the determination of himself and men to defend their country to the last if S. declines the truce. In Olvera, Doc., MS., 71-3, is a blotter of a somewhat similar letter, written by Flores on Dec. 31st; but he must have made great changes in it if the translation may be trusted at all. In this copy F. expresses his joy on the news of probable peace, and his surprise that S. should have started from S. Diego under such circumstances ; and he writes simply to save his responsibility in case blood shall be shed after a treaty has been made. Nothing is said of the unjust war or resolution to resist, etc. Forster, Pioneer Data, MS., 45 et seq., is the only one who names Olivas; and he also notes the fact that each of the three ambassadors finally met a tragic death.

5 Griffin, Forster, aud others represent Stockton as having shown much anger, especially at the idea of Flores' claiming to be governor of Cal.

6 Spanish translation in Olvera, Doc., MS., 75. Stockton says nothing of this document, but it is mentioned by Gritlin, who feared a pretended accept- ance by the people.

388

THE CONQUEST COMPLETED

tween Las Flores and San Juan a small force of the enemy might easily have defeated the army.

Stockton's camp of the 5th was at Los Alisos; next day he marched to Santa Ana; and on the 7th to Los Coyotes. John Forster accompanied the army and rendered valuable aid in obtaining supplies and infor- mation. A violent wind, raising clouds of dust, con- tinued through the night and morning of the 6th-7th, of which, as Emory says, the enemy should have taken advantage for an attack. Conflicting rumors had been received about Flores' movements, the general impression being that his first meeting would be with Fremont rather than Stockton; but in the region of Los Coyotes reliable information was obtained that the Californians would make a stand at the San Gabriel River; and indeed, the enemy's scouts were seen, making some hostile demonstrations.7 Next morning, the 8th of January, anniversary of the battle of New Orleans, as the soldiers did not need to be reminded, the advance was resumed. Though the official reports make no allusion to any change of plan or route, I have no doubt that the original intention was to proceed by the most direct way, crossing the San Gabriel at the lower ford, but was changed in consequence of information received through Forster that the Californians occupied a most advantageous position on the lower route.8 At any rate, Stockton

" Griffin, Diary, MS., 52, says they even captured two vaqueros, and also Forster, whom they released, for he soon came back to camp.

8 Forster, Pioneer Data, MS., 49 et seq., as in conversation, states posi- tively that such was the case. He learned that Flores, though supposed by the Americans and non-combatant Californians to be at S. Fernando awaiting Frémont, had really passed Angeles in the night and had posted his men in ambush in the willows and mustard at a point near the modern Gallatin, where Stockton's men could be attacked at a fearful disadvantage. This is confirmed, as we shall see, by Coronel and other Californians. In his narrative, Forster says he got the information from an Indian. He also mentions interviews with Ramon Carrillo, who was willing to abandon the cause of Flores, but feared punishment for breaking his parole and for his supposed part in the killing of the Bear Flag men at Sonoma. Forster promised to intercede with Stockton, from whom he got a written guaranty, but could not find Carrillo again, He claims that Carrillo knew nothing of Flores' real movements-not a very plausible elaim. Dr Griffin also noted in his diary Carrillo's reported presence and desire for pardon. In 1874 Forster stated that having fallen

389

FLORES' PREPARATIONS.

soon swerved to the right after leaving Los Coyotes, and directed his course toward the upper ford, the Paso de Bartolo. He approached the river between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and found the enemy in possession of the opposite, or north-western, bank, the Californian scouts having been seen before in the distance.

What has been said of Flores' operations during the last half of December,9 may be literally applied to the first week in January. There exists no docu- mentary record of what was being done by the Californians in these days, but there is nothing of mystery connected with the subject. Dissensions continued between the leaders, Flores being less to blame than the others for this state of things, but still much discouraged. His original intention had been to so harass the foe by a guerrilla warfare as to limit the American occupation to a few points until cither aid or news of a treaty should come from Mex- ico. With the hearty cooperation of all, even with his limited resources, he might have accomplished much in this direction. But there was no longer any popular enthusiasm whatever. Such patriotic zeal as had at first existed, and had been fanned into flame by early successes, had now disappeared in conse- quence of official disputes and mismanagement, calm reflection, and the personal hardships resulting from war. There was left no hope of success. The only remaining stimulants to action were a degree of stub- born national pride, and a fear of punishment for past offences, fomented by the officers who had broken their paroles. The Californians were not in earnest,

into the stream he went back to a house to dry his clothing. Here he met a party of Californians, among whom was a friend anxions to secure Stockton's protection, but fearful because of his Sonoma record; and from him, for a promise of protection, the information was received. Thus it appears clear enongh that Carrillo was the informant, though Forster thought it desirable, on second thoughts, to conceal the fact. The Californians, however, generally attributed the revelation of the plan to Lorenzo Soto. 9 See p. 355 of this volume.

390

THE CONQUEST COMPLETED.

and they accomplished nothing. Their scouts retired before the advance of Stockton and Frémont, not even driving off the cattle and horses along the route. The letter of January Ist was sent by Flores merely in the hope of gaining time. What reasons if any he had for expecting news of a treaty I do not know; but Stockton's verbal reply was not encouraging, and still less so his later written offer of armistice to the people if they would give up their general. As the enemy approached from south and north the situation became more critical, and no new resources were de- veloped. It was thought that Fremont would arrive first, or at least that the first conflict should be with his forces, and the Californian army was accordingly stationed for several days at San Fernando; but Stockton's advance was perhaps more rapid than had been expected; and at the last the plans were changed. On the 6th or 7th the army was moved rapidly and secretly, without entering the town, to the vicinity of the San Gabriel River, and posted at La Jabon- ería in the willows and mustard at a spot command- ing the route by which Stockton was expected to pass. But early on the 8th the scouts brought news that the plan had been revealed and the Americans were marching for the upper ford. The disappoint- ment was great at losing an expected advantage; but Flores at once set out up the river, and reached the Paso de Bartolo shortly before the Americans made their appearance.10

10 Coronel, Cosas de Cal., MS., 120, etc. Andrés Pico seems to have been in command at 8. Fernando, while Flores and Carrillo remained in the south, ordering Pieo to join them after Stockton had reached Sta Ana. Pico's route was by Los Verdugos and Arroyo Seco. The lower ford is called Los Nietos. This writer names the Sonoran, Lorenzo Soto, as the man who revealed the ambush. Most of the Sta Barbara company deserted in the night of the 7th. Larkin's journal, in Mont. Californian, Feb. 27, 1847, men- tions the encampment for 2 or 3 days at S. Fernando. Rico, Mem., MS., 48 et seq., mentions the ambush and change of route, but thinks the warning was given by one Dominguez. Each narrator is inclined to attribute this act to some personal enemy; but I have already noted the probability that Ramon Carrillo was the man. Manuel Castro, Servicios, MS., in presenting the troubles of the Californians, throws the blame chiefly on Flores, as cowardly and incompetent, inspiring no faith, keeping his place by intrigue, and thus

391

THE CALIFORNIAN ARMY.

Flores posted his men, nearly 500 in number, on a bluff, or bank, forty or fifty feet high, skirting the river bottom at a distance of from 400 to 600 yards from the water. The two cannon, nine-pounders ap- parently, were placed opposite to and commanding the ford. Two squadrons of horsemen under Andrés Pico and Manuel Garfias were stationed on the right a few hundred yards southward, and another squad- ron under José Antonio Carrillo on the left at a greater distance up the stream. A party of skir- mishers seems to have been sent across the river, and to have retired as the Americans advanced. Stock- ton's order of march was as follows: Centre, Turner's 2d division, with Hensley's riflemen as advance guard, and two guns on each flank; right, Ist division under Zielin; left, 3d division under Renshaw; rear, 4th division under Gillespie, with two guns under Thompson, and guard of 49 men under Haywood, the cattle and wagons being in the centre, in what the sailors termed a 'Yankee corral.' The army halted about a quarter of a mile from the river to make final preparations, and then moved forward again to attack the Californians. I append in a note Stockton's official report of the engagement that fol- lowed, interspersed with items from other sources.11

robbing real patriots of their due glory! Osio, Hist. Cal., MS., 487 et seq., tells us the Californians had no advantages but their courage. To the am- bush he adds Flores' plan to fire the mustard on the enemy's approach, and charge under cover of the smoke! He does not name the 'spurious Califor- nian' who betrayed his country. Botello, Anales del Sur, MS., 156, etc., gives a good account of the preparations, agreeing for the most part with that of Coronel. He says Ramon Carrillo commanded a party of scouts in the south, and Jose Carrillo (son of Don Carlos) a similar party in the north to watch Frémont, while the rest of the force was concentrated at S. Fer- naudo. It was on the 7th that the army countermarched secretly to La Jabonería. But Stockton turned off at Los Nietos and spoiled the plan. Palomares, Mem., MS., 76 et seq., gives some particulars of the retreat of the scouts before Stockton's advance, as well as of Flores' general move- ments. Avila, Notas, MS., 32 et seq., calls the upper ford Corunga, imply- ing that it was distinct from Bartolo. In Los Angeles Hist., 23, it is called Curunga, or Pico Crossing.

11 Report of Feb. 5, 1847, to Sec. Bancroft, in Stockton's Mil. and Nav. Oper., 32 et seq. Stockton also briefly describes the battle in his reports of Jan. 11th, Id., 17-19, and Feb. 18th, Stockton's Report, 47-8; but gives no additional information. There are mentions also in several other official re- ports of different officers, but no details. These documents have been often

392

THE CONQUEST COMPLETED.

From the testimony thus cited, the official report somewhat ridiculously magnifying the battle of San Gabriel for effect at Washington, it appears that Stockton's force forded the river under a constant fire

reprinted wholly or in part, especially by Cutts, Bryant, Stockton's Life, Lan- cey, etc. A brief but clear account is given in Emory's Notes, 119-20. See also Californian narratives as cited in note 10.

. A detachment of marines, under Lieut Watson, was sent to strengthen the left flank. A party of the enemy, 150 strong, had now crossed the river and made several ineffectual efforts to drive a band of wild mares upon the advance party.' There is no other authority for this attempt, though Castro, Servicios, MS., and others speak vaguely of having captured some horses and saddles at some time during the fight; and Griffin says 21 horses were lost, having been tied by the volunteers before the fight, and forgotten until it was too late. 'We now moved forward to the ford in broken files; Capt. Hensley's command was ordered to dismount, and, acting as skirmishers, it deployed to the front and crossed the stream, which is about 50 yards in width' (Emory says: 'The river was about 100 yards wide, knee-deep, and flowing over quicksand. Either side was fringed with a thick undergrowth. The ap- proach on our side was level; that on the enemy's was favorable to him '). 'driving before him a party of the enemy which had attempted to annoy ns.' García, Hechos, MS., 102-3, is the only Californian who says anything of this party, which he says was of 200 men under Joaquin and Gabriel de la Torre. Emory says that on approaching the thicket they received the scattering fire of the enemy's sharpshooters. The enemy had now takeu their position upon the heights, distant 600 yards from the river and 50 feet above its level; their centre or main body, about 200 strong, was stationed immediately in front of the ford, upon which they opened a fire from two pieces of artillery, throwing round and grape shot without effect.' (Emory says: 'As the line -of skirmishers-was about the middle of the river, the enemy opened his battery, and made the water fly with grape and round shot.') Their right and left wings were separated from the main body about 300 yards.' The C'alifornians say that Carrillo's division was 1,000 or 1.500 yards away; and several add that he was stationed there ou pretext of guarding a pass to the hills, but really because Flores distrusted him. 'Our column halted upon the olge of the stream; at this time the guns were unlimbered to return the enemy's fire, but were ordered again to be limbered and not a gun to be fired until the opposite bank of the river was gained.' It is stated in Stockton's Life, 144 et seq., and confirmed by other witnesses, that Kearny ordered the yuns unlimbered before crossing, as was doubtless the most prudent course, but Stockton countermanded the order. Half-way across, K. sent a message that it would be impossible to cross, as there was a quicksand; but S. dis- mounted, seized the ropes, and declared, 'Quicksand or no quicksand, the ins shall pass over.' The phrase as heard by Forster, who was present, was " Quicksands be damned,' etc. See also Bidwell's Cal., MS., 207 et seq. He says Kearny showed much suppressed anger at this and before at Stockton's reply to Flores' letter; but I fancy this is an exaggeration. 'The two 9- pounders, dragged by officers as well as men and mules, soon reached the opposite bank, when they were immediately placed in battery. The column now followed in order under a most galling fire from the enemy, and became warmly engaged on the opposite bank, their round shot and grape falling thickly amougst us as we approached the stream, without doing any injury, our men marching steadily forward. The dragoons and Cyane's musketeers, occupying the centre, soon crossed and formed upon a bank about 4 feet above the stream. The left, advancing at the same time, soon occupied its position across the river. The rear was longer in getting across the water; the sand being deep. its passage was delayed by the baggage carts; however, in a few

393

BATTLE OF THE SAN GABRIEL.

from the enemy's guns, which under ordinary circum- stances would have caused great loss of life, but had practically no effect because of the bad powder used, planted his artillery on the right bank, and soon si-

moments the passage of the whole force was effected, with only one man killed and one wounded, notwithstanding the enemy kept up an incessant tire from the heights.' (Emory says: 'On the right bank of the river there was a natural banquette, breast-high. Under this the line was deployed. Te this accident of the ground is to be attributed the little loss we sustained from the enemy's artillery, which showered grape and round shot over our leads.') Neither gives the chief reason for the slight loss of life, which was the worthlessness of the powder made at San Gabriel. Emory's further statement, 'Whilst this was going on, our rear was attacked by a very bold charge, and repulsed,' is unintelligible, to say nothing of the ' bull.'

'On taking a position upon the low bank, the right flank, under Capt. Zielin, was ordered to deploy to the right; two guns from the rear were in- mediately brought to the right; the 4-pounder under Thompson, supported by the riflemen under Renshaw. The left flank deployed into line in open or- der. During this time our artillery began to tell upon the enemy, who con- tinued their fire without interruption. The 9-pounders standing in plain view upon the bank were discharged with such precision'-most witnesses state, as was doubtless true, that Stockton himself aimed one of the guns-'that it soon became too warm for the enemy to remain upon the brow of their heights; eventually a shot told upon their 9-pounder, knocked the gun from its trail, astounding the enemy so much that they left it for four or five minutes. Some 20 of them now advanced, and hastily fastening ropes to it, dragged the gun to the rear.' Coronel says that the brow of the hill protected the Californi- ans, but at the same time prevented their own guns being fired effectively ex- cept as they were advanced to the brow, discharged, and dragged back; and soon both were dismounted by the Americans' fire. Rico claims that the guns were at first of no service; but that after they were put by Flores in his charge they were dragged forward by reatas and fired with much effeet. Osio says Flores' best gun was dismounted at the first shot. Forster says the sec- oui shot, aimed by Stockton, destroyed one of the wheels of the enemy's gun, but still they continued to fire it 7 or 8 times, the balls only reaching half-way. Both Coronel and Botello represent the artillery conflict as much less hot than does Stockton. Emory says that it required one hour and 20 minutes to cross the river and silence the enemy's guns.

'Capt. Hensley's skirmishers now advanced and took the hill upon the right, the left wing of the enemy retreating before them. The 6-pounder from the rear had now come up; Capt. Hensley was ordered to support it, and returned from the hill.' Neither Emory nor any one else mentions this movement. 'This movement being observed, the enemy's left made an attempt to charge the two guns, but the right flank of the marines under Zielin, being quickly thrown back, showed too steady a front for the courage of the Californians to engage, who wheeled to the left and dashed to the rear across the river. At this time the enemy were observed collecting on our left and making prepara- tions to charge our left flank. Gen. Kearny was now ordered to form a square with the troops on the right flank, upon which the left flank, in case of be- ing worsted, mnight rally. The right wing of the enemy now made an unsuc- cessful attempt to charge our left, but finding so warm a reception .. . they changed their purpose and retired, when a discharge of artillery told upon their ranks. The dispositions for charging the heights were now made. The troops having been brought into line, the command "Forward" being given, on they went (the artillery in battery) charging the heights, which the enemy's centre contested for a few moments, then broke in retreat; their right wing charging upon the rear under Gillespie, encumbered with paeks, etc, . .. but re-

394

THE CONQUEST COMPLETED.

lenced the Californian battery. Then his men were formed in squares and advanced toward the bluff. Flores ordered a charge by his horsemen; but the movement was clumsily executed, as by men whose heart was not in the work; some of the companies failed to cooperate promptly; an order to halt from an aid increased the confusion; and the few who came within reach of the Americans were quickly repulsed. Then the Californians retired, and Stockton took pos- session of their post on the bluff without further op- position. The engagement had lasted probably a little less than two hours from the time when the first shots were fired. The American leader distinguished himself by his valor and skill, though his policy at the ford could not have been justified in case of disaster.

ceiving a well directed fire from the guard, which hurled some of them from their saddles, they fled at full speed across the river we had just left. The other portion of their forces retreated behind their artillery, which had taken position in a ravine, and again opened fire upon our centre; our artillery was immediately thrown forward-the troops being ordered to lay (sic) down to avoid the enemy's cannon-balls, which passed directly over their heads. The tire from our artillery was incessant, and so accurate that the enemy were from time to time driven from their guns until they finally retreated. We were now in possession, where, a short time before, the insurgents had so vauntingly taken strong position; and the band playing Hail Columbia,' etc.

Emory describes this last part of the battle, doubtless much more accu- rately, as follows: 'Half-way between the hill and the river, the enemy made a furious charge on our left flank. At the same moment our right was threatened. The Ist and 2d battalions were thrown into squares, and after firing one or two rounds, drove off the enemy. The right wing was ordered to form a square, but seeing the enemy hesitate, the order was countermanded; the Ist battalion, which formed the right, was directed to rush for the hill, suppos- ing that would be the contested point, but great was our surprise to find it abandoned. The enemy pitched his camp on the hills in view, but when morning came he was gone. We had no means of pursuit.' Emory also gives a plan of the battle. Griffin's account agrees well with Emory's. He says the plain was about 250 yards wide, though Southwick by pacing made it 900 paces. Wilson, Observ., MS., 92, etc., who was a spectator at a dis- tance, says a part of the Californians charged and secmed for a time to have broken the American line. Avila, Notas, MS., 34 et seq., was also a looker- on, and gives a similar account. The Californian authorities already cited, though their accounts are confused in detail, all agree that a charge was or- dered and partly executed; but state that the failure of Carrillo to promptly obcy orders, or at least to arrive in time, and an order to halt given by Diego Sepúlveda, one of Flores' aids, caused a failure of what at first seemed likely to be a successful movement. No witnesses support Stockton's account of the final scenes of the fight, reopening of artillery fire, etc .; and I have no doubt they are purely imaginary. Juan Bautista Moreno, Vida, MS., 31-3, was in command of one of the charging companies, and was seriously wounded. The battle is described on authority of Agustin Olvera in Los Angeles Hist., 23-4. For additional authorities on this fight and that of the next day, see note 13.

Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.

History of California, Volume XXII, Part 41

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe Publication date: 1885-1890 Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers Number of Pages: 816

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816