History of California, Volume XXII, Part 21

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816

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190

BEAR FLAG REVOLT-FREMONT'S CAMPAIGN.

spondence on Frémont's movements, some of it not elsewhere found. It was on Frémont's letter to Benton, and on that of the latter to the president, that were founded brief mentions of the subject in various govt reports of the time, as well as the current popular ideas for several years. Fremont's Geog. Memoir and Kern's Journal contain some matters pertaining more or less directly to the subject; and Peters' Life of Kit Carson may be regarded as containing some original matter in the shape of Carson's testimony, thoughi of little value. Frémont's Cal. Claims (30th cong. Ist sess., Sen. Rept no. 75) is a collection of important testimony taken in 1848 from Frémont, Gillespie, Hensley, and many other prominent men, on a subject growing directly out of the revolt.

Phelps' Fore and Aft and Revere's Tour of Duty are books written by men who were in California in 1846, and to some extent actors in the scenes de- scribed. Both authors fall into some errors, doubtless without any inten- tional misrepresentation. The Monterey Californian, 1846, and the S. F. Californian, 1847, contained a good deal of valuable matter on the subject, much of it emanating from Dr Semple, editor of the former paper and a prominent Bear Flag man, a narrative from whose pen appears in the Hespe- rian, vol. iii. Much information, in a certain sensc original, being in many instances the personal recollections of pioneers, and in a few cases taking a documentary form, has appeared in California newspapers of later date, of which it is not necessary to give a list here, the S. F. Alta and San José Pio- neer being prominent in this respect. It is well to mention in this connection Thomas C. Lancey's Cruise of the Dale, published in the paper last named. It contains more matter on all topics connected with the conquest than any other publication extant, being compiled from newspaper and other sources by a gentleman who came to California in 1846, and who was well fitted in many respects for the task. This work merits more praise than it will ever obtain in its present form, marred by many typographical blunders, and lack- ing systematic arrangement. Of a similar nature to Lancey's work, though as a rule inferior, except where they have reproduced it literally, are the local county histories of California published during the past few years; the editors having occasionally, however, obtained items that were new and of some value. John S. Hittell's History of San Francisco should be noticed here as the only popular work of late years in which a correct understanding of the character of the revolt is shown.

Such are the sources of original information on the Bear Flag revolt; and I may add that most of the authorities cited treat also of later annals, or the conquest. Miscellaneous printed works treating more or less fully of both the Revolt and the Conquest-some of them trustworthy, and others trash, pure and simple; none of them containing original matter; and none of them cited in my pages except occasionally, to show the author's peculiar views, to cor- rect an error, or for some other special purpose-may be found in great num- bers in my general list of authorities.

CHAPTER IX.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

1846.

THE WAR WITH MEXICO-BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES-FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES RESPECTING CALIFORNIA-POLICY OF PRESIDENT POLK'S ADMINISTRATION-INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMODORE SLOAT IN 1845 AND 1846 -PLANS FOR PERMANENT OCCUPATION-THE PACIFIC SQUADRON AT MAZATLAN-RUMORS OF WAR-SERVICES OF DR WOOD AND JOHN PAR- ROTT-THE 'PORTSMOUTH' AND 'CYANE' SENT TO MONTEREY-NEWS FROM THE RIO GRANDE-SLOAT'S PLANS-HIS ' UNWARRANTED INACTIV- ITY'-CHANGES HIS MIND-STARTS FOR CALIFORNIA IN THE 'SAVANNAH' -ENGLISH DESIGNS-THE RIVAL FLEETS-A RACE, IN AMERICAN IMAGI- NATION-A PROTECTORATE-AN UNFOUNDED CONJECTURE-THE MONA- MARA COLONIZATION PROJECT-TEN THOUSAND IRISHMEN FOR SAN JOA- QUIN.

THE conquest of California was a part of the war of 1846-8, between Mexico and the United States. Not only was California a portion, and the richest portion, of the territory transferred from one nation to the other as a result of the war; but it was also the prize chiefly coveted in advance by that element in the northern republic which promoted the conflict. It was the region whose loss Mexico most dreaded, and whose prospective annexation to the United States was looked upon with most disfavor in Europe. There- fore I might appropriately-and in fact, were I writ- ing a detached history of California, should be obliged to-present at considerable length the general annals of the war, and particularly the causes which led to it. I am relieved, however, from this necessity by the fact that the Mexican war is in its general features ( 191 )

192

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

fully treated in another volume of my work; and I shall therefore confine myself to a brief statement respecting the outbreak of hostilities, and then pro- ceed to consider those phases only of the subject which directly concerned the territory to which these volumes are devoted.

The independence of Texas, effected in 1836 by Americans colonists, while fully recognized by the lead- ing powers of the world, was never so recognized by Mexico, which nation persisted in regarding the lone- star republic as its own territory, and believed that the so-called independence was but a pretext from the first for ultimate annexation to the United States. When the question of such annexation began to be agitated, the Mexicans of course were confirmed in their belief, and the popular feeling became very bit- ter. Over and over again the government of Mexico declared officially that annexation would be forcibly resisted, and would be made a cause of war. In the United States it was not generally believed that this warlike threat would be carried out. There was, how- ever, a strong opposition to the proposed measure, founded in part on the justice of Mexican claims, but mainly on the danger of extending southern political power. The project was defeated in congress; but, after a presidential election in which its friends were victorious, it was again brought up, and ratified at Washington in March 1845, receiving the final ap- proval of Texas in July of the same year. Before the end of 1845 a military force was stationed, not only on the Texan frontier, but over the line in disputed terri- tory, which Mexico with much reason claimed as her own, whether Texan independence were recognized or not. In Mexico, meanwhile, there was practically no difference of opinion on the merits of the case; but the administration in power, that of Herrera, was in- clined to avoid a declaration of war, and to favor delay and diplomatic negotiations, prudently foreseeing the danger of losing, not only Texas, but other parts of the

193

THE MEXICAN WAR.

national domain. The popular feeling, however, was irresistibly opposed to every policy of concession; the administration was forced to refuse negotiation with Slidell, the American minister, whose mission it had to a certain extent encouraged ; and finally it was over- thrown by Paredes, who took advantage of the public sentiment in favor of war to raise himself into power. Another effort to prevent the war was that which aimed at a treaty by which Mexico should recognize the independence of Texas, in return for a pledge against annexation. This plan was instigated by the European powers clearly foreseeing the result of a conflict, but it was rejected by Texas. Early in March 1846 the American army advanced toward the Rio Grande, impeded by protests and proclamations and threats, but no forcible resistance. Early in April the Mexican army was ordered to advance, and General Ampudia, commanding at Matamoros, assumed a hos- tile attitude, ordering Taylor to retire at onee beyond the Nueces until the question of boundaries could be settled. The order was not obeyed. Before the end of April blood had been shed in several minor eneoun- ters of small detached parties, and a considerable part of the Mexican force had erossed the Rio Grande. On May 3d an artillery duel was begun between the fortifieations on opposite sides of the river, and on May 8th was fought the first pitehed battle at Palo Alto. I need not follow the record of military opera- tions further. It was on May 13th that congress voted, and President Polk proclaimed, that "by the act of the republic of Mexico a state of war exists be- tween that government and the United States."

As to the popular sentiment in the United States respecting the acquisition of California, there is little or nothing to be added to what I have said on the same subjeet for 1845.1 The threatened war had lit- tle bearing on the subject, for it was not generally be-

1 See Hist. Cal., vol. iv., chap. xxv.

HIST. CAL., VOL. V. 18

194

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

lieved that there would be any war. It was felt that California was a most desirable province; that it was not destined to remain much longer under Mexican control; that it ought for many reasons to belong to the United States; and that the rapid increase of American immigration would inevitably bring about the desired result, unless it were prevented by Euro- pean interference. Those who were opposed to the ac- quisition founded their opposition mainly on political and sectional grounds; but many of those who favored it hoped to see it accomplished by purchase rather than by methods bearing a dishonorable taint of filibuster- ism. On two points there was wellnigh unanimous agreement-that England was no less eager than the United States to obtain California, and that no inter- ference by that or any European power must in any case be tolerated. Of course, the war once begun, there was but little disposition on the part of any to oppose the temporary occupation of California as a military measure; indeed, during the continuance of the conflict public attention was but very slightly directed to the ultimate fate of that country, though details of military achievements, there as in Mexico, were closely watched.2

Respecting the policy of the administration at Washington with regard to California, we are left iu no doubt whatever. From developments in the Commodore Jones affair of 1842,3 and from the sub- sequent naval operations on the coast, I might rea- sonably infer, as other writers have repeatedly done before me, that naval commanders had standing in- structions during all this period to occupy California in case of war with Mexico, and to prevent in any

2 The feeling in the U. S. is well shown in an article on 'California, ' pub- lished in the American Review of Jan. 1846, vol. iii., p. 82-99, in which par- ticular attention is paid to English designs. I might quote extensively from newspapers of the time; but I find no such material which throws fur- ther light on the subject than has already been obtained from citations of former years. Most articles on the Mexican war mention California, but only incidentally.

3 See chap. xii. of vol. iv.

195

INSTRUCTIONS TO SLOAT AND LARKIN.

event such occupation by England or France. But we have no need for inference or conjecture on the subject, since clearly written instructions are extant. On June 24, 1845, after congress had ratified the measure which Mexico had declared would be a casus belli, Bancroft, secretary of the navy, wrote in 'secret and confidential instructions' to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific squadron, as follows: "The Mexican ports on the Pacific are said to be open and defenceless. If you ascertain with certainty that Mexico has declared war against the United States, you will at once possess yourself of the port of San Francisco, and blockade or occupy such other ports as your force may permit. Yet ... you will be careful to preserve if possible the most friendly rela- tions with the inhabitants, and .. . will encourage them to adopt a course of neutrality."+ In later commu- nications of August 5 and October 17, 1845, Ban- croft called Sloat's attention anew to the importance of carrying out the previous instructions promptly, substituting in the first the words "in the event of war," and in the second "in the event of actual hostilities," for the phrase "if you ascertain with cer- tainty that Mexico has declared war." The receipt of these documents was acknowledged by Sloat on January 28th and March 17th respectively.

In October of the same year Buchanan, secretary of state, in his instructions to Confidential Agent Larkin, so often cited in previous chapters, implied clearly that California would be occupied in the event of war, stating openly at the same time that Eu- ropean interference would not be permitted. Accord- ingly Larkin was instructed, and orders to Frémont and Gillespie were of like import, to gain the good- will of the authorities and people, that they might quietly and voluntarily submit to the proposed occu-

+ 29th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Ex. Doc. No. 19; Cutts' Conq., appen. These instructions are often referred to in later correspondence. See especially document in Clarke's Speech on Cal. Claims, p. 8-9; Fremont's Cal. Claims, 71.

196

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

pation; or, if there should be no war, as now seemed most likely, that they might be induced to declare their independence and ask for annexation.5 Thus the policy of the United States respecting two distinct methods of acquiring California was clearly though not publicly announced in advance. What may have been the secret intention, in case both plans should prove unsuccessful, we may only conjecture; but as we have seen, though many have believed the con- trary, no steps were taken to promote the acquisition by means of a settlers' revolt or other form of direct filibusterism. Indeed, it was fully believed by the government, as by its agents in California, that the proposed methods of acquisition would prove amply adequate to the purpose.

On May 13, 1846, Bancroft wrote to Sloat: "The state of things alluded to in my letter of June 24, 1845, has occurred. You will therefore now be gov- erned by the instructions therein contained, and carry into effect the orders then communicated with energy and promptitude." Next day Buchanan sent to Lar- kin an official notification that war had begun, and that the Pacific ports would be at once blockaded. On May 15th Bancroft instructed Sloat more defi- nitely, but to the same effect. "You will consider the most important public object to be to take and to hold possession of San Francisco, and this you will do without fail. You will also take possession of Mazatlan and of Monterey, one or both, as your force will permit. If information received here is correct, you can establish friendly relations between your squadron and the inhabitants of each of these three places. .. You will, as opportunity offers, conciliate the confidence of the people in California, and also in Sonora, toward the government of the United States; and you will endeavor to render their relations with the United States as intimate and friendly as possible. It is important that you should hold possession, at least

5 Buchanan's Instructions to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845, MS.

197

CALIFORNIA TO BE TAKEN.

of San Francisco, even while you encourage the people to neutrality, self-government, and friendship." In a similar communication of June 8th occur the follow- ing passages: "It is rumored that the province of California is well disposed to accede to friendly rela- tions. You will if possible endeavor to establish the supremacy of the American flag without any strife with the people of California. If California sepa- rates herself from our enemy, the central Mexican government, and establishes a government of its own under the auspices of the American flag, you will take such measures as will best promote the attach- ment of the people of California to the United States. You will bear in mind generally that this country desires to find in California a friend, and not an enemy; to be connected with it by near ties; to hold possession of it, at least during the war; and to hold that possession, if possible, with the consent of its inhabitants." Still earlier, on June 3d, Secretary of War Marcy ordered General Kearny to press on overland from New Mexico to California; and in his instructions he was directed to establish temporary civil governments in the regions occupied, to continue in office such authorities as are friendly to the United States and will take the oath of allegiance; and to "assure the people of those provinces that it is the wish and design of the United States to provide for them a free government, with the least possible delay, similar to that which exists in our territories. They will be called upon to exercise the rights of freemen in electing their own representatives to the territorial legislature." Later instructions to Shubrick and Stevenson and Stockton were of the same tenor.6

The preceding communications might be cited more fully, and others of similar purport might be men- tioned. Some of them will be noticed in other con-

6 The communications cited are found in Larkin's Doc., MS., iv. 121; U. S. Govt Doc., 29th cong. 2d sess., H. Ex. Doc. 19; 31st cong. Ist_sess., H. Ex. Doc. 17: Cutts' Conq., append .; Stockton's Life, append., etc.

198

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

nections; but the citations given suffice for my present purpose, fully explaining the policy of the United States, before indicated with sufficient clearness in the instructions of 1845. Those of 1846 have no practi- cal importance in connection with naval and military operations on the Pacific coast in that year, because they did not reach their destination until later than July. In spirit, however, and in some instances with remarkable fidelity to detail, they were all obeyed long before they were received. This shows, what is otherwise clear enough, that the policy to be ob- served was well understood in advance-somewhat better, in fact, than could naturally be accounted for by the written orders extant-by officers and agents in the west. Naval commanders had been kept ac- quainted with that policy for several years; and there is no reason to doubt that Gillespie brought to Cali- fornia, and communicated to leading men, exact in- formation about the orders to Sloat. It is to be noted that the orders of 1846 go somewhat further than to prove an intention to maintain a purely military occu- pation during the war; and indicate a purpose to re- tain, by one means or another, permanent possession of California The selection for the regiment of vol- unteers of men deemed likely to remain in the coun- try, like other circumstances that might be mentioned, illustrates the same purpose; and, indeed, as early as January 1847 the secretary of the navy, in a com- munication to Commodore Stockton, "foresees no contingency in which the United States will ever surrender or relinquish possession of the Californias."

Thus we see that the administration at Washington had determined in case of a war with Mexico to oc- cupy California, and as a result of the war to hold that country as a permanent possession. If peace should continue, a scheme had been devised and op- erations actually begun to promote a revolution of the natives, and a subsequent appeal for annexation. In any event, California was to fulfil its 'manifest des-

199

THE PACIFIC SQUADRON.

tiny,' and become a part of the United States. Had both plans failed, it may be plausibly conjectured that a revolt of American settlers would have been en- couraged; but no such failure was anticipated; and so far as can be known, no steps were taken in that di- rection.7

The Pacific squadron of the U. S. navy, under the command of Commodore John D. Sloat, included in the spring of 1846 the following vessels: the ship Sa- vannah, flag-ship, 54 guns; the ship Congress, 60 guns; the sloops Warren, Portsmouth, Cyane, and Le- vant, each 24 guns; the schooner Shark, 12 guns; and the transport Erie. Five of these vessels had visited the California coast during the preceding year, as we have seen. The English squadron in Pacific waters, under Admiral Sir George F. Seymour, was consider- ably stronger in vessels, guns, and men. The two squadrons had been for some time closely watching each other's movements because of possible difficulties

" Most writers on California have something to say on the matter of U. S. policy; but I find it necessary to make but few references. The prevalent opinion, deemed by me an error, that the government did promote the settlers' revolt as a part of the conquest, has been fully noticed elsewhere. Jay, Mex- ican War, 154-7, and Mansfield, Mexican War, 96-7, argue that the war was made for the sole purpose of seizing California, presenting the prompt obedi- ence of orders in advance, as proofs that permanent occupation was intended from the first, and that plans were perfected and orders given long before hostilities began. See also Thompson's speech of Jan. 27, 1848, in Cong. Globe, 1847-8, p. 260; Dwinelle's Address before Pioneers, 1866, p. 9-20; Thompson's Recollections, 232-5. Dwinelle says: 'There are gentlemen of the highest re- spectability residing in Cal. who came here upon the personal assurance of President Polk, in 1846, that the war should not be concluded until Upper Cal. was secured by treaty to the U. S.' Wood, Wandering Sketches, 215, says: 'For many years before Cal. was annexed, the impression seemed to ex- ist in the U. S. Pacific squadron that its most important purpose was to occu- py Cal., and its vigilance was directed to the accomplishment of such a duty. The British squadron seemed to have an equally strong idea that its business was to prevent any such act upon the part of ours, and consequently these squadrons went about watching each other.' In Mexico it was the universal belief that the United States govt was determined to obtain Cal. by filibuster- ing encroachments; and most regarded war as the only means of resisting such encroachment; but a few opposed the war, because they believed it would only hasten the calamity. Hardly a newspaper published in Mexico that did not frequently contain the most bitter articles in opposition to the American policy respecting Cal .; and the subject was continually alluded to in official writings and discourses. Quotations would be bulky, and would serve no good purpose.

200

PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONQUEST.

to arise from the Oregon question, if for no other reason : but more of this hereafter. The movements of Sloat's fleet have no special importance for our present purpose until March, when all the vessels- except the Congress, which with Commodore Stockton on board was at Callao en route from the States, and the Cyane, which had lately sailed for Honolulu-were cruising on the Mexican coast, being practically all together at Mazatlan.

Sloat, with the Washington orders down to Octo- ber 1845 in his possession, was awaiting tidings of war which should enable him to carry out those orders. Lieutenant Gillespie had arrived at Mazatlan over- land in February, and had sailed February 22d on the Cyane, William Mervine commander, for Hono- lulu and Monterey, arriving at the latter port in April;8 but it does not clearly appear that he brought instructions to or had any official relations with Sloat. Late in March the military authorities at Mazatlan received news by express from the interior that war had broken out, and that the Mexican Atlantic ports had been blockaded. This report caused much excite- ment, during which the archives were removed to Rosario, whither the comandante went with his gar- rison, after warning the people in a bando that the Americans were about to blockade the port. Sloat had no news of an eastern blockade, neither had the Eng- lish commanders, whose means of communication were better than those of the Americans, and who had be- fore given the latter despatches not otherwise received; but during the excitement news came from California of Fremont's trouble with Castro, and on April 1st the Portsmouth, Captain John B. Montgomery, was despatched in haste to Monterey, where she arrived

8 Details about the exact movement of most of the vessels are but meagrely recorded. The Honolulu papers, the Polynesian and Friend, afford some in- formation. The Cyane arrived at Honolulu March 13th and sailed 19th 'for Mazatlan;' but as Gillespie says he came via the Sandwich Islands, and as there was no record of, or indeed time for, another trip by that route before April 17th, I suppose she touched at Monterey on the way to Mazatlan, for which place she sailed April 19th.

201

SLOAT AT MAZATLAN.

on April 22d, remaining there, and later at San Fran- cisco.9 The alarming or reassuring news was not confirmed by later despatches from Mexico. The lo- cal excitement passed away, and the naval officers re- sumed their watchful waiting for warlike rumors. Meanwhile the Shark, Lieutenant Neil M. Howison, had been sent on April 2d to await the Congress at Honolulu; and about the end of the month the Cyane returned from Monterey with news that the Castro- Fremont war-cloud in California had passed away.

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History of California, Volume XXII, Part 21

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe Publication date: 1885-1890 Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers Number of Pages: 816

Author: Bancroft, Hubert Howe
Publication date: 1885-1890
Publisher: San Francisco, Calif. : The History Company, publishers
Number of Pages: 816