USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 11
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33
It is true that the treaty reads "in the same extent that it had when France possessed it." These words are fol- lowed by others creating a limitation upon them "such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into
143
West Florida
between Spain and other states." Let us observe the effect of this clause upon the former .. "Subsequently" must re- late to any foreign state except France. Since France as a monarchy held Louisiana, Spain had made at least two treaties, the one of cession to England in 1762-63, and the other of arrangement with the United States in 1795. By the first treaty the boundaries of Louisiana and the two Floridas were formed and by the second they were ac- knowledged - the Mississippi being the eastern limit of the one and the western limit of the other. The province of Louisiana to the west of the Mississippi had not been the subject of any treaty by Spain. There seems to exist an opposite design of each of the clauses. The first evi- dently meant that Napoleon was to receive Louisiana (that is to the west of the Mississippi) as France held it during the monarchy without regard to any alterations of its shape produced by any colonial or governmental regulations on the part of Spain.
The second clause was designed to secure to Spain the boundaries which it had both given to and received back from England as the western boundary of the Floridas. It was further designed to establish those concessions which had been made to the United States by the treaty of 1795. This interpretation of the two clauses seems to be the only one possible to secure even a measure of consistency. 1
At the end of the French war or contest for colonial possession, French power was gone. By the treaty of peace France gave to England Nova Scotia, Acadia, Cape Breton, Canada, all the islands and all the coasts of the Gulf and River St. Lawrence, and divided her possessions in what is now the United States into two grand divisions : the line of partition was the Mississippi River to the Iber- ville, thence through the Iberville to Lake Maurepas and
1. Remarks on a Dangerous Mistake made as to the Eastern Boundary . of Louisiana, by Benjamin Vaughan, published 1814.
144
The Purchase of Florida
along the north shore of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchar- train to the Gulf of Mexico. All to the east she ceded to England, all to the west to Spain. England divided this cession which she had received: from the junction of the Yazoo and Mississippi rivers she drew a line due east along a parallel to the Appalachicola and down that river to the Gulf of Mexico and named that country West Florida. To what we know as the state of Florida, east of the Appalachi- cola, she gave the name of East Florida. For twenty years these boundaries remained untouched: in 1783 Great Brit- ain made the northern boundary of West Florida the paral- lel of 31° from the Mississippi to the Appalachicola and gave the Floridas to Spain.
In all truth Spain received East and West Florida from England, not from France. By the treaty of San Ilde- fonso Spain agreed to return to France what she had re- ceived from that country in 1762 and not what England had given her in 1783.
But Jefferson and Madison read otherwise: they said that in 1800 West Florida belonged to Spain: West Flor- ida was at one time a part of Louisiana: in 1800 Spain receded Louisiana to France: therefore she receded West Florida. That France had once owned West Florida, that Frenchmen had built Mobile and Biloxi, that French author- ity had once been recognized on the Perdido, sufficed for Jefferson and Madison - West Florida they were deter- mined to have. If we apply to this treaty the rules which we apply to a real estate transaction of lesser magnitude in private life, the inconsistent, untenable claims of our gov- ernment become apparent.
It is safe to say that had England or France or some equally virile power, capable of resisting and avenging all encroachments, been in possession of Florida, our course in this dispute would have been far less aggressive. But Spain, poverty stricken and oppressed at home, incapable
145
W est Florida
of resisting pressure abroad - of her we had no fear, and having no fear we proceeded as our interests rather than our conscience dictated. And should Spain resist, should war follow, would it not be even more welcome than peace- able submission or ineffectual protest, for thereby we would acquire East Florida as well, and perchance more?
10
CHAPTER V.
WEST FLORIDA AND LATER NEGOTIATIONS.
O N EVERY side the officials of the United States were urged to present a bold front and insist upon our al- leged rights to West Florida. "I think there can be no doubt of your right to go to the Mobile," writes Livingston, though admitting that the country between that and the Perdido had always been unsettled between France and Spain. 1 At any rate he advised Madison to take advantage of the ambiguity in the treaty by seizing West Florida as far as the Perdido. "The time is particularly favorable to enable you to do it without the slightest risk at home," said he. "With this in your hand East Florida will be of little moment and will be yours whenever you please. At all events proclaim your right and take possession."
In fact the dispute as to the eastern boundary of Louis- iana was but a small portion of the difficulty. All of the boundaries of that province were uncertain. The southern boundary was the gulf, but whether it went to the Sabine or the Rio Bravo was not known. The mountains, where- ever they were, constituted the western limit and the Eng- lish possessions equally uncertain were understood to bound it on the north.
Monroe's advice was as belligerent as that of Living- ston. "Take possession of both of the Floridas and the whole country west of the Mississippi to the Rio Bravo
1. R. R. Livingston to Secretary of State (Madison), May 3, 1804.
·
1.4
147
West Florida
unless it be thought better to rest at the Colorado: though we think the broader the ground the better. In this view all Spanish posts should be broken up within those limits. On that ground we might negotiate. The refusal to pay for the suppression of the deposit and for Spanish spolia- tions would justify taking possession of East Florida. The refusal to compromise the affair of the western limits, of French spoliations, and of West Florida gives a fair right at least to take what belongs to us."1 This sounds bel- licose, especially from the mild and diplomatic Monroe. But he was firmly convinced that France was supporting Spain in some ulterior scheme and that our course must be a bold one: decisive action alone would preserve any hope of securing Spanish spoliations due to the French cruisers, the suppression of the deposit, and our claim to West Florida.
In 1804 Monroe proceeded to Madrid to press negotia- tions with the Spanish ministry for the sale of Florida, the settlement of spoliation claims, and determination of boun- daries. He was instructed not to consent to the perpetual . relinquishment of any territory whatever eastward of the Rio Bravo. The zone idea was suggested as a favorable method of preventing encroachments by either Spanish or American settlers. As the United States secured further in- formation concerning Louisiana she became more averse to the occlusion for any long period of a "very wide space of territory" westward of the Mississippi. If the Rio Bravo could be made the limit of the Spanish settlements and the river Colorado the limit to which those of the United States might be extended: and a line northwest or west from the source of whatever river might be taken for the limit of our settlements to the junction of the Osage with the Mis- souri, and thence northward parallel with the Mississippi, with an interval to be unsettled for a term of years - such
1. Vol. VII, Monroe to Madison, May 25, 1805.
148 The Purchase of Florida
was our aim.1 The question of a European war it was understood would determine the advisability of pressing these matters. The perpetual relinquishment of the terri- tory between the Rio Bravo and Colorado was not to be made: no money was to be paid in consideration of the acknowledgment by Spain of our title to the territory be- tween the Iberville and the Perdido. If neither the whole nor part of East Florida could be obtained it was deemed important that the United States should own the territory so far as the Appalachicola and have common if not ex- clusive right to navigate that stream. Great care was to be exercised that the relinquishment by Spain of the terri- tory westward of the Perdido be so expressed as to give to the American title the date of the treaty of San Ilde- fonso.
In the summer of 1804 the report of a clash between Spain and the United States in the territory in dispute had reached Europe and, being published in the English ga- zettes, was given general credence. "Be assured the only · way to deal with this government is to be firm and show them you are determined to support your rights and they will give way immediately," writes Pinckney from Madrid, who a short time later was given leave to return home after Monroe had been designated to take his place. 2
In the meantime France had arrayed herself on the side of Spain in such manner that that nation was neither permitted nor disposed to grant our claims either with respect to West Florida or the French spoliations. The alternative to a successful issue of the negotiations was de- clared by Madison to be war, or a state of things guarding against war for the present and leaving our claims to be hereafter effectuated.
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 244, to James Monroe and Charles Pinckney, July 8, 1804.
2. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Madison, Oct. 8, 1804.
.
149
West Florida
"It may be fairly presumed," wrote Madison, "consid- ering the daily increase of our faculties for a successful assertion of our rights by force that neither the nation nor its representatives would prefer an instant resort to arms, to a state of things which would avoid it without hazarding our rights or our reputation. The two articles essential in such a state of things are, first a forebearance on the part of Spain as well as of the United States to aug- ment their settlements or strengthen in any manner their military establishments within the controverted limits, sec- ondly not to obstruct the free communication from our territories through the Mobile and other rivers mouthing in the Gulf of Mexico, or through the Mobile at least.
"I forbear to repeat the grounds on which the right of the United States to the use of those rivers is to be placed. They are already in the archives at Madrid; more effect, however, is to be expected from the necessity which a refusal of the navigation will impose on the United States to enforce their claim than from any appeal to the princi- ples which support it; and this necessity must be permitted to impress itself fully on the Spanish councils." 1
In the meantime Pinckney and Monroe had made their final propositions for a treaty to M. Cevallos. If his Cath- olic Majesty would cede the territory eastward of the Mis- sissippi and arbitrate the claims of the citizens and sub- jects of each power according to the convention of 1802, as yet unratified by Spain, the United States agreed to make the Colorado River the boundary between Louisiana and Spain, ceding all right to any territory westward of that line. Further they offered to establish a district of terri- tories, of thirty leagues on each side of that line, or on the American side only, from the Gulf of Mexico to the north- ern boundary of Louisiana, to remain forever neutral and unsettled, and to relinquish the claim to spoliations which were committed by the French within the jurisdiction of Spain in the course of the last war - the United States to compensate the parties in a sum to be specified, and to re-
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 295, Madison to Monroe, May 23, 1805. .
1.50
The Purchase of Florida
linquish all claim for injuries growing out of the suppres- sion of the deposit at New Orleans. 1
The special mission ended the latter part of May, 1805, by the total rejection in the highest tone by Spain of every proposition made. She refused to pay a shilling or even to arbitrate the French spoliations: she refused to yield a single foot of West Florida : she insisted on a line between the Adaes and Natchitoches to cut the Red River as the western limit of Louisiana: and she refused to ratify the convention of 1802. 2
We are inclined to wonder at and at the same time to applaud the firm stand taken by Spain at this time. Attacked by ravishing famine and devastating pestilence, drained of every farthing by her French ally and master, and buffeted about by France and England, an object of pitiable contempt to all Europe, her position was doubly grievous. Yet it was France rather than Spain that re- ' fused us, for French councils were predominant at the court of Madrid. Spain, naturally haughty and slow in her movements, was extremely jealous and fearful of the United States. She accused this country of all manner of ulter- ior designs to which, since the days of the Miranda plot, we had given little thought. She suspected that we looked with wistful eye to her rich but feeble dominions in our neighborhood, and this suspicion it had been the policy of other nations to excite and encourage. Pinckney was con- vinced that with the commencement of war our affairs at Madrid would take a more favorable turn : once persuaded that war was inevitable she would sell Florida to us rather than see it falling - as it must - without opposition into the hands of England. "Spain is saving Florida as a means
1. Vol. VII, Letters of Ministers to Secretary of State, p. 231. Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, May 12, 1805.
·
2. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Madison, May 28, 1805.
151
W est Florida
of settling our claims and riveting our affection and friend- ship." 1
Jefferson and Madison, in their instructions to Liv- ingston, seem to have lost sight entirely of the true char- acter of the French government at that time. To talk of France being bound to us "no less by sound policy than by a regard to right" is but childish prattle and inane stupidity when we stop to consider for a moment the man then at the head of the French government. Does any one suppose that Napoleon stands out in history as the expon- ent of "sound policy" or "regard for right?" Well might Madison write these dawdling sentiments, but of what weight were they? He might dilate upon the necessity of France preserving our friendship, but what of it? For France it was Spain or the United States, and there could be no American friendship as long as there were grounds for dispute between Spain and this country.
It amounted to nothing if Madison did insist that a transfer from Spain to the United States of the territory claimed by us, or rather of the whole of both Floridas, was nothing more than a completion of the policy which led France to cede Louisiana. Two conditions alone could have induced Napoleon to favor such a transfer ; the first to prevent the province from falling into the hands of her inveterate enemy England, the second that of financial considerations - the same causes which had induced the sale of Louisiana: We are forced to believe that Napoleon sought to convert the negotiations with Spain at this time into a pecuniary job for France and her agents. Cash was desired as a consideration for a transfer - not such intangible arrangements as a release of spoliation claims or of trading one country for another.
In a letter to Breckenridge, under date of August 12, 1803, Jefferson wrote: "Objections are raising to the east-
1. Pinckney to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804.
152
The Purchase of Florida
ward against the vast extent of our boundaries and proposi- tions are made to exchange Louisiana or a part of it for the Floridas. But as I have said we shall get the Floridas without and I would not give one inch of waters of the Mississippi to any nation, because I see in a light very im- portant to our peace the exclusive right to its navigation and the admission of no nation into it." 1
Jefferson's decision was strongly upheld by his advisors and counsellors. "The United States," writes James Bow- doin from Paris, "should pursue that line of conduct which best comports with their present interest, regardless of the views or feelings of this or the Spanish government. I take it they are neither in a situation to bring their force to bear nor in a condition to go to war with the United States, and that our commerce is absolutely necessary to both, from which I infer that if they should be pressed to the alternative of an open rupture or to yield the points in controversy they will be obliged to give way. .... The United States can have nothing to fear from these gov- ernments, especially the Spanish, by a decisive line of con- duct." 2
General Armstrong and Monroe, after conferring on the situation, likewise advised a measure of decision and tone as necessary, as well to our safety as to our honor, adding however, a word of caution lest we compromise our- selves with France, for by her treaties that country was bound to assist Spain in any and all wars. They wrote:
"It has occurred to us that the following might prob- ably have effect: to take possession of the whole country westward of the Mississippi to the Rio Bravo, removing the Spanish posts that are on this side of it. To say noth- ing at present about the eastern side, the law remaining of course in force : to have a force at command in Tennessee and Georgia ready to take the Floridas at pleasure, being
1. Jefferson's Works, Vol. IV, p. 499.
2. Vol. IX, James Bowdoin to Madison, Dec. 2, 1805.
153
West Florida
resolved not to permit the force of Spain or France to be increased there : that a power should be given to the pres- ident to suspend all intercourse with the Spanish colonies to be exercised at his discretion and indeed an adequate power over the whole subject. .... The above is the mildest course which it would in my judgment be proper to take, and in taking it, it ought to be understood that if the terms we demanded were not peremptorily accepted it was only a commencement of a system of others more decisive and important. .... If we are firm I have great confidence in our success and almost on our own terms, much better than those limited above. Be firm also in sustaining our claims to the Rio Bravo. A contrary doctrine should not be listened to."
Monroe also earnestly recommended the immediate sus- pension of D'Yrujo for its moral effect on Spain, that luckless minister having been guilty of some further indis- cretions which had aroused the executive animosity. 1 Pinckney advocated stirring up public feeling in the United States in favor of annexing Florida so as to make the more impression on Spain and induce her to arrange a transfer. 2
Let us take up the negotiations more in particular and watch their progress.
Demand was made on Spain for indemnity after the close of the first Napoleonic war. Numbers of American vessels had been condemned by French consuls resident in Spain. French privateers had been fitted out in Spanish ports to capture American vessels. Under pretense of a blockade of Gibraltar, Spanish subjects had seized every American vessel that had come for a convoy through the Mediterranean. Spain was ready to make redress for the depredations of her own subjects but she absolutely de- clined to consider the question of paying for the French misdemeanors. Finally the American minister, unable to secure better terms, gave way and the convention was
1. Vol. VII, p. 269, Monroe to Madison, June 30, 1805.
2. Pinckney to Madison, Aug. 24, 1805.
I54
The Purchase of Florida
framed., This provided for the spoliations by the Spanish subjects but left the question of French spoliations for future settlement. The senate refused to ratify the con- vention thus drawn up and the American minister was directed to press negotiations at Madrid for a broader treaty. Again Spain refused to consider the American demand. Meanwhile D'Yrujo, noting the attitude of the senate upon the subject, submitted the questions in dispute to five eminent lawyers of this country for their decision. Jared Ingersoll and William Rawle, leaders of the Phila- delphia bar, Stephen du Ponceau, Edward Livingston, and Joseph B. McKean, governor of Pennsylvania and brother- in-law of D'Yrujo, constituted the notable tribunal to which was referred the justice of the demand of the United States.
Concealing the names of the powers, D'Yrujo stated the case :
"The power A (Spain) lives in perfect harmony and friendship with power B (United States). The power C (France) either with reason or without reason commits hostilities against the subjects of the power B, takes some of their vessels, carries them into the ports of A, friend to both, where they are condemned and sold by the official agents of power C without power A's being able to prevent it. At last a treaty is entered into by which the powers B and C adjust their differences and in this treaty the power B renounces and abandons to power C the right to any claim for the injuries and losses occasioned to its subjects by the hostilities from power C."
Having thus stated the case, D'Yrujo asked :
"Has the power B any right to call upon the power A for indemnities for the losses occasioned in its ports and coasts to its subjects by those of the power C after the power B has abandoned or relinquished by its treaty with C its right for the damages which could be claimed for the injuries sustained from the hostile conduct of the power C?"
:
West Florida
155
Each of these five lawyers replied in an unqualified negative: To the Spanish arguments the United States replied :
"The only supposition on which Spain could turn us over to France would be that of her being in a state of absolute duress, of her being merely the staff by which the blow was given by France. But even on this supposi- tion the injuries done by France through Spain could not by any interpretation be confounded with the injuries re- leased to France by which could be meant such injuries only as proceeded from her own immediate responsibility and as were in the ordinary course of things chargeable on her.
:
"The last plea under which refuge has been sought by Spain against the justice of our claims is the opinion of four or five American lawyers given on a case stated, with- out doubt, by some one of her own agents : an argument of this sort does not call for refutation: but for regret that the Spanish government did not see how little such an ap- peal from the ordinary and dignified discussions of the two governments by their regular functionaries, to the author- ity of private opinions and of private opinions so obtained, was consistent with the respect it owed to itself or with that which it owed to the government of the United States : that it did not even reflect on the reply so obvious that four or five private opinions, however respectable as such, could have no weight against the probability that others had been consulted whose opinions were not the same and that if the government here could descend to the experi- ment, little difficulty could be found in selecting more num- erous authorities of the same kind not only in the United States but among the jurists of Spain." 1
When the convention and the letters showing the course of D'Yrujo were laid before the senate in Decem- ber, 1803, that body was indignant and less than ever disposed to ratify the instrument. The question of the Floridas was now urgent and to render possible new nego- tiations with Spain the treaty was at length approved,
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 199, Madison to Pinckney, Feb. 6, 1804.
·
156
The Purchase of Florida
though not without many eloquent expressions of disap- proval and indignation. 1
Duly signed and ratified it was shortly dispatched to Charles Pinckney at Madrid. He at once carried it to Don Pedro Cevallos, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, expecting its prompt approval as a matter of course. True to his Spanish training, Cevallos hesitated and delayed. Meanwhile a copy of the Mobile act had come to hand. Cevallos at once declared it a violation of Span- ish sovereignty, demanded an explanation from Pinckney and consumed a month in a profitless interchange of notes. ? At length he agreed to name definitely the conditions on which Spain would consent to ratify the convention. Time must be given to the subjects of Spain having claims against the United States, to prepare and submit them: the sixth article in reference to damages inflicted by French cruisers upon American shipping must be eliminated, the act set- ting up the custom district in West Florida must be re- pealed. 3
Pinckney, losing all sense of diplomacy and policy, in a delirium of rage wrote a threatening and insolent letter to Cevallos seeking enlightenment on "just one question." If the sixth article were not suppressed would Spain refuse to ratify the convention? An early reply was demanded as he proposed immediately to send messengers to all the American consuls in Spain and to the commander of the American squadron in the Mediterranean, to inform them of the critical posture, to bid them warn all ships and be prepared to quit Spain at a minute's warning. 4 Cevallos, though doubtless impressed by our minister's attitude, coolly replied that he did not believe Pinckney's instructions war-
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.