USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 13
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In the meantime alarming reports of the movements of Spanish forces to our southwest had reached Washington. Castilian troops had taken post at Lanans between Nacogdoches, their former most advanced post, and Nat- chitoches, our frontier post. Large reinforcements were said to be moving toward our forts in that quarter. Parties of dragoons were reconnoitering the disputed coun- try and troops had been ordered from the Havana for Pensacola and Mobile. Whatever might be the motives, such activity, it was felt, could not be favorable to the tranquillity of the two nations. Even though Spain insisted that they were merely precautionary steps against the pos-
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 357, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- doin, May 26, 1806.
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sibility of an attack by England, Madison declared that the cordial relations existing between this country and Great Britain were a sufficient guarantee that no hostile intrusions would be attempted, seeking to show some ulterior and hostile purpose on the part of the Spanish authorities. 1 Moreover the conduct of the Spanish in obstructing the Mobile was kindling a flame which must soon acquire pro- portions not to be easily resisted. The United States may soon "have no other choice than between a foreign and an internal conflict."
The conspiracy of Aaron Burr was at this time fore- most in the public mind and served to call attention to our Spanish connections. What his famous plot really was cannot be definitely known. In the later years of his life he declared that he had planned to do what Houston and others later did in Texas. Andrew Jackson, notoriously hostile to Spain, being approached, gave the plan his ap- proval, persuaded that some design against Spanish prov- ince's was being contemplated. Otherwise we know, from his intense patriotism, that he would never have gone so far with Burr as to call out his Tennessee militia for the in- vasion of Texas and Mexico. With three hundred Tennessee militiamen Jackson declared he would "cut his way through those d -- d greasers to the heart of Mexico." The confer- ences at Blennerhasett's Island, the purchase by Burr of the large Spanish grant, point in the same direction. D'Yru- jo, it was confidently believed, plotted with Burr with the idea that a dismemberment of the Union was the object. The silence and manner of Turreau convinced Madison be- yond doubt that he did not regard Mexico as the object. Merry, the English minister, was in the secret of the plot against the Spanish possessions and relished it, though without committing his government. These overtures to
1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Letters, p. 479, Madison to Governor Clai- borne, Feb. 25, 1805.
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Spain and France disclose a plan to sever the Union. It may be safely concluded that Burr would have stopped at nothing in an effort to retrieve his shattered fortunes and that he would adopt such a plot as augured most for suc- cess. 1
There was much secret meeting and planning, much approaching of various western officials, much sending of cipher dispatches, purchasing of supplies and boats, and much sailing and counter-sailing on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. And indeed for Burr's success there was too much talk and too little action, too much time spent in vain social frivolities when the cry should have been, "up and doing." Had Burr concentrated his time and his talents upon the Spanish plot and shown the ability to act quickly and decisively, history would tell a different story of the southwest. Burr's scheme was popular in that section, and familiar withal, ever since the early days of our national existence. Genet had proposed that George Rogers Clarke should call for volunteers and march upon New Orleans and the volunteers had not been slow to offer their services, nay to demand that they be accepted. And there had been other plots of a similar nature concocted in dark by-ways and conjured up in secret meetings but which had never seen the light of day. To crystallize that sentiment, organize an expedition quietly yet rapidly, and strike suddenly, before the enemy could be informed, was to spell success.
Unfortunately for himself. Burr became connected with General James Wilkinson, the commanding officer in that region, a man of whom historians even in the charity of patriotism are able to say little good. The revealed secrets of Spanish archives leave no doubt that in 1787-89, Wilkin- son had contracted to devote his influence and his life to
1. Burr insisted that his plan against Mexico was feasible only in case of war between Spain and the United States. After Trafalgar, in 1805, Spain was helpless and war with the United States impossible. Pitt was a necessary factor in Burr's anti-Spanish plots, and with his death in 1806 they were harmless.
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the end that Kentucky should be delivered to Spain. In the critical days of the Union a Castilian agent, receiving pay for his iniquity, later working against Spain, setting up brazen claims, and stooping to all manner of contemptible treachery, this is the man who later wore the epaulettes of commanding general of the American army, when justice, · with the bandage torn from her eyes, should have seen him standing before the execution squad, a condemned traitor, the companion of Benedict Arnold in the popular execration of later generations. A general of the army, an agent in Spanish pay, yet listening eagerly withal to the plots of Burr - and prepared to renounce both Spain and the United States, if Burr's schemes promised him more of personal glory or pecuniary gain. Guilty of treason, cow- ardly, treacherous, and corrupt, this was the man who might reveal the conspiracy and who did reveal it.
Andrew Jackson, from certain well defined rumors, was convinced of Wilkinson's traitorous conduct towards this government and wrote Governor Claiborne a letter of warn- ing.
"Put your town in a state of defense. Organize your militia and defend your city as well against internal enemies as external. My knowledge does not extend so far as to authorize me to go into detail but I fear you will meet with an attack from quarters you do not at present expect. Be upon the alert; keep a watchful eye upon our General (Wilkinson) and beware of an attack as well from our ownl country as Spain. .... You have enemies within your own city that may try to subvert your government and try to separate it from the Union. You know I never haz- ard ideas without good grounds and you will keep these hints to yourself. But I say again be on the alert ; your government I fear is in danger. I fear there are plans on foot inimical to the Union. Whether they will be at- tempted to be carried into effect or not I cannot say ; but rest assured they are in operation, or I calculate boldly. Beware of the month of December. I love my country
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and government. I hate the Dons; I would delight to see Mexico reduced, but I will die in the last ditch before I would yield a foot to the Dons or see the Union disunited. This I write for your own eyes and for your own safety ; profit by it and the Ides of March remember." 1
Wilkinson having betrayed his chief, the lesser asso- ciates adopted the discreet if cowardly course of seeking shelter. And Burr, if it ever was his intention to attack the United States, was now helpless, and, a disguised fugitive, hoping only to reach the gulf. Detected and captured in Alabama he was returned to Richmond to become the prin- cipal in one of the most bitter and partisan trials the coun- try has ever known. With one accord the Federalists, the chief fomenters of the proposed Miranda expedition, yet, such the anomaly of events, forgetful of their great Hamil- ton, rushed to his defense, and sought, through this means, to convict Jefferson of all manner of crimes and misde- meanors.
The affair took on the appearance of a worthy wel- come to a returning hero rather than the trial of a man who had been, a few short weeks before, a hunted fugitive in the wilds of the South. A suite of rooms was especially prepared for his confinement and his jailers became rather his servants. Magnificent levees were held where the lead- ing citizens paid court to dominant high treason. Judge and prisoner sat down together at a brilliant banquet. Choice fruits, beautiful flowers, daintily scented notes, the fair ladies showered upon this notorious seducer of their sex. And can even Marshall's most ardent admirer claim that the decisions of that eminent jurist were wholly un- tainted by party prejudice and political passion ? It must ever remain a problem to future generations, the manner in which leading Federalists rallied to the rescue of the murderer whose hands were yet wet with the blood of their
1. Parton's Jackson, Vol. I, p. 319. Jackson to Governor Clai- borne, Nov. 12, 1806.
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distinguished and adored Hamilton. Yet a great tribute they paid to the power of hatred, for their abhorrence of Jef- ferson rather than their love of Burr was the salvation of the brilliant but dissolute arch-conspirator.
But a short time before Burr's conspiracy came to a head, apparently wholly disconnected with it, Nathaniel Kemper with a body of volunteers invaded the Spanish ter- ritory to the south, arrested several alcaldes, published a proclamation calculated to excite the Spanish against their king, and endeavored to obtain possession of Baton Rouge by a coup de main; being driven back this knight errant had taken refuge in the territories of the United States. 1 In answer to our protest against the erection of a military road from Pensacola to Baton Rouge, on the ground that the United States claimed West Florida, the Spanish min- ister justified this course in part on the ground of the Kemper affair and similar incursions which had repeatedly been made into that province. The United States also found grounds for protesting to the Spanish officials, that the records and documents of Spain relating to grants of land in Louisiana had not been delivered but had been sent to Pensacola. Governor Claiborne was directed to take such legal measures as might be necessary to secure pos- session of them. Further reason for complaint was found in the Spanish settlements which were being established in the disputed territory to the southwest. Rumors reached Washington in the spring of 1807 of strenuous efforts on the part of the Marquis of Carondolet to alienate the peo- ple of Kentucky from their connection with the United States. These accusations, however, failed of substantia- tion.
In 1806 General Miranda, of uncertain fame, whom the reader will recall in connection with the plots of 1798,
1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Letters, p. 405. Madison to Governor Clai- borne, Nov. 10, 1804.
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appears again on the Spanish-American stage. Reaching this country in the winter of 1805-06 he sought some en- couragement and assistance in instituting a revolution in South America. He evidently had in mind the probability of a rupture between the United States and Spain. But receiving scant notice from the officials of this government, he organized and recruited a company of militia, purchased cannon and other stores, loaded them on a chartered ship, and, eluding the now watchful officers, set boldly to sea. Having fitted out as on a commercial trip to San Domingo, the true character of this venture was not known. Touch- ing first at a French port, Miranda headed for the Spanish possessions and military fame. This, together with the Burr expedition, served naturally to irritate Spain who com- municated to this country her determination to demand damages. Jefferson proposed to offset the complaints of Spain with their intrigues for the detachment of the Mis- sissippi region from the United States and suggested the balancing of this account and the unsettled claims of the convention of 1802 by taking Florida. "I had rather have war against Spain than not if we go to war with England," said the president. In 1808 he favored taking "our own limits of Louisiana and the residue of the Floridas as re- prisals for spoliations." European complications however exerted a chastening influence upon him and decided him to still keep peace and hold the favor of the United States wavering between France and England.
In the spring of 1806, France was undoubtedly anxious to secure a settlement of the Spanish-American difficulties and arrange a sale of the Floridas. Spain was in most desperate financial straits. Bowdoin was approached un- officially by French officers desiring to arrange a cession of those territories to the United States for six million dol- lars. Their intimations induced him to believe they might even be secured for four million. Spain owed subsidies to
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Napoleon and this amount must soon find its way to Paris. But she stubbornly refused to contribute more to the French war chest. Further, the United States wished to secure the Floridas either by way of satisfaction for spoliation claims or by exchange rather than by purchase. Thus the effort of Napoleon to continue negotiations at Paris came to naught.
The Spanish government was loath to enter into any sort of a treaty or convention. To postpone a treaty and yet avoid a war, making a treaty only as a last recourse was the aim of Spanish diplomacy. As Erving, our chargé at Madrid, wrote Bowdoin, they felt "that they must sac- rifice something by an arrangement, and they trust without it they will sacrifice nothing."1 It is evident that in the fall of 1806 Napoleon had lost all interest in any settle- ment. In fact, he did not really care to arrange the dis- pute, for, after Jena, Spain lay prostrate at his feet, in short, was his own. Further, from D'Yrujo's reports, Spain was confident that she need have no fear of war with the United States owing to the diversity of interests in this country. The northern states would never consent to a war for anything which concerned southern territory, it was believed. That this impression had great weight in Spain cannot be doubted. And this, with the mercurial var- iations of her position in Europe, changed her manner to- ward this country. She became more conciliatory to the United States as her fortunes in Europe were less favor- able, more firm as they brightened. Bowdoin, appreciating the failure of our representations at Paris, advocated more decisive measures and suggested seizing the Floridas. Like Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney, he felt that we must present a decided front, else give up forever our claims to West Florida and Spanish spoliations. The publication of a Spanish paper at New Orleans which might have a
1. Erving to Bowdoin; Sept. 12, 1806.
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circulation in the Floridas had suggested itself as a scheme likely to arouse in those territories a desire to become a part of this nation.
In the year 1807, the depredations committed by the English fleet off the Virginia capes and the prospect of immediate war with that country determined the president not in any way to apply "the public funds to objects not immediately connected with the public safety." Accord- ingly Armstrong and Bowdoin were instructed to suspend the negotiations for the purchase of the Floridas "unless it shall be agreed by Spain that payment for them shall, in case of a rupture between Great Britain and the United States, be postponed till the end of one year after they shall have settled their differences ; and that in the meantime no interest shall be paid on the debt." These terms it was felt would be agreeable to her by reason of the advantages which Spain and her allies would derive from such a contest. In- deed such considerations it was felt ought to lessen the price we should pay for the Floridas. For, in the event of war, our pecuniary faculties would be materially benumbed while those of Spain would be essentially aided by giving that country once again the command of her South American treasury through the United States. Further, such a war might remove the objections hitherto felt by Great Brit- ain to enterprises against the Floridas and even lead to a military occupation of them with views decidedly adverse to the policy of Spain. 1
In 1807 information was received in Washington that the people of West Florida meditated an attempt to liber- ate themselves from the Spanish government. With this in view they intended, if the manner of this government did not promise taking them by the hand, to address them- selves to England. Confident of their ability to overpower
1. Vol. VI. Instructions, p. 430, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- doin, July 15, 1807.
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the Spanish garrisons, the external aid they sought related solely to subsequent support against whatever force Spain might employ to regain possession. This development was one which must interest both Spain and the United States. Great Britain had not hitherto deemed it politic to direct any of her forces to the easy conquest of the Floridas, fear- ing thereby to add the United States to the number of her enemies. The present crisis with Great Britain might alter the course on the part of England and thus compel this country, either promptly to occupy the territory in ques- tion, or see it pass into the hands of a conqueror from whom it might not be easily secured in the future. Gen- eral Armstrong was directed to make suitable representa- tions on this subject with a view either to stimulating Spain to -an immediate concurrence in the plan of adjustment proposed by the United States, or to prepare her and her ally for any sudden measures which the approach of war with Great Britain might prescribe to this government. 1
Napoleon at this juncture made overtures for an ac- cession of the United States to the war against England, as an inducement to which his interposition would be employed with Spain to obtain for us the Floridas. Many his- torians consider this the time when we should have fought our war which came four years later. Here we would have secured a virile and powerful ally, who was nearly able to humble the haughty Briton and thus we might have derived much benefit from the startling victories of Napo- leon. Unfortunately we were doomed to wait until France lay exhausted and defeated on the field of battle, when England might turn her whole force and divert her battle- scarred veterans to our shores and there bring confusion and panic upon our untrained militia. Let it suffice to say that no man knows the future, and to Jefferson the
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 436, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- doin, Aug. 2, 1807.
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muse of history had not confided the virgin pages yet un- written. To Napoleon's advances Madison replied that "the United States having chosen as the basis of their policy a fair and sincere neutrality among the contending powers, they are disposed to adhere to it as long as their essential interests will permit, and are more especially dis- inclined to become a party to the complicated and general warfare which agitates another quarter of the globe, for the purpose of obtaining a separate and particular object however interesting to them." 1
It was now out of the question to think of negotia- tions between the United States and Spain. Harassed by Napoleon, drained of men and money, Godoy, the dissolute Prince of Peace, fallen, her king had abdicated and his son had been crowned amidst the joyful demonstrations of his insanely patriotic subjects. The French armies were in Madrid and shortly the imprisoned Charles and Ferdinand had both surrendered their rights at the dictation of Na- poleon. In May, 1808, at first dazed with this kaleidoscopic change of sovereigns, the people in every part of the Span- ish kingdom were in arms, and anarchy seemed complete in that wretched country. Governed by Joseph Bonaparte as king and a miserable though native junta, who claimed in their peripatetic movements to be the true rulers, all questions of diplomacy were forced to give way to the sterner considerations of war and pillage.
In the United States the accredited chargé continued to conduct the ordinary diplomatic intercourse. Foronda found cause for complaint in various irregularities in the south and southwest. Negroes and Indians were attack- ing Florida and shutting off provisions from the province. The commandant of American gunboats captured Spanish vessels within the jurisdiction of East Florida. This gov- ernment under its Embargo Act, forbidding exportation by
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 458, Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808.
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land as well as sea, had shut off supplies from Florida and was causing untold hardship and suffering. The Georg- ians were raiding Florida, stealing slaves and personal prop- erty. The Spanish territory was being violated by men in the naval and military service of the United States. They were encouraging an uprising at Mobile; Spanish vessels were being shut out of the Mississippi in violation of treaty rights. Certain citizens of New Orleans were plotting revolutionary movements in Mexico and Vera Cruz and setting on foot filibustering expeditions. Such was the bur- den of Foronda's letters to the secretary of state in the years of 1808 and 1809. That many of his complaints were ill-founded is probably true, but that there were constant incursions into Spanish territory, and constant violations of Spanish sovereignty and that our southern ports, particu- larly New Orleans, were being made the headquarters of revolutionary plotters and filibusters seems equally cer- tain. -
In the fall of 1808 the report gained credence in Spain that Napoleon intended to sell the Floridas to the United States. This caused the utmost concern and consterna- tion in Madrid and the Spanish junta protested vigorously to Mr. Erving against such an act. It was rumored that negotiations with this in view had already been opened by the French minister at Washington. There seems to have been no foundation for this canard and Erving promptly disclaimed all knowledge of it.
During the struggle then being waged for the posses- sion of the Spanish throne, the United States insisted on observing absolute neutrality, refusing to recognize either claimant until the question should be definitely settled. In 1810 Ferdinand VII having gained at least a temporary success, was nominally at the head of the Spanish govern- ment and as such appointed De Onis minister at Wash- ington to succeed D'Yrujo. The United States, true to its
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declaration, refused to recognize Ferdinand or receive De Onis.
As one reads the history of bleeding Spain during these years of national misfortune he must needs nominate it a "hapless, miserable country." And yet he cannot fail to admire those peasants, priest-ridden and ignorant though they were, who rose as one man to fight for their legitimate sovereign and drive out the hated despot - the people who taught other nations that even Napoleon was vulnerable, and inspired them to rise against the curse of Europe. For in Spain it was that Napoleon received the first reverses which culminated six years later in an overwhelming Water- loo. The Spaniards were a people - hitherto Napoleon had attacked governments and defeated them. At Jena he had fought a government and Europe lay prostrate at his feet - at Waterloo he fought a people and St. Helena was his grave. Let the future applaud the Spanish patriotism, unworthy though the beneficiaries were, which released Europe from the bonds of cruel slavery forged to satisfy the insatiable ambition of a heartless warrior.
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CHAPTER VI.
FLORIDA DURING THE WAR OF 1812.
T "HE anarchy which existed in the mother country, the downfall of the Spanish monarchy, and the elevation of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne had given a show of legitimacy to a series of revolutions which gradually in- fected most of the Spanish provinces of South America. Nor had the organization of the Spanish junta succeeded in restoring any degree of order in these countries. The. downfall of legitimacy at Madrid was rather the excuse than the justification of the rebellions which now sprang up in the South American colonies, like toad-stools in a night. Encouraged and assisted by English emissaries the people of Buenos Ayres rose and expelled the viceroy commis- sioned by the Spanish junta. The worthy people of Ca -- accas were not slow in imitating their neighbors and soon Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico were in arms and the discerning eye could readily detect the signs of immi- nent trouble in Cuba and West Florida. In the latter territory the germs of rebellion first bore fruit in the dis- trict of New Feliciana which lay along the Mississippi just across the boundary line of 31°. The immediate cause may have been a widely circulated rumor that Napoleon intended to seize and hold West Florida. A curious pop- ulation, that of this province, since the purchase of Louis- iana - a notable congregation of evil-doers ; Englishmen, Spaniards, renegade Americans, traders, land speculators, army deserters, fleeing debtors, fugitives from justice, fili-
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