USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 20
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Holmes of Massachusetts then took up the cudgels in behalf of Jackson and was in turn followed by Henry Clay. Beginning with a disclaimer of all hostility to either Jack- son or the administration, this eloquent speaker launched forth in a wonderful oration. Strengthened by his perfect diction, vivified by his stirring appeals, and marked by his acute reasoning, apt illustrations, and glowing peroration, this effort strongly affected the house and won for its author the bitter and undying hatred of Jackson. For to the doughty fighter those who approved his acts were his friends, those who criticised, his enemies, and that, too, whether or no any personal feeling was brought into the
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discussion of either law or fact. At any rate Clay was in opposition to the administration because he had not been appointed secretary of state. His hostility is generally declared to have been factious, despite his disclaimer. There are some facts which lend color to the theory that Clay and Crawford had already begun to regard Jackson as a possible competitor for the presidency.
Clay began his speech with a bitter denunciation of the treaty of Fort Jackson. He blushed with shame at the ignoble and unworthy ruse by which Francis and Himollem- ico were captured and the unceremonious manner in which they were executed, under the guise of retaliation for the crimes which had been committed by their followers. Even admitting the guilt of Arbuthnot and Ambrister he ridiculed and riddled Jackson's argument by which their execution had been justified. He likened their treatment to that ac- corded by Napoleon to the Duc d'Enghien, and found a duplicate for the seizure of Pensacola and St. Marks in the bombardment of Copenhagen and capture of the Danish fleet by England. To Jackson's statement that Arbuthnot and Ambrister had been legally condemned and justly pun- ished, Clay remarked, "The Lord preserve us from any such legal convictions and such legal condemnations."
· While acquitting Jackson of any intention of violating the laws, as he said, Clay accused him of seizing forts, usurping the exclusively congressional power of making war, and took occasion to warn the people against the military hero covered with glory. The eloquent Kentuckian closed with incomparable ability. "They may bear down all opposition," he declared, "they may even vote the general public thanks. They may carry him triumphantly through this house. But if they do, in my humble judgment, it will be the triumph of insubordination, a triumph of the military over the civil authority, a triumph over the powers of this house, a triumph over the constitution of the land. And I
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pray devotedly to heaven that it may not prove, in its ulti- mate effects and consequences, a triumph over the liberties of the people."
Other speakers followed in much the same general strain. Jackson had committed an act of war. He him- self had said that the articles of capitulation of Pensacola, "with the exception of one article, amounted to a complete cession of the country to the United States." If this did not constitute war the speakers earnestly demanded a suit- able definition of that term. Granted, as Jackson's adher- ents claimed, that the law of nations authorizes retaliation, yet the same law says, "where severity is not absolutely necessary, clemency becomes a duty." The war against the Indians being at an end, where was the necessity? Arbuth- not was punished upon the testimony of his admitted per- sonal enemies as the papers show. "The judgment of a court-martial is always under its own control," declares Macomb, "until it is communicated to the officer by whom it was convened." The final judgment of Ambrister was the only judgment of the court. And, by appointing the court- martial, Jackson was morally bound to accept its verdict. A notable example, they declared, of the maxim that when a man acquires power he forgets rights. It was even directly intimated that the court-martial was irregularly formed, and its verdict prepared beforehand.
The treaty of Fort Jackson of 1814, came in for a bitter arraignment. In its terms it was most harsh and severe; it was made with a minority of the Creek chiefs who had remained either friendly or passive. There were at the time manifest signs of its disapproval by the majority of Indians. They were robbed of a large portion of their territory, and unromantic roads, trading houses, etc., were inflicted upon the portion left to them. Not a single hostile chief had either signed or acquiesced in the pact, which was declared to be quite like the most of our Indian treaties.
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According to the principles of international law, it is not permitted to cross a neutral line after an enemy, scat- tered and broken up, fleeing from death and destruction, as were the Seminoles, but only after one retreating with the idea of again renewing the attack. Vattel laid it down that "extreme necessity may even authorize the temporary seizure of a place (in a neutral country) and the putting a garrison therein, for defending itself against an enemy or preventing him in his designs of seizing this place when the sovereign is not able to defend it. But when the danger is over it must be immediately surrendered." Where was the necessity which had justified Jackson's course, the opposition demanded. After the Indians had been conquered, with whom was the general waging war? Not with Spain and not with the Indian tribes - because they had been already subdued.
Jackson's letter of the second of June to the secretary of war was bitterly denounced. It read in part : "The Seminole war may now be considered at a close, tranquillity again restored to the southern frontier of the United States, and as long as a cordon of military posts is maintained along the Gulf of Mexico, America has nothing to apprehend from either foreign or Indian hostilities. Captain Gadsden is in- structed to prepare a report on the necessary defenses of the country as far as the military reconnoissance will permit, accompanied with plans of the existing works; what addi- tions or improvements are necessary, and what new works should in his opinion be erected to give permanent security to this important territorial addition to our republic." Un- sparing were the terms in which this report was character- ized.
But Jackson was not without his defenders. Johnson, Tallmadge, Poindexter, Alexander Smyth of Virginia, and Barbour ably met the onslaught of his detractors. They tore to pieces the speech of Clay, they quoted Vattel and
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Martens in support of their hero. They enumerated pre- cedents in our own national history which vindicated the de- fendant.
Yet after nearly a century Jackson's conduct stands out in bold relief, while their alleged precedents have paled into oblivion. The case of Major Andre and the conduct of Washington were cited repeatedly as though there could have been any real analogy between the conduct of the un- fortunate Englishman of our revolutionary days and that of his equally unfortunate countrymen of later date.
For twenty-seven days, without interruption, and to the exclusion of all business, flowed this stream of oratory. No attack upon any public man up to that time had so inter- ested and aroused the country. The sensations at the trial of Samuel Chase and of Aaron Burr were as nothing com- pared with this. Popular feeling was with Jackson. His hold upon the country had already begun to exert a wonder- ful dispensating influence for him and his misdoings. He possessed an extraordinary combination of those qualities calculated to arouse the imagination and sentiment of the people. The strange magic of military success had carried him to a height from which to attempt to drag him down would have been to invite ruin. Official Washington knew this only too well, and so did Jackson.
The battle of New Orleans, the one brilliant land feat of our armies in the war of 1812, had given him a firm hold upon the hearts of the people. Niles, representing the pop- ular sentiment and believing in the emissary theory, exactly summarized the general attitude in this paragraph: "The fact is that ninety-nine in a hundred of the people believe that General Jackson acted on every occasion for the good of his country, and success universally crowned his efforts. He has suffered more hardships and encountered higher responsibilities than any man living in the United States to
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serve us and has his reward in the sanction of his govern- ment and the approbation of the people." 1
On both sides of the question were the finest orators, the most skillful debaters, the shrewdest and most consummate politicians of the generation. This and the feeling that on the outcome might depend a Spanish war, brought all Washington to the daily feast of words and reason. Even the minority of the house committee, friendlier to Jackson, declared that after considering the documents submitted it would have been "more correct" to acquiesce in the final ver- dict of the court-martial in Ambrister's case. At length on the eighth of February a vote was taken on the amendments and on the resolution. In each case Jackson was sustained both by the committee of the whole and by the house.
In the senate the question had been referred to a com- mittee early in December, but no report was made until February 24th. The document then submitted declared that the general's ideas of international law were entirely un- founded on any recognized authority, that his actions were "calculated to inflict a wound on the national character," and condemned his conduct at every point. After an order to print, the report was laid on the table where it remained when the second session of the fifteenth congress ended on March 4th.
While the senate committee was in session preparing their report, wild stories were current in Washington of Jackson's wrathful denunciations of different members of the committee. It was commonly stated that he proposed to lie in wait and inflict summary vengeance upon his critics. Mr. Lacock of the senate committee wrote: "General Jack- son is still here and by times raves like a madman. He has sworn most bitterly he would cut off the ears of every mem- ber of the committee who reported against his conduct. This bullying is done in public, and yet I have passed
1. Vol. XVI, Niles Register, p. 25.
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his lodgings every day and still retain my ears. Thus far I consider myself fortunate. How long I shall be spared without mutilation I know not, but one thing I can promise you, that I shall never avoid him a single inch. And as the civil authority here seems to be put down by the military, I shall be ready and willing to defend myself and not die soft." After Jackson's return from his northern trip and after the report of the committee, his threats and menaces were repeated with increased violence, and there was more talk of ears as the reward of vengeance. There is good foundation for the story that Commodore Decatur with difficulty succeeded in preventing Jackson from enter- ing the senate chamber to attack Mr. Eppes. Members of the committee went armed prepared to resist bodily assault with powder and bullets.
General Jackson, after his return from Florida and during the congressional investigation, received many let- ters of fulsome praise and sickening flattery from unworthy sycophants - men who swore by the gods that they "adored" him, and lived for the opportunity to "feast their eyes on their favorite soldier and peacemaker." The Jack- son correspondence teems with these letters from that class of men who ascribe to themselves something of glory or fame in communicating with those prominent in the public eye. In April, 1819, Ex-Governor Blount wrote Jackson a highly disgraceful letter in which he traduced the opposition and referred to Cobb and Clay in disgustingly indecent terms.
Jackson's friends characterized Lacock's report as a "most malicious and iniquitous production where facts were suppressed and circumstances exhibited in a light to mis- lead and pervert the judgment," while General Jackson himself spoke of Crawford's "depravity of heart" and de- parture from that "strictly honorable deportment" in oppos- ing him through congress. An "infamous report of un-
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godly scoundrels" - such the Jackson coterie of flatterers nominated the senate committee resolution.
Captain Gadsden, a devoted personal friend of General Jackson, spoke of the "whole conduct of the executive as mysterious, and characterized with a degree of indecision and imbecility disgraceful to the nation" - a remark worthy of a court-martial and dismissal from the army. 1 Governor McMinns of Tennessee was "prodigiously pleased" to learn that Florida was in the hands of "the Americans out of which I trust in God they never will be taken." 2 One John B. White wrote a drama, "The Triumph of Liberty" in honor of the failure of Jackson's enemies in congress, and sent a copy to the general accompanied by a nauseating letter of adulation. 3
It is generally conceded that had there been less decla- mation and more convincing argument in support of the majority report in the house, Jackson would not have been
1. Capt. Gadsden to Gen. Jackson, Sept. 28, 1818.
2. Governor McMinns to Gen. Jackson, June 20, 1818.
3. The following is a fair sample of the letters received by Gen- eral Jackson from fawning individuals throughout the country :
Boone County, State of Kentuck, February 20, 1819. To Major General A. Jackson, Sir :--
Indulge one of the American revolution, while you are surrounded by an approving multitude, to offer his mite of gratitude to the pro- tector of female innocence and helpless infancy, and his country's wrongs, against the wily hand of the savage instigated by, and sup- plied with the means to perpetrate their cruel acts by the imbecile Spaniard and the vile Briton.
I hope ere this "the long agonies are o'er," of your quondam friends ! and when time shall have obliterated their sickliness and the forked tongue of envy and malice shall be at rest, the children, yet unborn, shall sound the praises of the man who had the fortitude, courage, virtue, and obedience to the call of necessity to step forward, with a gallant band to encounter every privation, hardship, and danger to rectify that country's wrongs. I am a simple, plain man in my habits and manners, no courtier. But here claim the privilege to give my sentiments in favor of patriotism, fortitude, courage, virtue, and morals when mingled with glorious deeds; of every man who nobly steps forward in the cause of Humanity, Justice, and his country's freedom ; in opposition to the enemies of the Human race !!! Accept the respect of my rational homage and very high consideration.
JOHN BROWN.
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sustained. Parton says: "If there had been but one hard- headed, painstaking, resolute man in the house who had spent ten days in reading and comparing the evidence relat- ing to the invasion of Florida and the execution of the pris- oners, and two days more in presenting to the house a com- plete exposition of the same, hammering home the vital points with tireless reiteration, the final votes would not have been what they were. The cause, despite the month's debate, was, after all, decided without a hearing." 1
When the news of Jackson's Florida exploits reached Washington all was excitement among the officials and the public. The administration was in a quandary. It was ignorant of the fact that Jackson had been authorized to violate neutral territory. Moreover, this administration, like those which had preceded it was timid, and, without precedents, knew scarcely anything of its powers. The cabinet was certainly anxious to secure Florida, but by purchase not by conquest. Monroe was weak, to say the least, and possessed little of the "defiant patriotism" of the younger Adams. The whole matter came up in the cabinet on the question of what disposition to make of Jackson and his conquests. On the fifteenth of July Adams records in his diary that there was a cabinet meeting lasting from noon until near five. The president and all the members of the cabinet except himself were of the opinion that Jackson should be disavowed and suitable reparation made.
Calhoun, "generally of sound, judicious, comprehensive mind," was offended with Jackson's insubordination to the war department and insisted that he be roundly censured. The secretary of war, was convinced that we would certainly have a Spanish war, and that such was Jackson's object that he might be able to command an expedition against Mexico. Crawford feared that if Pensacola were not at once restored and Jackson's acts disavowed, war would
1. Parton's Andrew Jackson, Vol. II, p. 550.
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follow and that our ships and commerce would become the prey of privateers from all parts of the world sailing under the Spanish flag, and that the administration would not be sustained by the people. 1 Jackson had to face the Indians but the cabinet was compelled to face Spain and England, congress, the hostile press, the people and not least, Jackson himself .. The question was indeed embarrassing and com- plicated.
During July and August, cabinet meetings were held almost daily and the question was hotly debated. In all of these conferences Jackson's sole friend and only defender was Adams, the secretary of state, the man upon whom would fall the labor of vindicating the general diplomatic- ally, should the administration decide to assume the respon- sibility. Adams declared that there was no real though an apparent violation of instructions and that his proceedings . were justified by the necessity of the case and by the mis- conduct of the Spanish commanding officers in Florida. He insisted that if Jackson were disavowed he (Jackson) would immediately resign his commission and turn the attack upon the administration and would carry a large part of the public with him. With the overwhelming majority against Jackson, the question arose as to the degree to which his acts should be disavowed.
The entry in Adams's diary under date of July 19, is of interest as indicating something of the struggle in the cab- inet. Having presented a new point in justification of Jackson, Adams commented upon the ensuing arguments :
"It appeared to make some impression upon Mr. Wirt, but the president and Mr. Calhoun were inflexible. My reasoning was that Jackson took Pensacola only because the governor threatened to drive him out of the province by force if he did not withdraw; that Jackson was only executing his orders when he received this threat; that he
1. Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, Vol. IV, pp. 107-109.
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could not withdraw his troops from the province consistent- ly with his orders and that his only alternative was to prevent the execution of the threat. I insisted that the character of Jackson's measures was decided by the inten- tion with which they were taken, which was not hostility to Spain but self defense against the hostility of Spanish officers. I admitted that it was necessary to carry the reasoning upon my principles to the utmost extent it would bear, to come to this conclusion. But if the question was dubious, it was better to err on the side of vigor than of weakness - on the side of our own officer who had ren- dered the most eminent services to the nation, than on the side of our bitterest enemies and against him. I glanced at the construction which would be given by Jackson's friends and by a large portion of the public to the disavowal of his acts. It would be said that he was an obnoxious man, that after having the benefit of his services he was aban- doned and sacrificed to the enemies of his country ; that his case would be compared with that of Sir Walter Raleigh. Mr. Calhoun principally bore the argument against me insisting that the capture of Pensacola was not necessary upon the principles of self defense and therefore was both an act of war against Spain and a violation of the consti- tution, that the administration by approving it, would take all the blame of it upon themselves ; that by leaving it upon his responsibility, they would take away from Spain all pretext for war and for resorting to the aid of other Euro- pean powers - they would also be free from all reproach of having violated the constitution; that it was not the menace of the governor of Pensacola that had determined Jackson to take that place; that he had really resolved to take it before; that he had violated his orders and, upon his own arbitrary will, set all authority at defiance."
After many days of argument, when Adams continued to oppose the unanimous opinions of the president, the secre-
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tary of the treasury, Crawford, the secretary of war, Cal- houn, and the attorney general, Wirt, a draft of a note to De Onis was prepared and a newspaper paragraph was sub- mitted to the press for publication. With a sigh at this "weakness and confession of weakness" Adams set himself to the task of meeting the protests and threats of De Onis and the inquiries of Bagot.
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CHAPTER IX.
ADAMS VERSUS DE ONIS.
W E have seen that on the renewal of diplomatic rela- tions with Spain in December, 1815, De Onis de- manded the surrender of so much of West Florida as Madison had organized under the congressional act of ISII, and that this demand had been followed by an inter- change of views upon the title to that province which Spain claimed never to have ceded to France, since she had received it from England and not from his Christian Majesty.
In 1816 Monroe expressed his surprise and regret that De Onis should bring up these troubles when he was with- out authority to settle them and declared that full power to conclude a treaty had been sent to George W. Erving, the minister of the United States at Madrid. Cevallos, the Spanish foreign minister, repeatedly complained of the number of Americans to be found officering the insurgent privateers and fighting in the ranks of the revolutionists against Spain; and of the export of arms from the United States to the insurgent forces. In answer to our complaints against the British occupation of East Florida during the late war, Cevallos denied that it had been done "with the acquiescence of the Spanish government. On the contrary it had remonstrated repeatedly and in the most energetic terms to the cabinet of St. James on this violation of its territory."1 But Cevallos had no intention of troubling
1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XIII, p. 30, Erving to Sec- retary Monroe, Aug., 1816.
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himself with such a negotiation. and gave De Onis full power to treat, referring the whole matter back to Wash- ington.
In January, 1817, an offer was made by Monroe of so much of Texas as lies between the Rio Grande and Colorado in exchange for the two Floridas, to which De Onis replied that the territory offered was already the property of Spain and could not therefore be made the basis of an exchange. And further that he had no instructions covering the entire cession of the two Floridas. De Onis declared that he could consent to no arrangement by which Spain should cede her claims to territory east of the Mississippi unless the United States ceded their claims to all the territory west of that river. And that even such an agreement would be restricted to a recommendation to his government to adopt such an arrangement. Monroe, declaring such terms utter- ly inadmissible, commented with considerable indignation upon the Spanish minister's lack of powers, and announced that this government had no motive to continue the nego- tiation on the subject of boundaries. De Onis was then requested to state whether he would enter into a convention similar to that of 1802, which had never been ratified, pro- viding compensation for spoliations and for the suppression of the deposit at New Orleans.1 The negotiation on the matter of boundaries being thus abruptly terminated, De Onis despatched his secretary of legation to Madrid for more definite powers.
Erving at this time wrote a letter to our secretary of state giving his impression of the status of our affairs with Spain. "I would not intimate," said he, "that Spain is disposed to war - on the contrary I believe its dispositions, though not friendly, to be pacific - this of necessity, for it has not the means of making war on us with any effect and
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