USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 22
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1. Vol. V, Foreign Relations, De Onis to Adams, Aug. 5, 1818.
2. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 341, Adams to De Onis, Oct. 23, 1818.
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quence of it. 1 Negotiations however were soon renewed, 2 and Adams sent to Erving, for presentation to the Spanish foreign minister, one of the most wonderful state papers ever conceived - a full statement of the American case.
This document, destined to become so famous, was narrative in form. Beginning with the violation of Span- ish neutrality by the English forces in the late war, Adams went on to speak of Colonel Nicholls and his crew, consist- ing of "all the runaway negroes, all the savage Indians, all the pirates, and all the traitors to their country," collected for the purpose of waging an "exterminating war against that portion of the United States." He treated with rid- icule and scorn the pretensions of Colonel Nicholls that the United States had failed to observe that article of the treaty of Ghent which related to the Indian lands, since out Creek war had terminated by the treaty of Fort Jackson, concluded some four months before the close of the war of 1812, and that we were at peace with those Indians at the time of the treaty of Ghent. He then derided the "treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, and a treaty of naviga- tion and commerce with Great Britain" which Colonel Nich- olls had concluded with the ignorant and credulous Indians. He referred to the occupation of the Negro Fort.
Then he fell upon poor Arbuthnot whom he character- ized as the successor of Nicholls, as a foreign incendiary in the employment of instigating the Seminole and outlawed Red Stick Indians to hostilities against the United States. Even his "intrusion" as a trader he declared was without excuse or justification and contrary to the policy of all European powers in this hemisphere. His "infernal insti- gations" were but too successful and his arrival was fol- lowed by the visitation upon the peaceful inhabitants of the border, of "all the horrors of savage war." He then pro-
1. Pizarro to Erving, Aug. 29, 1818.
2. De Onis to Adams, Oct. 18, 1818.
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ceeded to justify Jackson in crossing the boundary and in seizing St. Marks. It needed “no citations from printed treatises on international law" to prove his contentions for "it is engraved in adamant on the common sense of man- kind." He applauded the arrest of Arbuthnot, "the British Indian trader from beyond the sea, the firebrand by whose torch this Negro-Indian war against our borders had been kindled."
Adams disclosed the fact that councils of war had been held within the very walls of St. Marks by the savage chiefs and warriors. That the Spanish storehouse had been appropriated to their use. That it was an open mar- ket for cattle known to have been stolen by them from citizens of the United States, and which had been con- tracted for and purchased by the officers of the garrison. That information had been sent from this fort by Arbuth- not to the enemy, of the strength and movements of the American army. That ammunition, munitions of war, and all necessary supplies had been furnished to the Indians. He then enlarged upon the hostility of the governor of Pensacola, and justified Jackson in the capture of that town.
"The president," declared Adams, "will neither inflict punishment nor pass censure upon General Jackson for that conduct - the vindication of which is written in every page of the law of nations, as well as in the first law of nature, self-defense." On the contrary, "suitable punishment," it was demanded, should be inflicted upon Don José Mazot, governor of Pensacola, and Don Francisco Luenzo, com- mandant of St. Marks, for their "defiance and violation of the engagements of Spain with the United States." If these officers were powerless, Adams declared, the "United States can as little compound with impotence as with per- fidy, and Spain must immediately make her election, either to place a force in Florida, adequate at once to the protec-
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tion of her territory and to the fulfilment of her engage- ments or cede to the United States a province of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is in fact a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States, and serving no other earthly purpose than as a post of annoyance to them."
To Pizarro's complaint of the "shameful invasion of his Majesty's territory," Adams inquired "What was the character of Nicholls's invasion of his Majesty's territory, and where was his Majesty's profound indignation at that ? . . . Has his Majesty suspended formally all negotiation with the sovereign of Colonel Nicholls for this shameful in- vasion of his territory without colo.»of provocation, without pretence of necessity, without shadow or even avowal of pretext? Has his Majesty given solemn warning to the British government that these were incidents 'of transcen- dent moment, capable of producing an essential and thor- tough change in the political relations of the two coun- tries?' . .. Against the shameful invasion of the territory, against the violent seizure of the forts and places, against the blowing up of the Barrancas, and the erection and main- tenance under British banners of the Negro Fort on Span- ish soil; against the negotiation by a British officer in the midst of peace, of pretended treaties, offensive and defen- sive, and of navigation and commerce upon Spanish terri- tory, between Great Britain and Indians, Indians which Spain was bound to control and restrain? If a whisper of expostulation was ever wafted from Madrid to London it was not loud enough to be heard across the Atlantic, nor energetic enough to transpire beyond the walls of the pal- aces from which it issued and to which it was borne."
Next the affair of Amelia Island and MacGregor and his crew of patriots was discussed in no uncertain terms of indignation and wrath. Ambrister and his career were
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glowingly depicted. "Is this narrative," he questioned, "of dark and complicated depravity; this creeping and insid- ious war; this mockery of patriotism, these political phil- ters to fugitive slaves and Indian outlaws; these perfidies and treacheries of villains, incapable of keeping their faith even to each other; all in the name of South American liberty, of the rights of runaway negroes, and the wrongs of savage murderers ; all combined and projected to plunder Spain of her provinces and to spread massacre and devas- tation along the border of the United States; is all this sufficient to cool the sympathies of his Catholic Majesty's government excited by the execution of these 'two sub- jects of a power in amity with the king?' The Spanish government is not at this day to be informed, that cruel as war in its mildest forms must be, it is, and necessarily must be doubly cruel when waged with savages. That savages make no prisoners but to torture them; that they give no quarter ; that they put to death without discrimination of age or sex. That these ordinary characteristics of Indian warfare have been applicable in their most heart-sickening horrors to that war, left us by Nicholls as his legacy, re- instigated by Woodbine, Arbuthnot, and Ambrister, and stimulated by the approbation and encouragement and aid of the Spanish commandant at St. Marks, is proof re- quired?"
By way of illustrating the horrors which he had so eloquently described Adams cited three occurrences, two of which took place before Arbuthnot reached Florida and the third, one with which there exists no reason for connecting the unfortunate trader. The first was the case of the sailor Daniels, who had been captured by the occupants of the Negro Fort and tarred and burned alive in July, 1816. The second was the murder of Mrs. Garret and her children, in February, 1817, which General Mitchell expressly testified was an act of retaliation for the murder of Indians by the 19
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whites. The third was the massacre of Lieutenant Scott and his party, which we know to have been the Seminole re- venge for the attack of General Gaines upon Fowltown, and which occurred while Arbuthnot was at New Provi- dence.
"Contending with such enemies, although humanity revolted at entire retaliation and spares the lives of their feeble and defenseless women and children, yet mercy her- self, surrenders to retributive justice the lives of their leading warriors taken in arms, and still more the lives of the foreign white incendiaries who, disowned by their own governments, and disowning their own natures, degrade themselves beneath the savage character by voluntarily descending to its level. . . . It is thus only that the barbari- ties of Indians can be successfully encountered. It is thus only that the worse than Indian barbarities of European impostors, pretending authority from their governments, but always disavowed, can be punished and arrested. Great Britain yet engages the alliance and co-operation of savages in war. But her government has invariably disclaimed all countenance or authorization to her subjects to instigate them against us in time of peace. Yet so it has happened to this day, all the Indian wars with which we have been afflicted have been distinctly traceable to the instigation of English traders or agents. Always disavowed yet always felt; more than once detected but never before punished. Two of them, offenders of the deepest dye, after solemn warning to their government, and individually to one of them, have fallen, flagrante delicto, into the hands of an American general. And the punishment inflicted upon them has fixed them on high as an example, awful in its exhibition but we trust auspicious in its results, of that which awaits unauthorized pretenders of European agency to stimulate and interpose in wars between the United States and the Indians within their control."
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Adams also embodied in the note a demand for the punishment of the Spanish officers for their misconduct, and a further demand "of Spain for a just and reasonable indemnity to the United States for the heavy and necessary expenses which they have been compelled to incur by the failure of Spain to perform her engagement to restrain · the Indians, aggravated by this demonstrated complicity of her commanding officers in their hostilities against the United States."
Then followed further justification of the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister, declaring that Jackson would have been warranted in summarily hanging them without the formality even of a trial. That the latter had confessed his guilt and that the defense of the former consisted "solely and exclusively of technical cavils at the nature of part of the evidence against him."
Adams wound up the document with an open threat. "If the necessities of self defense should again compel the United States to take possession of the Spanish forts and places in Florida," it was fitting that the United States should "declare, with the frankness and candor that be- comes us, that another unconditional restoration of them must not be expected. That even the president's confi- dence in the good faith and ultimate justice of the Spanish government will yield to the painful experience of con- tinual disappointment. And that after unwearied and almost unnumbered appeals to them for the performance of their stipulated duties, in vain, the United States will be reluctantly compelled to rely for the protection of their borders upon themselves alone." 1
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Such was the answer to Pizarro, and with it was dispatched a forbidding mass of documents. Adams's de- fense was plausible and was fortified with references to doc-
1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 257, J. Q. Adams to George Erving, Nov. 28, 1818. Also see Appendix C.
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uments which, when examined with care, however, fail to bear out his statements. For example he quotes a letter as proving that Arbuthnot was not a trader but had certain ul- terior plans. The letter, on the contrary, bears no testimony whatever to the assertion. Some essential facts were omitted. Many were misstated and others perverted. Nothing was said of the tragedy of the Negro Fort - the awful career of that hot shell. Scarcely an allusion to the Fowltown attack which precipitated the war. The "fire- brand" Arbuthnot, mild mannered man of seventy summers, peace loving and submission-counselling, it was he who had taught the Indians to slaughter and pillage, to murder defenseless women, and take little children by the heels and dash their brains out on the side of the boat. No reference was made to Jackson and his notoriously anti- Spanish sentiments ; or to the surprise and opposition to the course of the general so widely prevalent in the United States.
There was no intimation of what every fair and im- partial student must admit, that the Seminole war was inspired by the attacks and ravages committed upon the redskins by the white border settlers. There was no hint that the attacks of the Indians were retaliatory; and that they were induced by that same treatment which, we blush to admit, has ever been accorded the doomed race that stands in the path of the white man's advance to something that he desires. The letter made no allusion to the pitiable and defenseless condition of the Seminole Indians, and the size of the army and the amount of armament collected by Jackson for the contest with so weak and contemptible a foe; or of the conclusions to be drawn from such suspicious circumstances. There was no comment upon the articles of capitulation of Pensacola which showed most clearly that the reasons assigned by Jackson for his expedition were but a pretext, and that the real motive was a pro-
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visional cession of the province as the first step to a permanent acquisition.
It was indeed a highly ingenious instrument and did credit to the author's legal acumen. To quote Parton, it stands as "the most flagrant piece of special pleading to be found in the diplomatic records of the United States." To one who is not acquainted with the facts its perusal is a pleasure and, admitting its premises, there can be no answer to its conclusions. Never has a diplomatic paper met with more signal success. It averted war. It silenced the English government and warranted that country in ignor- ing the execution of its subjects, though it was anxious for such an excuse. It gave the continental powers ground for refusing to assist Spain in making war against the United States. It convinced the people of the United States, and even well nigh persuaded Pizarro and the Spanish council of state. In this country it won for its author universal applause. 1 "Adams has done honor to his country and himself," was the verdict of all, irrespective of party or principle. The document as if by magic cleared the air so heavily surcharged with rumors and threats of war, and on the convening of congress the president was able to announce that our relations with Spain did not differ materially from what they had been a year before.
It was also necessary to appease General Jackson for the disavowal of certain of his acts. A long letter, a happy blending of mild rebuke and pleasing compliment, was writ- ten by President Monroe explaining the necessity of sur- rendering the Spanish posts. One paragraph in particular was noteworthy as showing the prevalent feeling upon the subject of a Spanish war. "Should we hold the posts it is impossible to calculate all the consequences likely to result from it. It is not improbable that war would im-
1. Jefferson thought that a translation of the note should be sent to all of the courts of Europe.
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mediately follow. Spain would be stimulated to declare it ; and once declared the adventurers of Britain and other countries would, under the Spanish flag, privateer on our commerce. The immense revenue which we now receive would be much diminished, as would be the profits of our valuable productions. The war would probably soon be- come general ; and we do not foresee that we should have a single power in Europe on our side. Why risk these con- sequences? The events which have occurred in both the Floridas show the incompetency of Spain to maintain her authority ; and the progress of the revolutions in South America will require all her forces there. There is much reason to presume that this act will furnish a strong in- ducement to Spain to cede the territory, provided we do not wound too deply her pride by holding it. If we hold the posts, her government cannot treat with honor, which, by withdrawing the troops, we afford her an opportunity to do. The manner in which we propose to act will exculpate you from censure, and promises to obtain all the advantages which you contemplated from the measure, and possibly very soon. From a different course no advantage would be likely to result, and there would be great danger of ex- tensive and serious injuries." 1
In a similar vein Calhoun wrote to Jackson: "A war with Spain, were it to continue with her alone, and were there no great neutral powers to avail themselves of the opportunity of embarrassing us, would be nothing. But such a war would not continue long without involving other parties, and it certainly would in a few years be an English war." 2
Gallatin, then our minister at Paris, had written that the capture of Pensacola and the execution of the two Englishmen, as well as that of the Indian chiefs, had excited
1. Monroe to Jackson, July 19, 1818.
2. Calhoun to Jackson, Sept., 1818.
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in France and even in other parts of Europe "sensations peculiarly unfavorable" to the United States. To Rush, at London, Adams wrote: "The impression produced upon the public mind in England, throughout Europe, and even partially in this country has been, that this was, on our part, a wanton and unprovoked war upon the Indians and that the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister were acts of sanguinary cruelty in violation of the ordinary usages of war." 1
Pizarro, commenting upon the Florida affair, referred to the executions as an "act of barbarity glossed over with the forms of justice and thereby rendered, on considering the nature of the plan and other circumstances, a refine- ment of cruelty." On the whole he had concluded "that it appears that a forcible occupation was preferred to a peaceful acquisition - no claim to the territory invaded by General Jackson, whether founded or unfounded, has been advanced by the American government -- no revolu- tion of the inhabitants real or supposed offered a pretext - no previous aggressions by banditti, as was urged on the occasion of the unjust occupation of Amelia Island." 2 There could be no doubt in their eyes that the invasion of Florida "was a premeditated act of hostility" and that "Gen- eral Jackson, trampling under foot all laws, has committed in the territory of his Majesty outrages and excesses, of which there are few examples in the civilized world." "It will," Pizarro continued, "one day or other be stated with surprise that the theatre of such devastation and unpro- voked offense, in the midst of peace, was the very same, on which Spain, not many years since, shed her blood and poured out her treasures for the United States in the
1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, pp. 204-205, J. Q. Adams to Richard Rush, Dec. 1, 1818.
2. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XVI, Pizzaro to Erving. Aug. 29, 1$18.
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days of their calamity."1 Spain had protested to France, England, and other continental courts against the conduct of Jackson and the action of the United States. Adams in his valuable diary refers to an interview with Bagot upon the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister in which some quotations were made from Jackson's letters. "He (Bagot) said," writes Adams, "he should think little of anything said or written by General Jackson because he thought there were evident marks in his conduct of personal bitterness and inveteracy."
In September, Pizarro and the other ministers, as a result of a court intrigue, were dismissed and banished and Casa D'Yrujo named as foreign minister in his stead. On Pizarro, Erving commented, "his intelligence and good sense, his moderate and conciliatory temper and his honor and good faith recommended him to every one - no Spanish minister of late years has done so much to repair the dis- ordered state of affairs as he has done, and none has re- ceived more marks of the satisfaction of the foreign cabinets with whom he has treated." Of the new minister, Erving wrote, "I expect no good from D'Yrujo in our affairs and shall be very happy if I can only keep him from undoing whatever Pizarro has done favorable to an amicable ad- justment of them." 2
For reasons of public policy, France had been anxious to secure a friendly settlement between Spain and the United States and thus prevent hostilities. Again then did European complications and dynastic aliances come to the rescue of the United States and prevent awkward compli- cations. "France," wrote Erving to Adams, "is very reasonably alarmed at the least symptom of discord any- where. It knows that the smallest spark may produce con-
1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XVI, Pizzaro to Erving, Aug. 11, 1818.
2. Ibid., Erving to J. Q. Adams, Sept. 20, 1818.
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flagration and that France is most combustible, The evacu- ation of the allies cannot but increase that tremor ; not like besotted Spain who has flattered herself so long that she was under the protection of a special providence, who has expected support from all quarters and has relied with entire confidence on that of England, the enlightened government of France sees that in the event of a rupture between the United States and Spain, the natural progress of things will necesarily lead to an alliance or at least to a very dangerous concert of measures between the United States and Great Britain. The separation of the congress of Aix- la-Chapelle without the least demonstration of a disposition to listen to the 'jerémiades' of Spain naturally confirms this apprehension. This then is probably the most favor- able moment for treating with Spain which has yet occurred, and I do not doubt but that even Mr. Casa D'Yrujo is now fully convinced of the necessity of making what he would consider considerable sacrifices to procure an arrangement." 1
1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XVI, Erving to J. Q. Adams (private), Oct. 22, 1818.
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CHAPTER X.
THE TREATY OF 1819.
IN accordance with our agreement, the Spanish posts, which had been captured by Jackson, were delivered over to the proper officials.
It might seem at first, that the reoccupation of Florida by the Spanish was a mere matter of form in which a proud and sensitive nation consulted its dignity and satisfied its honor by being placed in a position to make a voluntary sur- render of the province instead of submitting to a conquest. The course of Jackson had wounded her pride and exposed her weakness to the world. But the delay of Spain in ratifying the treaty, after the pressure of conquest had been removed, forces us to the conclusion that the mailed fist of Jackson was as much responsible for its final cession as the diplomatic pen of the secretary of state.
Enraged and humbled Spain, and rapacious and de- termined United States - these Adams must bring together and that too when there was so much of wrong on both sides and such realm for honest differences. Nor was De Onis unworthy of Adams's mettle. Of him we read Adams's opinion : "Cold, calculating, wily, always commanding his temper, proud because he is a Spaniard but supple and cun- ning, accommodating the tone of his pretensions precisely to the degree of endurance of his opponents, bold and over- bearing to the utmost extent to which it is tolerated, care- less of what he asserts or how grossly it is proved to be un-
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founded, his morality appears to be that of the Jesuits as exposed by Pascal. He is laborious, vigilant, and ever attentive to his duties ; a man of business and of the world." We are inclined to wonder whether this was not written by an irritated author after a long hard day of unsuccessful attempt to persuade the skillful Spaniard.
But De Onis was scarcely less solicitous than his adver- sary for a treaty and certainly the difficulties which he en- countered were no less grave. He was anxious to return home and to crown his mission to this country by a treaty which would be acceptable to his king and becoming to his fame. The Spanish nobles, three thousand miles away, were unable to appreciate the true situation. Arrogance and Spanish strength had not declined pari passu. The concessions demanded by the United States were to' them humiliating and intolerable. De Onis must have been often exasperated and discouraged, for, after a long attempt to persuade Adams to meet him on a boundary line, he de- clared that he had taken infinite pains "to prevail upon his government to come to terms of accommodation, and insisted that the king's council was composed of such ignor- ant and stupid niggards, grandees of Spain, and priests," that Adams "could have no conception of their obstinacy and imbecility."
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