USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 5
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2. Vol. II, Instructions, p. 63, Randolph to Short, March 16, 1794.
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settlers more bold and warlike. The government dreaded each stage from the West, lest it bring news of some fresh overt act which would precipitate hostilities. For it was felt that at this time a declaration of war would mean a conflict, not alone with Spain, but also with her ally Great Britain. Writing in cipher to Short in August, 1794, Ran- dolph directed him to "counteract the impressions which the unlicensed violence of our Western citizens may make upon the Spanish court." Short was further directed
"To ascertain as soon and as certainly as possible-
"I. Whether Spain counts upon the Union of Great Britain in maintaing the exclusive right to the Mississippi ?
"2. What overtures have passed between them on this subject ?
"3. Supposing the war with France to be settled, and the French Republic established, what douceur could Spain afford to England for entering into a war with the United States ?
"4. Do the progress of the ardor for liberty and arm- ing of the Spanish peasantry develop no reason to apprehend a convulsion in Spain ?
"5. Will not the distress of the Spanish government for money compel them to such a resort to the people as will awaken the sense of their real efficacy in all governments and enable them to urge demands of reform, to which an indigent prince dependent upon his subjects for supplies, will always be exposed ?
"6. Is there any mode in which our influence with France could be used that would accomplish for us the navigation of the Mississippi ?
"7. In what parts and through what means is Spain most vulnerable in South America - and to what part are her suspicions directed ? 5
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The Purchase of Florida
"8. What force by land or sea could she send to any foreign country in case of war?
"9. In what particular is it supposed in Spain that the United States if at war with her could be the most injurious to her? In short you perceive from these questions, that the mind is driven into an anticipation of a painful possi- bility and therefore whatever else belongs to this subject, although not comprehended in the above questions, you will be so good as to communicate. But notwithstanding these inquiries you may never hesitate to give the most unqualified assurances, that we deprecate the most distant interruption of our harmony."1
Spain now thoroughly weary of the unnatural alliance into which Godoy had been forced by popular clamor, sought a way to withdraw from a war more honorable to the bravery and patriotism of her troops than it had been successful. It was supposed that the relations between England and the United States were growing more hostile, and with France were improving under the able hand of Madison. In view of these circumstances the Spanish government made advances to France through the Ameri- can minister at Paris and took the necessary steps to resume direct negotiations with the United States, broken off by Carmichael's departure and the Spanish refusal to receive or recognize Short.
On August 16, 1794, Jaudenes, in a commun- ication to the secretary of state, expressed his regrets that so little progress had been made in the negotiations between the two countries and stated that His Majesty desired to renew the negotiations, provided commissioners be sent who should have unrestricted powers for a general treaty and not be bound by secret instructions which would defeat it. The powers which had been given to Carmichael and Short
1. Edmund Randolph to Short, Aug. 18, 1794.
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were not ample, he complained; nor were those two com- missioners personally satisfactory. "The lack of decorum" and "well known misconceptions" of Carmichael were com- mented upon ; and the "want of circumspection in conduct" of Short had made him personally undesirable. A man of "character, conduct and splendor" was desired by the Span- ish government. By "character" was meant a "diplomatic grade invested with full powers for all objects;" by "con- duct," a "proper attention to the court and a proper behavior in the management of the negotiation;" by "splendor" a "personal dignity and self-respect." In short the rank of Carmichael and Short, both chargés had not flattered the Spaniards. Nor was the idea of returning the same com- missioners wholly pleasing to them. In consequence of these intimations the president, in November, 1794, appoint- ed General Thomas Pinckney, then minister at the court of St. James, minister plenipotentiary with full powers to conclude a treaty with Spain. Thomas Jefferson having been offered this special mission had declined. Pinckney did not however reach Madrid until the summer of the following year.
The instructions to Pinckney sought to impress upon him the impatience and hostility of the Kentuckians and the necessity for a prompt determination of the Mississippi question. If Spain should refuse this, the United States, it was felt, ought to be immediately apprised of the fact, that they might prepare for the alternative of war. Yet Pinck- ney was warned not to give the Spanish minister any reason for supposing that we had determined upon hostilities, for, writes Randolph in a cipher dispatch, "if we break off in ill humor, we in some degree lose the choice of peace or war. If we show no symptom of ill temper we are not debarred from resorting to any expedient which we approve. It is not impossible too that in the settlement of peace with
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France some opportunity may be presented if we should be disappointed now. If any hint of this sort should be capable of improvement you will doubtless communicate your ideas to our minister at Paris. Our reputation with the French government is on a strong footing. It is of immense im- portance for us to know, if it can be ascertained, whether Great Britain is under no engagement to Spain, to support her in the retention of the Mississippi." 1
By this time a new question of dispute had arisen for diplomatic adjustment, or if that should fail, for the decision of the sword. The vessels of the United States were being constantly seized by Spain, as well as by others of the allied powers of Europe, upon the most frivolous and unwarrant- able pretexts. The seizure of one vessel in particular, the Dover cutter, had been the subject of continual diplomatic representations by this government to the Spanish officials. Built in Havre de Grace, it had been seized by a Spanish governor in the Western Islands for the use of the Spanish government, nor had any compensation been made for it. The complaint for this outrage had been forwarded to Madrid by Jay in the spring of 1786. Of late, more seizures had aroused the United States and to Pinckney was com- mitted the further question of the spoliation and vexation of our commerce and a full power given him to treat upon this as well as the other subjects. 2 These encroachments upon our commerce had been accompanied by further encroach- ments by the Spanish posts on the Mississippi River. Gov- ernor Guioso, the Spanish intendant, had recently estab- lished a fort at what was called Chickasaw Bluff - above the 35° of latitude.
At this time, owing to the European complications, Spain feared a break with the United States, partly because
1. Vol. II, Instructions, p. 245, Randolph to Pinckney, Nov. 18, 1794.
2. Ibid .; p. 294, Randolph to Thomas Pinckney, Dec. 25, 1794.
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of the entente cordiale existing between this country and France, and partly from fear of another war which, she felt, must multiply the misfortunes which she had suffered in her alliance with England, when the French armies had overrun her mountain districts and established themselves upon her soil. In fact Spain was desirous of an alliance with this country. 1 The three campaigns against France, after the English-Spanish alliance - more creditable to the valor of the Spanish troops than to their military ability - had been most unfortunate. The combination between the Castilian and the Saxon had been a forced one-of the head rather than the heart - without that sympathy and unity from which alone can come success. Randolph had said, "My conviction is firm that the courts of Madrid and London are cordial in nothing but a hatred of the United States and a determination to harass them through the Indians." 2 But he might have added that they were no less cordial in their hatred of revolutions, especially of the French variety, for this it was that had induced the alliance. But, constantly humiliated on the field of battle, the Cas- tilian soon tired of an alliance with those for whom, with their mother's milk, they had imbibed a bitter hatred. They looked with fond eye toward the triumphant militarism of a people with whom they had always had much in common and to whom they were bound by the ties of gratitude and of blood.
The internal changes in French politics opened the prospect of a more stable and conservative government for that country, and the peace of Basle (April 5, 1795) proclaimed the defection of Prussia, the keystone of the continental combination. In the meantime Spain, having deserted England, grew suspicious of her. She feared and suspected an Anglo-American arrangement. England, she
1. Vol. II, Instructions, p. 32, Pickering to Short, Aug. 31, 1795.
2. Ibid., p. 185, Randolph to Monroe, Sept. 25, 1794.
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thought, was endeavoring to excite the United States against her, and she anticipated a concert of measures between these two powers against her American possessions. This sus- picion was founded upon the Jay treaty with England - the extent of which was not yet fully understood at Madrid - and was confirmed by letters from the Spanish chargé d'affaires at Philadelphia. 1 This danger must be met by a Spanish-American treaty. Writing in March to our secretary of state Mr. Short said: "The rapid successes of the French armies in Holland - the desire of this court to find out some means of pacification - the close friendship between the United States and France combine to show the importance of the present moment. The minister would willingly make use of me as the means of sounding the French government and ascertaining their dispositions as to peace - but the stumbling block of the unsettled state of our affairs with Spain constantly presents itself." 2
After Jay's treaty with England the whole diplomatic situation in respect to the Mississippi Valley was changed. The United States bought a peace with England by sacri- ficing the friendship of France. The possession of Louisiana offered to France the opportunity to injure England and render the United States more subservient to her policy. Fauchet was convinced that Louisiana would furnish France the best entrepot in North America for her commerce and raw material, and a market for her manufactures, a mon- opoly of the products of the Mississippi territories, and a means of pressure on the United States. He declared that unless a revolution occurred in Spanish policy the force of events would give Louisiana to the United States. It now became more than ever a cardinal point of French policy to secure this province from Spain.
An active alliance with the United States was what
1. Letters of Wm. Short No. 193, Vol. IV.
2. Wm. Short to Jefferson, March 3, 1795.
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Spain earnestly desired at this time, and she expected the new American envoy to be provided with powers and instructions to conclude an alliance as well as terminate the . troublesome questions then pending. To secure this alliance, Spain was willing to pay a high price on other points. But the United States wisely declined to entangle themselves in the mad delirium of war by any such con- nection. 1 On the 22nd of July, 1795, a treaty was concluded between Spain and France. In return for this peace Spain ceded to the revolutionary republic the Spanish half of San Domingo. Humiliated and infuriated at this defection, England declared war upon her late friend. It was now rumored in Spain that England intended to take possession of a Spanish harbor, land an effective army, compel Spain to fight against France and to further attack the Spanish possessions in America. Ignorant of the Jay treaty, France earlier in the year sought to aid a Spanish-American con- ciliation, but nothing had come of this attempt.
In midsummer, Thomas Pinckney at length reached Madrid, where, sent as he had been at the instance and invitation of the Spanish minister, he expected rapidly to conclude a treaty. The differences to be settled by the commissioners shaped themselves into three groups. First was the subject of commerce, but Spain refused to discuss this point despite Pinckney's protest that the mission was of Spanish origin. The Spanish chargé at Philadelphia had ex- pressly stated that Spain was "ready to treat upon the points of limits, Indians, commerce and whatever may conduce to the best friendship between the two countries." Pinckney therefore intimated that he had a right to expect an arrange- ment of the commercial interests of the two countries. But as the United States were not willing to force themselves into
1. Wm. Short to Jefferson, March 3, 1795.
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connection with a reluctant people, he would not press what he could not but consider his right.
The second point concerned the navigation of the Mississippi. Spain, while admitting that its navigation should be free to both nations, objected to the arrangement suggested by the United States for a commercial depot at New Orleans. Spain further insisted that the language of the article conveying the right should be of a strictly exclu- sive character, restricting the navigation to the subjects of Spain and to the citizens of the United States. This, of course, could not be considered, as it would violate our treaty obligations to England, if not to France.
As to the third point, that of reclamations, Spain insisted that all captures should be divided into two periods - the one preceding April 6, 1795, in which the rule of decision should be the maritime regulations of Spain then at war with France; and the other, following that date, in which the decisions should be upon the usual grounds of international law. To such a division Pinckney positively and unequivocally refused his assent. Conformably with the traditional quibbling and procrastination of Castilian diplomacy, the negotiations dragged their weary course, varying only with the fluctuation of European and Spanish politics. Wearied and indignant at the apparent lack of faith and their persistence in maintaining their position, Pinckney at length demanded his passports on the 24th day of October.
This show of spirit and determination on the part of the American envoy aroused the Spanish minister to the necessity of action. Having thrown herself into the arms of England she had been despoiled of her territories by the French armies. Now deserting her former mistress and cultivating a French amour, Britain had turned upon her and was driving her fleets off the sea. Dreading an Anglo-
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American alliance, or a separate declaration of war by the United States, badgered at all points and fearing greater humiliations, Spain consented to a compromise of the difficulties and at San Lorenzo el Real, October 27, 1795, a treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation was signed in behalf of Spain by Godoy.
This treaty was decidedly favorable to the United States. It established as boundaries East and West Florida on the south and, above latitude 31°, the middle of the Mississippi River. Illegal captures made by Spain during her late. war with France were compensated for, favorable rules were prescribed for neutral commerce, and Indian aggressions on either side, together with the arming of privateers, were discountenanced. But the chief diplomatic exploit was in gaining Spanish recognition of the right, so long and so strenuously asserted by the United States, to the free navigation of the Mississippi River ; to which was added a three years' privilege of deposit at the port of New Orleans, free of duty. Thus was paved the way for that magnificent internal commerce so soon to become fabulous in its value, which has made that river the most crowded highway of domestic trade in the world. The claims com- mission provided for in the treaty met in Philadelphia, ter- minating their duties December 31, 1799, after having made awards to the amount of $325,440 on account of the Spanish spoliations. It is not unlikely that the conclusion of the Jay treaty with England strongly influenced Spain to agree to a treaty at this time. For our arrangement with Great Britain destroyed all hopes of a concerted action between Spain and that nation against our Western country. Since the treaty of 1783 Spanish agents in North America had made frequent advances to the Canadian authorities for a joint English and Spanish policy against the Americans, all of which
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found expression in the tortuous Indian relations they had pursued.
The treaty of 1795 marked the first step in our terri- torial expansion. Jefferson wrote as early as 1786, from Paris: "Our confederacy must be viewed as the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled. We should take care, too, not .... to press too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My fear is that they are too feeble to hold them till our popu- lation can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece. The navigation of the Mississippi we must have. This is all we are as yet ready to receive." Voy- ageurs, like Brissot, had prophesied the secession of the West; Washington had dreaded it; Western leaders, Wil- kinson, Sevier, Robertson, Clark, Butler, had sold their services to secure it; and Spain and England had nego- tiated to that end. Had the United States failed to secure free navigation it would have withdrawn, and for the want of sea power to protect its commerce passing from the mouth of the Mississippi through the Gulf, it must have allied itself with a foreign power.
Firmness rather than skill, determination rather than finesse, were required for the negotiation of the instrument. Political circumstances had compelled Spain to yield to the demands of the United States. She had made concessions which except for extraneous forces might have been post- poned for years. The treaty and the ministers who nego- tiated it were similarly applauded in both countries. As a recognition of his diplomatic success, Thomas Pinckney, on his return home, was named by the Federalists as the asso- ciate of Adams on the presidential ticket. The treaty of Basle and that with the United States were hailed by the corrupt court of Spain - one of the worst in her national
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history-as great triumphs, and Godoy as a reward received the title of Prince of Peace. 1
The country of Charles V. was at this time under the absolute rule of Godoy who, as a young lieutenant in the army, had become the paramour of the faithless queen and through her favor had been named prime minister. Under his régime the price of office had been such as to exclude men of any nobility either of mind or character - they were the rewards of those willing to submit their wives and daughters to the embraces of this libertine. Miserable Spain, dishonored in the shame of her queen, and ruled by men the most contemptible, willing for paltry office thus to sell their own honor!
1. In his memoirs Godoy felicitates himself on the American treaty and claims that he secured "unexpected advantages" though of what nature we cannot conjecture, for he virtually yielded all the demands of his adversary.
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CHAPTER III.
THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA.
T HE treaty of 1795 provided that the contracting parties should name commissioners to run the boundary line between Florida and the United States. As the American linesman was sent one Andrew Ellicott, who immediately re- paired to the post of Natchez on the Mississippi. A vain man whose pretensions and bombastic manner made him an object of ridicule, he reached the Spanish post with an idea that he was a sort of ambassador or envoy extraordinary rather than a mere astronomer or surveyor. Naturally irascible, his frequent toasts to the health of his country and himself scarcely tended to sweeten his disposition.
In his imaginary capacity of a diplomat accredited, or commanding general on the field, he sent daily and often hourly letters and remonstrances to the Spanish governor, Gayoso. He proceeded to stir up trouble among the settlers of this region, though they are represented to have been thoroughly contented under the mild rule of the Spanish. For nominal fees they had received liberal grants of land. They had paid no taxes, had been exempt from military service, had been allowed free access to the market at New Orleans, and had been paid a liberal price for their tobacco. Prior to the advent of the meddlesome Ellicott and his tem- pest in a teapot, no discontent seems to have existed. 1
1. Lowry's History of Mississippi, p. 148.
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By the second article of the treaty it was stipulated that the garrisons found to be above the line of demarcation - that of 31° latitude - should be withdrawn. The line had neither been run nor had the garrisons been withdrawn. Some of the Spanish posts were undoubtedly above this line - but their garrisons were not removed. In response to the American representations on this matter, the Spanish minister, D'Yrujo, replied :
"It appears that the first operation ought to be to draw this line in order to know which were the garrisons which were to be withdrawn according to the article cited and although the Natchez and some other Spanish posts are probably situated above the said line of demarcation the formality and delicacy which one government owes to another required that Mr. Ellicott should not pretend to take possession of the territory until the said demarcation should be made : and the more so as he had been informed officially that the Spanish engineer M. Guillemard was already on his way to fulfil this part of his commission. Mr. Elliott not attending to these just observations immediately, began to wound the feelings of the Spanish commander by hoisting the American flag on a territory before having jointly made the astronomical observation for ascertaining the course of the line. Not content with this he began to exercise an authority which was unlawful for the same reasons : to-wit, that of recruiting for the United States in a place which was then under the jurisdiction of the Spanish government. These imprudences which can admit of no excuse gave rise to a personal resentment from which there is little to hope with respect to harmony between the commissioners in the future."
In a proclamation issued in 1797 by Carondolet, the governor of Louisiana, the delay in transferring the posts was excused because of an apprehended expedition by the
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British from Canada: a belief that the advance of the American troops was with a hostile design of surprise, and in the expectation of an immediate rupture between France - the intimate ally of Spain - and the United States. The United States should either leave the posts in the hands of Spain, the proclamation declared, or secure her against an article of the British treaty which exposed them to be pillaged.
Probably the real reason for this delay was the expecta- tion of a breach between France and the United States which might furnish an excuse for the non-fulfillment of the treaty. There is little doubt that Spain, then under the influence of France, either to protect her own possessions or with a view of ceding them to that nation, had determined to defeat the execution of the treaty.
At New Orleans it was confidently believed that the French would soon own Louisiana and the Floridas. But Spain was not yet ready to cede them; her present purpose was to alienate the Western country from the Union and establish over it a government under her own influence. Considerable trouble in regard to the delivery of the posts was occasioned by the uncertainty as to the meaning of the treaty provisions therefor. The United States contended that they should be delivered in the condition in which they then stood while Carondolet insisted that it could never have been the intention of his Catholic Majesty to deliver up any fortifications on which he had expended great sums of money and which through political vicissitudes might perhaps be one day prejudicial to his subjects. 1 Ellicott felt called upon to secure them by force or strategy. Governor Gay- oso having discovered these hostile intentions of the engin- eer, minister plenipotentiary and ambassador extraordi-
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