USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 3
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Under the leadership of the astute and diplomatic half- breed, McGillivray, the Creeks were disposed to peace, dif- ficult as it was to secure. Skillfully arraying interest against interest, he sought to husband the strength and resources of his peoples, by a strict neutrality without giv- ing cause for offense to either neighbor. But the Georgians continued their incursions and even the authority of McGil- livray was barely sufficient to repress the hostile passions of his followers. In 1785, we find that the Georgians had made incursions into Florida which congress, by a resolu- tion of October 13, 1785, felt called upon to expressly dis- avow. Again on the eleventh of September, 1786, a reso- lution of congress was passed deprecating "the conduct of some people in that state towards the Spaniards," with the warning that "such measures will be taken as may prevent the like in the future."
In 1785 the Georgia legislature organized the territory lying between their western boundary and the Mississippi River, opened the lands for general sale (thus precipitating the infamous Yazoo land frauds), and appointed as gov-
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ernor one Thomas Green. Some of the points comprised within these demarcations were fortified and garrisoned by Spanish troops and the greater portion was included within the area claimed by the Spanish as conquered by their arms. Thomas Green had settled within this disputed territory near the fort of the Natchez, in 1782, as a subject of the Span- ish king, but he seems to have been clandestinely plotting for the subversion of the Spanish rule - another example of the familiar "conquest by colonization." Congress replied to the representations of Gardoqui by asserting that, though they claimed and insisted on their title to this territory in question, yet they disavowed the act of the state. 1 Georgia and the Carolinas, together with their western territories, were undoubtedly full of adventurers constantly conspiring against Florida and neighboring Spanish possessions.
Secretary Knox, in his letters and reports to congress, is repeatedly led to speak of "the most unprovoked and direct outrages" against the Indians of the South "dictated . by the avaricious desire of obtaining the fertile lands possess- ed by the said Indians." Colonel Sevier figures as the leader of many expeditions against the Spanish and Indians whom he slaughtered without discrimination of age or sex. A bloody page of our history, these avaricious and unprincipled men were writing. Whole villages were put to the torch and their inhabitants either forced to flee to the forests, there to experience the horrors of starvation and exposure, or to be more mercifully offered up as sacrifices to the white man's cruelty and greed. Yet the Indians seem to have honestly sought a treaty of peace with the United States, full well realizing that any armed resistance on their part must mean national or tribal extermination. 2 The patriotic American must feel the flush of shame as he reads of the most
1. Gardoqui to Congress, Sept. 23, 1785, letter No. 125, Negotia- tion Book, pp. 23-25.
2. Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, pp. 405-407.
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cruel, unwarranted and blood-thirsty manner in which peaceable Indians were murdered in their fields and robbed of their lands. 1
The settlers robbed the Indians, avoided war with them by a treaty, and then, directly violating the treaty, seized more lands. At times they sought to provoke the Indians to a general war that they might thus deprive them of all their lands. In such a condition of affairs it is not surprising that many innocent settlers on both sides of the Florida line were pillaged by the lawless element of both Indians and whites, nor is it surprising that many negro slaves took advantage of the opportunity to escape to the Spanish ter- ritories and thereby add another element of ill feeling and hostility to that already engendered.
The Articles of Confederation did not grant power to congress to control Indian tribes in the limits of any state. Therefore the United States was unable to interfere in the dispute between Georgia and the Indians, for though the Creeks were an independent nation, they were within the boundaries over which the state of Georgia exercised leg- islative control. Secretary Knox recommended that con- gress persuade Georgia and North Carolina to cede their western lands to the United States, for thus the affair with the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees would become national and the United States could enforce the treaties which the Indians claimed had been violated.2 Small wonder is it that these Indians thus harried and pil- laged should turn to the Spanish for counsel and assistance. The settlers could scarcely have been unaware that the cer- tain consequence of their lawless outrages would be a ter- rible carnage on their frontier. To them, Indians were without rights and might be killed as indifferently as veno- mous snakes.
1. Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, pp. 349, 362 and 373.
2. MSS. State Dept., letter No. 151, pp. 275-282.
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Constant rumors reached the sensitive ear of the ready Gardoqui, that plots and counterplots were being hatched against the Spanish territories to the south and west. In 1787 a letter from one John Sullivan, a deserter from the American Revolution, and an ordinary example of crank and soldier of fortune, aroused the fears of the Spanish minister who brought the matter to the attention of con- gress. The letter was an open one, published in a southern paper of that year, and was written in the bombastic style which easily betrayed the character of the author. He had doubtless heard something of an anti-Spanish expedition and, with the self-conceit and importance of the harmlessly insane, had made himself a constituted organizer and leader of "this host of Myrmidons" who, as an "overwhelming inundation," were preparing "to pour down along the waters of the Mississippi into the Bay of Mexico."1 Further complaints were made of sinister meetings at North Fort in North Carolina, for the purpose of conspiring against New Orleans and the Mississippi. 2 While Gardoqui was often misled by vague rumors, the spirit of the Western settlers was such that hostile expeditions were without doubt secretly planned and openly threatened.
The reports that congress intended to barter away the rights of the United States to the Mississippi tended to increase the hostility of the Westerners and incite them to seek their own salvation by the strong arm. In 1787 and 1788, Kentucky openly proposed to declare her indepen- dence not alone of Virginia but also of the United States, which had shown such an utter contempt for her rights and interests. Spanish agents were at work sowing seeds of discontent but at no time did the Kentuckians turn a will- ing ear to the Castilian blandishments. Unfettered by diplomatic and treaty restraints, Kentucky felt that, inde-
1. Letter No. 125, Negotiation Book, pp. 146, 148, 154.
2. Ibid., p. 171.
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pendent, she could more easily accomplish her purpose of securing New Orleans and the Mississippi River, and so the Spanish appeals and manifestos fell upon barren soil. The vicious public-land system then in vogue did much to ren- der intolerable the position of the Western settlers. The method of selling those domains to land and settlement com- panies had little to recommend it, for the lands were held at a forbidding figure. They should have been given to settlers for homestead claims after the manner of later years. This would have encouraged emigrants to settle between the Mississippi and the Wabash and by increasing their num- bers would have made more difficult the machinations of the Spanish on the south and west, and the English on the north. 1
Couriers from the Western settlements brought such disquieting reports that in the fall of 1787 the secretary of war addressed instructions to General Harmar, comman- dant on the frontiers, directing him to ascertain what plots, if any, were being formed, the number, names and char- acter of the participants, their equipment and armament, their object, and, if necessary, to employ force to repress any hostilities. After an investigation General Harmar re- ported that no plot hostile to any foreign nation had been discovered. 2
Jay, the secretary of foreign affairs, seems to have more thoroughly grasped the true situation and appreciated the necessity for a treaty with Spain which would remove all points of dispute. He sought to impress upon his fel- low officials the fact that Spain would be our best country for trade and that the United States had much to hope for from that country in a commercial treaty. Further, he appreciated the fact that France and Spain were on friendly terms through marriage alliances, that in case of a Spanish-
1. Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, p. 519.
2. Letter No. 125, Negotiation Book, pp. 163-168.
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American rupture France would assist her Bourbon neigh- bor and not us; and that the Spanish influence with the Barbary powers was of no small moment. In an address to congress, August 3, 1786, he declared, "We shall, I think, either find her in America a very convenient neighbor or a very troublesome one." To all of Jay's representations Gardoqui's concluding answer was that his king would never consent to any compromise on the question of the Mississippi River : that it was a maxim of Spanish policy to exclude all mankind from their American shores. Jay in- sisted that the adjacent country was fast filling with people and that the time must surely come when they would not peaceably submit to being denied the use of the natural highway to the sea. Gardoqui replied that that question could be diplomatically adjusted at such future time as it might arise, for, at most, it was a remote and highly im- probable contingency, as, in his mind, the rapid settle- ment of that country would be so injurious to the older states that they would find it necessary to check it.
Appreciating the advantages to be gained by a treaty, and, feeling that the Mississippi navigation was not of pres- ent importance, a forbearance to use it, while we did not desire or need it, could be no great sacrifice, Jay advocated a treaty limited to twenty-five or thirty years, the United States giving up the river for that period. Spain excluded the subjects of the United States from the river and held it with a strong hand; she refused to yield it peaceably and therefore it could be secured only by an appeal to the arbit- rament of war. But the United States were unprepared for war with any power and many of the eastern and northern states would have refused to supply troops at that time for the purpose of securing a right which they felt in no way concerned them. Thus Spain would continue to ex- clude us from the river. Would it not then be best to con-
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sent, and for a valuable consideration, to forbear to use what it was not in our power to use, at any rate? From the temper manifested in many of the papers published in the Western country it was apparent that the United States must shortly decide either to wage war with Spain or settle all differences with her by a treaty on the best terms in their power.
To quote Jay in his able presentation of the case:
"If Spain and the United States should part on this point, what are the latter to do? Will it, after that, be consistent with their dignity to permit Spain forcibly to exclude them from a right which at the expense of a bene- ficial treaty they have asserted? They will find themselves obliged either to do this and be humiliated or they must attack Spain. Are they ripe and prepared for this? I wish I could say they are ..... Not being prepared for war I think it to our interest to avoid placing ourselves in such a sit- uation as that our forbearing hostilities may expose us to indignities. It is much to be wished that all these matters had lain dormant for years yet to come, but such wishes are vain - these disputes are agitating - they press themselves upon us, and must terminate in accommodation, or war, or disgrace. The last is the worst that can happen, the sec- ond, we are unprepared for, and therefore our attention and endeavors should be bent to the first."
If we should not secure the treaty,
"The Mississippi would continue shut - France would tell us our claim to it was ill-founded. The Spanish posts on its banks and even those out in Florida, in our country, would be strengthened, and that nation would bid us defiance with impunity, at least until the American nation shall become more really and truly a nation, than it at present is, for, unblessed with an efficient government, destitute of funds and without public credit
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either at home or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in patience for better times or plunge into an unpopular and dangerous war with very little prospect of terminating it by a peace either advantageous or glorious."1
In Jay's report to congress the following year the same subject is discussed at length. 2 He says :
"Your secretary is convinced that the United States have good right to navigate the river from its source to and through its mouth and, unless an accommodation should take place, that the dignity of the United States and their duty to assert and maintain their rights, will render it proper for them to present a memorial and remonstrance to his Catholic Majesty insisting on their right, complain- ing of its being violated and demanding in a temperate, inoffensive, but at the same time in a firm and decided man- ner, that his Majesty do cease in future to hinder their citizens from freely navigating that river through the part of its course in question. Your secretary is further of opinion that in case of refusal it will be proper for the United States then to declare war against Spain. There being no respectable middle way but peace and war, it will be expedient to prepare without delay for one or the other : for circumstances which call for decision seem daily to accumulate.
"With respect to prescribing a line of conduct to our citizens on the banks of the river our secretary is embar- rassed. If war is in expectation then their ardor should not be discouraged, nor their indignation diminished, but if a treaty is wished and contemplated, then those people should be so advised and so restrained as that their sentiments and conduct may as much as possible be made to quadrate with the terms and articles of it. . . . He (your secretary)
1. Jay in a speech to congress, Aug. 12, 1787, Letter No. 125, Negotiation Book, pp. 40-56.
2. April 12, 1787.
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also takes the liberty of observing that a treaty disagreeable to one-half of the nation had better not be made, for it would be violated - and that a war disliked by the other half would promise but little success, especially under a government so greatly influenced and affected by popular opinion."
Spain absolutely declined to make a treaty for a lim- ited period or one which in any manner recognized any right or claim of the United States to the Mississippi River. Thus the question remained no nearer a solution - though demanding immediate arrangement - at the installation of the federal government and inauguration of Washington.
In the meantime Spanish authorities were actively en- gaged in stirring up the spirit of unrest in the West. They promised the free navigation of the Mississippi in return for the acceptance of Spanish sovereignty by Kentucky and the Tennessee and the Cumberland settlements.
The Westerners were gravely impressed with the effec- tiveness of the mountain barrier dividing them from the coast states. Scarcely were they to be blamed if loyalty to the Union rested lightly with them, and even if a strong separatist feeling prevailed. The value of the Union to them was measured only by the scale of its efficiency in pro- tecting them from the Indians and securing them the Mis- sissippi. A rope of sand, what protection could the con- federation offer, to win support or inspire respect? For the type of life displayed on the seaboard the frontiersman had little sympathy and less regard. To the "fierce inhabitants of the West" there was little love for a government that levied taxes without giving return, whose seat of power was an impossible two months' journey, and whose posts of honor and influence were monopolized by the self-seek- ing politicians of the effeminate East.
The thirteen states as independent bodies were con-
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sidering the question of ratifying the constitution. The Western settlements quite naturally were inclined to decide their own allegiance at the same time and by the same manner. Some favored complete independence, some would have willingly returned to England. Some were desirous of connecting themselves with Spain - for that meant New Orleans and the world beyond. With true human instinct they balanced rewards and penalties. Yet as a whole they preferred the Union.
General Wilkinson, Judge Sebastian, Colonel Sevier, the redoubtable George Rogers Clark, and even the hon- ored Robertson showed distinct Spanish proclivities, and went so far as to accept pensions, or douceurs, from Spain for their support. Daniel Boone, still the forerunner of civ- ilization, growing restless under the approaching tide of humanity, pushed across the upper Mississippi, and in a newer and wilder region became a Spanish official. New Madrid was settled by Americans, colonists accepting the sovereignty of Spain.
The defeat of the Spanish intrigues in the West was really compassed - though Spain did not and could not realize it until later years - when the new constitution was ratified, and a strong power was substituted for what out of generous charity we may call the government of the confederation. As the United States grew stronger, Spain, weakened by the French Revolution and the Na- poleonic wars, gradually lost her former prestige and could hope to gain only through intrigue that which had been denied her arms. Instead of Spain annexing portions of the United States, this country took advantage of Spain's weakness and forced from her one after another of her fairest provinces.
Foreign emissaries in this country were firmly con- vinced that the politics of the Western communities were
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rapidly approaching a crisis, and could terminate only in an appeal either to Spain or England, who were playing their analogous parts on our unstable frontiers. It seemed probable that an independent confederacy under the pro- tection of some European power might be the outcome of the needs of the West and the impotency of the East. Jefferson grasped the true inwardness of the situation when he insisted that we must either reconcile ourselves to the loss of the West or wrest what we needed from Spain.
Troubles along the southern border between the Creeks and white settlers increased and war seemed the probable outcome. Washington, soon after assuming office, ap- pointed commissioners to treat with the Indians and fix a satisfactory boundary line -one that might insure peace and tranquillity in that section. But the mission was a failure, as had been the previous one constituted during the period of confederation. As a last resort Washington determined upon a personal interview with McGillivray the Creek chief, who in June, 1790, set out for New York City, at the head of thirty Indian chiefs. On the road these aborigines were greeted with continuous and enthusiastic ovations and their reception at the temporary capital partook of the homage generally paid those of distinguished rank and birth. New York City on the day of their arrival presented a gala appearance. Tammany Hall, even then a powerful and historic institution, turned out in full regalia, and the national congress in a body waited on the visitors, by this time thoroughly impressed with the warmth and sincerity of their reception. A treaty was negotiated by which the Oconee lands - which had been the principal ground of dispute - were ceded for an annual payment of $1,500 and a distribution of merchandise. The question of boundary was settled, at least until the whites should desire more - the Indians had not then learned the futility and
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faithlessness of treaties - the. Indian territory was guar- anteed against further encroachment - a hollow mockery. A permanent peace was provided for. The Creeks and Seminoles placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the United States and renounced their right to make treaties with any other nation. Such was the open treaty.
Then a secret treaty was negotiated between McGilliv- ray and the United States which stipulated that after two years the Indian trade should be turned to points in the Unit- ed States-clearly a violation of certain articles in the Span- ish-Indian treaty of a few years before. McGillivray was appointed Indian agent of the United States and, in imitation of continental methods, was given the rank of brigadier general, with annual pay of $1,200. The treaty was bitterly criticised and the Indian chief was much maligned for his part in it. The Indians claimed that their choicest lands had been surrendered for an inadequate consideration ; yet the only alternative was a war in which the Creeks must have been crushed. Further the United States was pledged to keep the Indian territory inviolate - history had not then shown how little that meant. The treaty was manifestly unfavorable to the Spanish, and in violation of rights which they had secured in 1784. Nor would they quietly submit to the loss of the Indian trade and consequent bankruptcy of the trading house of Panton and Company, the chief proprie- tors of Spanish sovereignty in those parts. Spanish emis- saries increased the dissatisfaction of the Indians who sullenly determined to oppose the running of this new ' boundary against which even McGillivray had protested at New York, insisting that he could not guarantee it. This Indian chief has been greatly berated for his trickery and double dealing but his course seems to have been the only one possible, for by thus balancing America against Spain and avoiding war with either nation he prevented the extinc-
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tion of his tribe. His was a hard task and that his tribe continued to exist from year to year was his vindication.
General William Augustus Bowles, an American deserter of the Revolutionary army, with the aid of a band of adventurous settlers and disaffected Indians, whom he had won by fair promises of unlimited booty, in 1789 made an abortive attempt to capture Florida from the Spanish. Such incursions across the borders - at this time quite the order of the day - served only to increase the general disorder and bitterness of feeling already existing in that section. Settler pitted against Spaniard in an effort to win the Indian favor; mercenary speculators grasping after Indian territory ; and Spanish intrigue - the only sub- stitute for the force of the Americans - stimulating savage passions. Small wonder that shocking atrocities were committed. The federal government was doubtless sincere in its wish to secure the establishment of well-defined bound- aries, the protection of the frontier, and peace among the southern tribes.
The treaty of 1790 in New York ignored the Geor- gian treaties and thus bitterly incensed the Georgia settlers. Owing to the "double dealing" of the chief, Mc- Gillivray, the freebooting settlement of General Elijah Clarke, seeking every opportunity to overthrow the Florida government, the intrigues of the trading house of Panton and the Spanish emissaries, and the indignation of the Georgians at the manner in which their wishes had been disregarded and overruled, the stipulations of the New York treaty were never carried out; and the horrors of a border warfare loomed darkly over the southern horizon. Secretary Knox in a report to Congress had insisted that an expedition against the Creeks would require a force of twenty-eight thousand men and the cost of such an expedi- tion would be at least $450,000. He had a profound respect for the fighting qualities of the Creeks and in comparing
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them with the Wabash tribe, said they "are not only greatly superior in numbers but are more united, better regulated and headed by a man whose talents appear to have fixed him in their confidence." 1
Immediately after the inauguration of the new govern- ment the question of a Spanish treaty was taken up by the department of state with the determination to push it to a successful issue. Realizing the intimate relations between the courts of France and Spain, Jefferson sought to secure the French support. Accordingly Jefferson instructed Wil- liam Short, our minister to France, to secure the assistance of La Fayette and M. de Montmorin at the court of Spain, and impress upon them "the necessity, not only of our having a port near the mouth of the Mississippi River (without which we could make no use of the navigation at all) but of its being so well separated from the territories of Spain and her jurisdiction as not to engender daily disputes and broils between us." For, continues Jefferson,
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