USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 24
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The situation was now considered so critical that Count Bulgary, the Russian chargé d'affaires, was sent to explain matters and request that the returned note be withheld, and to say that a minister would be immediately sent to the United States to ask for certain explanations. The minister selected for this mission was Mariscal de Campo Don Fran- cisco Dionisio Vives and with his departure Forsyth was notified that all discussion of the difficulty at Madrid must cease.
Vives with the undoubted purpose of consuming as much time as possible, traveled by easy stages from Madrid to Bayonne, thence to Paris, and from Paris to England, reaching the United States in April, 1820.
1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 343, J. Q. Adams to Forsyth, Aug. 18, 1819. See also De Onis to Adams, Oct. 24, 1818, and answer Oct. 31, 1818. De Onis to Adams, Nov. 16, 18Is. De Onis to Adams, Feb. 9, 1819. Adams to De Onis, Feb. 13, 1819.
2. Forsyth to Duke of San Fernandino and Quirago, Oct. 18. 1819. Answer to Forsyth, Nov. 12, 1819. Forsyth to Duke of San Fernandino, etc., Nov. 20, 1819. Forsyth to Adams, Nov. 27, 1819.
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In the United States the course of Spain aroused in- tense indignation. There was a wide feeling that the Unit- ed States should forcibly possess Florida, that Spain had paltered long enough with us. Adams, long before desir- ous of an act of congress authorizing the seizure of Florida and Galveston, now thoroughly indignant, advised that the United States prepare at once to take and hold the disputed territory and some undisputed territory as well. Monroe and the other members of the cabinet advocated a milder course. France and England expressed hopes to this coun- try that no violent action would be precipitately taken.
The agitation of the slavery question, already exerting a great power in American politics, had its influence on the still pending and rather dubious Spanish treaty. The south was desirous of seizing not only the Floridas but as much as possible towards Mexico to carve into more slave states. But the north was no longer eager for an extension of the Union on the southern side. Sectional predominated national interests. The question was not without its effect upon the presidential aspirations of Adams.
Poor Spain, with her vast American empire in open and successful revolt, was in no humor to add to her losses by the cession of Florida. The announcement that a special envoy would be sent to the United States to treat further in the case created, in this country, a sensation of the most profound disgust. Jackson, fuming at the Spanish breach of faith, wrote to Senator Eaton: "I deprecate the idea of waiting longer for an explanation from unfaithful Spain. Can we receive a minister from that power, under present circumstances, without compromising in some degree our national character? Under the bad faith of Spain, as I believe, the only good explanation that can be given is from the mouth of American cannon." 1 The general was ex-
1. Jackson to Eaton, Dec. 28, 1819.
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pecting soon to have the pleasure of leading another ex- pedition into Florida. 1
In April of 1820, Vives arrived in Washington and immediately addressed Adams upon the reasons which had induced the delay in ratifying the treaty. The sys- tem of hostility so prevalent in many parts of the Union against the Spanish dominions was a cause of grave dis- satisfaction. The "scandalous system of piracy" carried on from the ports of this country induced Spain to de- mand: That satisfactory and effectual measures be taken to repress "the barbarous excesses and unexampled depre- dations committed upon Spain, her possessions and prop- erties ; that in order to put an entire stop to any future armaments and to prevent all aid whatsoever being afforded from any port of the Union which may be intended and employed in the invasion of the possessions of his Catholic Majesty in America, the United States will agree to give security that their integrity shall be respected. And finally that they will form no relations with the pretended govern- ments of the revolted provinces of Spain lying beyond the sea, and will conform to the course of proceeding adopted in this respect by other powers in amity with Spain." In addition Vives took occasion to comment upon the "dis- respectful" manner in which Forsyth had conducted him- self in Madrid. 2 During the interim between the departure of De Onis and the arrival of Vives, the charge of the Span- ish legation had constantly complained of the filibustering expeditions from the ports of the United States and of the vessels which had been brought into our ports and adjudi- cated prizes. Strong proofs were also presented of the connivance of the American officials and men-of-war.
1. In January, 1819, even, Jackson had considered the plans for another attack upon Florida, and was making preparations with that in view. Gaines to Jackson, Jan. 16, 1819.
2. Don Vives to J. Q. Adams, Volume VI, Foreign Relations, April 14, 1820.
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Adams, in reply to the representations of Vives, as- serted that by the universal usage of nations nothing could release a sovereign from the obligation to ratify such a treaty except the proof that his minister, empowered to conduct the negotiations, had been faithless to his trust by transcending his instructions - that this the Spanish king did not even allege. 1
To this contention Vives took exception and declared that there might be other reasons sufficiently valid to exon- erate a sovereign from the obligation of ratifying a treaty. "The scandalous proceedings of a number of American citizens ; the decisions of several of the courts of the Union and the criminal expeditions set on foot within it, for the invasion of his Majesty's possessions in North America, when the ratification was still pending, were diametrically opposite to the most sacred principles of amity and to the nature and essence of the treaty itself. . . . So that the belief generally prevailed throughout Europe that the rati- fication of the treaty by Spain and the acknowledgment of the independence of her rebellious trans-Atlantic colonies by the United States would be simultaneous acts. . . . It is therefore," he concluded, "not possible to assign reasons more powerful or more completely justificatory of the sov- ereign resolution of the king to suspend his ratification of that instrument." 2
Vives was told in reply that the representations made to his government of the hostility of our courts, people, and administration were unfounded. That in the war between Spain and her South American provinces an impartial neu- trality had been constantly avowed and faithfully maintain- ed. That whenever the laws enacted for the preservation of neutrality were found defective they had been strength-
1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 385, J. Q. Adams to Don Vives, April 21, 1820.
2. Vol. VI, Foreign Relations, Don Vives to J. Q. Adams, April 24, 1820.
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ened by new provisions. That Spanish property, illegally taken, had been constantly restored by the decisions of our tribunals and that even life itself had not been spared when individuals had been found guilty of piracy against Spain. But that the United States would not contract any engage- ment with regard to the revolted provinces. That it would be inconsistent with the obligations of neutrality and had not been done even by any of the European nations, and further that the United States could not, "consistently with what is due themselves, stipulate new engagements as the price of obtaining the ratification of the old." That if there were any further delay in the ratification of the treaty by Spain this country could not hereafter accept either the five million dollars for indemnities nor the Sabine for the bound- ary line. 1
In answer to certain observations made by Vives upon the subject of our proposals to European powers for recog- nizing the South American colonies, Adams wrote: "The proposal which at a prior time had been made by the gov- ernment of the United States to some of the principal powers of Europe for a recognition in concert of the independence of Buenos Ayres was founded ... upon an opinion then and still entertained that this recognition must and would, at no very remote period, be made by Spain herself. That the joint acknowledgment by several of the principal powers of the world at the same time might probably induce Spain. the sooner to accede to that necessity in which she must ultimately acquiesce, and would thereby hasten an event propitious to her own interests by terminating a struggle in which she is wasting her strength and resources without a possibility of success ; an event ardently to be desired by every friend of humanity, afflicted by the continual horrors of war, cruel and sanguinary almost beyond example; an
1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 387, J. Q. Adans to Vives, May 3, 1820.
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event, not only desirable to the unhappy people who are suffering the complicated distresses and calamities of this war, but to all nations having relations of amity and com- merce with them.
"This proposal, founded upon such motives, far from giving Spain the right to claim of the United States an engagement not to recognize the South American govern- ments ought to have been considered by Spain as a proof at once of the moderation and discretion of the United States ; as evidence of their disposition to discard all selfish or exclusive views in the adoption of a measure which they deemed wise and just in itself, but most likely to prove efficacious by a common adoption of it, in a spirit entirely pacific, in concert with other nations, rather than by a precipitate resort to it, on the part of the United States alone." 1
Vives denied the assertion that the laws of the United States were or had been competent to prevent the excesses of which he had complained, and asserted that the Euro- pean nations so far from being disposed to recognize the insurgent governments of South America, had declined the invitation thus extended. He further declared that the question of the land grants had not been the chief motive for suspending the ratification of the treaty, but rather the question of the South American provinces. "I shall sub- mit it," he concluded, "to the general sense of the reflecting ' part of mankind to decide whether the reasoning you rely on to show the motives of the American government for proposing to the powers to acknowledge the revolted prov- inces of Spanish America and in exhibiting them as favor- able not only to suffering humanity but to the interests of Spain herself, is not in the highest degree specious. For if such maxims were to be adopted, nations could no longer
1. Vol. II, Foreign Relations, p. 398, J. Q. Adams to Don Vives, May 8, 1820.
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count upon the integrity of their possessions or on the maintenance of that mutual amity and good understanding which it is equally their duty and their interest to cultivate in their mutual relations." 1
In the meantime, by a change in the government of Spain, and the adoption of a constitution, the sovereign was prohibited from alienating any portion whatever of the Spanish territory without the consent of the cortes. Vives informed Adams that the king would lay the treaty before that body at its next meeting in July. 2 Adams maintained that the solemn pledge of the nation had already been given before the change and could not be affected by any subsequent engagement of the king. Forsyth was in- structed to manifest no peculiar earnestness to obtain the ratification ; but to announce that, in the event of further delay, an additional provision for indemnity would be de- manded and that the right of the United States to the western boundary of the Rio del Norte "will be re-asserted and never again relinquished.".3
On the ninth of May the papers on the Florida treaty were sent to both houses of congress. Adams had as- sumed an air of effective indifference. In view of the prevailing public opinion, the secretary of state maintained a decisive bluntness and stubbornness scarcely calculated to invite further discussion. Spain might make the treaty or take the consequences, and congress was about to declare upon the consequences. No other course than this obvious indifference could have been more effective.
In congress the question went over to the next session, ,but in the house much had already been said on the sub- ject. Several attempts had been made to secure vigorous action. A member from Virginia, impressed with the idea
1. Vol. VI, Foreign Relations. Vives to Adams, May 5 and 9, 1820.
2. · Ibid., Vives to Adams, May 28, 1820.
3. Vol. IX, Instructions, p. 7, Adams to Forsyth, May 25, 1820.
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that De Onis had been authorized to cede more territory than provided in the treaty, moved that the president be asked to inform the house how much the Spanish minister had been empowered to cede. At one time the committee on foreign affairs reported a bill authorizing the president to take possession of both East and West Florida, and if nec- essary to use the army, navy, and militia. The motion and bill were both ignored and, as the house showed a strong disposition to do nothing, Clay made a vigorous attack on the treaty.
He introduced two resolutions which were referred to the committee of the whole. The first declared that, by the constitution, congress alone had the power to dispose of territory belonging to the United States and that no treaty alienating any part thereof was valid unless approved by congress. The second declared that as the equivalent of- fered by Spain for the territory of the United States west of the Sabine was inadequate, it would be inexpedient to re- new the treaty. Clay declared that he did not desire to re- new a discussion of the treaty making power. But as con- gress alone had power to dispose of the territory of the United States, and, as the constitution contained specific grants of power to congress, they controlled, and it must follow that no treaty disposing of territory could be valid without the consent of the house as well as the senate. A treaty fixing limits or establishing boundaries might be valid without the intervention of the house. The treaty of 1794 with England had done so. So had that of "1795. with Spain. And the provisions of the treaty of Ghent for determining the northeast boundary of Maine - they did not mark out a new boundary, they merely established or proclaimed the location of the old line. The Florida treaty differed from these. It had fixed a new and arbitrary line ¿ with a large cession of territory to Spain. "What do we get for Florida?" demanded Clay. "We get Florida loaded
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and encumbered with land grants which leave scarcely a foot of soil for the United States. What do we give? We give Texas free and unencumbered. We pay five mil- lion dollars and we surrender all our claims for damages not included in that five million dollars."
Several members replied to Clay asserting that Texas had always been disputed territory, and that our claim to . it had always been questionable. That Clay's construction of the treaty making power would prevent any question of limits ever being settled without the consent of the house, as such questions always involved the cession of territory by one or both parties. The resolutions failed to pass the committee of the whole, and the question was dropped for the time. Monroe in his message transmitting the corre- spondence with General Vives had requested that no ac- tion be taken till Spain had once more been heard from. With this congress willingly complied, though many radi- cals were for forcing immediate action.
While negotiations were pending Adams received little support in his efforts to push the boundary line westward. Monroe and the cabinet cared little for Texas. Jackson who was consulted, thought that the Sabine should be ac- cepted if thereby we could acquire the Floridas. His inter- ests were then centered in the Floridas and he was indiffer- ent as to Texas. Jackson afterwards denied this in a vio- lent and insulting manner. 1 In a letter to President Mon- roe, the general wrote: "I am clearly of your opinion that, for the present, we ought to be contented with the Floridas. . With the Floridas in our possession, our fortifica-
1. In 1836 General Jackson denied having been. consulted in re- gard to the boundary line. When told that Adams's diary showed that he had approved of the line of the Sabine, he vehemently replied : "His diary. Don't tell me anything more about his diary. Sir, that diary comes up on all occasions-one would think that its pages were as immutable as the laws of the Medes and Persians. Sir, that diary will be the death of me. . ... Sir, I did not see it; I was not con- sulted about it." Vol. II, Parton's Life of Jackson, p. 587.
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tions completed, New Orleans, the great emporium of the West, is secure. The Floridas in possession of a foreign power, you can be invaded, your fortifications turned, the Mississippi reached, and the lower country reduced. From Texas an invading enemy will never attempt such an en- terprise. If he does, notwithstanding all that has been said on the floor of congress on this subject, I will vouch that the invader will pay for his temerity." 1
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On the fifth of October Forsyth's efforts were rewarded by the Spanish cortes, who, after annulling the three land grants, advised the king to ratify the treaty, which he did October 24, 1819. At the same time the cortes declared that they "had observed with great mortification and pain that besides the alienation of valuable provinces of the Spanish monarchy. .... the Spanish negotiator of the treaty had left altogether unprovided for and had renounced all the just claims of Spanish subjects upon the United States for which indemnity had been stipulated by the con- vention of 1802." 2
The treaty was ratified despite the opposition of Clay who had declared that Florida must come to us sooner or later; "that ripened fruit will not more surely fall. Flor- ida is enclosed between Georgia and Alabama and cannot escape. Texas may." Only four votes were cast against it : Brown of Louisiana, a brother-in-law of Clay ; Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky from mere political subserviency to Clay ; Williams of Tennessee from a violent hatred of Gen- eral Jackson ; and Trimble of Ohio from "some maggot of the brain."
Mr. Benton was bitter in his regrets that the western boundary had not been extended much further westward into Texas. Besides cutting off Texas, the treaty, he de- clared, dismembered the Mississippi, mutilated two of its
1. Gen. Jackson to President Monroe, June 20, 1820.
2. Vol. VI, Foreign Relations, Memorandum of Interview between Adams and Vives, Feb. 12, 1821.
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noblest rivers, and brought a non-slave-holding foreign do- minion to the neighborhood of New Orleans. He declared that "the Spanish government had offered us more than we had accepted" and that our policy and not hers had deprived us of Texas and the vast territory between the Red River and Upper Arkansas. Political considerations had entered into the question, for the repugnance in the northeast was not merely to territorial aggrandizement in the southwest but to the subsequent extension of slavery in that quarter. To prevent the slavery extension question from becoming a test in the presidential election was, he declared, the true reason for thus giving away Texas.
But the treaty met with popular approval and Mr. Ben- ton was forced to admit that he stood "solitary and alone" in the matter, not a paper in the United States supporting his opposition. 1 Jefferson remained inflexibly opposed to its ratification.
1. Benton's Thirty Years' View, Vol. I, p. 16.
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CHAPTER XI.
THE FLORIDA TREATY.
E AST Florida was delivered by Governor Coppinger to Lieutenant Robert Butler of the United States army, July 10, 1821, and on that day the Spanish flag was finally lowered from the walls of St. Augustine, where it had so long and so proudly waved. The stars and stripes announced the second acquisition to the young nation of the New World.
Before the end of the cession during which the Florida treaty was ratified, congress did not have time to legislate for the new territory. An act was passed, however, ex- tending to it the revenue law and the laws against slave trade which had already existed in the United States. In April, General Jackson was appointed governor of Florida, possessing all the powers of the captain generals of Cuba and the Spanish governors of Florida, except those of grant- ing lands and laying taxes. An American governor under Spanish law, of American territory not under the consti- tution -- an anomalous position pregnant with possibilities for complications of serious import. With what was at- tributed to the traditional Spanish policy, the actual ces- sion of Florida was not accomplished until July 17. In the meantime Jackson fumed, and his fury and his hatred for Spain and things and people Spanish increased in geo- metric proportion.
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In September through a trifling misunderstanding re- specting some papers in the hands of the Spanish officials, Jackson sent Callava, the Spanish commissioner, and sev- eral of his associates, to the calaboose in that same unrea- soning manner and with that same contempt for all law and form which had characterized his conduct of affairs in the Seminole war. Somebody had crossed his path and in- curred his wrath and that somebody must pay the penalty. Then Elgin Fromentin, judge of the western district of Florida, in due form issued a habeas corpus for Callava. Jackson's wrath knew no bounds. He summoned Fromentin, to show cause why he had not interfered with the governor and thus become liable. A stormy interview followed and each side sent a statement to the authorities at Washington. Meanwhile some of Fromentin's friends, with less discre- tion than loyalty, published a defense of the judge. Again Jackson waxed warm and they were ordered out of Flor- ida at four days' notice on pain of arrest for contempt and disobedience.
Worthington, the secretary and acting governor of East Florida, was meanwhile embroiled with Cop- pinger, the former Spanish governor, over papers which had been seized under Jackson's orders. These were a few of the problems which the headstrong Tennesseean prepared for his friends at Washington within six months' service. Small wonder that Adams dreaded the arrival of mails from Florida lest some new difficulty of Jackson's brewing be presented for solution. In fact his whole conduct, based only upon a snap judgment, was in open disregard and contempt of all diplomatic obligations, propriety, law, or procedure, and his course only failed of being atrocious by being ludicrous. 1 In short Jackson played the fool. Yet again his personal popularity saved him. But why have
1. For a detailed account of the whole miserable farce, see Vol. II, Parton's Jackson, p. 638.
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trusted so dangerous, so irresponsible a man in so delicate a position ? Only because of his personal popularity we presume, for everybody had been taught what to expect of Jackson. When he was sent to Florida as governor there was ringing in Monroe's ears Jefferson's remark upon the subject of sending Jackson on the Russian mission, "Why, good God, he would breed you a quarrel before he had been there a month." Yet he was sent south and the nation was made ridiculous in the eyes of the world.
Now that Florida was actually ours, all reason for de- lay in recognizing the South American countries seems to have disappeared and in March, 1822, congress passed an appropriation for missions to these revolted provinces. *
Thus ends the history of the acquisition of Florida and our relations with Spain. No sooner were we a nation than we cast our eyes about. We coveted Florida, and we talked of manifest destiny, and the falling of ripened fruit, and eased our conscience by like casuistry. Spain was weak, she was entangled in the Herculean grasp of Euro- pean complications - all of which materially assisted this ever favorable manifest destiny. The nation's leaders, Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Livingston, Pinck- ney, and a score of others all insisted that we must pos- sess the Floridas. They wanted Louisiana, they even talked of Mexico and South America - they were to be ours, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary. 1
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