USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 12
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1. January 9, 1804. Journal of Executive Proceedings of the Sen- ate, Vol. I, pp. 461, 462.
2. Cevallos to Pinckney, May 31, 1804.
3. Cevallos to Pinckney, July 2, 1804.
4. Pinckney to Cevallos, July 5, 1804.
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ranted such action and transferred all negotiations from Madrid to Washington. 1 Not in the least perturbed by Cevallos's answer, Pinckney dispatched the couriers and gave notice that as soon as his affairs could be arranged he should demand his passports and quit the Spanish court.
In October news of the developments at Madrid reached Washington followed by a request for Pinckney's recall; this request was granted and Monroe ordered to Madrid. 2 But Monroe was already on his way. After the Louisiana treaty of 1803 had been concluded Mon-' roe prepared to join Pinckney at Madrid. But the recep- tion of that treaty at the Spanish court led the French officials to insist that he alter his course. 3 Following their advice he remained at Paris and while there, was commis- sioned minister plenipotentiary at London in place of Rufus King. In July he reached London and immediately took up the impressment question with the English government. Orders now came to proceed to Madrid.
Four things he was directed to accomplish; induce Spain to recognize the Perdido as the eastern boundary of Louisiana ; persuade her to sell her possessions east of the Perdido for $2,000,000; secure the payment of our claims for condemnations by the French courts on Spanish soil; insist on the right of the United States to Texas. If Spain refused to yield the last point he was authorized to waive the question of the western boundary of Louisiana and consent to establish a neutral zone into which people of neither power should be permitted to emigrate. The east- ern limit of this belt should be the Sabine River from its . mouth to its source; a straight line to the junction of the Osage and Missouri, and a line parallel to the Mississippi River to the northern boundary. On the west side the
1. Cevallos to Pinckney, July 8, 1804.
2. Madison to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1804.
3. Monroe to Madison, July 20, 1805. Monroe to Talleyrand, Nov.
8, 1804. Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 634.
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limit was fixed at the Rio Colorado to its source; thence a line to the most southwesterly branch of the Red River ; the highlands parting the beds of the Missouri and Missis- sippi from those of the Rio Bravo as far as the source of the Rio Bravo and a meridian to the northern boundary. No inducement should prevail upon him to give up our claim to the Rio Bravo nor to consent that the neutral belt should exist for more than twenty years ; later he was instructed to secure the Rio Bravo as the limit of Spanish, and the Rio Colorado of American settlement but not to give up the intervening territory forever. 1
Proceeding to Madrid by way of Paris, Monroe there sought to enlist French assistance for his undertaking. He was not long in learning the attitude of the French govern- ment on the question. He saw that it was a financial mat- ter. "Spain," he was told, "must cede territory ; the United States must pay money." Marbois informed him that for a suitable compensation Spain might be induced to comply. No official encouragement was given him; in fact he saw that France was unmistakably hostile to his mission. Has- tening to Madrid he lost no time in presenting to Cevallos a project for a treaty in line with his instructions. Politely refusing the project which had been submitted to him, Cevallos replied that a plan of treaty should result from a negotiation on the points in issue under three heads - gen- eral spoliation claims, the subject of the damages caused by the suspension of the deposit at New Orleans, and the Louis- iana boundaries.
After a fruitless discussion of the subject of indemnity that matter was passed and the eastern boundary of Louis- iana taken up. After several weeks of profitless confer- ences they passed to a discussion of the western boundary. Cevallos proposed to fix a point on the gulf of Mexico between the Calcasieu and Marmenton rivers and draw a
1. Madison to Monroe and Pinckney, July 8, 1804.
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line northward between the Spanish post of Nuestra Senora de los Adaes and the French post of Natchitoches on the Red River, where the line should then run to be determined by a commission. 1 The reply was, while the United States were persuaded that they owned to the Rio Bravo, they would nevertheless accept the Rio Colorado on two condi- tions; if Spain would ratify the convention of 1802 and cede the two Floridas, the United States would waive all other claims for damages and as a western boundary estab- lish a neutral zone thirty miles wide on one or both sides of a line to be the Colorado to its source, to the most south- westerly source of the Red River, thence along the high lands parting the Missouri and Mississippi rivers from the Rio Bravo, and a meridian to the northern boundary of Louisiana. 2 Cevallos declaring these terms to be utterly unreasonable, the correspondence terminated. Monroe de- manded his passports, and was within a few days well on his way to London.
The most favorable terms which he could secure were manifestly of French dictation; a loan of seventy million livres to be given to Spain and when Spain had transferred it to France the United States should receive from Spain the disputed territory ; the money was to be repaid by in- stalments in seven years.3 Pinckney having received his recall prepared to leave but was delayed some months, for every mule had been seized for the use of the king and other means of transportation could not be secured. In the meantime James Bowdoin of Massachusetts was appointed to take his place as minister to the court of Spain.
Jefferson, having been informed that all negotiations at Madrid were broken off, turned first to Madison and
1. Cevallos to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805.
2. Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, May 12, 1805. Foreign Re- lations, Vol. II, p. 665.
3. Monroe's Diary at Aranjuez, April 22, 1805. MSS. State De- partment.
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then to the other members of his cabinet for advice. Madi- son favored dropping the questions which had caused the dispute, taking up others as yet untouched by the mission and reopening negotiations anew at Madrid. Gallatin coun- seled peace - a war would cost more than Florida was worth. He thought the boundaries should have been settled when the Louisiana treaty was made; since this had not been done the Sabine and Perdido should be accepted, the militia improved and one million dollars appropriated for building ships of the line, and, with this as a threat, nego- tiations renewed. 1 Smith advised more gun-boats, twelve new seventy-fours, and, if necessary, an English alliance with war against France and Spain. 2 Jefferson himself inclined strongly to an alliance with England, stipulating that peace should not be made with France and Spain until West Florida and the spoliation claims had been secured. 3
Various other counsels were offered. Armstrong, from Paris, urged Jefferson to seize Texas and break off all inter- course with Spain. This plan seemed most feasible to the president. Congress was to be asked for power to drive the Spanish out of Texas, to sever diplomatic relations at will, and provide a commission to determine the amount of our spoliation claims. Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney offered similar advice - their single theme was a bold and deter- mined line of conduct. Jefferson's decision was strengthen- ed by news from the southwest. From Claiborne, governor of the Mississippi Territory, and Wilkinson, commander of the army, came reports that the garrisons of Mobile and Baton Rouge had been strengthened; that a fort had been erected in Trinity River ; a new governor general had reach- ed San Antonio ; a large number of families from old Spain
1. Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 12, 1805. Gallatin's Works, Vol. I, p. 241.
2. Robert Smith to Jefferson, Sept. 10, 1805.
3. Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 4 and 17, 1805. Madison MSS. Department, Aug. 27, 1805. Jefferson's Works, Vol. IV, p. 585.
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were on the way to settle in Texas; troops were being massed at Nacogdoches and Matagorda; that Spanish sol- diers had led foraging expeditions into Louisiana and Mis- sissippi, stealing horses and abusing Americans; that every American vessel attempting to pass through the Mobile was forced to pay duty of twelve per cent. on the value of the cargo even when it belonged to the United States.
But before Jefferson's plan could be definitely form- ulated and communicated a sudden combination of circum- stances changed everything. Each day brought word of some new outrage committed by England upon our citizens. Our seamen were impressed, our ports blockaded, and our ships overhauled and examined; Monroe was neglected at London, and Armstrong insulted at Paris, and, to determine finally the question, a London packet brought the news that an added restriction had been placed upon neutral trade, that eighteen American merchantmen had been already con- demned, and that the condemnation of thirty more was immediately expected. No English alliance could now be considered. The policy of overawing Napoleon must be given up. After a conference with the members of his cabinet he decided to appeal to France for assistance in the Spanish negotiations. Armstrong was to inform Napoleon that one more attempt would be made to secure a peaceable settlement and to ask him to lay before Spain three prop- ositions :
To sell the two Floridas for five million dollars; the United States to cede to Spain Louisiana from the Rio Grande to the Guadeloupe; Spain to pay to the United States all spoliations committed under her flag. A letter was dispatched to Governor Claiborne directing that the Marquis de Casa Culvo and all other persons holding com- missions or retained in the service of his Catholic Majesty
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be ordered to quit New Orleans as soon as possible, and in such terms as to leave no room for further discussion. 1
Word from Armstrong at this time encouraged Jeffer- son in his determination to reopen negotiations. During the summer an anonymous agent of the French government came to him with an unsigned letter from Talleyrand sug- gesting another note to Spain of no uncertain tone and calculated to rouse that country from her lethargic indiffer- ence. She should be warned that to persist in her refusal to treat could only mean war, and arbitration should be suggested. Should Spain agree to this, Armstrong, accord- ing to the program, should address Talleyrand asking the Emperor Napoleon to serve as arbitrator. Napoleon would decree, it was intimated in unmistakable terms, that the Floridas. should go to the United States in return for ten million dollars; the Rio Colorado to its source and the northwest line heading all the waters flowing into the Mississippi should be the western boundary of Louisiana ; a strip thirty leagues each side of this line should be a neutral zone forever ; the spoliation claims were to be settled by Spain and she should have the same commercial rights in Florida that she then enjoyed in Louisiana and New Or- leans. Armstrong after decidedly rejecting these terms - refusing even to communicate them to his government -- was a few days later given an audience with the emperor . and informed that the sum should be seven millions instead of ten. This offer appearing more reasonable, Armstrong agreed to forward it to America. The matter was laid before the cabinet and debated most carefully ; the Spanish troubles were reviewed and discussed from alpha to omega. All of Napoleon's propositions except one were finally ap- proved ; after mature consideration it was determined that five million dollars should be the limit of the consideration
1. Vol. XV, Domestic Letters, p. 52, Madison to Governor Clai- borne, Nov. 18, 1805.
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to emanate from this government. Further a portion of this should be canceled by the spoliation claims which ap- proximated, it was believed, three million dollars.
The other two millions must be secured from congress. Secrecy above all things was essential. To name publicly the inducements would be to invite a refusal. Gathering the Spanish papers Jefferson transmitted them to congress without any hint of his purpose. Summoning various mem- bers of the committee in charge of the message, the presi- dent initiated them into the secret and even drew up resolu- tions which he desired them to report. Congress assembled the second of December and on the following day received the message treating at length on the subject of outrages inflicted, upon the Spanish indisposition to a friendly ar- rangement of boundary disputes, upon their violation of our sovereignty by invading Louisiana and Mississippi and mur- dering our people in that quarter. More complete details he promised would shortly follow and three days later another collection of Spanish papers was submitted to a breathless and expectant house.
In obedience to the injunction of secrecy, the galleries were promptly cleared and behind closed doors the members eagerly listened to the further disclosures. But their ex- pectation and curiosity were disappointed. To the surprise and astonishment of all, the president suggested no line of action. Neither did he make any requests. Unable to fathom the mystery, the curious house referred the papers to a select committee of which the brilliant but eccentric John Randolph of Roanoke was the chairman. Hastening to interview the president he was informed that two million dollars was wanted immediately to purchase the Floridas. A proceeding which seemed to him so irregular, Randolph declared he could not and would not support. Money he said had not been requested; and indeed if it had been, he would still have opposed such a course, for, after negotia-
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tions had been suspended, to offer money would be an everlasting disgrace to the country. 1 Some of the com- mittee however enjoyed Jefferson's confidence to a greater degree. Nicholson already had in his possession the resolu- tions which the president had drawn up. Barnabas Bid- well, intimating that to his mind the proper course was an appropriation, moved a suitable grant. His motion was lost and an adjournment of two weeks followed.
During this interval the members of the cabinet strove manfully to turn Randolph from his obdurate course, but all to no avail. The gentleman from Roanoke denounced the whole plan in no measured terms. Jefferson, he declared, should not be permitted to have two sets of principles - the one ostensible, the other real. He should not be tolerated publicly to urge vigorous measures while secretly advising tame ones. He should not be allowed to appear as an energetic executive thwarted by an unpatriotic and hesitat- ing congress. Between losing all hope of securing the Floridas and openly breaking with Randolph, Jefferson chose the latter alternative, and the discerning public was shortly aware of a schism in the dominant party. A secret report of the committee was soon made denouncing the hostile attitude of Spain. To a government of rulers such a course would be considered ample cause for war. But to a government such as ours where the rulers and people were so closely identified, and especially to a government with a debt which absorbed so large a portion of its revenue, an honorable peace must ever be preferred to war. Culti- vate the interests of the Union by peace until such time as the national debt should be extinguished, that as many troops be voted as the president should deem necessary to defend the southern frontier and render our territory im- mune to all incursions.
1. Letters of Decius No. 1, Richmond Inquirer, Aug., 1806.
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Jefferson realizing the failure of his original course took a new tack and communicated his desires to other trusted members of the house who, when the report had been presented to the committee of the whole, mustered the friends of the administration and immediately submitted three resolutions. The first of these provided for a sum of money to meet such extraordinary expenditures as might be incurred in connection with our intercourse with foreign countries. This money was to be borrowed if the amount was not in the treasury .. The second provided for the perpetuation of the two and one-half per cent. ad valorem duty constituting what was termed the Mediterranean fund. The third stated that congress would look with favor upon any settlement of the boundary which, while it gave Spain ample territory on the Mexican side, at the same time secured to this country the territory east of the Mississippi and the regions watered by that river. Randolph's commit- tee report having been defeated, a bill was passed appro- priating two million dollars for our negotiations with foreign powers; this was accompanied by a resolution explaining that the appropriation was made with a view to purchasing the Floridas. The senate promptly concurring, Jefferson signed the bill on the thirteenth of February. 1
On the last day of March the injunction of secrecy was removed and the doors of congress were thrown wide open that the long confined news might sweep across the land. There had been rumors wild and incredible, but yet finding credence. In some quarters it was believed that the Louis- iana stock would be confiscated, for what had seemed to be the conduct of Spain was generally credited to French domination. Others were confident that, with the removal of the mask of secrecy, would come the declaration of war. When therefore the announcement was made that two mil- lion dollars had been appropriated for the purchase of
1. Annuals of Congress, 1805-06, pp. 1226-27.
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Florida it is said that disappointment and disgust were vividly pictured on the faces of the crowd thronging about the capitol. And as the expectant and dissatisfied multitude slowly separated, many and loud were the mutterings that Jefferson was truckling to France and bringing dishonor upon the nation.
In 1804 the hapless D'Yrujo became involved in certain transactions in this country which increased his unpopu- larity and resulted in instructions to our minister at Madrid to insist upon his recall. He was accused of "an attempt to debauch a citizen of the United States into a direct violation of an act of congress, and into a combination with a foreign functionary, in favor of a foreign government against the supposed measures of his own." D'Yrujo, it seems, approached Mr. Jackson, editor of the Political Register of Philadelphia, with a proposition for printing in his paper certain pro-Spanish articles. / Having been so often made a target for the attacks of the newspapers and having sufficiently perused our constitution to know that there existed therein some sort of a provision for the liberty of the press, D'Yrujo conceived that its use must be a "shield of defense as it had been an instrument of attack." Having on a previous occasion been taught the futility of bringing the authors of these attacks into the courts of justice, D'Yrujo concluded to take up the same weapons. "Were the foreign ministers to be deprived of this right, enjoyed by every individual who breathes the air of the United States, they would be reduced to the sad condition pf distinguished slaves in the very center of the Land of Liberty," wrote D'Yrujo to Madison. Summoning Mr. Jackson, D'Yrujo, according to his official explanation, sought to impress upon him the fact that the interests of both Spain and the United States dictated peace but that the spirit being engendered in this country forboded war. D'Yrujo requested him to publish certain "explanations and
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elucidations which could not fail to be favorable to the cause of peace and that for his trouble he would have the ack- nowledgment that would be proper." Jackson in sworn affidavits promptly declared that he had detected the "in- famous purpose" of the Spanish minister, crediting the indiscreet D'Yrujo with all manner of Machiavellian devil- try. D'Yrujo blandly insisted that the acknowledgment was intended merely as a just compensation, "which is due an editor of a newspaper full of advertisements - for the room that my intended essays would have occupied in his gazette, or a reward for his labor if he was to take upon himself to couch my ideas in a more correct language than I could do myself." "Surely," continues D'Yrujo, "the honor of a man who is in the habit of retailing the space of his paper by lines should not be hurt at a just compensation which was offered when it was a question of occupying some columns."
To D'Yrujo it seemed comprehensible that a foreign minister might risk an intrigue with a high officer of a crown, depositary of the secrets of state and director of its measures, but bribing the editor of a newspaper whose sheets were scarcely to be seen beyond the borders of his own city, a man without a place in the government, and without personal influence, seemed such perfect folly as in itself to establish his innocence. The offer of a reward he placed in the same category as the payment of a fee to a lawyer or a physician. 1
Whatever may have been his purpose in this matter and however guiltless his intentions his course was at any rate indiscreet and his explanation was not such as to increase his standing with the government or proclaim his innocence to the people. D'Yrujo was further charged with publishing certain correspondence in the papers of the day
1. Vol. I, Spanish Minister to Secretary of State, D'Yrujo to Madison, Oct. 3, 1804.
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and using expressions "grossly disrespectful" to the exe- cutive of the United States. The request for his immedi- ate recall was submitted by Monroe and Pinckney to Ceval- los, the Spanish foreign minister, in April, 1805.1 Al- though succeeded in his official capacity by Valentine de Foronda, D'Yrujo lingered in the United States until 1807, to the indignation of Jefferson who all the while content- plated vigorous steps to relieve the country of the presence of "this troublesome foreigner."
In the spring of 1806 instructions were sent to Arm- strong and Bowdoin, at Paris, to guide them in their task of securing a Spanish treaty under French auspices.
"The object of the United States," wrote Madison "is to secure West Florida which is essential to their interest and to obtain East Florida which is important to them; procuring at the same time equitable indemnities from Spain for the injuries for which she is answerable, to all of which the proposed exchange of territory and arrangement of the western boundary, may be made subservient." 2 The min- isters were directed to seek, if possible, an arrangement which would involve no pecuniary consideration on the part of the United States; the project of a convention which was forwarded to them indeed made no provision for a money payment. By that instrument Spain was to confirm West Florida and cede East Florida to this country. On the west side the Colorado River should be the boundary ; provision was made for a neutral zone in the southwest.
It could hardly be supposed that Napoleon would man- ifest any particular enthusiasm in persuading Spain to accept such a treaty. It must be conceded that his sole motive for desiring an arrangement was the idea that the United States would pay a large sum of money which would naturally gravitate into his coffers.
1. Vol. VII, p. 199, Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, April 13, 1805.
2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 315, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- doin, March 13, 1806.
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A few months later Madison, suspecting the rejection of the terms which he had suggested, sent instructions that in such an event an arrangement be sought providing that the status quo, taking the date of the transfer of Louisiana to the United States, should be established with respect to the disputed territories on both sides of the Mississippi ; neither country to strengthen or advance its military force or positions or make any other innovations unsatisfactory to the other party. The navigation of the Mobile and other rivers running from our territories through those of Spain, should be freely enjoyed by our citizens in like manner 'as that of the Mississippi was enjoyed by the subjects of Spain inhabiting the territory adjoining. Further that the con- vention of August, 1802, be allowed by Spain to go into effect. Such an arrangement, intimated Madison, could alone insure peace between the two countries and would, without any dishonorable concessions on the part of either nation, afford a time for further consideration "and for that increase of the relative power of the United States for which time alone is wanted," the last an expression pregnant with meaning. 1
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