USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 23
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In October of 1818 De Onis informed Adams of the arrival of new instructions, and offered as the western boundary a line from the Gulf of Mexico between the Mer- menteau and Calcasieu rivers to the Red River at latitude 32°, thence due north to the Missouri and along that river to its source. 1
1. De Onis to Adams, Oct. 24, 1818: "A line beginning on the Gulf of Mexico between the rivers Mermenteau and Calcasieu follow- ing the Arroyo Hondo between the Adaes and Natchitoches, crossing the Rio or Red River at 32º of latitude and 93º of longitude from Lon- don-and thence running directly north, crossing the Arkansas, White and Osage rivers and then following the middle of that river to its source."
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This, the first sign of concession on the part of Spain, was met by an offer on the part of the United States, which, abandoning the Rio Grande, proposed the Sabine from its mouth to 32°; a line due north to the Red River; the channel of that river to its source in the mountains, then to the summit and along the crest to latitude 41º and by it to the Pacific Ocean. De Onis, accepting the Sabine line, declared that he had no authority to go to the Pacific whereupon Adams withdrew his offer and declared that the United States stood by the Rio Grande.
A further difficulty presented itself in the question of the grants of land which had been made in Florida. Adams wrote to De Onis that the United States could not "recog- nize as valid all the grants of land until this time, and at the same time renounce all their claims and those of their citizens for damages and injuries sustained by them and for the reparation of which Spain is answerable to them. It is well known to you, sir, that notice has been given by the minister of the United States in Spain to your govern- ment that all the grants of land alleged to have been made by your government within those territories must be can- celled, unless your government should provide some other adequate fund from which the claims ... of the United States and their citizens may be satisfied."1 The United States in return for the cession of Florida, would exonerate Spain from all claims and agree to make satisfaction for them to an amount not exceeding five million dollars - the amount. and validity of the claims to be determined by a commission which should meet at Washington within three years.
De Onis replied that the demand that the Spanish land grants in Florida after 1802 be declared null and void, was "offensive to the dignity and imprescriptible rights of the
1. Adams to De Onis, Oct. 31, 1818, Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 360.
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crown of Spain" which, as the legitimate owner of both Floridas, had a right to dispose of those lands as it pleased -- and further as the said modification would be productive of incalculable injury to the bona fide possessors who have acquired, settled, and improved these tracts. However he agreed that the grants made since January 24, 1818, "the date of my first note announcing his Majesty's willingness to cede them to the United States . . . shall be declared null and void in consideration of the grantees not having com- plied with the essential conditions of the cession, as has been the fact." 1
The question of the South American colonies was like- wise an embarrassing feature in the negotiations. Monroe was anxious not only to recognize the revolted provinces of Spain, but also to persuade England and other European countries to take the same step. Under date of July 25, 1818, we find the following entry in the diary of John Quincy Adams: "Two days ago he (Monroe) had very abruptly asked me to see Mr. Bagot and propose through him to the British government an immediate co-operation between the United States and Great Britain to promote the independence of South America. 'All South America and Mexico and the islands included.' I told him I thought Great Britain was not yet prepared for such a direct propo- sition."
The first of the following year representations were made to the English government upon this subject. These consisted of a statement of the attitude of this country toward the belligerents and an effort to secure some con- certed action in the matter. Adams declared that it was the purpose and the policy of this government to "remain neutral;" to award to both of the contestants "equal and the same treatment, recognizing neither the supremacy
1. Vol. V, Foreign Relations, De Onis to J. Q. Adams, Nov. 16, 1818.
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contended for by Spain nor the independence contended for by the South Americans." . An entire equality of treatment was not possible. As Spain, being an acknowledged sover- eign power, has "ministers and other accredited and privi- leged agents to maintain her interests and support her rights," the American government considered it among the obligations of neutrality to obviate this inequality and "we listen therefore to the representations of their deputies or agents and do them justice as much as if they were formally accredited." Adams had the grace to admit that "by acknowledging the existence of a civil war the right of Spain as understood by herself is no doubt affected. She is no longer recognized as the sovereign of the provinces in revolution against her."
This state of things was declared to be merely tem- porary. Any guarantee of the restoration of Spanish sov- ereignty in South America on the part of the allied powers would have been a departure from neutrality by them. No mediation ought to be undertaken without the consent of both parties in the contest. "Whether we consider the question of the conflict between Spanish colonial dominion and South American independence upon principles, moral or political, or upon those of the interest of either party to the war, or of all other nations as connected with them, whether upon grounds of right or of fact, they all bring us to the same conclusion that the contest cannot and ought not to terminate otherwise than by the total independence of South America. ... Convinced as we are that the Span- ish authority can never be restored at Buenos Ayres, in Chili, or in Venezuela, we wish the British government and all the European allies to consider how important it is to them, as well as to us, that these newly formed states should be regularly recognized," both because of their just right to such recognition, and that they may be held to an observation of the rules of the laws of nations. For that
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course seemed to present the only effectual means of "re- pressing the excessive irregularities and piratical depreda- tions of armed vessels under their flags and bearing their commissions. ... It is hardly to be expected," declared Adams, "that they will feel themselves bound by the ordi- nary duties of sovereign states while they are denied the enjoyment of all their rights." The letter then stated the determination of President Monroe to recognize the govern- ment of Buenos Ayres "at no remote period" and concluded that, "if it should suit the views of Great Britain to adopt similar measures at the same time and in concert with us, it will be highly satisfactory to the president." 1
After the refusal of De Onis to accept the Sabine bound- ary proposition in full, there was a lull in the negotiations. Early in January the president and his cabinet conferred upon the advisability of securing from congress an act authorizing the seizure of Florida upon certain contin- gencies. The secretary of state favored such a bill and desired that it should extend to the power of taking and holding the entire province, "in the event of any further failure on the part of Spain to fulfill her engagement of re- straining by force the Indians within her territory from hostilities against the United States, formal notice having been given her that such would be the result." Crawford declared that it would give the nation the appearance of acting in bad faith and lose the credit we had obtained in Europe by restoring the places captured by General Jackson. Calhoun did not consider the necessity sufficiently urgent. That to suppose Spain unable or unwilling to fulfill her treaty engagements would be, in the least, insulting. That congress ought to "pass laws only upon existing facts and not upon speculative anticipations." .
1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 296. J. Q. Adams to Richard Rush, Jan. 1, 1819.
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Wirt stated that if it were res integra it might be in- sulting to Spain to assume that she would not fulfill her treaty, and asked if all prospect of obtaining Florida by an arrangement seemed hopeless. Adams answered in the affirmative unless such a law should pass ; that that might bring Spain to it but that nothing else would. The matter was then laid aside for future consideration. 1
Agreeably to his instructions and the policy of his government, Hyde de Neuville, the French minister at Washington, took a warm interest in the negotiations. He served as a channel of communication and carried proposi- tions and counter-propositions, arguments and denials be- tween the two negotiators - messages which could pass better through a third party than directly from hand to hand. He even expostulated and argued in turn with De Onis and with Adams imploring the one to yield a point, the other to be reasonable in his demands. England's prof- fered services were rejected. Adams neither needed nor desired any mediation. He was willing to take upon him- self the entire responsibility for the success or failure of his efforts.
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But Adams was forced to contend with lukewarm sup- port, nay even active opposition in his own ranks. Craw- ford, apart from seeking to disgrace Jackson and thus make him an impossibility for the presidency, sought steadily to discourage a Spanish treaty on the ground that, if it were a success, it would add too much strength and popularity to Monroe's administration. This secretary of the treasury, of whom Adams said, "He has a talent for intrigue only," did not hesitate to intimate indirectly to De Neuville and De Onis that the French should demand special commercial privileges in Louisiana, and that Spain should insist upon a boundary line west of the Mississippi more favorable to her than that offered by Adams. The cabinet of Monroe at
1. J. Q. Adams's Diary, Jan. 2, 1819.
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that time was innately vicious, the various members fighting the administration and one another, all playing for the presidential stake, utterly indifferent to the demands of the country and the pledges of their oaths. There was every reason to expect that Clay would fight any treaty which did not satisfy the wildest demands of the United States and of his romantic mind. Crawford desired to see Adams fail in his negotiations or conclude an unpopular treaty.
In Spain, D'Yrujo, the foreign minister, was hostile to the United States, and was still controlled by the "unex- tinguished rancorous feelings ... of ancient date." The king was probably more anxious for a treaty and more ready to make the necessary sacrifices to obtain it, than any member of his council. Erving wrote home that however sincere may be the disposition of the Spanish government to treat at that time, a dissolution of congress before a treaty was concluded, "or without taking some very strong reso- lution with regard to the Floridas," would produce a most unfavorable change. If the independence of the South American colonies should be acknowledged the greatest evil which Spain apprehended would thus come to pass, and the temptation to any sort of an arrangement would be diminished. Should the independence not be acknowledged and the Floridas be restored, Spain would "lapse into se- curity or indifference," for twelve months would thus be gained for the operation of chances in her favor. "But in either of the supposed cases," concluded Erving, "should the president be authorized to take and to hold possession of the Floridas till the claims of the United States be satisfied, this pressure may produce a final adjustment." 1
In January, 1819, De Onis, announcing the receipt of new instructions, offered the old line to the source of the Missouri, with a new one thence to the Columbia, and so to
1. Vol. XVI, Letters from Ministers Abroad, Erving to J. Q. Adams, Jan. 4, 1819.
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the sea. Monroe anxious for a treaty - though long in accord with Adams - as De Onis gradually conceded point by point, began to fear lest Adams by insisting on extreme measures would not only fail in a treaty but might invite war. But Adams seems to have correctly measured the exact line to which the pressure of Spanish misfortunes would compel De Onis to advance. Gradually yielding, but bit- terly protesting, and imploring Adams to concede here or there and advance to meet him, the Spanish minister slowly approached the demands of our secretary of state. Yet so slowly was this done that we find Adams noting in his diary that he "could not express the disgust with which he was forced to carry on a correspondence with him upon subjects which it was ascertained that we could not adjust." And even saying to De Onis that he "was so wearied out with the discussion that it had become nauseous," and that he "really could discuss no longer and had given it up in despair." 1 And yet during all this time the other members of the administration and the members of congress talked freely both with De Neuville and De Onis intimating how far they may urge their pretensions and how far we might "be prevailed upon to concede." 2
. There were many alarming pauses and Adams was ever anxious as to the outcome and fearful lest De Onis might make a firm stand and refuse absolutely to yield more. But as they approached nearer to an agreement Adams records that the president was inclined to give up all that remained in contest. On February II, Monroe declared decidedly for agreeing to the 100° of longitude and 43° of latitude and taking the middle of the rivers (Arkansas, Red, and Multnomah). The other members of the administration all inclined the same way, but Adams was convinced that more might be obtained by adhering
1. Adams's Diary, Feb. 11, 1819.
2. Ibid., Feb. 15, 1819.
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steadily to our demands. 1 De Onis objected strongly to having the United States name five million dollars in the treaty, to be paid for claims, lest it should appear that he was selling Florida for that sum, while it was worth ten times that amount; that to name that figure would arouse indignation in Spain and endanger the ratification of the treaty. 2
The proposed line of De Onis to the South Sea was the beginning of the end. For each receded gradually until on the twenty-second of February, 1819, the two negotiators signed and sealed the counterparts of the treaty - consum . mating the diplomatic efforts of this country for nearly a score of years.
The result justified Adams and was a great personal triumph, although Erving is authority for the statement that the Spanish cabinet was "highly delighted with the treaty." 3 No concession had been made except as to accepting the Sabine as the boundary. The United States received the Floridas in return for an agreement to settle the disputed claims of certain of her citizens against Spain to an amount not more than $5,000,000; while the Spanish claims against the United States, provided for in the con- vention of 1802, were wholly expunged. The western boundary secured for this country the coveted outlet to the shores of the "South Sea." The line ran along the south banks of the Red and Arkansas rivers leaving all the islands to the United States, although granting to Spain a common right of navigation.
Let us quote from the famous diary under date of February 22, 1819: "It was near in the morning when I closed the day with ejaculations of fervent gratitude to the Giver of all good. It was, perhaps, the most important day
1. Adams's Diary, Feb. 11, 1819.
2. Ibid., Feb. 15, 1819.
3. Vol. XVI, Letters from Ministers Abroad. Erving to J. Q. Adams, April 28, 1819.
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of my life. What the consequences may be of the compact this day signed with Spain is known only to the all-wise and all-beneficent Disposer of events, who has brought it about in a manner utterly unexpected and by means the most extraordinary and unforeseen. Its prospects are propitious and flattering in an eminent degree. May they be realized by the same superintending bounty that produced them. May no disappointment embitter the hope which this event warrants us in cherishing, and may its future influence on the destinies of my country be as extensive and as favora- ble as our warmest anticipations can paint. Let no idle and unfounded exultation take possession of my mind, as if I could ascribe to my own foresight or exertions any portion of the event. It is the work of an intelligent and all-embracing cause. May it speed as it has begun, for without a continuation of the blessings already showered down upon it, all that has been done will be worse than useless and vain.
"The acquisition of the Floridas has long been an object of earnest desire to this country. The acknowledg- ment of a definite line of boundary to the South Sea forms a great epoch in our history. The first proposal of it in this negotiation was my own and I trust it is now secured beyond the reach of revocation. It was not even among our claims by the treaty of independence with Great Britain. It was not among our pretensions under the purchase of Louisiana - for that gave us only the range of the Missis- sippi and its waters. I first introduced it in the written proposal of 31st October last, after having discussed it verbally both with De Onis and De Neuville. It is the only peculiar and appropriate right acquired by this treaty in the event of its ratification."
A protest against the treaty, particularly against the boundary line, appeared the following day in one of the Washington papers, and was believed to have been written
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or inspired by Clay. However his opposition was practi- cally without effect, and on the twenty-fourth the treaty was unanimously ratified. It was proclaimed a day later by President Monroe.
But troubles soon appeared. In February, 1818, while the negotiations for the cession of the Floridas were under way, Erving wrote to Madison that the king had made three vast grants of land in that province - one to the duke of Alagon, captain of the bodyguards; another to the Count de Punon Rostro, one of his Majesty's chamberlains ; the third, which it was believed contained all the land in Florida and the adjacent islands not already disposed of, was to Don Pedro de Varges, the treasurer of the household. There can be no doubt that this was a highly disgraceful act of bad faith and that the intention of the king was to deprive the United States of the ownership of the crown lands. Adams, with these grants in mind, we will recall, had insisted in October of 1818 that all grants made since 1802 in the Floridas should be declared null and void. De Onis in a counter-proposition suggested rather the date of January 24, 1818, that being the date when Spain first expressed her willingness to cede the Floridas. Adams finally accepted this date, but not knowing the exact date of the grants referred to by Erving, distinctly declared to De Onis that he did so with the express understanding that these three grants should be held void. Adams cannot be absolved from blame, for he was undoubtedly guilty of carelessness in not examining the original grants. He accordingly wrote to De Onis that he understood it to be the intent of the treaty to nullify the grants. De Onis at first evaded and quibbled, but a few days later he candidly declared that it was his understanding that these three grants were, by the eighth article of the treaty, to be null and void whatever their dates may have been.
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In April, in consequence of a long expressed desire, the Chevalier de Onis returned home and was succeeded at Washington by General Don Francisco Dionisio Vives. On the twenty-ninth of April Erving held his farewell audience with the king and princes of Spain and gave way to his successor, John Forsyth of Georgia. 1
That no doubt might exist upon the point of the land grants, Forsyth received special instructions to deliver a written declaration upon the subject when he exchanged the ratifications of the treaty. On reaching Madrid, in May, he applied to Marquis Casa d'Yrujo for a date for exchanging ratifications. Receiving no reply, he wrote again, two weeks later, reminding him of the presence of the sloop of war, "Hornet," in the harbor of Cadiz, that the time for her departure was nearly at hand, and that if she returned without the ratified treaty a most unfavorable im- pression would be created in the United States. 2 This brought a reply. "The importance of the treaty made nec- essary an extended deliberation on the part of the king." 3 Before a decision could be reached there must be cer- tain explanations on the part of the United States; that a person enjoying the fullest confidence of his Majesty would be sent to Washington for that purpose. August twenty-second being the last day on which, by the terms of the treaty, ratifications could be exchanged, Forsyth served formal notice on the twenty-first, that matters were in precisely the same condition as before the consummation of the convention, and the United States were free to enforce and maintain their claims in such manner as might seem best.
In the meantime the "Hornet" had reached the United
1. Forsyth as a member of the senate was ever inveterate in his attacks upon General Jackson for his course in Florida.
2. Forsyth to D'Yrujo, May 18 and June 4, 1819.
3. Gonzales Salmon to Forsyth, June 19, 1819.
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States. Full instructions were dispatched to Forsyth. The United States would hold Spain responsible "for all dam- ages and expenses which may arise from the delay or refusal of Spain to ratify, and from the measures to which the United States may resort to give efficacy to their rights, and that for the indemnities to which they will be justly entitled for this violation of faith by Spain, the United States will look to the territory west of the Sabine River." From the powers given to De Onis, after the signature of that min- ister and the ratification of the United States the treaty was as binding upon the honor and good faith of the Span- ish king and nation as it would be after its ratification by the king.
De Onis had declared that he was ashamed that the grants had been made and wished them declared void be- cause of certain remarks publicly made that he was per- sonally interested in them. These grantees were not named in the treaty (1) to save the honor of the king, and (2) "because there were other grants made at the same time and to have named these would presumptively have raised an inference in favor of others. De Onis had expressly stated (1) that the grants in question were all, in his belief, in- cluded among those positively annulled by the date of Jan- uary 24, 1818; (2) that these grants had been made by the king with the view of promoting population, cultiva- tion, and industry, and not with that of alienating the terri- tory and, (3) that the grants were all null and void because the grantees had not complied with the essential conditions of the grants.
Adams continued: "When the government of a nation degrades itself by flagrant and notorious perfidy, those who are constrained to entertain political relations of neighbor- hood are justified by the law of nature, and it is their duty to themselves in subsequent transactions with such a state, to take pledges of security for the performance of its en-
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gagements more effectual than confidence in its good faith. Such pledges are amply within the reach of the United States, in their intercourse hereafter with Spain, nor is it to be presumed that those who are entrusted with the main- tenance of the rights and interests of this nation, will over- look or neglect the duty which may be devolved upon them of taking them."1 Forsyth was also to announce that, although six months had elapsed, the ratification by Spain would still be received on two conditions. It must be within one week, and must be accompanied by the avowal that the three land grants in question were null and void. This . demand having been explicitly stated, the note was returned to Forsyth with the statement that it could not be laid before the king. Forsyth insisted that it be delivered, and wrote to Adams that in the event of its failing he should leave Madrid. 2
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