USA > Florida > The purchase of Florida; its history and diplomacy > Part 8
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33
Meanwhile instructions were dispatched to Robert Liv- ingston, our minister at Paris, to undertake to dissuade France from her purpose of securing Louisiana, not know- ing whether the treaty of cession had definitely been con- cluded. But if the cession had already been made, Living- ston was directed to ascertain whether it included the Flor- idas as well as New Orleans, and if so, to learn the price at which these would be transferred to the United States. 4
1. Vol. VI, Letters from Charles Pinckney to Don Pedro Cevallos, March 24, 1802.
2. Vol. VI, Instructions, MSS. State Dept., p. 40, Madison to Charles Pinckney, May 11, 1802.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 35, Madison to Robert R. Livingston, May 1, 1802.
-
105
The Purchase of Louisiana
If it is possible "to obtain for the United States on convenient terms," writes Madison, "New Orleans and Flor- ida, the happiest of issues will be given to one of the most perplexing of occurrences."1 The United States govern- ment seems to have definitely concluded that the Floridas were a part of the French cession but yet directed our min- ister at Madrid that, although at present the cession wished by this country must be an object of negotiation with the French government, the good disposition of Spain in rela- tion to it, must be cultivated, both as they may not be en- tirely disregarded by France, and as in the turn of events Spain might possibly be extricated from her engagements to France and again have the disposal of the territories in question. 2 While still pressing the subject of a cession to the United States, Pinckney was unable to secure an answer as to the sale from Cevallos, who employed the traditionally Spanish method of diplomacy, delay and procrastination. 3 At any rate, Pinckney was convinced that much more de- pended upon France than Spain, even if the Floridas had not been ceded to that nation. Priding themselves as they did upon the extent of their empire, Pinckney expected his proposition to fall upon deaf ears and, although not hopeful of success, felt greatly encouraged that the Spanish min- istry was willing to even receive the proposition.
Livingston meanwhile, obedient to his instructions, had been pressing the matter with Talleyrand at Paris. "Flor- ida is not .... included in the cession," he reported to Madi- son. 4 'And in November he writes, "I have obtained ac- curate information of the offer to Spain: it is either to sell them Parma for forty-eight million livres or to exchange it for Florida. You see by this the value they put on Florida.
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 56, Madison to Livingston, Oct. 15, 1802.
2. Ibid., p. 52, Madison to Pinckney, July 26, 1802.
3. Pinckney's Letters, Pinckney to Madison, Aug. 30, 1802.
4. Letters of Robert Livingston to United States, Nov. 2, 1802.
106
The Purchase of Florida
I fear Spain will accede to their proposition."1 In all his letters to Talleyrand, Livingston speaks of the Floridas as entirely apart from Louisiana and containing the Mobile and Pensacola rivers.
Jefferson now determined upon a special mission to se- cure a settlement of the difficulty and selected Monroe to be joined with Livingston in a commission extraordinary to treat at Paris and with Pinckney at Madrid. "The object of Monroe's instructions," writes Madison, "will be to pro- cure a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States and consequently the establishment of the Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and Louisiana." 2 In order to draw the French government into the agreement, a sum of money was to constitute a part of the proposition, to which should be added such regulations of the commerce of that river, and the others emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, as ought to be satisfactory to France.
From news recently received by Jefferson it was in- · ferred that the French government was not averse to nego- tiating on the grounds suggested. And Livingston was cautioned to use the utmost care in repressing extravagant anticipations of the terms to be offered by the United States, particularly of the sum of money as a bonus.
Speaking broadly it may be said that two considerations moved Napoleon in his purpose to sell Louisiana to the United States. First, the increasing jealousy between Great Britain and France and the known aversion of the former to seeing the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the latter and the imminence of a Franco-English war wherein England, with her superior navy, would promptly seize the province. In the second place the First Consul desired to build up a power on the western continent, which should
1. Letters of Robert Livingston to United States, Nov. 14, 1802.
2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 71, Madison to Pinckney, Jan. 18, 1803. Ibid., p. 73, Madison to Livingston, Jan. 18, 1803.
-
107
The Purchase of Louisiana
balance England and hold that nation in check. 1 Of lesser note but largely included in the considerations already named, was the state of things produced by the breach of our deposit at New Orleans; the situation of the French islands, particularly the important island of San Domingo, and the unsettled posture of Europe.
An order from the board of health of Spain for the exclusion of all vessels from the United States, at this juncture inspired a strong protest from the United States. This unreasonable order together with the closing of the port of New Orleans tended to bitterly increase the hostile feeling toward that nation.
Again in February Pinckney addressed the Spanish secretary of state in a strong plea for a cession of the Floridas and New Orleans because,
"The government of the United States from many cir- cumstances as well as from the conduct of the intendant feel themselves every day more convinced of the necessity of their having a permanent establishment on the Mississippi, convenient for the purposes of navigation and belonging solely to them. To obtain this they have authorized me to say that, should his Majesty be now inclined to sell to the United States his possessions on the east side of the River Mobile agreeably to the propositions inclosed, the United States will make to his Majesty, and I do now in their name, make the important offer of guaranteeing to him and his 'successors his Dominions beyond the Mississippi." His
1. It is commonly supposed that Bonaparte sold Louisiana for the purpose of raising money from the necessity of replenishing a depleted treasury. This is a mistake. It was a cardinal principle of Napoleon to make war support war. Pursuing this theory he resolved war into a game of loot, and he played the game well, robbing, pillaging, and practicing the most outrageous and extravagant extortions upon his fallen enemies. He virtually lived on plunder. It is true that at this time he was anticipating an extensive war and that money would be useful - yet that cannot be accurately considered as one of the principal motives that induced him to part with Louisiana.
108
The Purchase of Florida
Majesty should consider well "the immense importance of this offer to the Spanish crown and to reflect how far it may be in the power of any other nation to make an offer so truly valuable and precious as this is to Spain. One that the United States would never have made but from a con- viction of the indispensable necessity of their possessing a suitable establishment on this River and which this territory can alone furnish." 1
In a conference between these two officials held at the end of March the Spanish minister informed Pinckney "that Louisiana had been ceded to the French including the town of New Orleans," a statement which by the ordinary rules of construction can only mean that Louisiana as ceded to France comprised the territory to the west of the Mississippi besides the city of New Orleans. This question became the subject of bitter dispute in later years.
Spain realizing the danger of breaking with the United States and thus driving us to join England, the time for securing such a cession seemed most propitious. While our representatives were too late to prevent the cession of Louisiana they were largely instrumental in saving the Flor- idas from going the same way. 2 The Chevalier d'Yrujo, in a letter to the secretary of state in the summer of 1803, definitely stated that Spain must decline to cede the Flori- das because to do so would excite complaints from Euro- pean maritime powers, that it would injure the reputation of his Catholic Majesty thus to dismember his states and because "this compliance would be offensive to France who was desirous of having the cession of the Floridas, offering advantageous terms: and nevertheless his Majesty did not accede to it notwithstanding the ties and considerations which unite us with that power." 3
1. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Spanish Secretary of State, Feb. 4, 1803.
2. Vol. VI, Letters of Charles Pinckney, April 12, 1803.
3. D'Yrujo to Madison, July 2, 1803.
109
The Purchase of Louisiana
Cevallos, the Spanish minister, in a letter to Pinckney, similarly demurred to the proposition. "The system adop- ted by his Majesty," he writes, "not to dispossess himself of any portion of his states deprives him of the pleasure of assenting to the cessions which the United States wish to obtain by purchase, as I have intimated for their infor- mation to the Marquis de Casa Yrujo. By the retroces- sion made to France of Louisiana, that power regains the said province with the limits it had saving the rights ac- quired by other powers. The United States can address themselves to the French government to negotiate the acqui- sition of territories which may suit their interest." 1
An analysis of the instructions to Livingston and Mon- roe discloses the views held by our government with regard to the desired cession and the French control of New Or- leans and Louisiana proper. Jefferson felt that there was "on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans. . . .. France placing herself in that door, assumes to us an attitude of defiance."
The new master of the mouth of the Mississippi was not a person whom an eloquent dispatch could intimidate. Spain held Louisiana merely on sufferance and it could be obtained from her at any time we might care to force the issue. But Napoleon would not be content with a couple of trading posts in a territory which could easily be trans- formed into an empire. The object was to procure a ces-
1. Cevallos to Pinckney, May 4, 1803.
"El sistema adoptado por S. M. de no desprenderse de porcion alguna de sus estados le priva del gusto de condescender à las cesiones que por compra quieren obtener los Estados Unidos segun tengo manifes- tado para inteligencia de estos al Marques de Casa Yrujo. Por la retrocession hecha à la Francia de la Luisiana recobro esta Potentia decha Provincia con los limites con que la tubo y salvos los derechos adquiridos por otras potencias. La de los Estados Unidos podra derigirse al Gubierno Francese para negociar la adquisicion de Ter- ritorias que convengas à su interés."
٥٠
IIO
The Purchase of Florida
sion to the United States of "New Orleans and of West and East Florida or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with." It was not clear just what France had acquired. It was understood that she had secured New Orleans, as part of Louisiana, and if the Floridas had not been included in the cession it was con- sidered not improbable that they had since been added to it.
The danger of war with France was alluded to. If she held New Orleans, continued conflicts and hostilities · were certain ; and in such an event the United States would ally herself with Great Britain. The low ebb of French finances might persuade that country of the desirability of making a sale. The motives of France in securing Louisi- ana were then discussed.
I. The eastern states favoring Great Britain, by hold- ing Louisiana and the key to the commerce of the Missis- sippi River, France might be able to command the interests and attachments of the western states and thus either also control the Atlantic or seduce the western states into a separate government and a close alliance with herself.
2. The advancement of the commerce of France by an establishment on the Mississippi.
3. A further object with France might be the forma- tion of a colonial establishment having a convenient relation to her West India Islands and forming an independent source of supplies for them. The cession of the Floridas was particularly to be desired as obviating serious contro- versies that would otherwise grow out of the regulations, however liberal, which she might establish at the mouths of those rivers. The right of navigation to those rivers was indispensable to procure the proper outlets to foreign markets ; this was a claim so natural, so reasonable, and so essential that it must take place and in prudence ought to
III
The Purchase of Louisiana
be amicably and effectually adjusted without further delay.
In a plan of treaty embodied in the instructions the first article read :
"France cedes to the United States forever the territory east of the River Mississippi, comprehending the two Flor- idas, the Island of New Orleans, and the islands lying to the north and east of that channel of the said river which is commonly called the South Pass, together with all such other islands as appertain to either East or West Florida, France reserving to herself all her territory on the west side of the Mississippi." The commissioners were author- ized as the highest price to offer fifty million livres tournois, about $9,250,000, this sum to be applied to the claims of the citizens of the United States and the remainder to be paid to France. This price was to be the consideration for the cession of "the Island of New Orleans and both the Floridas." But should France be willing to dispose of only some parts of those territories the commissioners were in- structed that "the Floridas together are estimated at one- fourth the value of the whole Island of New Orleans, and East Florida, at one-half that of West Florida." If France refused to cede the whole Island of New Orleans, the com- missioners were instructed to buy a place sufficient for a commercial town on the bank of the Mississippi and to secure suitable deposits at the mouths of the rivers passing from the United States through the Floridas, as well as the free navigation of those rivers by citizens of the United States. 1
By supplementary instructions the commissioners were authorized to treat with Great Britain for an alliance against France, if France should decline to treat with the United States. War seemed not unlikely. For, if France denied
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, pp. 81-95. Madison to Livingston and Monroe, March 2, 1803.
*1
112
The Purchase of Florida
to this country the free navigation of the Mississippi, hostil- ities could not be avoided. 1
Our minister to Great Britain, Mr. King, had been informed by the British minister, Addington, that in the event of war between Great Britain and France, England would in all likelihood seize New Orleans. The commis- sioners were therefore directed in no event to guarantee to France the territory west of the Mississippi, as, should Great Britain conquer it, the United States would be placed. in a most embarrassing position. 2
At the time the negotiations for the purchase of Louis- lana were closed, Barbé-Marbois, the French minister, orally stipulated that France would never possess the Floridas, that she would relinquish all her rights and would aid us to procure them. 3 Cevallos in an interview with Pinckney expressed the greatest surprise at the cession of Louisiana to this country, since France, in receiving it from Spain, had promised never to part with it. The entire Spanish min- istry shared this feeling of chagrin and disappointment, real- izing how much better it would have been had Spain kept the colony and sold it directly to the United States. 4
The Duke of Parma, son-in-law of the king of Spain, was desirous of securing for himself the succession to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany that he might be raised to the dignity of king and have his dominions enlarged by the addition of Tuscany. France having promised these dis- tinctions and enlarged territory in Italy, Spain, by the treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1800, agreed to cede Louisiana which she had held for thirty-eight years. These terms of the treaty had not been carried out by France.
1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 113. Madison to Livingston and Mon- roe, April 18, 1803.
2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 131, Madison to Livingston and Monroe, May 28, 1803.
3. Livingston to Secretary of State, No. 74, April 13, 1803.
4. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Secretary of State, June 12, 1803.
II3
The Purchase of Louisiana
She had also agreed to secure the recognition of Russia and Great Britain for the king of Tuscany. This she had not accomplished. Furthermore she had agreed never to alien- ate the province to any nation except Spain.
On the fourth of September, 1803, and again on Sep- tember 27th and October 12th of the same year, D'Yrujo protested against the cession to this country on the ground that France could not, in consonance with the treaty, dispose of the province and, further, that the consideration for the cession between Spain and France had failed.
There can and should be no other way to judge of the acts of a nation than by applying to them the same rules that we consult in passing judgment upon the acts of men. Let us frame a case in municipal law, fitting the conditions as nearly as possible to those which existed in the relations between Spain, France and the United States with regard to the Louisiana purchase.
A enters into a contract to transfer to B a piece of property, in consideration of B's securing to him certain rights. B, however, does not perform his part and the consideration of the contract thus fails. The contract is thereby rendered void. B takes steps to transfer the prop- erty to C. A, learning of this, notifies C that B does not possess and cannot pass a good title. Even if C be a purchaser for value from B his title will not stand as against A. It is a rule of universal application that if a person acquiring either a legal or equitable estate has, at the time of acquisition, notice of an existing interest or estate in the subject matter possessed by a third party, he will be held to have acquired only such an interest or estate as the owner could honestly transfer. A court of competent juris- diction would, in the case supposed, not hesitate to restore full title and possession to A. Further let us suppose that B expressly contracts never to alienate the property except to retransfer it to A. Ignoring any irrelevant question, 8
114
The Purchase of Florida
which might arise as to whether such a contract violated the rule against perpétuities or was in restraint of trade, A's rights would be enforced by the courts, and title and pos- session restored to him were B to alienate the property to a purchaser with notice.
These were practically the conditions which existed in the history of the Louisiana acquisition. France had guar- anteed to Spain, as consideration for the transfer of Louis- iana to herself, to secure the recognition of the king of Tuscany by Great Britain and Russia. This France had not done, and the consideration having failed, the treaty was null and void. She had further agreed as part of the consideration never to alienate the province except to Spain. The United States was undoubtedly a purchaser with notice, for Spain on the fourth and twenty-seventh of September, and the twelfth of October, 1803, had served notice upon this country and protested against the sale. And fully as signifi- cant from the standpoint of municipal law is the fact that France, when she sold Louisiana to the United States, had not entered into possession, nor did she do so until December, 1803.
If we might suppose the dreams of the theorists real- ized and a court of international jurisdiction established, Spain as a litigant, applying the principles of municipal law, could have secured a decree compelling the United States to restore Louisiana to her; or had she so desired, she might have sued France for the original consideration and accompanying damages. 'The United States would have had recourse on France to secure the return of the purchase price. The author cannot believe that there are any two rules of right, one for nations and another for men. Nowhere does our religion teach two systems of ethics, but only one unalterable code, applicable alike to individuals and to nations. The only way to justify many of our national acts is to insist that there exists one code of morals by which
115
The Purchase of Louisiana
we shall judge of men and another by which we shall judge of nations. The answer of course is that all nations do the same - which is true to a large extent and also very dis- graceful. But custom does not make right or excuse wrong.
Many writers claim that Spain was estopped from pro- testing against the transfer of Louisiana to the United States, by the letter of Cevallos to Pinckney of May 4, 1803, wherein the following statement occurs : "The United States can address themselves to the French government to negotiate the acquisition of territories which may suit their interest." In the first place was the letter anything but an effort on the part of Cevallos to be rid of a persistently importuning minister, feeling as he did that Spain was protected by her treaty with France? Further the letter was undoubtedly written when Cevallos still expected Na- poleon to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of San Ildefonso. Later it became clear that the treaty was null and void for want of mutuality, and then Spain served notice on the United States who could not be considered an innocent purchaser.
A stronger nation, England for instance, would beyond doubt have appealed to the sword, but poor Spain, realizing her own helpless position and the futility of stronger repre- sentations, could only protest. She knew she could do no more, she knew that a resort to arms could only increase her humiliation and her losses - and the United States knew it too and treated her protests with silent contempt - and Louisiana became ours. When we realize the helpless- ness of Spain buffeted and kicked around by first England and then France, and our boot was in it too, we see in fact how little chance there was for her to secure any redress. Had she been a more virile power, and less hampered by misfortunes, she might have considered our acquisition of Louisiana, in spite of her representations, a casus belli.
The present time seemed most propitious for pushing
116
The Purchase of Florida
the Spanish government for a sale of the Floridas. War had been declared between Russia and France and there was every indication that by spring it would involve the entire continent. General Bournonville, the French am- bassador at Madrid, assured Pinckney that he had received directions from his government to promote a disposition in Spain to sell the Floridas to us. To French influence it was believed was due our failure to secure the coveted territory before. 1
"The Floridas are not included in the treaty, being, it appears, still held by Spain," wrote Madison to Pinckney. Although it was true that Spain had refused to alienate any part of her colonial possessions yet, "at the date of this refusal," continued the secretary of state, "it was probably unknown that the cession by France to the United States had been or would be made. This consideration with the kind of reasons given for the refusal and the situation of Spain resulting from the war between Great Britain and France lead to a calculation that at present there may be less repugnance to our views. . . But considering the motives which Spain ought now to feel for making the arrangement easy and satisfactory, the certainty that the Floridas must at no distant period find a way into our hands, and the tax on our finances resulting from the purchase of Louisiana which makes a further purchase immediately less convenient, it may be hoped as it is to be wished that the bargain will be considerably cheapened." 2 Pinckney follow- ing instructions, continued to address overtures to Cevallos, dwelling on the danger that Florida, from her position, might cause a rupture between Spain and the United States; that in reality the Floridas were a financial burden to Spain costing far more than they returned; and that the United States desired them from no spirit of aggrandizement or
1. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1803.
2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 135, Madison to Pinckney, July 29, 1803.
.......
117
The Purchase of Louisiana
dictate of ambition but merely to fill out the boundary and insure against future disputes.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.