USA > Kentucky > History of Kentucky, Volume II > Part 22
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The same attitude was popularly held throughout the state, and was expressed in numerous meetings condemning South Carolina and the doctrine of nullification, and praising Jackson for his firm stand for the Union.58 There seemed to be little political significance in these meet- ings; the fundamental feelings of the Kentuckians had been touched and that deep love and attachment for the Union welled up to assert itself forgetful of petty party advantages. Nevertheless, the Jacksonian demo- crats felt that their position in Kentucky had been greatly strengthened by the firm stand the President had taken.
Throughout this whole period of tariff discussion and evaluation of the Union, Kentucky had from the position she had taken tended to draw away from the traditional doctrines of the South, and hence had suffered in the estimation of most of the southern states. Much of Kentucky's trade was with this region, and consequently most of her prosperity de- pended upon it. Every year thousands of head of livestock streamed across the Cumberland Ford and through the Cumberland Gap on their way to the markets of South Carolina and of other Southern states. During the fall of 1821, there passed through Cumberland Gap 26,824 hogs, 5,070 horses, and 410 cattle, valued at $623, 180.59 During the next year, it was estimated, almost $800,000 worth of live-stock passed over the Cumberland Ford, while in 1828, it was estimated that live stock valued at more than $1,100,000 passed through the Gap.60 The South needed these Kentucky products, but it resented that state's position in national politics, and threatened to sever all trade relations with this region that failed to sympathize with the South.61 A boycott was urged, especially in South Carolina, where Clay was very unpopular. Upon hearing that he was sending 300 wagons laden with various Kentucky products to be disposed of in South Carolina, the Carolina traders re- solved to purchase nothing from these wagons. As it happened, three Kentucky wagons, in no way connected with Clay, were unjustly sus- pected, and forced to sell out at a great sacrifice or return with their
56 Niles' Register, Vol. 43, P. 352.
67 Acts of Kentucky, 1832, pp. 309-316. These resolutions were passed Feb. 2, 1833.
58 Argus, Feb. 27, et seq., 1833.
59 Niles' Register, Vol. 21, p. 400.
60 Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 259; Vol. 35, P. 402; Vol. 38, p. 108. The numbers were esti- mated as follows: Horses, 3,412; mules, 3,228; hogs, 97,455; sheep, 2,141 ; stall-fed beef cattle, 1,525.
61 See Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1900, I, 390.
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loads to Kentucky.62 Public meetings were held in many place to pass resolutions against trading with the Kentuckians and to strengthen the boycott. In reference to some of these meetings and resolutions, Clay said in 1832: "They [South Carolinians] must have supposed us as stupid as the sires of one of the descriptions of the stock [ referring to mules] of which that trade consisted if they imagined that their resolutions would affect our principles. Our drovers cracked their whips, blew their horns, and passed the Seleuda gap to other markets, where better humors existed, and equal or greater profits were made. I have heard of your successor in the other house, Mr. President, this anecdote : that he joined in the adoption of those resolutions ; but when, about Christmas, he ap- plied to one of his South Carolina neighbors to purchase the regular supply of pork for the ensuing year, he found that he had to pay two prices for it, and he declared if that were the patriotism on which the resolutions were based he would not conform to them." 63
With the nullification troubles out of the way, Jackson immediately set to work to carry out the will of the people, as he considered it had been expressed in the last election, to destroy the United States Bank. The fight had been forced upon him; now he would carry it to a con- clusion. Not only actuated by a natural hostility to the bank, but fearful that the bank might use its power immediately before its charter expired to call in its loans and produce a panic, Jackson decided to avert this possible evil by reducing the federal funds in the bank through depositing no more there and gradually drawing out the amount then present. Here- after, he would deposit the federal funds with the leading state banks. He had considerable trouble in finding a secretary of the treasury who would carry out this program; but finally Roger B. Taney agreed, and on October 1, 1833, the process was begun.
The whigs in Kentucky, mindful of Clay's leadership, were bitterly opposed to this raid on the people's prosperity by destroying the only sound banking institutions in their state. With the aid of certain demo- crats, they pushed through the Legislature, resolutions of strong protest The bank, they declared, could not be dispensed with "without a certain prospect of private and public distress," and it ought by all legitimate means to be re-chartered. Jackson's attempt to reduce the funds in the bank would operate "to the great oppression of its debtors and to the in- jury of every branch of trade and labor." The plan to deposit the na- tion's funds in state banks would greatly endanger the people's money ; and the bank Jackson would set up, "would be a dangerous institution, calculated to enlarge the powers of the executive department, and put to hazard the best interests of the people of the United States." 6ยช The next year resolutions to the same effect were passed, and the executive tyranny was again deprecated.65 As the funds of the bank were curtailed by the withdrawal of the federal money the branches were forced to call in their loans, which in turn produced distress among many indebted to the bank. The branch at Louisville was directed by the parent bank to call in more than $200,000 worth of loans. Signs of distress were soon evident, with loans called in, prices falling, and unemployment increasing. A meeting was held in Louisville to memoralize Congress on the question of the bank. "In the opinion of the memoralists, the first remedy for this state of things is the restoration of the deposits. They therefore pray
62 Letters on the Conditions of Kentucky in 1825, p. 72.
63 Colton, Life and Times of Henry Clay, I, 110.
64 Niles' Register, Vol. 43, p. 399.
65 Ibid., Vol. 45, P. 431. These resolutions were passed in the House only, by a vote of 53 to 41. The attempt was not made in the Senate as the result was feared. Argus, Feb. 5, 1834.
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that the deposits be restored, and such measures taken in relation to a National Bank as shall be most likely to afford relief to the Country." 6G
As the destruction of the branches of the United States Bank loomed up, Kentucky was threatened with the complete deprivation of all bank- ing facilities in the state. The democrats argued that it was a distinct advantage to be rid of these institutions as they were costing the people of the state over $300,000 a year, and it were much better that a state bank be set up. The democrats desired such a bank, also, in order to receive federal deposits that were being handed around to the so-called "Jackson pet banks." Governor Breathitt advocated a state bank in his message in 1833, and a bill was introduced to incorporate one, but it failed to pass.67 However, the Louisville Bank of Kentucky was chartered during this session. The question of the state bank became an issue in the August election for the Legislature, and the next Legislature elected was favorable to the idea. In February, 1834. the Bank of Ken- tucky was chartered to run thirty years, to be located in Louisville, and to have a capital of $5,000,000, of which the state should buy $2,000,000 worth of shares. Six branches were to be established, one each at Lex- ington, Frankfort, Maysville, Greensburg, Bowling Green, and Hopkins- ville.68 The following year the Legislature chartered the Northern Bank of Kentucky at Lexington, to have four branches, and to be capitalized at $3,000,000, of which the state would take $1,000,000.69 The state had now entered onto another period of government banking, but it had learned much in its former experiences and it was not now going to make the same mistakes again. Conservatism and sound principles were here- after to pre-eminently characterize Kentucky banking.
The whigs hoped to secure much political capital from Jackson's deal- ings with the bank. They in fact exaggerated the distress in the state. for party purposes ; and now began to pose as the only party that could bring prosperity. They preached hard times under democratic control in the state and nation, and declared that if the democrats won in the next gubernatorial election the farmers could count on getting $2.00 a hundred for their hemp and laborers would draw 50 cents a day for their wages. As the democrats commented on it, "we were all told that our rivers, lakes, and canals were to be one extended scene of hideous desolation, and that the sun and moon were to be darkened." 70 The whigs stood out pre-eminently for internal improvements, and at federal expense where possible. They held their accustomary conventions prior to the different state elections, and sought to keep their party knit to- gether in all the ways best known to them. They turned Fourth of July celebrations into whig festivities, and hoped, thereby, to monopolize the patriotic sentiment of the state. In their Fourth of July convention and celebration at Frankfort in 1834. they, however, failed to beguile the Lexington Light Infantry to "participate in the Whig festival" on account of its political nature.71
The democrats profited from the strong position Jackson had attained for his party throughout the nation. His handling of nullification in South Carolina stood well with Kentuckians generally, and his dealings with the bank had not produced the dire results predicted by the whigs. They, too, were in favor of internal improvements in the state, but the state should pay for them. However, they would not have powerful
66 Ben Casseday, The History of Louisville (Louisville, 1852), 188, 189; Argus, Aug. 5, 1835.
67 Argus, Mar. 13, 1833.
68 Basil W. Duke, History of the Bank of Kentucky (Louisville, 1895), 24-64; American Almanac, 1836, p. 245; Argus, Feb. 19, 1834; Collins, History of Ken- tucky, I, 39.
69 American Almanac, 1836, p. 245.
70 Argus, Aug. 5, 1835.
71 Argus, July 2, 9, 1834.
JOHN JORDAN CRITTENDEN, 1787-1863 (Courtesy of The Filson Club)
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private companies incorporated with permission to exact from the people high tolls, as they charged the whigs with favoring.72 They were a party of common people, who stood for the interests of the common people first, and gloried in the fact, and as they judged themselves, "a large majority of the intelligent farmers and mechanics of the country, belong to, and support the democratic side of the question." But according to the same authority the whigs are made up of the "would be nobility of Frankfort, comprising bank, railroad, and turnpike monopolists" and "they constitute the principal strength of the party. * * * "73
Strong as they were nationally, the democrats found their strength hard to maintain in the state, though. The state elections steadily went against them. After the August election of 1834, the parties in the Legislature were estimated as twenty-one whigs and sixteen democrats in the Senate and seventy-four whigs and twenty-five democrats in the House. The following year John J. Crittenden was sent to the United States Senate by a vote of ninety-four to forty for James Guthrie, the democratic candidate." The democrats had suffered a misfortune in the death of Governor Breathitt in the early part of 1834; for the lieutenant- governor Morehead, who now succeeded to the governorship, was a whig. A considerable amount of bitterness had arisen out of the result- ing circumstances. The succession of Morehead to the governor's chair, left the Senate without a speaker, and James Guthrie had been elected by the democratic majority to fill the vacancy. But on the convening of the Senate in the next session, the whigs, who had captured this body in the preceding August election, declared that Guthrie had been elected only for the session of 1833, and that a new speaker should now be chosen. Having a majority, they proceeded to elect James Clarke, one of their own party, despite the protests by the democrats of irregularity. In the next campaign the democrats bitterly assailed the whigs for this usurpation and political proscription.73 The gubernatorial campaign of 1836, was vigorously carried on by both parties, with James Clarke and Charles A. Wickliffe running for governor and lieutenant-governor re- spectively as whigs, and Mathew Flournoy and Elijah Hise, as democrats. The whigs were successful by majorities varying from 3,000 to 8,000.
The campaign for the presidency of 1836, was begun early in Ken- tucky. as was the custom; and much of the parryings for advantages in the state elections was designed to aid the cause in the National election. The whigs never allowed an opportunity to escape them to attack Jackson and the executive tyranny they charged him with building up. Provoked by Jackson's dealing with the United States Bank, George M. Bibb, called upon the Kentuckians to help destroy him: "Fellow citizens, arise in the majesty of your power ; be watchful; your liberties are insidiously as- sailed. The Government established by our ancestors is about to be converted into an odious tyranny. The power and influence of the Gov- ernment is about to be made greater than the rights and influence of the people. The passport to office is the indiscriminate support of every act of the president : brawling partisans are rewarded from the public treas- ury; freedom of opinion is threatened with dismissal from office; and office holders, senators and representatives are taught to expect promo- tion, according to their zealous support of the most questionable or the more odious acts of the administration. The executive influence is brought into contest with the freedom of elections, and with the freedom of inquiry in the halls of Congress. The expenditures of the Government are increasing to enlarge the patronage of the Government; and the
72 Ibid., July 27, 1836.
73 Argus, Aug. 12, 1835. 74 Niles' Register, Vol. 47, pp. 7, 356.
75 Argus, Jan. 21, 1835.
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patronage of the Government so increased as to be exerted to sustain the president and the receivers of salaries, jobs and contracts. The people are to be governed by their own servants and money, by fraud and deceit. I see no remedy but by the people in their primary assemblies and at the polls. They must cause their interests and sentiments to be respected ; they must make known that the people are to be represented; that repre- sentatives are the trustees and agents of the people, and not the servants of the president." 76 As a method of striking at Jackson, efforts were made in the Legislature to have the Federal Constitution amended so as to prevent a President from serving but one term, of six years duration ; to greatly restrict his power of veto ; and to take away his right to dismiss from office any one for whose appointment the concurrence of the senate was necessary, unless the senate should agree.77
Kentucky was much interested in the question of the public lands, and the whigs found much to their disliking in Jackson's plan of dealing with it. This problem was closely bound up with Federal aid to internal improvements and the disposition of the surplus revenues. Jackson pro- posed to have Congress turn over the public lands in each state to that state, so that it might use the proceeds of their sale for internal improve- ments if it so desired. As Kentucky was a landless state it naturally objected, and Clay was quick to carry forward the opposition. He would have a certain percentage of the sales turned over to the state in which the land lay and the remainder kept in the national treasury for general use. The Kentucky Legislature declared that the public lands were not "of right, the property of the particular states in which they lie, nor that of the people of such states; and therefore, the Congress of the United States ought not to cede such lands to such states, or any of them; or to appropriate such lands for any purpose whatever, but in behalf, and for the benefit of the people of all the states;" and that when the public debt was paid off the moneys arising from the sale of such lands "ought to be distributed among the several states according to the federal num- bers of each state." A long argument in defense of this position was set forth.78 These views were reiterated in 1836.79 The question of the surplus was finally settled by lending it to the states without interest in- definitely.80
As Jackson had served his two terms, another candidate would have to be produced by the democrats. But as the president's hold on his party was so complete, it was only a question as to whom he would have. The Kentucky democrats, therefore, did not concern themselves with this matter; but the vice-presidency was of early and considerable interest to them. Richard M. Johnson had long been prominent in Kentucky and a strong supporter of Jackson. The Kentucky democrats believed he should be nominated for this office; and they began to boom him two
76 Niles' Register, Vol. 46, pp. 416, 417.
77 This was an interesting forerunner of the famous Tenure of Office Act passed to curtail the power of President Johnson in the days of Reconstruction. The pro- posed amendment follows: "The president of the United States shall not remove any officer, in whose appointment the concurrence of the senate shall be necessary; but, for sufficient cause, he may suspend such officer from the exercise of the duties of his office; but he shall within the first ten days after the commencement of the next session of the senate, lay before that body the cause of such suspension. The cause of such suspension shall then be considered by the senate; and if it shall be deemed sufficient, the officer so suspended, shall be adjudged to be removed from his office; but if the senate shall consider the same insufficient, the suspension of the said officer shall immediately cease, and he be restored to all the rights and privileges of his office." Niles' Register, Vol. 45, p. 416.
78 Niles' Register, Vol. 43, P. 399. Passed in the session of 1832, 1833.
79 American State Papers, Public Lands, VIII, p. 657.
80 The Panic of 1837 soon upset this plan; and the question of the lands was still brought up by Kentucky at intervals and discussed and resolved upon. See Acts of Kentucky, 1840, pp. 271-275.
Vol. II-10
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years before the election. Numerous meetings were held widely over the state during the spring and summer of 1834, to stir up enthusiasm for him, and the democrats in the Legislature recommended him. On April 10, 1834, a state convention was held in Frankfort for the purpose of bringing him forward as Kentucky's candidate. An address was issued to the people praising his record, lauding Jackson, and bitterly assailing the United States Bank. 81 He possessed the valuable asset of a military record, and this was not forgotten. The Battle of the Thames was re- enacted in long and glowing addresses on its anniversaries in 1834, 1835, and 1836; and thousands were reminded in these political celebrations of the valor and generalship of Col. Richard M. Johnson : and the old dispute as to whether he killed Tecumsehi was as bitterly and prominently dis- cussed as the Bank, the public lands, or the surplus.82
The democratic national convention was held in Baltimore on May 20, 1835, and Martin Van Buren, "Jackson's man," was announced for the Presidency, while Kentucky was delighted to see Johnson receive the nomination for the Vice-Presidency. Although Jackson was not a can- didate for any office whatsoever, still the old political game of voting to fire a salute on January 8, was played again with the democrats losers. Deprived of the privilege of having the state fire the salute in its own name and at its own expense, the Jackson democrats fired it in their own right and name and payed for it themselves.83
The Kentucky whigs had a rather dismal outlook in the presidential campaign. Their own favorite son and inspiration was not a candidate at this time ; and in the absence of his commanding personality, a number of candidates sprang up over the country, representing, each one, his own section. William Henry Harrison. of Tippecanoe fame, came out in the Northwest; Daniel Webster in the Northeast; Senator White in the Southwest, and Judge John McLean in Ohio. The best the whigs could hope for was for the election to be thrown into the House of Representa- tives. Kentucky was unable to rouse much enthusiasm for Old Tippe- canoe, and the whigs feared they might not give him a majority. A Kentucky whig wrote Crittenden in 1834, "As things stand at present I know it will be a difficult task & require much effort to carry the State for the Nominee." 84 Nevertheless the state seemed to be so completely under the spell of Clay that all signs pointed to a whig victory. In a special election in 1834, called to settle the congressional contest between Thomas P. Moore and Robert P. Letcher, the latter candidate, a whig. nosed out a victory ; and in the general congressional election of the fol- lowing year, nine whigs were elected to four democrats.85 The whigs, nevertheless, did not slacken their efforts as the election approached. The democrats accused them of searching the militia rolls for the names of those whose cases needed special and personal attention and of having in secret : "Resolved, That they procure horses, carriages or other con- veyances for the sick, lame, blind, and all others who have no conveyance of their own, to enable them to get to the polls." 86 The gubernatorial election in August indicated a whig victory, and so it was. Harrison defeated Van Buren by a majority of 3.520, with the total vote cast by the state almost 10,000 short of the preceding Presidential election, when Clay and Jackson were running.s7 But the whigs were surprised and
81 Argus, March 5, 1834.
82 For example, see Argus, Oct. 15, 1834.
83 Argus, Jan. 8, 1834.
84 Crittenden MSS., Vol. 6, Nos. 1164, 1165.
85 Niles' Register, Vol. 45, pp. 20, 41, 290, 365; Vol. 46, pp. 177, 193, 194, 207, 208, 220, 246-248, 263, 264, 412; Vol. 49, P. 4. 86 Argus, Oct. 19, 1836.
87 Argus, November, passim, 1836.
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disappointed to learn that Van Buren had received 170 electoral votes to 124 for all his opponents, and had therefore been elected.
Jackson had scarcely retired to the "Hermitage" and Van Buren taken up the reigns of government when the most severe panic the coun- try had ever known burst upon the people. Prices rapidly declined, factories shut down, and banks called in their loans and closed their doors. The fundamental causes were largely the same as for all panics- over-production and states and individuals engaging in projects far be- yond their resources. But Jackson's specie circular, issued in the sum- mer of 1836, declaring that public lands must be paid for in gold or silver, his dealing with the United States Bank, and other acts of the democrats were held responsible for the hard times. Kentucky was now engaged in an ambitious project of internal improvements, and her citizens were embarking in speculative enterprises. The revival of banks here had served to multiply the circulating medium, and everyone seemed to have forgotten hard times. The blow fell swift and hard. The banks suspended specie payment, and when the Legislature met in 1837, it re- fused to compel them to resume.88 An outcry for a special session had arisen during the summer, but Governor Clarke had steadily refused to call it, but now in the regular session he counseled the banks and all creditors to be lenient with the debtors, and the charters of the banks should not be forfeited for their suspension of specie payment.89 Great consideration and forbearance was exercised everywhere. Many of the towns issued small paper currency to relieve the scarcity of money. Maysville issued script in the denominations of 614, 121/2, 25, 50 and 100 cents, while Lexington issued a considerable amount which, however, the butchers refused to accept. The Danville, Lancaster and Nicholasville Turnpike Road issued about $20,000 in notes, which steadily fell in value.90 The brunt of the panic in 1837 was broken and the people felt as though the worst was past. Governor Clarke, in his message to the Legislature in 1838, said: "By the prudent course on the part of the banks; by the energy of the people and the abundant products of the soil, the severity of the shock has been but little felt, the price of the property sustained, and the commercial interest of the State pro- tected." 91 But this was only a temporary lull, for in 1839 conditions became aggravated again. The banks, which had resumed specie pay- ment, were now forced to suspend again, and it became evident that payment of the mass of debts held in abeyance could not be avoided much longer. State finances were in a bad condition, with no market for her bonds in the East. The governor as a last remedy begged 200 patriotic and public spirited Kentuckians to each buy one $1,000 state bond and thus raise $200,000, urgently needed to complete internal im- provements then under way.92 The real force of the panic was to come later.
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