USA > Kentucky > History of Kentucky, Volume II > Part 45
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"I have reason to believe that we could, last winter and spring, have corrupted the Yankee army and fed and clothed our own by a judicious use of cotton. British gold was one of England's most effective weapons in Revolutionary days and came near taking West Point, and I believe that Southern cotton could have saved Vicksburg when Southern arms were powerless to do so." 37
Although the Confederate Government forbade its citizens to trade with the enemy or carry cotton toward the northern lines, the Govern- ment, itself, entered into contracts with certain persons who promised to pass into the Confederacy large quantities of bacon, shoes, clothing, and other necessaries, in return for cotton. The army officers were given orders to pass out through their lines cotton contracted for in this way. It appears, however, that the Confederacy was never able to get a large amount of material by this method. It generally happened that these special agents could not fulfill their part of the contract. This system was also attacked as inconsistent with the policy in force for private individuals.38 As the Federal armies overrun the South there came to be little semblance of trade restrictions on the part of the Confederacy. The whole system became disorganized, and people traded with whom they pleased, unless prevented by the Federal Gov- ernment. And, if the Federal military commanders were correct, the Confederacy profited much more from this disorganization than from their own regulations. A naval officer described the conditions existing in the Lower Mississippi Valley as "reeking with a corruption more pestilential and fatal than the malaria of its swamps. * * *" "In trade, at least," he continued, "the dull quiet of annihilation is prefer- able to the baleful activity that springs from fermenting and festering decay of all the higher and more noble elements of commercial life." 39
The constant evasions of both the Federal and Confederate trade regulations, show how the human instinct to trade and make money could not be checked by the efforts of even both governments. The con- stant friction between the treasury and army officials, the ever changing regulations supposedly to meet new conditions as the army advanced, the disorganization of the Confederacy as it was further pierced-these made a very distasteful trade situation in which the most brazen made the greatest fortunes.
Kentucky presented many difficulties to the Federal Government during the Civil war both commercially and politically. Although the state had refused to secede from the Union, still it did not by that action pledge its unquestioned support to the Federal authorities in whatever they should see fit to do. At least a half of her population were either openly arrayed against the Federal authorities or were sul-
36 Ibid., Vol. XXXI, Part 3, pp. 744, 745.
37 Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXI, Part 3, p. 834.
38 Ibid., Vol. XVII, Part 2, pp. 839, 840; Vol. XXVI, Part 2, pp. 418, 558; Vol. LII, Part 2, p. 701.
39 Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXIX, Part 2, p. 267.
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lenly silent ; and this was by far the more effective half. This very condition greatly multiplied the difficulties in dealing with the other half supposed to be loyal; for stern repression against a great part of the commonwealth was sure to have its reflex upon the loyal population. But just here the United States Government was in a dilemma. If it did not resort to stern measures the Confederate sympathizers would be certain to boldly aid the South; but if it did practice repression, it would largely alienate the whole state. It chose the latter method of dealing with the situation.
One of the prime tenets of the policy adopted was that the Confed- erate sympathizers should get as little comfort as possible out of the war. They were to be discriminated against in every way; and too often it was very difficult to draw the line between the Confederate sympa- thizers and the Union sympathizers. The Confederate sympathizers were forbidden to engage in any trade of any character through the re- fusal of agents to issue them permits, under which all trade must be carried on. In order to safeguard the rights to trade, the following oath was required : "I do solemnly swear that I have not by word or action given the slightest aid and comfort to the present rebellion, and that by my conversation and action I will do all I can to discourage and discountenance and overthrow the rebellion, and will use all my influ- ence to restore the authority of the Government of the United States over the States now in rebellion." 40 It soon became necessary for a Kentuckian to establish his loyalty before he should be permitted to engage in commerce even locally within the state.41 General Burnside issued an order prohibiting anyone disloyal to the Federal Government from shipping produce or goods of any kind, in, into or through the state.42 Kentuckians establishing their loyalty might obtain permits for 20 cents each.43 But the idea of permitting a Kentuckian to do what he considered himself always to have had a legal and constitutional right to do, seemed preposterous to him. It worked badly on all sides. Ken- tucky was made a region unto herself, although legally and constitu- tionally it was as much a part of the Union as Massachusetts. People were restricted in their trade with Kentucky just as if it were a part of the insurrectionary region. The Federal Government was always laboring under the apprehension that trade with Kentucky was very likely to develop into trade with the Confederacy. These trade restric- tions were criticized by traders out of the state as well as in. Cincin- nati protested against the petty oppressions of the system, while a storm of protest arose among Kentuckians. ++ Governor Bramlette bitterly denounced them in a letter to Lincoln: "The ordinary and necessary trade of the State is now, by military trade regulations, subjected to restrictions which harass the citizen without any compensating public good and which wears more the phase of subjecting the citizens to odi- ous political tests than looking to the public good." 45
Southwestern Kentucky was the first part of the state to fall under the yoke and here it fell hardest and remained longest. This region was undoubtedly the most sympathetic to the Confederacy. Columbus and Hickman were early occupied by Confederate troops, and then seized by the Federals. As has been noted before, trade with this part of the
40 Official Records, Series III, Vol. IV, Part 4, p. 690.
41 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Nov. 14, 1862.
42 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 115, 138.
43 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, March 31, 1862. This is the copy of a permit to people living out of the state to deal with persons in the state: "This is to certify that . . . of . . . . . County, State of . .... has permission to ship . . . out of and into the State of Kentucky." Official Records, Series III, Vol. IV, 690.
44 This shows the unity of sentiment along both banks of the Ohio River.
45 Official Records, Series III, IV, pp. 688-690.
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state had been early put under the ban and for a time the people seem to have been cut off from all lines of supply and to have suffered genuine distress. Many of the business houses in Paducah were closed, and in Owensboro a majority of the leading merchants "are doing no busi- ness at all-some because they are known to be traitors, and therefore, can get no goods, and others, because they are afraid to lay in a stock. * *
*" 46 A report on this general region said, "There are now no groceries, no goods nor money, in our section of the State." 47
When the Federal troops occupied this region, they interfered very little with the trade restrictions that had been placed upon it. It was still a no-man's land in the commercial field; steamers might not stop between Evansville (Indiana) and Paducah.48 Ostensibly loyal men were allowed to engage in trade ; but it was very difficult for a Kentuckian here to convince the Federal officers and agents that he was loyal. But despite rules and regulations, this region did trade, and it did it almost exclusively with the Confederates. For a time much material reached the South by being taken across the southern part of Illinois through Jonesborough and thence across the Mississippi River into Missouri and thence southward.49 To break up this traffic Grant ordered all trade between Kentucky and Illinois stopped.50 With this avenue cut off the resourceful traders resorted to trickery. Barrels and boxes containing one thing would be marked another. Grant said of a con- signment of goods, "Eighty barrels of this freight were whisky; a character of commerce I would have no objection to being carried on with the South, but there is a probability that some barrels marked whisky might contain something more objectionable." 51 This freight was being taken directly down the river. An overland trade across the border into Tennessee also went on unchecked. A large amount of live stock was driven southward from Union, Crittenden, Graves, Marshall, Calloway, Trigg, Lyon, and Caldwell counties, and "Large quantities of salt, flour, coffee, sugar, leather, etc., are taken from Franklin south via Tyree Springs, by persons having no military per- mits to ship or take goods south." 52
Early in 1864, the treasury ordered all restrictions removed from trade in Kentucky and Missouri. The Federal commander at Cairo immediately complained to Grant that "goods going from Cairo, Pa- ducah, and Hickman will undoubtedly reach Tennessee if unrestricted, as I have not sufficient force to guard the whole border." 53 This order had its reflex, for it was soon charged that the railroads from Columbus to Union City (Tennessee) and from Paducah to Mayfield were being taken up to a great extent in transporting goods to the Confederacy and especially to Forrest's cavalry which were in this region at this time.54 The Federal commander at Cairo said of this trade, "For the past few months the interior of Western Kentucky has been filled with war- like stores and army supplies of every kind.
"The loose administration of Treasury regulations, the complicity of both Treasury and Army officers, have given free course to this in- famous traffic." 55 The Union League of America at Paducah pro- tested that the "Rebels are doing all the business, and they are reaping
46 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Dec. 2; October 29, 1861.
47 Ibid., Dec. 14.
48 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Oct. 29, 1862.
49 Official Records, Series I, Vol. VII, pp. 510, 511.
50 Ibid., 449.
51 Ibid., Vol. VIII, 404.
52 Ibid., Vol. XX, Part 2, p. 172; Vol. VII, 472; Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Dec. 5, 1861.
53 Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part 2, p. 427.
54 Ibid., Part I, p. 512.
55 Ibid., Part 3, p. 233.
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all the advantages of trade." 56 As a last resort to effectually stop this commerce, the Federal commander at Cairo, on his own authority, on April 2, 1864, issued a general order forbidding steamers to land between Paducah and Memphis. The use of all ferry boats, trading boats, skiffs, or other irregular crafts was forbidden on this part of the river ; and all trains out of Columbus and Paducah were prohibited ex- cept for military purposes.57 On April 13, the following treasury order tardily followed, "All trade in arms and munitions of war in Kentucky and on the Mississippi River below Cairo is hereby prohibited." 58 Southwestern Kentucky was in fact sending to the Confederacy much commerce which could not have originated with her. The only con- clusion is that these commodities came originally from the North and that this region was an important link in an illicit trade from the North to the Confederacy, that was never completely broken up.
The Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, running into the Ohio through Western Kentucky were also important highways to the Con- federacy. Commerce on these rivers was never completely sealed, even by orders. In November of 1861, a steamer and barge in two were allowed to pass up into Tennessee, as they bore the seal of the custom house inspector. Although loaded with cotton mill machinery, it was given permission to proceed, since it was consigned to "Union men." 59 The Upper Cumberland, which flows into Southern and Western Ken- tucky after making its great bend into Tennessee, was used by the Con- federates for getting out coal and salt, until the fall of Nashville.60 By the middle of March, 1862, the Federal troops, having taken posses- sion of Northwestern Tennessee, opened up traffic to Nashville, placing it in the hands of treasury officials.61 The people on the Upper Cum- berland were notified, "that they can ship coal and produce to Nash- ville, and find a market there." 62 Much tobacco found an outlet this way.63 A typical news item in the Louisville Journal said, "The Com- modore Perry passed up yesterday from the Cumberland with a heavy cargo of tobacco." 64 Halleck encouraged steamers to take goods up to Nashville as a ruse to get steamboats for a military move up the river.65 On June 21, 1862, the Tennessee River was also opened to trade under licenses from the custom house inspectors. As in all other trade going south, contraband of war was excluded.66 But the eternal question with the army officers and custom house officials was what contraband in- cluded. All seemed to know that "family and plantation supplies" should go.67 And it was generally believed that "boots, shoes, blankets, woolen socks, leather of all descriptions, medicines, gray and mixed woolen cloths, and jeans, and all descriptions of saddlery" should be stopped.68 Grant was very much opposed to this trade, as, indeed, he was with all trade in the wake of the army. He seems to have become disgusted with the whole business and ordered the Federal commander at Nashville to take no trouble about going to Kentucky, as the treasury officials were supposed to manage the trade of this region.69 But this trade
56 Ibid., Vol. XXXIX, Part 2, p. 171.
57 Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part 1, p. 515.
58 Ibid., Vol. XLI, 535-
59 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Nov. 25, 1861.
60 Ibid., Jan. 16, 1862.
61 Ibid., March 8, 1862. 62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., June 24, 1862; Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part 2, p. 74.
64 April 21, 1862, quoted in Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 22. 65 Official Records, Series I, Vol. X, Part 2, p. 18.
66 Ibid., Vol. XVII, Part 2, p. 21.
67 Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXI, Part 3, P. 304.
68 Ibid., Vol. XXXII, Part 2, p. 137.
69 Ibid., 453.
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was never freed from suspicion. A military officer wrote Sherman, "There is something wrong about these trading boats that run up the Tennessee River. The rebels never take them except when they want to cross a few men, and let them go, and a week or two afterwards the boats report the facts at Paducah. If half the stories I hear of them are true, they are continually violating the trade regulations, and, whether they do or not, they cannot expect to trade with any one but rebels in that country." 70
The commercial welfare of the state lay not only with external regions ; it was first concerned with internal conditions. In the early part of the war, the Confederate armies were in control of much of the state, from which they were largely provisioned and equipped. But they were soon pushed far to the south, and although still provisioned to a considerable extent from Kentucky stores, they escaped the denun- ciations heaped upon occupying armies. After the first year of the war, the Confederates occupied the state in force only for short periods, as in the case of Bragg and Kirby Smith's invasion of 1862; or engaged in smaller raids, as those by John Morgan. In the occupation of 1862, the Confederates for a short while controlled large parts of the state, and took full advantage to replenish their stores as far as possible.71 However, they attempted to carry out their operations in an orderly way, so as not to alienate Kentucky opinion. In pursuance of this policy Kirby Smith issued the following proclamation, "I shall enforce the strictest discipline, in order that the property of citizens and non-com- batants may be protected. I shall be compelled to secure subsistence for my troops among you, and this shall be paid for." 72 In Lexington, alone, the Confederates bought 7,000 barrels of pork and $90,000 worth of clothing. For this and all other purchases, they paid the Confederate script. As a result Confederate script came to be used rather exten- sively for a time in commercial transactions,73 until in April, 1863, General Burnside ordered the arrest of anyone dealing in this kind of money.74 Even with their raiding parties driven out, the Confederates managed to obtain considerable amounts of provisions until the collapse of the Confederacy.75
The Union armies operating in or near the state also obtained large supplies from Kentucky storehouses. Vouchers were given promising payment later, if the loyalty of the holders could be established.76 This was used as a threat against lukewarm Union supporters aiding the Confederacy in the future, and a punishment for those who were already guilty of disloyalty. Only those professing their loyalty were given army contracts or work connected with them.77 These measures pro- duced the bitterest resentment and widespread confusion, as their prac- tical result was the confiscation of large amounts of material. In the spring of 1862, large army bases were established at Lexington and Richmond, with thousands of men engaged in hauling stores.78 Many, who no doubt were unable to obtain contracts for themselves, saw money-making subordinated to patriotism. One of those who was either disgruntled or strongly patriotic asked, "Is this a peoples' war for the Union, for the maintenance of our country, and those principles upon which this Republic was first established? or is it a contractors' and
70 Ibid., Part 3, p. 150.
71 See Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 113.
72 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Sept. 5, 1862.
73 Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Sept. 16; Oct. 25, 1862.
74 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 122.
75 Ibid., 347.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 133.
78 W. H. Perrin, History of Fayette County, Kentucky (Chicago, 1882), 455; Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Sept. 1, 1862.
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brass button war, for the benefit of unscrupulous money makers and Brigadier-Generals ?" 79
Some effort was made to direct the use of materials where they could be best used. In 1863, General Boyle, in command of the Ken- tucky region, ordered the distillers of Bourbon and Harrison counties to deliver the corn they had purchased to the quartermaster, and for- bade them to purchase more.80 In the early part of the next year the distillation of corn was prohibited throughout the state. But the opposi- tion aroused was so strong that the order was later revoked.81
Kentuckians were by no means pleased with those who were strip- ping their state of its provisions, and most of this anger went out against the Federal authorities as they were in control and were, therefore, chiefly responsible. As noted heretofore, the Confederates were never in the state long enough to incur the enmity of the people to a great extent by seizures, and the provisions that they continued to receive were obtained through trafficking and bargaining and not through the requisitions of an occupying army. The Louisville Journal bewailed the spoliation of the state by the Union military authorities: "Hun- dreds of drovers are daily driving off our horses and cattle and hogs, and almost interminable trains of wagons are hauling away our bacon and pork and all kinds of breadstuff. * * The genius of starva- tion that has been stalking grimly among rebel armies and rebel citizens, may haunt our own homes." 82 Governor Robinson saw something more than hunger staring the people in the face. The sovereignty of Kentucky had been invaded; and the state was being treated as a con- quered province. Instead of allowing the Kentucky farmer to bargain and traffic with the armies, as was the case north of the Ohio River, the Federal authorities took what they wanted and left worthless vouch- ers. He bitterly resented this wholesale plundering of the state.83 In 1864, the Legislature called upon the state's congressmen at Washing- ton to press the clainis of the Kentucky farmers for damages done by the Federal arinies. 84
In line with this general policy of requisitioning stores and provi- sions at the will and convenience of the Federal military authorities was the so-called "hog frauds" and "hog orders," which gravely agi- tated the state for a time. On October 28, 1864, Major-General Bur- bridge, in command of Kentucky, issued an order, which seemed inno- cent enough. All persons having hogs for sale were asked to sell them to government agents, who would pay "a fair market value." There was no intention of limiting the "amount deemed necessary to be packed for family use, but it is hoped that all will willingly sell to the Gov- ernment any excess of personal wants, and not allow so much to be packed in the country as to invite raids for its capture." The details of this business were left to Maj. H. C. Symonds, the commissary of subsistence of the army.85 Symonds immediately taking it upon him- self to gather up a large number of hogs issued an order stating that he would receive droves of fifty or more and would pay a "just and fair market rate, as may be deemed proper from day to day." He de- clared he was making no threats of impressment, but he hoped all would see fit to sell, and that when contracts were made they would have to be carried out. The Government had the first claim, he continued,
79 Ibid., Jan. 10, 1862.
80 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 128.
81 Ibid., 130, 131.
82 Oct. 4, 1862, quoted in Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Oct. 6, 1862.
83 In message to the Legislature, January 8, 1863, in Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Jan. 9, 1863. 84 Acts of Kentucky, 1863, p. 141.
85 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 144.
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and he would "take steps to secure such results." 86 To carry out his policy agents were appointed for the congressional districts and "no hogs will be allowed to be taken out of the district by any one but agents." All other markets were completely prohibited. The Cincin- nati market was closed by an order threatening confiscation of all hogs driven toward the Ohio River, and the arrest and detention of the owners.87 Louisville buyers, according to Governor Bramlette, "were warned off under threats of arrest and confiscation * * *" 88 As
the price paid by the Government agents was much lower than the mar- ket price, the farmers lost on an average of $5 on the head.
Soon the most intense excitement was aroused over these proceed- ings. Governor Bramlette sought relief from President Lincoln, while the farmers began to refuse to sell to the agents.89 Finally on Novem- ber 27, Burbridge issued this order, "All orders from these headquarters affecting the hog trade in Kentucky are revoked." 90 But during only one month of this collusion between speculators and dishonest Gov- ernment agents, 60,000 hogs had been bought up and the farmers cheated out of large sums of money. Governor Bramlette said, "The hog swin- dle was promptly ended, but not until the farmers had sustained losses to at least $300,000; yet in time to save them the loss of over one mil- lion dollars." 91 It was due to President Lincoln's interference that this speculation was finally broken up.
During the latter period of the war the most minute regulations were set up to govern commercial intercourse, locally as well as otherwise. "Boards of trade" were appointed in every congressional district, on the authority of the military officers alone, which for certain fees "were to pass upon and determine who should buy and sell, not only in the ordinary course of trade, but for family supplies. As administered in Kentucky, it was a most shameful and corrupt system of partisan political corruption and oppression." 92 These boards became dictatorial in the smallest detail. The Maysville Bulletin which had incurred the displeasure of a board of trade was not allowed to purchase white print paper. But rather than suspend, for a time it used wrapping paper.93 The Frankfort Common- wealth claimed that "Hundreds-we may say thousands-of persons had paid to the Revenue Collector in Ky. a license tax to transact for twelve months a particular kind of business, who were refused a permit by these boards." 94 These petty regulations were often used for partisan political ends.95 Bound up with this system of "boards of trade" were the provost marshals. Of these a contemporary said, "Kentucky endured far more outrage from the acts of the Federal provost marshals than they did from all the acts of legitimate war put together." 96
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