History of Kentucky, Volume II, Part 43

Author: Kerr, Charles, 1863-1950, ed; Connelley, William Elsey, 1855-1930; Coulter, E. Merton (Ellis Merton), 1890-
Publication date: 1922
Publisher: Chicago, and New York, The American Historical Society
Number of Pages: 680


USA > Kentucky > History of Kentucky, Volume II > Part 43


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13 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 88.


14 John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln (New York: n. d.), VI, 357-361. Letter to O. H. Browning.


15 Ibid., 350, 351.


16 Shaler, Kentucky, 249.


JEFFERSON DAVIS


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its loyalty to Lincoln by opening our markets to its hemp fabrics. Let it lay in the bed it has chosen until it awakes to a sense of its duty as well as its interest. * * It is the clear duty of our Government * now to declare Kentucky under a blockade. * * Kentucky and the West must be made to feel this war, and feel it until they cry peccavi." 17


Under these conditions, neutrality was becoming distasteful to all parties concerned. The secessionists in the state and outside were becoming disgusted, while Unionists everywhere were becoming im- patient for what they strongly believed they would ultimately receive. On May 31, Joseph Holt wrote to Joshua F. Speed in a doubtful tone concerning neutrality. He said, "If, however, from a natural horror of fratricidal strife, or from her intimate social and business relations with the South, Kentucky shall maintain the neutral attitude assumed for her, by her legislature, her position will still be an honorable one, though falling far short of that full measure of loyalty which her history has so constantly illustrated." 18 But in less than two months he assumed a much stronger attitude, condemning neutrality and boldly calling upon the state to come out for the Union. He furthermore attempted to saddle the whole policy upon the scheming politicians.19


The people by this time were beginning to find themselves; they were taking sides, and when the decision should be complete, neutrality would automatically cease to exist. A number of elections were held during this period which gave an index into the general desires of the people. In May (1861) the delegates to the Border Slave State Convention, who were construed as favoring the Union received 110,000 votes, or about two-thirds of the votes of the state. For various reasons the open seces- sion ticket was withdrawn.20 In June of the same year there was held a special congressional election, in which the Union party won nine out of the ten congressmen and carried the state by a majority of 54,756.21 Also in the August following an election was held for a new State Legis- lature. Here again the side favorable to the Union won. It elected 76 to the House and 27 to the Senate; while the secessionists held 24 in the House and II in the Senate.22


These elections did not mean an endorsement of the Union at any price, but they were decisive against the state seceding. They were, furthermore, very encouraging to the strong Union leaders. They were equally discouraging to the secession leaders, who now began to debate whether the arbitrament of war should not settle what the elections had failed to do. And as a result of numerous causes and contributing factors, the Confederate forces seized Columbus and Hickman on Sep- tember 3.23 As a consequence of this action and an invasion of the east- ern part of the state by Zollicoffer, the Legislature, now made up of the newly elected members, definitely abandoned neutrality and took its stand for the Union. This was on September 18. The resolution an- nouncing the new policy follows: "WHEREAS, Kentucky has been in- vaded by the forces of the so-called Confederate States, and the com- manders of the forces so invading the State have insolently prescribed the conditions upon which they will withdraw, thus insulting the dignity


17 Quoted in Rebellion Record (New York, 1864), edited by Frank Moore, II, 72.


18 Joseph Holt to J. F. Speed, May 31, 1861 (New York, 1861). Published in separate pamphlet.


19 An Address by Honorable Joseph Holt to the People of Kentucky, July 13. 1861 (New York, 1861). Published in pamphlet form.


20 Thomas Speed, R. M. Kelley, and Alfred Pirtle, The Union Regiments of Kentucky (Louisville, 1897), II.


21 Tribune Almonoc, 1861, p. 60.


22 Shaler, Kentucky, 247; Speed, Union Regiments of Kentucky, 12.


23 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 93.


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of the State by demanding terms to which Kentucky can not listen with- out dishonor ; therefore,


"I. Be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, That the invaders must be expelled; inasmuch as there are now in Kentucky Federal troops assembled for the purpose of pre- serving the tranquility of the State, and of defending and protecting the people of Kentucky in the peaceful enjoyment of their lives and prop- erty." 24


It is not the purpose here to examine into the question as to who vio- lated the states neutrality first. Indeed, it matters little who did it, even if it were possible to hold one party more guilty than the other. But is sufficient to say that in an examination of the question, the "Lincoln Guns," Camp Dick Robinson, and Grant's movements and intentions op- posite Columbus, would have to be taken into consideration as well as the movement of Polk and Zollicoffer.25


More important than a mere discussion as to who first violated neutrality, is an examination into the economic conditions and trade relations of the state both with the North and the South during the early period of the crisis, which in fact had much to do with making the attitude of mind which produced neutrality. The Mississippi and its tributaries had since the days of Burr and Sebastian and the Spanish intrigues been the very nerve center of the inland country. And al- though canals and railroads had by this time lessened its importance, still a very delicate question was involved when its navigation was affected. Fully recognizing this, and seeing the disastrous consequences that might ensue if a bungling policy were adopted, the Confederate Con- gress in February, 1861, passed a law securing the free navigation of the Mississippi to all vessels of any state bordering upon that river or upon its navigable tributaries.26 This was, of course, a direct bid for the border states.


But with the traffic free upon the Mississippi, the North was receiv- ing much cotton, so very necessary for war purposes. The South in seceding had counted upon her cotton as a most effective club to wield against the Union as well as against foreign mountries. She was not now going to let a great power slip from her, by permitting the North to import Southern cotton. Knowing that the border states would not be primarily affected, and believing that the injury that would be done to the North would more than compensate for the loss of any sympathy she might suffer in the border states due to inconveniencing them, the Confederacy on May 21 passed a law prohibiting the shipping of cot- ton north. It became effective June I and provided directly that no cotton or cotton yarns should be shipped from the Confederacy except by way of her seaports. Special exception was made for shipments across the Rio Grande to Mexico. Any steamboats or railway trains carrying such products out of the Confederacy in violation of the law were to be confiscated for the use of the Government.27 The South had not counted upon the fact that the slightest interference with the free trade of the Mississippi Valley would create a storm of opposition. Even against the Confederate enactment of February 25, merely assuming control of the trade without stopping it, the Kentucky Legislature pro- tested as follows: "Whereas this General Assembly is informed that


24 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 93, 94. There were five resolutions, the preamble and the one quoted being adopted in the House 73 to 23, and in the Senate 26 to 9. The Governor vetoed them; but they were passed over his veto.


25 These points will be discussed hereafter in connection with the military movements.


26 War of the Rebellion. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series IV, Vol. I, 111, 112. Referred to hereafter as Official Recards.


27 Official Recards, Series IV, Vol. I, 341, 342.


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certain persons acting as a Congress of the seceded states have assumed power to obstruct and regulate the free navigation of the Mississippi River by the citizens of this Union to whom it belongs, therefore be it "Resolved, by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Ken- tucky, That Kentucky, having as much right to the Mississippi River. to its free, unobstructed navigation, as Louisiana or any other State, and that right being of vital importance to her people, feels it her duty to herself and to her sister States, at the earliest day, to make this her most solemn protest against any assumption of such power to control the navigation of that river as utterly without right or proper authority, and as what she cannot and will not submit to." 28 The South was thus losing much sympathy in Kentucky by a too hasty treatment of the trade relations of the interior.


The Confederacy, at length, seeing that Kentucky would most likely take her position in the Union, now determined to strike at the very root of all trade with the North. The Confederate Congress on August 2, extended the provisions of the act of May 21 to include also all ex- portations of tobacco, sugar, rice, molasses, syrup, and naval stores. This law was to become effective after August 10.29 About this time Governor Harris of Tennessee placed an embargo on a long list of articles.30 By the beginning of June, the steamboat traffic on the Mis- sissippi River was being most seriously interfered with. Most of the river crafts were stopped at Memphis on their trips up the river. A traveller from New Orleans reported that the steamboat which he had come up the river upon was tied up at the wharves at Memphis, "the last of the fleet-all laid up to rot, and ruin their owners." 31 At a Southern Boatmen's Convention in Memphis in early June, the follow- ing among other resolutions was adopted: "That no boat, not owned within the limits of the Southern Confederacy, should be permitted to sail on Southern waters, in the pursuit of a local and a coasting busi- ness." 32


The South had by these proceedings, no doubt, the additional pur- pose of forcing Kentucky to make a decision. It was, of course, appar- ent that there would be an immense steamboat tonnage owned or oper- ated by Kentuckians, which would be cut off from the lower Missis- sippi traffic, unless Kentucky would secede from the Union and enter the Southern Confederacy. There was, however, this argument for the Kentuckians, that even if they should secede and join the Confederacy, there would be still a loss to them in being cut off from the Northern trade. Furthermore, there was irritation to the Kentuckians from an "unjust and unwarranted" interference with their trade affairs-and this coming from the outside, made it doubly objectionable. It is appar- ent, then, that the South had made a mistake in her trade policy in the Mississippi Valley, as far as it proposed to secure the sympathy or co-operation of Kentucky.


The North was able to handle her trade policy in the Mississippi Valley with more tact, being helped largely by natural influences and by hasty action on the part of the South. There were intimate trade


28 American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events, 1861 (New York, 1865), 396. This outburst of the Kentucky Legislature was precipitated by the instructions issued by the Treasury Department of the Confederacy to its revenue officers, requiring manifests to be delivered, and entries to be made of all merchandise coming down the Mississippi River from states outside of the Con- federacy. This is an excellent example of the delicacy of the question of trade relations.


29 Official Records, Series IV, Vol. I, 529.


30 Ibid., 384.


31 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 29, 1861.


32 From the Memphis Argus, quoted in the Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 7, 1861.


ALincoln


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relations between the northern and southern banks of the Ohio River, that would not permit of a rude upsetting. In one week at Cincinnati alone, one group of ferry boats made 1,480 trips across the river, carry- ing 29,311 passengers, 369 horses, 382 cattle, 1,566 drays, and 1,877 other kinds of vehicles.33 The Ohio River was a bond of union for this region, rather than a barrier. When the war came, the trade of the states north of the Ohio became very brisk. Of course, much of it was carried on ostensibly with Kentucky; but in reality Kentucky was merely a link in the transportation of large shipments to the Southern Confederacy. Within a few days 2,500 bags of coffee were shipped from Cincinnati to Louisville, presumably for Kentucky consumption, but in reality destined for the Confederacy.3+ Louisville soon became a great entrepot for trade between the North and the Confederacy. Of course, the trade was all going South, as the Confederate embargo was being enforced against traffic northward. The depots became con- gested with freight for the South, and immense quantities were going daily over the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to the Confederacy. Whatever rules had been promulgated by the United States Treasurer were hopelessly out of working.35


The states north of the Ohio River soon awoke to the fact that they were supplying the Southern Confederacy with immense quantities of foodstuffs and not inconsequential amounts of munitions of war. The Vincennes Gazette demanded that the trade down the Wabash River be completely cut off unless it could be prevented from reaching the Con- federacy.36 On May 4, Governor Morton, of Indiana, wrote Lincoln, demanding that this trade with the South be stopped at once. He argued that Kentucky's sympathies lay with the South and that she would "maintain substantially a neutral position which is the most that their so- called Union men pretend to hope for." 37 But Lincoln was biding his time. He knew too well the conditions in Kentucky and the remainder of the Ohio Valley to do anything radical. In the latter part of April a meeting was held in Cincinnati, which declared "That any men or set of men, in Cincinnati or elsewhere, who knowingly ship one ounce of flour or one pound of provisions, or any arms or any articles which are contraband of war, to any person or any State which has not declared its firm determination to sustain the Government in its present crisis, is a traitor, and deserves the doom of a traitor." 38 And according to the Cincinnati Daily Gazette, "In the meantime, we would urge upon the citizens of New Albany and Jeffersonville, that not one dime's worth of any supplies, not even a pound of butter or a dozen of eggs-be allowed to cross the river from this side, till this species of 'neutral' rascality is at an end. * * " 39


By means of a whole storm of agitation, the trade between the north- ern and southern banks of the Ohio was largely curtailed. The Federal revenue officers at Cincinnati forbade steamboats to carry to Paducah or Smithfield any pork, bacon, flour, wheat, hay, corn, oats, live stock, or arms and ammunition. This order was made in the early part of June, but affected only the western part of the state, which was strongly seses- sionist in sympathies.40 A closer watch was kept on the boats plying between the Kentucky ports and the regions to the north, and all goods


83 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 76.


84 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 30, 1861. Also see E. M. Coulter, "Effects of Secession upon the Commerce of the Mississippi Valley" in Mississippi Valley His- torical Review, Vol. III, No. 3, December, 1916, pp. 275-300. 35 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 1, 1861.


36 Quoted in Cincinnati Daily Gazette, May 29, 1861.


37 Official Records, Series III, Vol. I, 158.


38 History of the Ohio Falls Cities and Their Counties, 96.


39 Editorial, June 15, 1861.


40 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 12, 1861.


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sent to such ports had to be sworn to be for Kentucky's consumption alone.41 But Kentucky, herself, was still sending much freight to the South, and many things consigned to Kentuckians and designed for their use alone ultimately found their way to the Confederacy. The states north of the Ohio looked upon this with bitter resentment. The Cincin- nati Daily Gazette in an editorial caustically remarked that "The 'neutral- ity' of Kentucky seems to consist in perfect freedom to furnish our ene- mies the wherewith to make war upon us, and the Government knowingly permits this nefarious business to go on. *


* * We unhesitatingly assert that there is not, and cannot be, any palliation for this criminal negligence, and unless instant and effective measures are taken by the Administration to stop the villainous traffic, the whole West should rise up in indignation and denounce it in thundering tones." 42 But through- out all this agitation and clamor, Lincoln refused to be moved from his purpose. He showed wonderful tact and foresight in the handling of the whole trade situation. When he was convinced that Kentucky had been sufficiently alienated from the South through annoying treatment, he sealed all exit from that state to the South.


The Louisville and Nashville Railroad was the great trade route from Kentucky to the South, after the Mississippi had been closed. The South was receiving immense supplies over this road. The nature of the traffic became so clear, that the National Government was forced by popular clamor north of the Ohio River to interfere with it. Consequently, on June 24, the surveyor for the port of Louisville issued a prohibition on all shipments to the southward, without a permit from his office.43 The large Louisville dealers who had their warehouses filled with goods for the South were not disposed to yield to this order. They sought an in- junction, and in the case of Brady and Davies vs. the Louisville and Nash- ville Railroad, brought in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, Judge Muir decided that the United States had a right to stop the traffic on the railway.44


But luck was on the side of the Federal authorities again. In the meantime, the Confederates in Tennessee, believing that the road would be closed and fearing that they might lose most of the rolling stock to the northern branch of the road, brought about a crisis in the situation by seizing everything on the Tennessee end. Acting under orders from Gov- ernor Harris, of Tennessee, they secured three engines, forty box-cars, and many flat-cars. A short while later they were able to seize two more engines. This was justified on the ground that the Tennessee stockholders must be insured against losing the use of the Tennessee part of the road.45 These proceedings on the part of the Tennesseeans were very displeasing to Kentucky. Of the 286 miles of the road, only 45 lay in Tennessee, and this had cost $2,025,000 of which Tennesseeans had contributed only $1,160,500. It appeared, then, to the Kentuckians that this was an unjust and unwarranted division of the property. This did much to alienate Kentucky sympathy from the Confederacy. Further- more, the very fact that this seizure had been made previous to the court decision took most of the sting out of the closing of the road by the Federal Government. This shows another case in which the South acted hastily, much to her detriment and to the corresponding gain of the North. There is little doubt that, if the rolling stock had not been seized


41 Ibid., June 19, 1861.


42 June 15, 1861.


43 Ohio Falls Cities and Their Counties, 324; Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 92. 44 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, July 12, 1861; Ohio Falls Cities and Their Coun- ties, 324; Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 92.


46 American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, 397, 398; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, July 12, 1861.


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until after the court decision, the South would have alienated little sym- pathy in its actions.


Perhaps one of the weightiest natural forces that tended to draw Kentucky to the Union was her geographic position. By a direct east and west course the state presents a 400 mile frontier line, or by the sinuous Ohio River, 700 miles.46 On her southern frontier lay one state* with a single important line of entry ; on her northern frontier lay three states with a dozen lines of entry; and besides, there was the great highway of the Ohio River to afford easy approach to any point on the state's northern frontier. It was no wonder that Joseph Holt could write of Kentucky's frontier thus, "Feeble states, thus separated from powerful and warlike neighbors by ideal boundaries, or by fears as easily traversed as rivulets, are as insects that feed upon the lion's lip-liable at every moment to be crushed. * * * Kentucky, now occupying a central position in the Union, is now protected from the scourge of a foreign war, however much its ravages may waste the towns and cities upon our coasts, or the commerce upon our seas ; but as a member of the Southern Confederacy she would be a frontier state, and necessarily the victims of those border feuds and conflicts which have become proverbial in history alike for their fierceness and fre- quency." 47 Indeed, so much more was the northern frontier of the state exposed than the southern, that the Kentuckians thought little of the possible dangers of invasion from the South.


Kentucky feared the great aggregation of troops that might be thrown across the Ohio at any point, by her three northern neighbors. Indeed, the North was alive to this fact and used it with telling effect in arguing with Kentucky. An instance, later in the war, presents an example. When Governor Bramlette was threatening to resist the drafting of negroes, even to the point of open conflict, the Cincinnati Daily Gazette reminded him that there was no sane man who would suppose "that the state would not be overrun by the fresh swarms that the northern hive would pour out upon such an occasion." 48 Also Robert J. Breckin- ridge, as early as January 4, 1861, declared that if Kentucky went with the South, she would soon be overrun by the millions from the north and speedily subdued.49


Equally as persuasive as these threats, was the offer of speedy help and protection. According to a Cincinnatian, "We do not hesi- tatÄ— to assert it as our opinion that, within ten days after a call for help from the Union men of Kentucky, thirty thousand northern men would cross the Ohio River to their relief, and that in a fortnight fifty thou- sand would go forward." 50


Kentucky's geographic situation was also fatal to the South on the slavery question. Robert J. Breckinridge pointed out the distinct aspects of slavery and geography. He saw the cotton states in the far South, whose paramount interests were completely bound up in the preserva- tion and perpetuation of slavery. Then there were the mixed states with plantations and small farms such as Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Texas. Finally there were the purely border states such as Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia. Kentucky's position, thus, put her where the things vital to a southern confederacy would be fatal to herself. "If your design," he said, "is to accept the principles, pur- poses and policy which are openly avowed in the interests of secession. *; if that is your notion of regulated freedom and the perfect


* * security of life and property; if that is your understanding of high


46 American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, p. 395; Shaler, Kentucky, 24, 25.


47 Letter from Joseph Hott to J. F. Speed, May 31, 1861.


48 March 21, 1864.


49 Discourse at Lexington.


50 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Sept. 2, 1861.


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national prosperity, where the idea is more negroes, more cotton, direct taxes, free imports from all nations *


* * then, undoubtedly, Ken- tucky is no longer what she has been, and her new career, beginning with secession, leads her far away from her strength and her re- nown." 51


But even had the preservation of slavery been of prime importance economically to Kentucky, still her very position would militate against her if she should go with the South. Kentuckians had no doubt that slavery would still be preserved in the Union where it already existed. But she saw that as soon as all the slave states should secede, the United States would likely take steps to abolish slavery in the Union. And then she would see the North, which had been hitherto under no moral restraint, relieved from legal restrictions in enticing slaves to leave their masters and helping them along to freedom. Under these conditions her slave population would "melt away as snow in the sum- mer sun." Speaking of this phase of the question, Breckinridge said, "For even those who act in the mere interest of slavery, ought to see that after the secession of the Cotton States, the border slave States are obliged, even for the sake of slavery, to be destroyed, or to adhere to the Union as long as any Union exists; and that if the Union were utterly destroyed, its reconstruction upon the slave line, is the solitary condition on which slavery can exist in security anywhere, or can exist at all in any border State." 52 Joseph Holt wrote to Joshua F. Speed, "She will, virtually, have Canada brought to her doors in the form of free states, whose population, relieved of all moral and constitutional obli- gations to deliver up fugitive slaves, will stand with open arms, inviting and welcoming them, and defending them, if need be, at the point of the bayonet. Under such influences slavery will pass rapidly away in Kentucky, as a ball of snow would melt in a summer's sun." 53




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