USA > Kentucky > History of Kentucky, Volume II > Part 42
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This marked the definite decline of the whigs, Know Nothings, or Americans, as the opponents of the democrats were variously called. From now on Kentucky was a democratic state, with varying degrees of insistence on the principles of the national democracy. The Ameri- cans continued to urge their principles of Americanism and avoided as far as possible sectional issues. The party leaders declared in an address to the people that they would have won in the Presidential election had not the question of slavery been elevated into the chief issue and true American principles submerged. They believed there would be no ques- tion of slavery if the country would do like the Americans, refuse to discuss it. They were "determined that the political battles hereafter shall be fought upon the true American ground, that no sectional issues shall be allowed to divide and distract their strength. * * * " 36 They still would point the people to the perils of the Roman Catholics, rather than talk on sectional issues. But if their views must be pressed on the distracting question of slavery in the territories, some at least would have no interference with it, except when the people "come to the adoption of a state constitution." 37 In the campaign for state offi- cers and congressmen in 1857, the American party held to their an- nounced policy that "under every political complication, the pure question of Americanism shall take precedence of all others." 38 In this election the defeat of the American candidates was decisive, showing a rapid decline of the American party since the election of the preceding year. James H. Garrard was elected state treasurer by a majority of more than 12,000 over Thomas L. Jones, the American. Eight democrats and two Americans were sent to Congress, while to the State Legislature 61 democrats and 39 Americans were sent as representatives and 13 democrats and 7 Americans as senators.39 This gave the democrats a majority in the Legislature, which enabled them the next year to elect Lazarus W. Powell to the United States Senate.40 The year following this John C. Breckinridge, the Vice President of the United States, was elected to the United States Senate to begin his term March 4, 1861. Thus by 1858 the democrats had captured all of the representatives in Congress except two, held both of the senatorships, and controlled the state government, with the exception of the governorship.
Each succeeding election saw the democrats maintaining their hold on the state. In the election of a clerk for the Court of Appeals in August of 1858, the Americans made a strong fight. But they still side-stepped the questions of the hour. They hoped to capture the state with high-sounding platitudes. The Union should be preserved, the
84 Ibid., Vol. 19, No. 3801. Letter to Crittenden, September 5, 1856.
35 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 77.
38 Lexington Observer and Reporter, Jan. 28, 1857.
37 Ibid., April 8, 1857. Robert J. Breckinridge was still the inspiration of those who would attack the Catholics. He was appealed to for points to use in the cam- paign. For example see the letter from F. G. Strahan to Breckinridge, March 24, 1857, in Breckinridge MSS. (1857).
38 Lexington Observer and Reporter, April 8, 1857.
38 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 78.
40 Ibid., 79.
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rights of the states should be respected, the union of the church and state must be prevented at all hazards, "American interests must be maintained," "American nationality must be cherished," sectional agita- tion must stop, immigration must be restricted, the Supreme Court must be the final arbiter of the constitution, and the democrats were bad and could not be trusted-these were the political tenets and pro- gram of the Americans.41 They declared their party was the only friend of the Union; the other two parties were running directly into disunion. "The Black Republicans of the extreme North and the Locofoco of the extreme South are equally blasphemous in their attacks upon the sanctity of the Union and equally ardent in their efforts to break it up and dissever it forever." 42 More patriots and fewer politicians were demanded. The Americans were held up as the only party that could express the genius of the state. "Kentucky was never intended for a Democratic State. She has too much conservatism and patriotism to remain permanently under the dominion of such a party. The lead- ing commercial, financial, agricultural and professional men for the most part are Americans." In answer to the charges of the democrats that they were the only true friends of slavery, the Americans said : "It may safely be asserted that three-fourths of the slaves in Kentucky are owned by Americans. * * *" 43 In the election, which came on August 2, the democrats won by a majority of over 13,000 votes.44
It was true but painful to the Americans that the state was now dem- ocratic normally by a safe majority. The Americans, having no substantial principles, were fast losing their group feeling. The designation Amer- ican party soon disappeared, and they could find no better name than "The Opposition," by which they were commonly known. Letcher de- clared that something must be done "to infuse new life and courage and confidence in our party or we are lost." 45 The settlement of Kan- sas, the veritable civil war that was devastating the region, and the efforts of the two factions for statehood were subjects that were being discussed with great heat throughout the country. Crittenden favored the admission of Kansas as a free state, since no one could conceive of slavery ever thriving there and since it was the apparent will of the majority that it be a free state. Kentuckians were much interested in the question and, according to one, most Kentuckians agreed with Crit- tenden. He declared: "I am satisfied that the mass of the democratic party in Kentucky concur with you; but most of them will sustain their
President. * * * Most of them think with you, but a large ma- jority will go with their chief." 46 Crittenden was now enjoying much of the popularity that Clay had one time held. On his return to Ken- tucky in June, 1858, from the Senate, he was received in a number of towns with rousing receptions and booming canon.47 But this popu- larity of one identified with the "Opposition" did not prevent the demo- crats from securing the state government completely in the gubernatorial election in August, 1859. Beriah Magoffin, the democratic nominee, was elected over Joshua F. Bell, of the "Opposition," by a majority of
41 Lexington Observer and Reporter, Jan. 30, 1858.
42 Ibid., May 1, 1858.
43 Lexington Observer and Reporter, June 9, 1858.
44 R. R. Revill, Democrat, received 68,540 and G. R. McKee, 68,540. Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 80. The Americans were strongest in those regions where the Whigs had predominated. This election shows it clearly. See Lexington Ob- server and Reporter, Aug. 4, 1858.
45 Crittenden MSS., Vol. 21, Nos. 4345, 4346. R. P. Letcher to Crittenden, Jan- uary 26, 1859.
46 Crittenden MSS., Vol. 20, Nos. 4164-4166. L. Robertson to Crittenden, April 26, 1858. See also Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, II, 146, 147.
47 See Lexington Observer and Reporter, June, passim, 1858.
JOHN CABELL BRECKINRIDGE
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8,904 votes. The democrats lost strength in the congressional delegation, succeeding in electing only five of the ten.48
Whether the erstwhile Americans would admit it or not, sectionalism was becoming more bitter and the country was drifting fast toward disunion. The Dred Scott decision was a bomb shell explosion in the North, and the John Brown raid was a horrifying shock to the South. Talk of secession became common, and peoples' minds were soon pre- pared for the worst. In Kentucky the realization of the danger to the Union seemed terrible. A majority of Kentuckians were democrats, but not to the extent of destroying the Union. In the early part of 1860, meetings, without regard to parties, sprang up, seeking to devise means to stay the course of events. The "Opposition" held a state convention in Frankfort on February 22, where Union sentiment ran high. It declared that the people of Kentucky were for the Union and the Constitution, that Union must be maintained, and that Ken- tucky would redress her grievances inside the Union rather than out- side. It recommended Crittenden as a suitable candidate for the "Na- tional Union" party to run for the Presidency. The election of 1860 approached with the last bond of union between the two sections broken -the democratic party. John C. Breckinridge was the candidate of the Southern democrats, while Stephen A. Douglas represented the North- ern division. Abraham Lincoln was the choice of the sectional repub- licans. But what was to become of the old Whig-Know-Nothing-Amer- ican group, which had hoped to settle the trouble by holding that there would be no troubles if people would stop wishing them. In the border region between North and South, where the influences from both sec- tions played their part, the Constitutional Union Party sprang up to carry forward the old principles. This party, refusing to discuss the issues confronting the country, called upon the people to support the Constitution and the Union. John Bell became their candidate. That the democrats could not win, divided as they were, was a foregone conclusion to all who would face the facts. That even Kentucky would not support the Southern democrats with Breckinridge leading, was made certain by the election in August of Leslie Combs, an old whig, but now a Bell candidate, to the clerkship of the Court of Appeals. He polled 68,165 votes to 44,942 for Clinton McClarty, the Breckin- ridge democrat, and 10,971 for Robert R. Bolling, the Douglas democrat. In November, Kentucky was carried by the Constitutional Union Party. Bell received 66,016, Breckinridge, 52,836, and Douglas, 40,372. Lin- coln received 1,366. There was a strong indication in these results that the great majority of Kentuckians were in favor of a conservative course which would avoid the rocks of disunion. The Constitutional Union vote was preeminently a vote for the preservation of the Union, the Douglas democratic vote was somewhat less so, while the republican, although almost negligible, was still less. The Breckinridge democrats were largely men of audacity and action, who would have what they considered to be Southern rights protected or stop with no remedy short of secession. Kentucky was now at the parting of the ways; with Lin- coln elected and secession at hand, what would be her course?
48 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 81.
CHAPTER LXI
NEUTRALITY AND THE UNION
When South Carolina seceded from the Union in December, 1860, she found little sympathy in Kentucky. Although most of the North and South were much agitated, Kentucky maintained a course of conserva- tism. The Union "under the Constitution" was entirely acceptable to her. She had often shown her attachment to the Union, and now she thought that too much haste in any direction would be fatal. From the very in- ception of the secession movement, the South was not certain as to Ken- tucky's course. As early as December 25, 1860, a commissioner from Mississippi, sent by the governor with the concurrence of the Legislature, arrived in Frankfort to consult with Governor Magoffin on the state of the country, and also to urge him to call an extra session of the Legislature to co-operate with the South "in the adoption of efficiency measures for their common defense and safety."1 Two days later a commissioner from Alabama called upon Magoffin and proposed that Kentucky co- operate with the Southern States in obtaining a redress of wrongs. And on the same day the governor issued a call for an extra session of the Legislature to meet in January.
Magoffin was undoubtedly strongly in favor of the South and would have liked to see the state cast her lot with the Confederacy. However, he was not an extremist, and was willing that the popular will should be conclusive. He would much rather have seen the Union preserved, but in a choice between the North and South, he was always for the latter. His message to the extra session advocated the calling of a convention of the border slave states, including North Carolina and Tennessee, to devise ways and means of saving the Union. He also stated the position of his state as a whole when he advised the Legislature to "declare by resolution the unconditional disapprobation of Kentucky of the employ- ment of force in any form against the seceding states." 2 The Legislature also struck a sympathetic chord throughout the state when it "directed the sergeant-at-arms to hoist the American flag over the capitol during the present session." 3
Kentucky was extremely solicitous that the United States Govern- inent employ. no force against the seceding states. It seemed clear to her that as long as the "erring sisters" were allowed "to depart in peace," her position was in the Union ; but should an expedition be launched against the South, the course would not be so clear. The House unanimously passed the resolution, "That this general assembly has heard with pro- found regret of the resolutions recently adopted by the states of New York, Ohio, Maine, and Massachusetts-tendering men and money to the President of the United States, to be used in coercing certain sovereign states of the South into obedience to the federal government." It fur- thermore resolved that "the governor of the state of Kentucky is hereby requested to inform the executives of each of said states that it is the opinion of this general assembly that whenever the authorities of these
1 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 85.
2 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 86.
3 Ibid.
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states shall send armed forces to the South for the purpose indicated in said resolutions, the people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the South, will as one man resist such invasion of the soil of the South at all hazards and to the last extremity." 4 But this same Legislature definitely refused to call a sovereign convention, which might make secession possible.5 Instead, it appointed six commissioners or delegates with $500 each for expenses to the Peace Conference in Washington, be- ginning on February 4.
The Legislature, having adjourned on February II, reassembled on March 20, and on April 3, called another border slave state convention to meet in May. The state was abundantly showing its training : while its senators were suggesting compromises in Congress to save the Union, the state was holding conventions to mend affairs.
Meanwhile, Fort Sumter had been fired upon and reduced, and it now seemed that armed resistance was inevitable. On April 15, Magoffin received a call from the War Department for four regiments of troops "for immediate service." He replied in part, " * * * I say emphatic- ally Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subdu- ing her sister Southern States." 6
Indeed, Kentucky was now in an anomalous position. She had con- demned the use of force against the South, and with equal resolution she had determined to remain within the Union. On April 17, John J. Crit- tenden, in a speech at Lexington, condemned the fratricidal strife, and counselled the people not to be dragged into the war either for the North or for the South, but to remain free from both and act the part of media- tor. The day following the Union State Central Committee, appointed by both parties, issued an "Address to the people of the Commonwealth," in which they again expressed the state's position. It was a virtual fore- runner of her later neutrality policy. Speaking of the call for troops, the Address said, "She has refused to comply with it. And in this refusal she has acted as becomes her. We approve the response of the Execu- tive of the Commonwealth. One other appeal now demands a response from Kentucky. The Government of the Union has appealed to her to furnish men to suppress the revolutionary combinations in the cotton states. She has refused. She has most wisely and justly refused. Sedi- tious leaders in the midst of us now appeal to her to furnish men to uphold those combinations against the Government of the Union. Will she comply with this appeal? Ought she to comply with it? We answer with emphasis NO She ought clearly to comply with neither * * * the one appeal nor the other. And if she be not smitten with judicial blindness, she will not. The present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position-taking sides not with the Government and not with the seceding states, but with the Union against them both; de- claring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if neces-
* sary, making the declaration good with her strong right arm. * She ought to hold herself independent of both sides, and compel both sides to respect the inviolability of her soil." 7 This address, being pre- pared by members from the different parties, may be taken as the recog- nized position of the state as a whole.
*
The state was merely fighting against time. The situation was be- coming more complicated as the days passed. On April 22, L. P. Walker, secretary of war of the Confederate states, requested Magoffin "to fur- nish one regiment of infantry, without delay. * * With less
4 This resolution was passed by the House by a vote of 87 to 6. The Senate did not act upon it.
5 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 87.
6 Ibid.
7 History of the Ohio Falls Cities and Their Counties, 94, 95; Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 88.
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harshness than he had used in replying to the call of the United States, he declined to comply with the request. Although the people had made known their views at many times and places, the state had not yet offi- cially spoken. For the purpose of settling the state's problem, Magoffin had again on May 6 attempted to have the Legislature call a sovereign convention, but without success. Finally on May 16, the definite policy of neutrality was established by the House in the following resolution, "That this state and the citizens thereof should take no part in the Civil war now being waged, except as mediators and friends to the belligerent parties ; and that Kentucky should during the contest occupy the position of strict neutrality." It furthermore resolved, "That the act of the gov- ernor in refusing to furnish troops or military force upon the call of the executive authority of the United States, under existing circumstances, is approved." 8 The Senate adopted in a separate resolution its policy. The resolution follows: "Resolved, That Kentucky will not sever her connections with the national government, nor will she take up arms for either of the belligerent parties; but will arm herself for the one pur- pose of preserving tranquillity and peace within her own borders." ?
The state thus committed itself to a position unheard of in law or the constitution. It later came in for the ill-will of both sides, which is gen- erally the lot of neutrals. It assumed an extra-legal as well as an ex- traordinary position; but the occasion that brought it about had never before been paralleled. Neutrality came early to be condemned severely from without; and both factions from within soon disowned it. As a matter of fact, it was used by the extremists of both parties to serve their own purposes. Those, who were attempting to swing the state to the Southern Confederacy, welcomed it as being much better than an open stand for the Union. They used it to their advantage as much as possible by making it an armed neutrality, ostensibly against "all other states, whether separate or united, and especially the 'United States' and the 'Confederate States.'" Those who would have had the state take a stand for the Union at once, a small but growing faction, merely tolerated neutrality and bided their time. But neither faction was the originator of the idea of neutrality. It sprang full grown from the great body of Kentuckians; it was the logical outgrowth of their characteristic con- servatism. It came as much from the "Mothers, Wives, Sisters, and Daughters of Kentucky," who later sent hundreds of petitions to the Legislature, praying to "guard them from the direful calamity of civil war, by allowing Kentucky to maintain inviolate her armed neutrality," as it did from the scheming politicians.10 As noted before, it was only a transition period in which Kentucky was striving to find herself.
Perhaps the first important allusion to a possible neutrality position was made in a speech by Robert J. Breckinridge, at Lexington on January 4, 1861. Referring to a possible solution for the difficulties, he said. "The first of these is, that in the progress of events, it may well become the border slave States to unite themselves into a separate confederacy ; the second is, that it may well become Kentucky, under various contin- gencies, to assume a separate sovereign position, and act by herself." 11 This early suggestion, thus, came from one of the state's strongest Union supporters. Neutrality in the beginning was almost unanimously adopted by the leaders of both parties, and large majorities upheld it in the Leg- islature.12 Although used by all factions, each for its own ends, as stated
8 The first resolution was adopted by a vote of 69 to 26; and the second, 89 to 4. Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 91.
9 This resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 9.
10 See Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 89.
11 Discourse of Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. At Lexington, January 4, 1861. Pamphlet, 21.
12 Collins, History of Kentucky, I, 90.
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before, neutrality was a natural outgrowth of the Kentucky tempera- ment. But from its very nature it was transitory and untenable, placing the state in an anomalous position.
It was almost certain that if the war should run a long course the contending armies could not possibly be kept out of the state. The Union as well as the Confederate Government was handling the situation in Kentucky as tactfully as circumstances seemed to admit, each well knowing the possible consequences of an untoward act. On April 26 Lincoln, in a conversation with Garret Davis, promised that he would make no military move against any state that offered no armed resist- ance to the authorities of the United States. He also stated that he contemplated no military operations that would require the movement of troops through the state. He regretted that Kentucky had not fur- nished her quota of troops, which it was clearly her duty to have done, but still he had no right or disposition to coerce her. In fine, then, he promised that if Kentucky made no war against the Government of the United States, he would respect her position. Two days later he told W. L. Underwood, another prominent Kentuckian, that "he hoped that Kentucky would stand by the Government, in the present difficulties; but, if she would not do that, let her stand still and take no hostile part against it ; and that no hostile step should tread her soil." 13 Lincoln could well make these promises, knowing that before the necessity should arise to invade the state, a change in her untenable position would take place. These suave promises were additional weight drawing the state closer to the Union. Lincoln did not minimize the extreme importance of the state to whichever side it should go. He worked hard and with great tact in saving it for the Union. Lincoln's estimate of the situation is clearly shown in his tactful handling of Fremont's bungling procla- mation freeing slaves in Missouri. In writing of this, he said: "The Kentucky legislature would not budge until that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Fremont having issued deeds of manumission, a whole com- pany of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded." He added, "I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Mary- land." 14 In writing to Fremont concerning the proclamation Lincoln said it would "alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us ; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospects for Kentucky.15
The South, which had expected Kentucky from the start acted with less tact but with more boldness and in a chiding spirit. In answer to a communication from Magoffin requesting the Confederate Govern- ment to respect the state's neutrality, Jefferson Davis said that neutrality to be respected must be maintained against all parties, and that as long as it was maintained against all parties, the Confederacy would respect it. A very unfortunate and impolitic remark, attributed to Howell Cobb, of Georgia, was also doing much to alienate the Kentuckians from the South. Cobb was reported to have said that the South would only "have to go home, raise cotton, and make money," leaving the war to be fought out by the border states.16 The impatience of the South at Kentucky's position was expressed by the New Orleans Delta when it threatened to cut off trade: "We want no corn, no flour, no swill-fed pork, no red-eye, no butter or cheese from the great Western Reserve, no 'sass,' no adulterated drugs, no patent physics, no poisoned pickles. * * * And we will not pay the 'Blue Grass' country of Kentucky for
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