USA > Kentucky > History of Kentucky, Volume II > Part 58
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Louisville was also able to bring into the opposition against Cincinnati the Ohio and Cumberland Railroad, which held a charter for a road across the state and was now looking for subscriptions. This project had had some success in securing funds, even to such an extent as to make the road a possibility if generous help could be had from Cincinnati. The $10,000,000 of Cincinnati railroad money looked very alluring to this railroad company.87 They sought to convince the Queen City that the best use for her money would be to put it into the construction of their road.88 But for numerous reasons, which will be discussed later, Cin- cinnati was forced to refuse. This company thereupon became the enemy of the Cincinnati Southern Railroad and opposed it at every opportunity. Thus again was the clever hand of Louisville evident. She had raised up another ally in her fight in the Legislature against granting Cincinnati a right-of-way across the state.89
The Cincinnati Southern Railroad had thus advanced from a seemingly interminable discussion to something more real. Ohio exhausted her ability to aid when she allowed the city to vote on a bond issue to con- struct the road. Cincinnati went to the extremity of her power when she voted to issue the bonds. The peculiar element in the situation was that the road would lie entirely outside the jurisdiction of both Cincinnati and of the State of Ohio. It was therefore necessary for the city to go to other states for permission to build a railroad through their limits.
V
EFFORTS TO SECURE RIGHTS-OF-WAY
Before Cincinnati could begin her railroad, she had to have two sep- arate grants of rights-of-way, one from Kentucky and one from Tennes-
82 Ibid, Dec. 5, 1869.
83 Quoted in Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 14, 1870.
84 Ibid., Dec. 4, 1869.
85 Ibid., March 5, 1870; Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky Passed at the Regular Session of the General Assembly which was Begun and Held in the City of Frankfort on Monday, the Sixth Day of December, 1869, 16-25.
86 Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 11, 1871.
87 Ibid., June 29, 1870.
88 Cincinnati Commercial, Dec. 4, 1869; Aug. 15, 1870.
89 Ibid., Jan. 12, 1871.
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see. As the Legislature of the latter state met first, she decided to ask for the Tennessee grant before going to Kentucky. Here she met with unex- pected opposition ! 1 The strong rivalry that existed between the three Tennessee cities for the road had settled into a desire on the part of the unlucky two to get revenge on the lucky third. Furthermore, Louisville, ever watchful for an opportunity to obstruct Cincinnati's plans, gave her aid to the opposition with keen willingness. The Nashville and Chat- tanooga Railroad was also concerned about this new road which might materially cut down its traffic.2 So when the trustees of the Cincinnati Southern Railroad presented their elaborately drawn bill in the Tennessee Legislature, they found that it would take a strong fight to put it through. Unluckily for Cincinnati, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to whom the bill was first referred, was from Knoxville. And although he had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Cincinnati Southern before Chattanooga was selected as the southern terminus, he now used every effort to defeat the bill. One of the first signs of this hostility was the adverse report of the committee.3 The argument generally used was that such a grant of power to the City of Cincinnati was unwarranted by the state constitution, and that the rights of the state were not prop- erly safeguarded in the measure. It looked suspicious to many that a "foreign city" should bring a bill elaborately drawn and attempt to force it through the Tennessee Legislature without permitting amendments. Louisville also had no doubts that the powers asked for from the Tennes- see Legislature were unconstitutional, which provoked the Cincinnati Commercial to say, "Louisville, too, has a freshness of devotion to the constitution that would he extremely touching if we did not know that her scruples grew out of a tender desire to continue in possession of ad- vantages she now enjoys in cutting off our Southern trade." 4 After a de- termined fight, the bill passed both houses and became a law in the latter part of January, 1870.5
The Cincinnati Southern trustees realized that their strongest fight was now due to be in Kentucky. A warning went out to "the people of Cincinnati and the Trustees who have the location of the road, against the idea of looking to the Kentucky Legislature for the grant of an independent charter, to be used, managed, controlled and run wholly in the interests of your city." The informer furthermore predicted that "The rival routes, private and public interests, the jealousies of State pride, State rights, party politics (whether used rightly or wrongly, I do not say), would all conspire to prevent the granting of an independent char- ter." 6 It was evident to all that Louisville would lead the fight and seek by her great influence throughout the state to defeat any bill intro- duced in the interest of Cincinnati. Moreover, Kentucky had long had a traditional opposition to granting Cincinnati special favors:7 This antici- pated opposition of Louisville had been used by certain of the Central Kentucky communities as a club over Cincinnati. Those supporting the Knoxville route had promised less opposition from Louisville, if that route were chosen. Others who held some of the numerous railway char- ters that existed in Kentucky counseled their route for which a charter
1 The Cincinnati Commercial, April 21, 1869, says that Cincinnati "has no more to fear from Frankfort or Nashville than from Columbus."
2 Cincinnati Semi-Weekly Gazette, Nov. 16, 1869; Cincinnati Commercial, Dec. 13, 1869. Some of the stockholders of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad said they did not expect their stock to be worth two cents on the dollar; if the Cincinnati Southern Railway succeeded. Ibid., Feb. 1, 1870.
3 Ibid., Dec. 3, 1869.
4 Cincinnati Commercial, Dec. 2, 10, 1869.
" Boyden, The Beginnings of the Cincinnati Southern Railway-A Sketch of the Years, 1869-1878, 15; Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 20, 1870.
6 Cincinnati Commercial, July 1, 1869.
7 Ibid., May 22.
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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY
already existed, as Louisville would no doubt block a charter asked for by Cincinnati.8 The truth of this warning was now proved. On the eve of the introduction of the Cincinnati bill in the Kentucky Legislature, the South felt greatly concerned. In the words of one who had traveled through that region and knew its sentiment, "If Kentucky stands in the way of this great measure of relief projected by Cincinnati, there will be a small-sized rebellion in the South-a rebellion against the old dotards who allow themselves to be led around by the nose by the selfish city of Louisville." 9
From the moment the legislature met, almost every move was judged from the standpoint of its bearing on the Cincinnati Southern Railroad bill. The fight began in the appointment of committees. Louisville was able to win all the initial skirmishes.10 On January 7, 1870, the trustees, through their supporters in the Legislature, had their bill introduced. It was almost identical with the one that had been introduced and passed in the Tennessee Legislature.11 They came well prepared for a fight. An advance of $20,000 on the bonds had been made to Miles Greenwood, president of the board of trustees appointed by the Cincinnati municipal government to manage the railroad, without any restrictions as to its use.12 This obviated the necessity of the city auditor indicating in his annual report the amount spent by the city in lobbying. Two of the trus- tees remained at Frankfort most of the time during the sitting of the Legislature. They attempted to fortify their position by securing the services of John C. Breckinridge, who had returned from exile in Canada a few months previously.13 With this array of money and men, the Cin- cinnatians expected to win easily. The Cincinnati Commercial reporter on the Legislature happenings said, "It is likely not only to pass, but to pass by a large majority." 14
Louisville was confident that she could easily kill the bill. She had numerous lines of attack both against the bill and especially against the city that was desiring the legislation. One of the legislators favoring the bill claimed that it was Louisville's method to "pit one rival city against another, and then appeal to State pride, to the political prejudice of the people of Kentucky, against the city of Cincinnati." 15 Louisville had a powerful weapon in this very situation. Cincinnati was an outside city, with which a large part of Kentucky had been at war five years be- fore and with which now the whole state was out of accord politically. The Western Railroad Gazette summed up the elements in the situation as "first, Louisville's commercial jealousy of Cincinnati; and second, a political hostility to the North, and especially to a northern city like Cin- cinnati, which sometimes gives Republican majorities." 16 Kentucky had turned herself squarely against the North after the war and had come to detest the national regime as much or more than any one of the South- ern states that had seceded. Louisville, thus, had a field to work in well adapted to her purpose.
8 Ibid., May 21, 26.
9 Ibid., Feb. 16, 1870.
10 Congressional Globe and Appendix 1870, Part 2, 42 Cong., I Sess., 8; Cin- cinnati Commercial, December, passim, 1869; Cincinnati Semi-Weekly Gazette, Dec. 14, 21, 1869.
11 Ferguson, Founding of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, 35; Cincinnati Southern Railway, Memorial of Trustees and Speech of John C. Breckinridge to the General Assembly of Kentucky; Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 8, 1870.
12 Annual Report of the City Departments of the City of Cincinnati for the Year Ending February 28, 1870, 79.
13 Cincinnati Commercial, March 10, 1869. For his aid, Breckinridge was promised a sum not to exceed $3,000. Ferguson, Founding of the Cincinnati Southern Railway, 55.
14 Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 15, 1870.
15 Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 28, 1870.
16 March 12, 1870.
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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY
Of the political sentiment obtaining south of the Ohio, a Cincinnatian said, "A genuine Union daily cannot keep body and soul together in Louisville. This is not true of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans, Mont- gomery, Savannah, Charleston, or Richmond, but it is true of Louisville with its population of eighty-five thousand. There is more rancor and pig-headed prejudice in Kentucky at this moment than in any three other Southern States." 17 These political differences between the two states were made to work overtime. Isaac Caldwell, who was one of Louisville's staunchest defenders, accused Cincinnati of helping to vote negro suffrage upon Kentucky, and then immediately coming and asking a special favor for doing it. "Ohio," he added, "forces negro suffrage upon us with one hand, and then offers ten millions to buy us with the others." 18
In arguing against the bill, the first inquiry that a Kentuckian would be supposed to make would be concerning its constitutionality. Every Kentuckian, in this case, considered himself first a constitutional lawyer ; other attributes came later. It is not strange, then, that the bill was strongly attacked on this ground. The Kentucky Legislature, they con- tended, not only had no right to grant this railway concession to a city outside the state; but the Ohio Legislature had openly and flagrantly vio- lated their own constitution in allowing Cincinnati to vote the bonds. They were now, in effect, asking Kentucky to let them do what their own constitution forbade. Caldwell warned his state against embarking "in this wild and visionary scheme, bartering away sovereignty, honor and right for a price. * * Kentucky ought to be above purchase." 19 Some opponents even went so far as to say that apart from the immediate consideration of the bill, Ohio or any other state had no right inherently to act with reference to anything outside of its own jurisdiction.20 The friends of the bill facetiously accused their opponents of claiming that "it was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Con- stitution of Kentucky, the Lord's Prayer and the Ten Commandments." 21 The opponents were asked, "Are you so squeamish on the subject of the Constitution, and constitutional violations, that you will not ride in a car that passes over a road which has any constitutional taint about it ?" 22 The debates were long and heated. Isaac Caldwell and John C. Breckinridge held a series of open discussions in the Kentucky House before the Committee on Railroad, attended by large audiences. These railroad debates were eagerly listened to throughout the session by people from all over the state.23
Numerous methods were resorted to to defeat the bill. By ingenious arguments the opponents attempted to add amendments that would auto- matically kill the measure. One amendment was offered which would grant a right-of-way across the state, provided that Knoxville route were followed. This was purely an obstructionist move, as Cincinnati had chosen the Chattanooga route and the bonds could be issued for no other road. But the support this proposition received from certain of the central Kentucky representatives shows how disappointed they were in not securing the Knoxville route and how they still hoped in some way to be able to get it. However, they were unwittingly playing into the hands of Louisville and the opposition. Representative McCreary
17 Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 13, 1868.
18 Ibid., Jan. 28, 1870. The Cincinnati Commercial strongly deprecated Louis- ville's efforts to join business and politics. Ibid., Feb. 3, 1870.
19 Ibid., Jan. 28, Feb. 2, 1870.
20 Cincinnati Commercial, July 3, 1869.
21 Cincinnati Semi-Weckly Gazette, Feb. 18, 1870.
22 Cincinnati Southern Railway. Memorial of Trustees and Speech of John
C. Breckinridge to the General Assembly of Kentucky.
23 Cincinnati Semi-Weekly Gazette, March 11, 1870; Cincinnati Commercial, Jan. 26, Feb. 1, 1870.
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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY
of Madison County argued that Cincinnati could build the railway along the Knoxville route and still fulfill the conditions of her bond issue, by extending the road on to Chattanooga from Knoxville.24
The opposition took special delight in amending the bill beyond rec- ognition. They resented, in the first place, an outsider coming with a previously prepared bill and asking the Kentucky Legislature to pass it without amendment. By offering amendments and forcing them through by cleverly playing on certain elements disappointed on the choice of the route, they could make the bill so objectionable to its friends that they would refuse to vote for it. An amendment was offered to force the railroad to charge no more for local freight than for through freight.25 This struck at the very foundation of rate mak- ing. It was a sop to the supporters of the bill from Central Kentucky, but an impossibility to the successfully running of a railroad. For if Cincinnati were forced to charge as much for her through freight as for the local freight along the line, then the value of the road as a through connection with the Southern markets would be largely de- stroyed. But if she were to charge a very low rate for the local freight in order to get a desirable rate for her through traffic, the road could not be a financial success. Among other onerous amendments offered were : all lands used for any purpose must be paid for 26 ; all cases aris- ing against the railway must be tried in Kentucky courts only ; rolling stock is subject to attachment ; no freight discriminations can be allowed ; the state must be given the same control over this railroad as over any other railroad in the state; no counties may make subscriptions or give bonuses to the road.27
From the very nature of the situation, many of these amendments completely nullified Cincinnati's powers. All were burdensome, but still under an ordinary case of a railway applying for a charter, some would have been nothing more than a just protection. But the case of Cincinnati was very peculiar. The city was, indeed, not asking for a charter at all, but for the right of entering Kentucky to build a rail- way across it. The whole proceeding was very close to an evasion of the Ohio constitution, and the city had no choice but to follow specifically the powers granted by the Ohio Legislature. Thus, when she presented her carefully worded bill and asked the Kentucky Legislature to pass it without amendment, the opponents of the road professed to see some- thing very strange in Cincinnati's actions. When they pointed out that the road would be wholly owned and run by authorities over whom Kentucky had no jurisdiction, and that Cincinnati consistently refused to let a certain number of Kentuckians be appointed on the board of trustees, their case against the Queen City seemed unimpeachable to the man on the street. But the astute opponents knew that if Cin- cinnati should allow Kentuckians to become trustees, a corporation would have to be created, and there would be a clear inhibition in the Ohio constitution against aiding it with the $10,000,000 of bonds. It was Cincinnati's task to build the railroad in her capacity as a municipal government, and to scrupulously refrain from doing anything that would make a corporation of the trustees which she had appointed to administer the business. It was, thus, a clever move on the part of the opponents of the bill to accuse Cincinnati of sinister designs on Kentucky and a lust after unheard-of powers; and it was by no means easy for Cin- cinnati to explain the complications to the ordinary Kentucky voter. Another argument that went hard with Cincinnati was that if she wanted
24 Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 16, 17, 1870.
25 Ibid., March 5, 1870.
26 This would make it unlawful for any authority to donate land to the rail- road, as was very frequently done in other cases.
27 Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 25, 1870.
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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY
the road on just and honorable terms, she could subscribe to one of the half dozen companies that held charters for railway across the state. This very thing, of course, she was prohibited from doing by the constitution of Ohio.
As Kentucky had been through a species of reconstruction at the hands of the North, she was very wary of outside powers exercising authority in the state. This accounts for her fear of the Federal courts as was shown in the amendment which made the Kentucky courts the first and last resort for all cases in which the railroad was a party and which laid down a heavy fine and forfeiture of all rights for removing or appealing a case to the Federal courts. It was also claimed that by the wording of the bill offered by Cincinnati, the route could be anywhere within thirty-nine counties and might enter Tennessee on a frontier of 120 miles.28 This would be dangerous, as it would allow her to encroach upon other railway properties. It was, furthermore, argued by Basil Duke that the road could never pay and that its real purpose was to divert as much trade as possible from Louisville.29
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad ably supported Louisville in this fight. In fact, it was claimed by the friends of the bill that this gigantic corporation was the main source of opposition, trying to hide behind the city.30 Even before the Kentucky Legislature met, the trus- tees had been warned that if they should wait "till they secure favorable action by the Kentucky Legislature in behalf of their proposed road, they will never build it. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad runs the Kentucky Legislature." 31 Incensed at the very idea of this road mixing in the fight, a representative from Central Kentucky exclaimed, "The Nashville Road! What is the record of her history, that she should attempt to throw her influence across the pathway of Kentucky legislation." 32 Now was the opportune time for the Central Kentuckians to get revenge against that railroad. The representative from Wayne County declared, "Our people are feeling hourly more and more the oppressions of that road. Every day the people of Kentucky feel its iron heel upon them and upon their commerce." 33 An appeal made by this road to stir up prejudice against Cincinnati on account of its war record was ingeniously answered in kind, with telling effect, against the road itself. The representative from Barren County charged that "Only since the war closed did the Court of Appeals relieve Billy Ball from a judgment of twelve or fourteen thousand dollars, recovered against him by this remorseless corporation, for the only offense that he happened to be out with John Morgan at one time when the Louis- ville and Nashville was torn up, though he himself was not near at the time." 34
This opposition to the bill was confined almost wholly to the western part of the state, which was controlled by Louisville and her railroad. It came to be the bitterest kind of a sectional fight within the state, or as one person expressed it, it was a "battle between a growing city and a number of railroad corporations, on the one hand, and the city of Cincinnati and the people of the counties through which, and adjacent to which, the proposed Southern road is to run, on the other." 35 When
28 Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 25, 1870.
29 Ibid., Feb. 18. 30 Ibid., March 5.
31 Ibid., Aug. 3, 1869.
32 Ibid., Feb. 28, 1870.
33 Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 25, 1870.
34 Ibid., March 5.
35 Ibid., Dec. 4, 1869; American Annual Cyclopaedia, and Register of Important Events, 1871, 431. One who was bitter against Louisville said, "The vital interests of the 'first city of the State' require that all works of internal improvements shall tend to carry trade to her mart; if they do not, why, then, of course, they
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HISTORY OF KENTUCKY
the opposition had become so strong as to threaten to defeat the bill a veritable storm of indignation arose throughout Central Kentucky and the Blue Grass region. Delegations from almost every county in this section went to Frankfort to work for the bill.36 George H. Pendle- ton, president of the Kentucky Central Railroad, promised his un- qualified co-operation in furthering the measure.37 Many of the cities held meetings memorializing the Legislature to pass all measures neces- sary for the construction of the railroad.38 The Tennessee Legislature, suddenly realizing that the bill was about to fail, sent a telegram to Frankfort asking that the vote be postponed until certain Tennessee legislators could arrive to be heard.39
But before the Legislature was ready to vote on the bill, some very astonishing events happened. Although innocent enough in their out- ward appearance, there seems to be little doubt that they were polite means of bribery, or at least efforts to make people feel ungrateful if they did not choose to follow a certain course of action. About the middle of February, 1870, the City of Louisville invited the Legislature to take part in the celebration of completion of the bridge across the Ohio River at that point.40 Upon learning of this, Cincinnati immedi- ately invited the Legislature to partake of her hospitality; and soon afterwards Covington and Newport, her satallites, did likewise.41 After some discussion, the Legislature decided to accept the invitations of all four cities.42 The members visited Louisville first. The city did its best to entertain its guests with its traditional hospitality.43 Loaded with legislators, trains were run across the bridge for the first time. The usual sightseeing with banquets and receptions followed.44 The city government spent $4,370.90 in convincing the legislators of its good- will.45 Cincinnati charged the Louisville and Nashville Railroad with giving a banquet to the legislators which cost $1,450.46
Louisville's invitation to the Legislature had taken Cincinnati by surprise. Believing that this was an adroit move to influence the Leg- islature, Cincinnati hastened to administer an antidote by securing a visit of the Legislature to her city there to show it her hospitality. She, thus, found herself on short notice feverishly making preparations for receiving her guests. She sent a committee to Louisville to wel- come them who together with the committee left for Cincinnati by steamer. 47 When they had proceeded as far as Lawrenceburg, Indiana,
ought not to receive any countenance." Cincinnati Semi-Weekly Gazette, Dec. 14, 1869.
36 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1870; Cincinnati Commercial, Feb. 16, 1870.
37 Ibid., Dec. 31, 1869. This was unusual generosity, as the Cincinnati Southern would without doubt virtually parallel the Kentucky Central.
38 At a meeting in Covington, the following resolution was adopted: "We, the citizens of Covington, in mass meeting assembled, have learned with the most unfeigned regret and surprise that there is opposition of a serious character in the Kentucky Legislature to pass what is called the Cincinnati Southern Rail- road Bill." Ibid., Feb. 8, 1870.
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