USA > Ohio > The Forty-first Ohio veteran volunteer infantry in the war of rebellion. 1861-1865 > Part 8
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The Forty-first went into this engagement with 262 men, and lost 108 killed and wounded. In one company, out of 22 men engaged, 20 were shot; and in a very small company, which took into the fight only 11 men, the loss was 9. The greater part of this heavy loss was sustained in the opening of the battle, which came like a volley from an ambush, and in the second attempt to storm the enemy's position, when the men, who had found some shelter. were called to their feet only to receive a fire as severe as that at the beginning of the fight. Finally, the wounds were made at short range; not a hundred yards separated the combatants. The ex- ception to this was the enfilading fire from the right, where the enemy was a half mile away.
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A HUNDRED DAYS UNDER FIRE.
No part of the line on which the battle took place was held by the Union troops, but all fell back. It was a repulse from right to left. What would have happened had the original plan been carried out, is, of course, only matter of conjecture, the result de- pending largely on the dispositon and movement of the opposing army. One thing, however, may be taken as certain: Had a second and a third line, or even one line, come up while the Forty-first was still engaged, that one point in the enemy's position would have been carried. The failure of the movement as laid out, the deflect- ing of the line of march of the second line and those following, entirely changed the attack. It was to have been an attack in col- umn of battalions with wide intervals; as it was made, so far as Hazen's brigade was concerned, it was an attack in echelon, without reserves.
The wounded who were unable to help themselves off the line of the fighting, fell into the enemy's hands; the dead were buried by him on the ground. Trenches were dug, and the bodies were thrown in with little care. Sometime afterward, when the army had passed on toward Atlanta, several of these trenches were opened, that certain bodies might be rescued, for friends in the North. Union and Confederate were found piled together, and none could be identified.
This action was called the battle of Pickett's Mill. In his book, "A Narrative of Military Service," Gen. Hazen says that "it was the most fierce, bloody and persistent assault of the Atlanta cam- paign." In his official report, Gen. Wood says of the right of the attacked position, where was the Forty-first, that "no troops could stay there and live." The Confederate force in front of the Forty- first was Cleburne's division, and it was reinforced during the fight. Confederate official reports mention the enfilading fire delivered from the right, and say that but two pieces of artillery were engaged. It is a fact worth notice, that while the Confederate reports of the Atlanta campaign minutely record the Pickett's Mill battle as one of the most prominent and important events of the campaign, Gen. Sherman's memoirs wholly ignore the action. As to the choice of commands to make the attempt on the enemy's right, Gen. Wood vigorously protested against taking his division out of the line which
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
it had just fortified at no little hazard and with some losses. Gen. Howard's reply was that he had taken the commands which he thought most likely to succeed in the hazardous attempt. It was the fortune of the Forty-first to open the fighting at Mission Ridge, and again at Pickett's Mill. Hazen speaks of the change from the original plan of attack, but gives no explanation except by saying that the battalions following the Forty-first had drifted away to the left. He thought that the long delay of the flank movement to get away from the Union left, as hereinbefore described, was fatal to the enterprise, and says the attack could have been delivered two hours and a half sooner (it was near 5 in the afternoon when it was made), this interval having been employed by the Confederates in bringing up forces and strengthening their position. Confeder- ate reports show that they were on the alert, and had expected a further movement against their right, that having been the trend of the Union tactics for a day or two before. The position of Cle- burne, as it was seen during the battle, had the look of one chosen for the occasion-that is, to meet this attack-as his line was not a prolongation of the line of earthworks which could be seen to the right.
The withdrawal from the field of battle was not to a great dis- tance. The Forty-first was moved to the right and rear, and took position on a wooded ridge. The enemy's line, on high ground across an open field, was in sight. The new position was at once fortified, and was occupied for several days. At one time, the enemy came down across the open ground to reconnoiter. His skirmish line was plainly seen from the start. They came up the wooded slope in front of the Forty-first with little resistance offered. the Union skirmishers falling back by order. The regiment stood behind its earthwork, and when the enemy was well up toward it. two volleys, by front and rear rank, set them off flying. Then the Union skirmish line, returning to its position, picked up a prisoner or two.
Very little in the way of recuperation and restoration was pos- sible while occupying this position. It seemed to be peculiarly an out-of-the-way place; communications were not direct and easy: the roads were byways, not highways; there was nothing in the
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A HUNDRED DAYS UNDER FIRE.
country within reach; it seemed as if the regiment had been put into a side pocket and forgotten.
A notable incident about this time was a severe thunder storm one afternoon. The lightning played around uncomfortably. Four men who were lying under their shelter tent were shocked, but not killed; and the brigade bugler, who had taken refuge in a hollow tree on a hillside, was upset by a bolt which shattered the tree and sent him rolling down the hill.
Pickett's Mills left the Forty-first much saddened, for many a comrade was missed from the ranks. The regiment was far below the two-hundred mark in strength, with no prospect of recovery in this regard. It had not half the men who started on the campaign, for although the greater loss was in the late battle, it was constantly suffering from sickness. No men were coming up from the rear, from hospital or as recruits. Far down in the heart of the enemy's country, with the base of supplies so distant as to be practically cut off as to anything but ammunition and crackers and coffee and bacon; with only the dog-tent for a shelter, and for cooking utensils tin cups and frying pans-the whole outfit for shelter and living carried on the soldier's back and in his haversack-why, two months or so of this, with little or no word from home, made life seem like banishment to a wilderness. A campaign in Africa would hardly be farther from home; and Crusoe on his island would not be in greater need of the common comforts of civilized life.
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
CHAPTER XIV.
CLOSING UPON ATLANTA.
The battle of Pickett's Mills was fought on the 27th of May, and on the 4th of June the Confederates left their position there. On the 6th, the Forty-first marched seven miles in the direction of Acworth. The enemy was in close proximity from day to day, and always there were more or less severe encounters along the lines. On the 10th of June, the regiment moved at 4 in the morning, and all day long was kept on the alert with movement, skirmish and wait; going into bivouac at dark only four hundred yards from the place of starting. This was the character of the work from day to day. On the 15th, a deserter came in and reported the death of the Confederate Gen. Polk, who had been killed by a shell while recon- noitering on a hill in plain view from the ground then occupied by the Forty-first. On the 17th, a movement in line of battle was begun, Kimberly's and Foy's battalions in the first line. The front seemed to be clear, but on each flank the enemy's skirmishers were active. Finally, Capt. Kile, of the Forty-firs', was sent with four companies to clear the left front. The enemy was well posted in a farmhouse and its surroundings, but Kile charged the position and dislodged the Confederates. The advance was then possible, and was made, but brought on nothing more than desultory skirmishing.
Reveille at half past 3 in the morning, an advance at 4, and an all day skirmish-this was the order for day after day. It happened so on the 18th and again on the 21st, the enemy being driven about 400 yards on the latter day. On the 22d, Hooker's line was attacked. and the Forty-first was sent to fill a gap. Skirmishing as usual. but no serious fighting, for the hour was late. On the 23d, the regiment got within 75 yards of the Confederate main line, and a hastily made cover sufficed to hold the position until dark, which was near at hand, and during the night the line was fortified. On the 27th the regiment was at the base of Kenesaw Mountain.
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CLOSING UPON ATLANTA.
The assault which was made at this point did not involve the Forty-first, except in skirmishing. The heavy fighting was to the right of the regiment's position in the line; but a skirmish line was sent up the steep and obstructed hill in front, until the enemy's fortified line stopped further progress. That night the regiment was sent on special service. An attack was expected some distance to the right. The opposing lines were close together and the night was very dark. Instead of relying on a skirmish line, it was some- body's notion to put a regiment between the lines as an outlying force, and the detail for this duty fell to the Forty-first. A staff officer was the guide. With great caution, to avoid discovery by the enemy, the regiment was led into the edge of a dense thicket, and halted. No commands were given above the breath. Now and then a word or two could be heard from the front-that was the enemy. Again, some slight sound would come from the rear-that was our own people. As regards any conception of the direction of lines, or of the configuration of the ground beyond the spot where the men stood, the regiment might as well have been in the bottom of a well. There was not even the pretense of a bivouac in line at this place. The men sat or lay down, guns in hand, and waited for the night to pass. Nothing came of it, except intolerable weari- ness, and just before daybreak the regiment was ordered back, steal- ing away as cautiously as it came.
In this way the campaign wore on. Some progress was made, on one part of the line or another, with every day. Sherman was hugging Johnston close, and pressing nearer and nearer to Atlanta. On the morning of July 2d, there came a departure from the regular order. The pickets were to fire briskly for ten minutes. By mu- tual understanding, there had been no useless picket firing, and so Col. Kimberly, the men of the Forty-first being at the front, gave due notice before the firing began. The purpose of this picket firing was never made known; its visible effect was nothing at all. On the 3d the enemy's position was found to be evacuated. A reconnoiter- ing force was sent forward, developing nothing but the elaborate- ness of the enemy's defenses. There were traverses, abattis, chev- aux-de-frise, advanced works, lunettes, and so on. It looked as though the Confederates had relieved time that hung heavily, by
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
constructing all forms of field fortifications to be found in the mili- tary textbooks.
On the 5th of July, the Forty-first was detached to march by a parallel road to the Chattahoochie river, striking it at a point where was a pontoon bridge. A railroad station agent had given informa- tion that a portion of the enemy's trains were crossing the river on this bridge. The regiment was put on the road and the march hastened. Approaching the river, the enemy's cavalry was found, but no trains. The skirmish line, commanded by Major Williston, went forward at a run across the flat ground, and so pushed the cavalry that the last man had barely time to cut the bridge loose and let it swing over to the Confederate side. The enemy opened up a lively fire across the river, and hurt some men, Major Williston receiving a shot in the shoulder. But, with the Chattahoochie be- tween the armies, and later on Peach Tree Creek, the contending forces were not so close together as they had been.
From the crossing of the Chattahoochie to the arrival at Peach Tree Creek, the Forty-first was not brought into immediate contact with the enemy. At the latter stream, the enemy was disposed to resist the passage, and sharp fighting occurred just beyond the right of Hazen's brigade, and some also in front, the troops being within the enemy's range and suffering a few casualties, though not en- gaged. Just at dusk the brigade was crossed quickly and moved to the top of the steep bank. Here a line was formed to protect the crossing, and during the night it was strongly intrenched. The enemy was known to be in position not a thousand yards from the creek, and it was thought that when morning came he might at- tempt to crush any force that had crossed in the night. The Forty- first was in front, and built a good earthwork. The men had be- come expert in this work; intrenching tools were as much a part of the equipment as the rifle. After a regiment was halted in line, a few moments sufficed to produce a defense of no little value in case of attack, and a few hours would find it effectual against field artil- lery. At this point, most of the night was spent on the earthwork. The regiment stood to arms before daybreak, but no attack came. An occasional picket shot from a line of bushes along a fence in front, was the only indication of the enemy's presence. Peach Tree
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CLOSING UPON ATLANTA.
Creek was crossed on the 20th of July. It was the last natural ob- stacle on the way to Atlanta, and on the 22d the regiment was fairly established in line before that city. This was the day saddened by the death of McPherson.
Before Atlanta, the position of the Forty-first was on a low ridge, slightly covered with a bushy growth, open ground in front and rear, and to the right. No troops joined the line on the right, for the ridge ran out there, and the ground was low for three or four hundred yards to a heavily wooded tract. Running obliquely across the front was the bed of a little stream. and beyond this an open slope, at the top of which were the Confederate works. On this open slope the enemy had well-constructed rifle pits, each one large enough to hold from four to six men. Off in the woods on the right front the enemy had a heavy siege gun, which sent some shells into the front of the little ridge where the Forty-first lay, and some others far overhead toward the left. These big missiles swept down from the Confederate lines with a tremendous roar, and when they burst the air was full of fragments. But that was all; they did not succeed in hurting anybody. . The men soon came to hear them with indifference. Soine one said that the big shells came as if they were firing a blacksmith shop at the Union line-this with reference to the quantity of iron let loose when the shell burst.
On the 25th of July, the brigade lost two good regiments, re- lieved from service because of expiration of term of enlistment. These were the First Ohio and the Fifth Kentucky. On the 27th, Gen. Stanley was assigned to the command of the Fourth Corps, Gen. Howard going to the Army of the Tennessee. On the 28th, the Forty-first was ordered to take the Confederate rifle pits on the open slope in its front. The regiment was deployed as skirmishers, made a quick and determined dash, and easily drove the enemy out, taking the reverse side of the pits for its shelter as it pelted the running Confederates. A battery in the rear (Bridge's), attempting to help an attack that needed no helping, exploded a shell directly over one of the rifle pits after it was taken-fortunately hurting no one. One or two more shells flew almost as close to the captors, and then somebody mercifully stopped the artillerymen. The
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
Forty-first had come to dread this battery more than it did those of the enemy, for on one or two former occasions, something like the experience just related had been encountered.
When the movement was made to the rear of Atlanta, to cut the enemy's line of communication, the Forty-first was a part of it. There was a great deal of marching, some of it in the night time; several positions taken up without encounter; and much tear- ing up of railroad track. The movement ended near Lovejoy Sta- tion, the Forty-first having some trifling skirmishing to end up the campaign. In this winding up of the long struggle, one singu- lar thing occurred near the Forty-first. The Seventy-first Ohio, which had been at the battle of Shiloh with some ill fortune, and had afterward been kept in the rear on various kinds of guard duty with more ill fortune, was sent to the front at Atlanta. It looked like a brigade or a little division beside one of the regiments that had been through the campaign. Officers and men were anxious to wipe out the old stains, and a single opportunity occurred while the troops were near Lovejoy. A Confederate skirmish line was posted along a fence on the farther side of an open field, and some companies of the Seventy-first were deployed as skirmishers and sent against it. The line of Seventy-first men advanced into the field and began firing. The Confederate skirmishers were covered by the fence, those of the Seventy-first stood upright in the open ground. Not a man of them would take cover; they were set to prove that the regiment would stand and fight. They lost a dozen or more men in less than as many minutes, without accomplishing what a practiced regiment would have done with little or no loss. At that cost they made their point, and at least won the sympathy of those who saw the needless sacrifice.
After the evacuation, the Forty-first was encamped east of At- lanta for rest and recuperation. It began the campaign with 331 men, and had dwindled to 99. One hundred and fifty had fallen in battle, and more than 80 had succumbed to disease. No other cam- paign in the middle West equalled that one in duration, in marching service, and in frequent and close contact with the enemy. Many a day when there was no battle, it was a picket fight for breakfast, a skirmish for dinner, and another little fight to finish the day. For
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CLOSING UPON ATLANTA.
week after week, the din of musketry was ringing in the ears with- out cessation, save in the night; and the night itself was often broken by marching, or intrenching, or standing to arms. Those were a hundred days of unintermitted strain, with none but the commonest indispensable supplies, and those not always regular and in full quan- tity. The marvel was that anything at all was got over so long a line of supply. Nothing but the railroad, reconstructed as the army went forward, made it possible.
One of the happenings at the close of the campaign, important to the Forty-first and its old brigade, was the transfer of Gen. Hazen to the Army of the Tennessee, where he was given a division. His departure left Col. O. H. Payne, of the One Hundred and Twenty- fourth Ohio, in command as the senior colonel. This officer was well qualified to take the command, and he was certainly entitled to it by virtue of long and uniformly good and creditable service. Never- theless, an Illinois colonel, whose regiment had never served a day with this command, was sent to take Hazen's vacant place. * Col. P. S. Post, the officer referred to, was a good and worthy soldier --- not a word to be said against his faithfulness or efficiency; but his assignment to this command over the heads of men as competent, and entitled to the preferment by long service with the command, was a grievous wrong. Hazen had some active and bitter enemies, and one o these, Gen. D. S. Stanley, was now commander of the corps. This officer's hostility extended to all who were connected with Hazen, or supposed to be friendly to him, and it did not stop when Hazen had left those connections and friends behind him. Indeed, Stanley's aggressive enmity did not cease with the ending of the war. He had the ear of Sherman as one of a coterie of regu- lar officers who would be called a "ring" in politics. He seems to have taken umbrage at every good stroke Hazen made, and to have counted him always a rival for a coming brigadier generalship in the regular army. After the war, this hostile influence was able to banish Hazen to a post in the wilds of the far West and keep him there, while better posts were reserved for others. This was at all times a serious adverse influence for Hazen to contend with, and it affected very directly the fortune of his command. No proof can be made, but Ilazen's friends had no doubt that the assignment of
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
Col. Post to command the old brigade, passing over competent men of the brigade, was due to the influence which Stanley conspicuously represented. The strength of Hazen's enemies was shown at the time of the Hazen-Stanley court martial long after the war, when the finding of the court was against Stanley, and the general of the army (Sherman) approved the finding, but reversed the penalty. Col. Payne's resignation quickly followed the ungracious and wrong- ful act which took from him what he had fairly won. It was a stig- ma which the old brigade did not deserve.
Some leaves of absence followed the ended campaign, and there was a prospect of freer communication with the North; but this was soon changed when Hood, leaving Sherman to do as he pleased, started the Confederate columns for Nashville.
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AFTER HOOD.
CHAPTER XV.
AFTER HOOD.
When the Confederate army was set in motion for the attempt on Nashville, the Fourth and Twenty-third corps were detached from Sherman's army and given the task of taking care of Hood while Sherman made his jaunt to the sea. The Forty-first made so hasty a march to Chattanooga that there was little time for observa- tions on the way. One of the sights, however, was Rome, Georgia -remembered as an oddly located little town. The latter part of the march to Chattanooga was greatly hastened, and on one day the regiment scored a march of thirty miles. From Chattanooga the regiment went by rail to Athens, Alabama, the transportation being in freight cars and most uncomfortable. At Athens, one hun- dred and sixty-four drafted men and substitutes were received. Compared with the worn clothing of the Forty-first, these new men were magnificently fitted out. Some of the outfit they got rid of on the first day's march toward Pulaski; the day was warm, the march hard on the recent arrivals, and they dropped many a brand new overcoat by the roadside.
At Pulaski there was a partial return to Atlanta campaign ex- periences. Elaborate earthworks were planned and thrown up. The supposition was that Hood's men were once more to be encoun- tered, but this did not happen then. The next move was to Colum- bia, and it was a hurried one. There was no longer a doubt of the close proximity of the Confederate army, and that in numbers the two Union corps were overmatched. The Forty-first was sent across the river to look out for the flank and rear, while the troops 7
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THE FORTY-FIRST OHIO INFANTRY.
went into position. There were crowds of negro refugees, eager to follow the army when they thought it was being driven out of the country never to return. There was rain here, though the weather was cold.
The principal duty in which the regiment was here engaged was a reconnaissance toward a ford several miles above Columbia. There was a report of Confederates crossing at this place early one morning, and the reconnaissance was ordered to determine the fact. The matter was important, for the road from the ford to Spring Hill, on the road to Nashville and in rear of Columbia, was shorter than the road from the army's position to Spring Hill. Marching several miles toward the road from the ford, the command at last came in sight of it across a wide stretch of open fields, and saw that it was full of passing baggage trains, hurrying toward Spring Hill. A staff officer from army headquarters was with the reconnaissance, and for some time he was convinced that these trains were a foraging ex- pedition sent across the river, and not, as it proved, the trains of part of Hood's army which had already passed on toward the Union rear. The Forty-first was deployed and advanced to a farmhouse half a mile from the road. From this point it was plain to be seen that while the trains occupied the road, beside the wagons the way was crowded with infantry. Still the staff officer was not satisfied. A skirmish line was sent forward, and had not advanced far when a line of infantry rose to its feet behind a fence midway between the skirmishers and the road. That was enough; nobody doubted long- er that a heavy force, a large part of the Confederate army, was rapid- ly putting itself between the Union forces and Nashville. The re- connaissance was quickly returned to Columbia, where the whole army was found in motion, or getting in motion, withdrawing from its position on the southern side of the river, to get back as fast as might be to Spring Hill. There were reports that a division which had been sent there late in the day had encountered the enemy ac- tually on the Nashville road.
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