USA > Oregon > Douglas County > History of southern Oregon, comprising Jackson, Josephine, Douglas, Curry and Coos counties, comp. from the most authentic sources > Part 38
USA > Oregon > Jackson County > History of southern Oregon, comprising Jackson, Josephine, Douglas, Curry and Coos counties, comp. from the most authentic sources > Part 38
USA > Oregon > Josephine County > History of southern Oregon, comprising Jackson, Josephine, Douglas, Curry and Coos counties, comp. from the most authentic sources > Part 38
USA > Oregon > Coos County > History of southern Oregon, comprising Jackson, Josephine, Douglas, Curry and Coos counties, comp. from the most authentic sources > Part 38
USA > Oregon > Curry County > History of southern Oregon, comprising Jackson, Josephine, Douglas, Curry and Coos counties, comp. from the most authentic sources > Part 38
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Captain Barnes, of the spy company, reconnoitered during the halt at the Little Meadows, and found the Indians in large numbers, scattered in the rough, mountainous and brushy country between the camp and the Big Meadows, which lie below the Little Meadows, and also the north side of the river. Major Bruce being communi- cated with, his battalion was ordered up, and he joined forces with Colonel Kelsey, the total force gathered there being 535 officers and men. The camp was on a high bench or terrace, two miles north of the river and a thousand feet above it. A breastwork of pine trees was formed, enclosing a space sufficient for camping purposes, and there being an abundance of grass and water near, the locality was well adapted for that purpose. The Indian encampment was found to be on a large bar on the south side of the river and some three miles below. The Big Meadows were deserted by them, and the intervening country contained none except those doing duty as scouts. On the twenty-third Colonel Kelsey with 150 men made a reconnoissance toward a suspected
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point, but without results, and on the same day Major Bruce at the head of a like force, started to descend the slope toward the bar. At a distance of a mile from camp a creek was arrived at, beyond which were collected a considerable number of Indians, but these being beyond rifle range, and Major Bruce's instructions not allowing him to attack, no fighting was done, and the detachment having plainly seen the Indian village on the bar, returned to camp. During the following days until the twenty- seventh, considerable reconnoitering was done, and a brush with the enemy took place, without result. The Indians were thought to number several hundred, including women and children, and were found to be as actively employed in scouting as were the whites themselves.
At a council of war ordered by General Lamerick it was resolved to attack the enemy in his stronghold on the bar; and to do this effectually and at the same time prevent the Indians from escaping over the mountains in their rear, Major Bruce was ordered to cross to the south side of the river and march to a point where they could be intercepted in case of flight. The other battalion under Colonel Kelsey in person was to proceed westward from the encampment, and gaining the summits opposite the Indians' position, was then to march down the steep declivity directly in their front and attack them from across the river. The southern battalion duly arrived at the point where they were to cross, but the two canvas boats being launched, the men declined to enter them, alleging that the Indians might easily sink them by rifle shots, or failing in that, might massacre the few who would be able to land. Major Bruce's authority was insufficient to compel them to obedience, and the plan was abandoned. It does not appear that any Indians had been seen by the battalion on their march to the river, nor does it seem likely that any considerable number of them, if any, were in the neighborhood, their total force probably having been at that hour at their rendezvous on the bar, three miles below. This is a fair example of the difficulties met with by the officers at that time. Such a state of insubordination prevailed that it rendered all plans nugatory. Every private thought himself entitled to reason upon his superior officer's commands, and to refuse compliance if they seemed injudicious. Under such circumstances it is no wonder that such a large force accomplished so little.
Major Bruce being compelled to remain on the north side of the river, concluded to move down stream and join Colonel Kelsey at the bar. Meanwhile, this commander had reached a point on the declivity nearly opposite his objective point, and started directly down hill, following a ridge which afforded comparatively little obstruction to his advance. In this he was much favored by a heavy fog which rested upon the hills, utterly obscuring his every movement from the Indians. Thus he was enabled to arrive nearly at the river before they discovered his whereabouts. The detachment was now formed in order of battle, and all rushed down and took position on the bank of the river facing the Indian encampment on the bar, and opened a continuous fire upon the enemy. The savages were thrown into confusion by the sudden attack, and dill not return the fire for some time. The women and children, the former carrying heavy packs, soon left the camp and passed up the hill toward the Illinois river, while the greater part of the males sought shelter in the edge of the fir woods behind their encampment, and watched the movements of the whites. Major Bruce arrived with
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his command, and taking a position on the left of the northern battalion, began firing at the enemy, who, however, were in positions of comparative safety. Desultory and ineffectual firing was kept up all day, but no means of crossing the river being at hand, nothing could be done to complete the victory. It is supposed that quite a number of Indians were killed, while the only loss to the whites was the severe wounding of Elias Mercer, of Wilkinson's company, who, on being removed to Rose- burg, died upon the way. John Henry Clifte also sustained a severe wound, but recovered.
In the evening the whole force went into camp at the Big Meadows, on the north side of the river and six miles below the former camp. On the following morning Colonel Kelsey and Major Latshaw with 150 men went to a point on the river two miles below the bar, with the expectation of crossing to the south side and " scouring " the country thereabouts. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman with 100 men marched to the battle-ground of the previous day to engage the enemy if they were still there, with the object of diverting their attention from the movement below. The former command found Indians scattered along the shore, who showed fight and "moved further into the brush and set up a considerable hallowing," consequently the detach- ment did not cross. The casualties of the day were, as might be judged, very light. A private of Sheffield's company was wounded, and one or two Indians were thought to be hit, but the latter is very doubtful. About twelve o'clock the Indians "withdrew beyond range of our guns, and deeming it impracticable to cross the river at this point we drew off the command and returned to camp." Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman had found no Indians at the bar, so he returned, probably also thinking it impracticable to cross. Major Bruce had " scoured " in the direction of John Mule creek with 100 men and he also returned unharmed.
On the twenty-ninth Captain Crouch, with his company, left for Roseburg, via. Camas valley, to escort the wounded to the hospital. The remainder of the regiment broke camp and occupied the bar where the Indian encampment had stood, and met with no resistance in so doing. The scouts reported that the Indians had all left the vicinity and that the remains of seventy-five camp-fires existed on the mountain side above the bar, making the spot where they encamped on the night following Colonel Kelsey's attack. On the thirteenth the command remained at the bar on account of bad weather, and Captain Lewis' spies reported that the Indians had gone down the river. "The provisions now being nearly exhausted, and the weather continuing so unfavorable, it was considered impracticable to follow the enemy over the rough ground before us, which was covered with snow, and many of the soldiers were already nearly barefooted." On the first of May, the troops re-crossed the river, Captains George and Bushey proceeded immediately to Grave creek, while the rest camped at the Big Mead- ows, at a place selected as the site of a permanent fort. Williams, Wilkinson, Keith, Blakely and Barnes' companies were detailed to remain there, the remaining com- panies setting out for home the next day. Captains Sheffield and Noland with their men went to Roseburg via. Camas valley, and Robertson, Wallan, Miller (Rice's), O'Neal, Alcorn and Lewis' companies marched to Fort Leland, the headquarters of the northern battalion, which they reached on the fourth of May.
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WALLNO-LITH-PORTLAND -OR
OCEAN HOUSE, PROPERTY OF J. P. TUPPER, SEASIDE CITY, CoOS Co.
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If we sum up the fruits of this, the Second Meadows Campaign, we shall find that they equal those of the first. To descend to details, we find that the army " scoured " a large traet of wild country, consumed twenty-five days' rations in two weeks, drove the Indians from their place on the bar to another place in some unknown region, and returned to civilization. It is useless to enter into any long explanations of why such slight results were attained. It must have been partly the insubordination of the troops, who while nominally under the command of their general, colonel, lieutenant-colonel, four majors and unlimited captains and lieutenants, domineered shamefully over these officers and acted their own pleasure in times of emergency. It is difficult to under- stand why these individuals retained their commands under such discouraging circum- stances, and why their own self-respect did not impel them to quit their charges in dis- gust. Some curious and amusing incidents, whose record has come down to us, will illustrate the spirit of insubordination which so injured the army's usefulness. After General Lamerick had planned the fight at the Meadows and had given Major Bruce the order to cross the river, one of the latter's men said, "Look here, Gen'ral; this ain't gwine ter do. Jest as sure as we cross thar, some of us will git hit. Don't yer know we got one man killed tryin' ter cross thar afore?" Rather more encouraging was a reply to one of Major Bruce's commands to charge, "Yes, We say charge, and we'll chalk you out a damned good charge, Major!" There is no question of the individual bravery of those men. As expressed by one who was among them-a coward had no chance. A more daring set could not have existed than these miners and settlers. Their experience had made them the most self-reliant men that the world contained. But the peculiar circumstances surrounding them, the fact of their officers being raised from the ranks and being consequently regarded as no better than anybody else, wonderfully impaired their efficiency and reliability.
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE WAR IN CURRY COUNTY.
Character of the Indians-Tribal Designation-Number-Incidents-Coquille Massacre-Killing of Buford, Haw- kins and O'Brien-The Natives Remain Peaceable-Captain Poland and His Company-Character of Enos- Massacre at Gold Beach-The Survivors Take Refuge in a Fort-Other Casualties Seeking for Help-The Crescent City Company-Views of General Wool-A Military Campaign Planned-Arrival of Regular Troops Captain Smith Descends the River-Actions With the Indians -- Volunteer Companies.
Having now brought the detail of events down to the end of the second meadows campaign, it will be necessary to retrograde in order that a connected account of of affairs in a totally distinct region may be given, and their bearing upon the main features of our story be understoodl. The coast of Curry county had become known to Americans through the energetic explorations of Captain Tichenor and others in 1850 and 1851. The gold-bearing sand along the beaches was examined a few years later, and during the half-dozen years next following its discovery the region became a mining locality of considerable importance. Several hundred miners had, by the fall of 1855, gathered near the mouth of Rogue river, and together with the traders and others incidental to mining communities, made up a considerable population. These people lived mainly at the month of Rogue river, and held communication with the outer world by way of San Francisco, accessible by steam and sailing vessels, and with Crescent City by means of a much traveled road along the coast southward. The mouth of Rogue river is sixty-one miles north of Crescent City, Pistol river is twelve miles south of Rogue river, and Chetco, nearly upon the California state line, is twenty-five miles south. Some thirty miles north of the Rogue river is Port Orford, celebrated as the place where the first landing and settlement upon this portion of the coast was made, and where the first people to land sustained a memorable siege by Indians. Port Orford was, during the Indian wars, a military post of the United States army. No communication, or scarcely any, was carried on along the coast northward from Curry county, nor was it considered accessible from the eastward. Rough and impassable ranges of heavily wooded mountains cover almost the entire surface of the country and approach so near to the coast as to almost ent off travel by the sea shore. On the east these mountains penetrate to the Illinois, the Applegate and Cow creek. Among their defiles meander streams to whose beds the sunlight never penetrates. Steep hillsides and bushy canyons block the path of the adventur- ous explorer who would fain force his way among them, and roaring streams, swollen by winter's rains to an impassable height, impede the progress of man or animal. Among these mountains roamed the elk, deer, bear and smaller game in profusion. In the open glades and by the sides of the cool streams grew the salmon berry, and many edible roots. In such a region existence was an easily solved problem, and a numerous race of Indians gave proof of its solution.
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Here resided the To-to-tin, a numerous people, related to the Rogue Rivers and Klamaths. Their northern limits were at Coos bay ; toward the south they reached Chetco. They were divided into twelve bands, of whom eight lived along the coast, being the Vasomah, at the mouth of the Coquille ; the Quah-to-mah, on Flores creek ; Sixes (first called Shix) river and Port Orford; the Co-sut-hen-tan, near the Three Sisters ; the Eu-qu-ach-ces, along the coast from Port Orford to Rogue river ; the Tah- shutes, southward of the river ; next the Chet-less-un-tun, or Pistol Rivers, about the mouth of that stream ; the Wish-te-not-ins south of the Pistol Rivers, and north of the Chetcoes (Che-at-tee), who were the southernmost tribe. On Rogue river were the To-to-tins, who gave their name to the whole tribe; the Mack-a-no-tins lived above, and the Shista-koos-tees still higher up stream, or about the mouth of the Illinois. At the forks of the Coquille dwelt the Cho-cre-ten-tan band. All these divisions were small ; the Chetcoes, the most numerous, numbering but 242 in the sum- mer of 1854, while the total number of Coast Indians was 1230, of whom 448 were men.
On the resignation of Judge Skinner in 1853, Samuel H. Culver became Indian agent for Southern Oregon, and resided for a part of the time at Port Orford. The government had decided upon the removal of the To-to-tin tribe to a reservation, but with the usual delay of governmental matters this was not carried out in time to avoid the great catastrophe. In 1854 Isaiah L. Parrish became agent and made the enumer- ation of the Coast Indians, whence the above statistics are taken. There is nothing distinctive or peculiar about the intercourse of these people with the whites who came into the country ; they received the usual treatment accorded the Indian by the Cau- casian. With rather more than ordinary patience and humility they endured the encroachments of the higher civilization, and lived on calmly in their smoky hovels, spearing the salmon and gathering mussels, until their outbreak in 1856. From a long list the following incidents have been extracted, to show whatever they may of the situation of affairs along the coast previous to that date. The report of the com- missioner of Indian affairs for 1854, states that on or about the fifteenth of February, 1854, one Miller, with several accomplices from Smith river, killed fifteen Chetcoes, residing at the mouth of the river of that name, because these Indians interfered with the profits of a ferry which he was running. They transferred white passengers in their canoes, thus competing in a manner unacceptable to Miller. By another source we are told that Miller was subsequently indicted for the killing and sentenced to two years in the penitentiary. But this assertion is too wildly improbable for belief. It had no precedent, and has no subsequent counterpart. The only case in our knowl- edge that bears a resemblance was that of a white man named Thompson, who was indicted for murdering an Indian on Galice creek some time in 1854. The defendant made his escape before his case came to trial and left the country.
On a previous page in this book the "Coquille massacre" was referred to. This was the work of forty miners and others living near the mouth of the Coquille, who killed sixteen Indians who were accused of having become "insolent" to the whites, and specifically of having said " God damn American" in the presence and contrary to the dignity of a white citizen of this great republic-of having fired a shot at a crowd of whites-of cutting a ferry-boat rope-of riding a white man's horse without
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permission-and finally, of having refused to explain these insolent actions. On page 272 and following, of the Indian commissioner's report for 1854, may be found descriptions of the subsequent proceedings of the whites, wherein they demolished an Indian village, killed sixteen persons, including a squaw and an infant, and wounded several more. These statements having been given by Abbott, leader of the whites, no room is left for cavil.
Another incident of importance has a termination somewhat different from the ordinary tale, but is itself very lamentable in its results. On August 26, 1855, James Buford, a miner living at the mouth of Rogue river, became involved in a quarrel with an Indian, and was shot by the latter, the bullet taking effect in Buford's shoul- der. The native was arrested and brought before a justice of the peace, and after a partial examination it was resolved to remove him for the night to the council ground, and afterwards to Port Orford. There being a considerable number of Indians there- abouts, a squad of United States troops was detailed for the service of guarding the prisoner, who was taken in a large canoe with his guard. Shortly, another canoe ran alongside in the semi-darkness, and from it Buford and two friends, Hawkins and O'Brien, fired and killed the prisoner and an Indian who was paddling. Instantly the soldiers returned the fire, killing two and mortally wounding the other assailant, who retained only sufficient strength to swim ashore, where he died upon the bank. This incident, we need not add, created a great deal of excitement, and resulted in a war of words against the army which could so quickly take the side of the savages, and leave unavenged the wrongs they committed upon the whites. Nevertheless, the army was, from the nature of things, opposed to the whites, although they could not be said to favor the Indians. Departmental instructions leave the officer commanding a military post no option regarding the treatment of either savage or civilized persons, but require him to interpose to restrain, on the one hand, the violence of the nation's aboriginal wards, and on the other to resist the action of the whites who may interfere unlawfully with them. After the uprising of the Interior Indians under John, Limpy and other chiefs, the Coast Indians were solicited to join in the warfare against the whites, but the sentiment of the larger portion was for peace, and the overtures of those chiefs were rejected. The Buford affair may be allowed to have contributed somewhat to produce the hostilities which followed in the spring of 1856, but still greater weight is probably to be attached to the success of the malcontents on the river above in resist- ing the efforts of their opponents who sought to conquer them. During the early part of the winter of 1855-6 symptoms of increasing discontent were noticed among the natives, and the condition of affairs was pronounced grave enough to warrant immedi- ate measures being taken to preserve peace. An Indian agent for the locality at the mouth of the river was considered indispensible, and Ben Wright, the celebrated Indian fighter, who had gained a vast experience in the management of the savages, and who had sustained intimate domestic relations with various tribes, was, at the solicitation of certain people of Yreka and elsewhere, appointed to that post as suc- cessor to Mr. Parrish, by Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs for Oregon. Wright began his ministrations under favorable auspices and for a time everything promised security for the whites, whose fears were not of the most serious cast. The military arm was present in the person of Brevet-Major Reynolds, U. S. A., who, with
WALLING- LITH PORTLAND OR.
ROCK CUT, ONE AND ONE-HALF MILES NORTH OF TABLE ROCK. O & C.R.R.
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his company of the third artillery, was stationed at Port Orford, the post bearing the official designation of Fort Orford. This force, though too small to be of much service in time of a real outbreak, still served to maintain order as between the whites and natives, and was much relied upon by the infant colony so far away from effective help, and so completely at the mercy of the savages. The settlers, of course, were atmost entirely men in the prime of life; very few women and children had yet arrived in the country-a peculiarly fortunate circumstance as we shall see. Only two or three white families were to be found at the settlement at the mouth of the river, called Gold Beach, but many miners abode in small cabins scattered along the banks of that stream for several miles upwards from the mouth, and along the sea-coast north and south, but mainly located near the present site of Ellensburg. Three miles up the river was Big Flat, where a considerable settlement had been formed, and some land brought under cultivation.
Something had been done in the way of protection against possible outbreaks by the formation of a small company of volunteers who were under the command of Cap- tain Poland. This company numbered thirty-three men and had been called out by the agent and stationed at the Big Bend, some fifteen miles up the river, where they served to separate the hostiles above from the peaceful Indians below. Here they had a strongly fortified post and were deemed secure from defeat or capture. These troops maintained their station until about the first of February, 1856, when they abandoned it and joined the main body of citizens at Gold Beach. Wright, observing the growing discontent of the natives at this time, put forth every effort to induce them to go peace- ably on to the temporary reservation at Port Orford, where they would be safe from the attack of ill-disposed whites and the solicitations of hostile Indians. It was still thought, notwithstanding hints of an outbreak, that the Indians about the mouth of the river would be induced to submit to the authority of the superintendent and would eventu- ally, without trouble or bloodshed, be removed to some distant reservation. It has always been supposed that it was owing to the intriguing of one man that this effect was not brought about. This man was an Indian of some eastern tribe -- Canadian, it was said-and had been with Fremont on his last expedition ten years before. He pos- sessed great experience of savage warfare and savage craft and duplicity, of which latter qualities he was certainly a master. Enos, called by the Indians Acnes, had become a confident of Wright's to the extent of knowing, it is said, all his plans for the peaceful subjugation of the Indians. We must confess Ben Wright changed from what fact and tradition have described him, if instead of meditating a mighty coup-de-main to destroy them, he relied upon negotiations, squaws' enticements and the persuasions of an Indian renegrade to accomplish what his arms alone had been want to do. Enos, nominally for Wright, constantly entered the Indian camps, in one of which his wife dwelt; and laid with the braves of these coast tribes a far-reaching plan to destroy utterly and beyond regeneration the small colony of whites; and this done, to join the bands of savages who were waging war along the upper reaches of the Rogue, and at one fell swoop to defeat and drive from the country the invaders who so harrowed the Indian soul. Thus large they say his plan was ; but not larger, doubtless, than those of other savages, but more nearly being executed than most others, because laid by a brain that could contrive and a disposition that made bloody deeds and violence like 36
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balm to his feelings. Many a dangerous and rough enemy the whites had in Southern Oregon, but none more dangerous nor capable than this planning and contriving, smil- ing and hating foreign Indian, whose treachery cost the sea-cost colony many valuable lives and nearly its whole material wealth.
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