USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780 > Part 31
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1 Kent's Commentaries, vol. I, 103 (12th ed.).
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other States. She was not to be the subject of trade and barter when the war should end, but should be free or otherwise, as the result of the war should determine for her sister States. We wish that we could adopt with some degree of assurance the Laurens version of the proposition as the true one ; but while John Laurens cer- tainly knew of its terms, we are met by the statement of Moultrie, that all the messages carried out were in his possession when he wrote.1
There is a probable solution of the proposition of the Governor and Council to include the whole State in the terms of neutrality which we have found nowhere sug- gested, but which may have had great and controlling influence in the offer. Wherever the British forces had hitherto obtained possession of the country it had at once been assumed that the Royal authority was restored, and that the inhabitants were to be thenceforth regarded as of their old allegiance, and by logical consequence subjects of Great Britain, and moreover that such being the case, as subjects they were liable to military duty, and were to be enrolled as provincial militia under his Majesty, to be called upon for service against their former friends and allies. This had been done in Savannah and Augusta, and if Charlestown was taken, without condition, it would be so done here. Indeed, it was so to be attempted in South Carolina when Charlestown fell the year after. Prévost had offered that if the town would be surren- dered, such of the inhabitants who might not choose to receive his offers of peace and protection might be
1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 433, note, " All the messages that were carried out were signed by the gentlemen, and are now in my posses- sion." Moultrie, however, it is to be said, is a very loose writer, and is certainly at times incorrect about matters which he should have known. He wrote in 1802, twenty odd years after these events.
VOL. III. - 2 B
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received as prisoners of war, and their fate decided by that of the rest of the colonies. The Governor and Council now proposed to enlarge the scope of the offer to include all the people of South Carolina, - for with the fall of the city the fall of the rest of the State would undoubtedly follow, - but to modify the proposition so that the people should be regarded as neutrals, and hence not subject to service in the Royal militia. We can scarcely doubt that this consideration had great weight, if, indeed, it was not the controlling motive.
Ramsay says that it was presumed that Lincoln was in close pursuit of Prévost, but his situation was unknown, and that the proposition of the Governor and Council was made only to gain time. This view has been ear- nestly and elaborately argued by the historian, William Gilmore Simms, in a lecture delivered in New York City November, 1856,1 and there is a well-authenticated family tradition which maintains that Governor Rutledge years after assigned the same cause for his action. We, how- ever, have been unable to concur in that solution of the matter. Governor Rutledge may doubtless have claimed, and justly so, that the manner in which he had conducted his negotiations up to this point had saved the city by detaining Prévost a whole day before the town. Twenty- four precious and, as it turned out, decisive hours had been gained by his negotiations, and it was to these, no doubt, to which he alluded when he gloried in having saved the city, and with the city the State over which he presided. But he had now exhausted diplomacy, and no guns were heard announcing Lincoln's approach ; no message through the lines had come from him. The necessity for final action had now come. It was a storm
1 A. S. Salleys, Jr., in the Sunday News, Charleston, S.C., July 9, 1899.
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of the city by a force believed to be overwhelming, or a surrender upon the best terms he could obtain. If the Laurens account of the terms he proposed is correct, is he to be blamed for offering them ? If surrender he must, what better could he have hoped to obtain ? But that the offer when made was made for acceptance or rejection by Prévost, and no longer for mere delay, - wise or unwise, honorable or improper, as it may be regarded, -must be admitted. Suppose Prévost to have promptly accepted the proposition, would not Governor Rutledge and the Council have been bound by it? And was the proposi- tion so different from that proposed to General William- son, shortly before, which Rutledge had rejected, or from that first made by Prevost at this time, as to have insured its rejection ? The circumstances all contradict the sug- gestion. Had the offer been made, not in good faith, but merely for delay, would not Moultrie and Gadsden and Laurens and McIntosh, or some one of them, have been let into the design and have so understood it? That they did not so understand it is evident from their conduct. While, however, Moultrie refused to carry on the negotia- tions for a surrender when the responsibility was returned to him, by whom it should never have been committed to another, he cannot escape equal responsibility in the mat- ter, for not only did he himself send the message, but there is evidence that he did not altogether discourage the Council in making the proposition. In the manu- script account by Colonel Laurens, to which we have just referred, there is this statement : -
" The Governor asked General Moultrie's opinion of the Propo- sition, and what he immagined the other States would think of it - who said altho' he was against it, and would not have himself or the Troops under him included, yet he thought the other States had no reason to complain, as they had not fulfilled their engagements
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to it in giving it aid and assistance, from which promise that State came into the union." 1
There was, no doubt, a strong feeling prevailing in South Carolina that she had been abandoned to her fate by the Congress - a belief which continued until the fall of Charlestown, and for which, indeed, there was strong foundation, so strong a foundation that Congress itself felt called upon by a special resolve to deny it. To this sentiment was now added the resentment that Lincoln, who had been sent without troops, but with implied if not specific instructions to defend Charlestown, as he him- self afterward claimed in his justification upon its loss, had carried off the greater part of the South Carolina continentals to Georgia, upon a rash and, as it turned out to be, a fruitless expedition, leaving the town and State open to this invasion. This feeling pervaded all ranks, affecting, even as appears from Laurens's statement, Moultrie himself.
1 Laurens's MS., So. Ca. Hist. Soc. In Moore's Diary of the Am. Rev., vol. II, 162, we find this note : -
" The following is the proposition made by Colonels Smith and McIntosh to Colonel Prévost and Captain Moncrief at a conference at Charlestown, May 12, 1779 : - ' That Carolina should remain in a state of neutrality during the war, and the question whether Carolina should remain an independent State or be subject to Great Britain be determined by the fate of the war.'
" 'This proposition shows in a clear point of view with what ease the people of Carolina can throw off and break their most solemn engagement with the Continental Congress and France on the approach of real dan- ger, or whenever they think it will suit their private views. Such is the boasted virtue and honor of the inhabitants of South Carolina.
"'Some time ago the State of South Carolina made a requisition to the Continental Congress for a supply of troops in South Carolina. The Congress sent young Mr. Laurens to recommend it to them to arm their domestics, and at the same time recommending Mr. Laurens as a proper person to head them. This is said to be the cause of Carolina's being willing to remain in a state of neutrality.'" - Gaines' Mercury, July 12.
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The deliberations of the Governor and Council were required to be kept secret, but the excitement caused by the proposition broke the seal of silence. Christopher Gadsden and his brother-in-law, Thomas Ferguson, and John Edwards vehemently opposed the message. Moul- trie says, " Edwards was so affected as to weep, saying, ' What ! are we going to give up the town at last ?'" and Gadsden, without scruple, communicated to some citizens, members of the legislature then under arms in the works, the nature of the measure which had been decided upon by the Governor and the other members of the Council. And solemnly and openly, it is said, was it then declared that the lives of the advocates of the measure should atone for the disgrace inflicted on the country.1 This determination was made known to the members of the Council. But Rutledge and those who had resolved to make the proposition were just as firm and determined men as Gadsden himself, and did not shrink from the responsibility they had assumed, nor were they to be intimidated because Gadsden and his friends threatened their lives. How completely John Rutledge maintained his ascendency, and retained the implicit confidence of the people, was amply demonstrated the next year when in the crisis of the war he was clothed with dictatorial pow- ers-a delegation of power by which alone the authority of the State was preserved during two terrible years, when South Carolina was abandoned to her fate by those in whose interest she had gone into the struggle, and while Gadsden lay in the dungeon in St. Augustine.
There was difficulty, however, to get some one to carry the message. The Governor and Council adjourned to Colonel Beekman's tent on the lines at the gate of the town, and Moultrie requested Colonel John Laurens to carry this 1 Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, 271, 272.
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message, which Laurens, knowing its purport, refused to do. Moultrie then sent for Colonel McIntosh, and requested that he would go with Colonel Roger Smith, who was to be sent out by the Governor. Both of these begged to be excused, and requested that Moultrie would get some other person. But Moultrie says, " I, however, pressed them into a compliance." By his own statement, therefore, Moultrie was himself less opposed to this propo- sition than Roger Smith or Colonel McIntosh, for he "pressed them into compliance " ; and whatever blame, if any, is attached to the Governor and Council for propos- ing this message, Moultrie must share, for he sent it. Why Roger Smith declined is not so clear, for he was present as a member of the Council, and was, it is sup- posed, one of the majority that passed the resolution to make the proposition.
There is another view of this matter which cannot escape observation. General Moultrie, it is claimed, refused to allow himself or his troops to be included in the surrender, but surely that position cannot be main- tained. Moultrie had begun the negotiation by asking Prévost "on what terms he would be disposed to grant a capitulation." A capitulation of what but of Moultrie's army as well as of the town? His army consisted of about one thousand Continentals and two thousand mili- tia. There can be no question that the militia would be included in the surrender by the Governor if made, and as certainly when Moultrie sends the proposition deter- mined upon by the Governor and Council without reser- vation and by one of his own officers-and that a Con- tinental officer -he was offering a capitulation of the whole army, which was necessarily and primarily included in Prévost's summons to the town.
Colonel McIntosh and Roger Smith were met by
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Colonel Prévost, appointed by General Prévost, his brother, to confer with them. They held their confer- ence a quarter of a mile from the gate, in the sight of the lines. Upon hearing the proposal Colonel Prévost answered "that they did not come in a legislative capac- ity, but if Colonel Smith pleased, he would show the proposal to the General." Upon their meeting a second time at twelve o'clock, Colonel Prévost said "that he had nothing to do with the Governor, that his business was with General Moultrie, and as the garrison was in arms they must surrender prisoners of war." Upon this, says Moultrie, the Governor and Council looked very grave and steadfastly on each other and on him, not knowing what he would say. After a little pause Moultrie said to the Governor and Council, "Gentlemen, you see how the matter stands ; the point is this : I am to deliver you up prisoners of war or not." Some replied "Yes." Then said Moultrie : " I am determined not to deliver you up prisoners of war. We will fight it out." Upon Moultrie saying this, Colonel Laurens, who was in the tent, jumped up and exclaimed, "Thank God, we are on our legs again ;" and as Moultrie was coming out of the tent General Gadsden and Mr. Ferguson, two of the Council who were against giving up the town, followed him and said, " Act according to your judgment and we will sup- port you." Moultrie thereupon immediately ordered the flag to be waved from the gate, which was a signal agreed upon should the conference be at an end. The enemy did not perceive the flag wave and continued theirs flying some time longer, upon which Moultrie sent out Mr. Kin- loch to inform them that he " was very sorry they should be detained so long - that his flag had been waved some time ago, and that all conference was at an end." Moul- trie then hurried on preparing for the defence.
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The next morning, that is to say the 13th, at daylight, strange to say, to the great joy of the citizens, it was cried out along the lines, " The enemy is gone !" And so it proved to be true. The main body had commenced the retreat immediately after the conference was ended, leav- ing some of their light troops to make a show before the lines to prevent Moultrie from perceiving their movement, and then to move off under cover of the night. Pulaski immediately proceeded to reconnoitre and followed them with his cavalry, but they had crossed the Ashley River before he could overtake them.
Moultrie's letter to Lincoln of the 8th, informing him of his arrival in Charlestown and of the condition of affairs, reached Lincoln at four o'clock P.M. on the 10th. Where, it is not stated ; but Lincoln's reply to Moultrie, written at that hour, was taken by the British on the 11th, near the lines of Charlestown. He was, therefore, on the afternoon of the 10th, within twenty-four hours' com- munication with Moultrie, and yet at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, two days after, he was quietly en- camped " about thirty-five miles from Wort's Ferry on Edisto."1 This Wort's Ferry is that since known as Givan's Ferry, and is sixteen miles from Dorchester and about thirty miles from Charlestown. He had, therefore, made scarcely any progress in these two days, and was still, . on the afternoon of the 12th, encamped sixty-five miles from Charlestown, though Moultrie had informed him, on the 8th, that Prevost was at Salkehatchie Bridge, that is, within fifty-six miles of the town.2 He had now at last realized the seriousness of Prévost's invasion, for he writes : " We are now making and shall continue to make every exer- tion for the relief of Charlestown. The baggage will be left . . . the inability of the men only will put a period 1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 435. 2 Ibid., 410.
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to our daily marches," and yet he was making no haste. If he had made a full day's march on the 10th, why did he not, instead of sending a letter, which might fall into the hands of the enemy, as it did, resume the march on the morning of the 11th, and press on toward Wort's Ferry, thirty-five miles, and to Dorchester, sixteen miles further, which he might have reached on the evening of the 12th? He would then have been exactly the same distance from Ashley Ferry as was Prévost ; for Ashley Ferry is equidistant from Dorchester as from Charlestown. When, therefore, Prevost would have learned of his approach, and turned to reach the Ferry, - his only way to cross the Ashley, -he would have been met by Lincoln across his path, and with Moultrie in his rear, between the two forces, Prévost must have been de- stroyed. Prévost had indeed placed himself in a cul-de- sac. Having no boats he had been obliged to cross the river at Ashley Ferry, twelve miles from Charlestown, and then to march down the peninsula which, as we have said, for six miles from the town was not a mile wide from the Ashley to the Cooper. Had Lincoln, therefore, sent no letter, but let his guns only announce to Prévost his coming after he had passed the quarter house, six miles from the town, he must surely have captured the British army - " Burgoyned " them as Moultrie, in his letter to Lincoln on the 5th, had hoped they would do. But instead of this, Lincoln writes in the evening of the 12th, " We are now encamped about thirty-five miles from Wort's Ferry on Edisto." Imagine Sumter or Marion or Tarleton or Stonewall Jackson going into camp under such circumstances !
Lincoln's letter of the 10th had been taken by the British on the 11th ; but though it declared he was making every exertion for the relief of Charlestown, and that the
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inability of his men only would put a period to his daily marches, the British, no doubt, were fully aware that at the rate of his progress they would have at least twenty- four more hours within which to storm the town or receive its capitulation. Doubtless, however, it was the letter that Prévost wished. But why, then, did he not accept the propositions of the Governor and Council, if that proposition was in the terms given by Moultrie and Ramsay? The answer of Colonel Prevost, that they did not come in a legislative capacity, and that the General would have nothing to do with the Governor and Council, was inconsistent with his proposition to General William- son for a neutrality for a part of Georgia, the month before, which Governor Rutledge had then indignantly repudiated ; and it was inconsistent, too, with his offer of the day before to General Moultrie, viz., " That such of the inhabitants who may not chuse to receive the generous offers of peace and protection may be received as prisoners of war, and their fate decided by the rest of the colonies." The proposition of the Governor and Council, if Moultrie and Ramsay are correct, was practically an acceptance of this offer enlarged to include the whole people of the State. Prévost, on the 11th, had proposed that such of the inhabitants of the town - not soldiers -such of the in- habitants, that is civilians, as would not accept his offer of peace might remain prisoners of war, that is, take no further part in the struggle until their fate was decided by the rest of the colonies. The Governor and Council had answered this proposition by another, offering the neutrality of the State until their fate should be decided by the result of the war between Great Britain and the other colonies.
There was under the circumstances nothing ignominious in the proposition of neutrality itself, for the people of
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South Carolina had never proposed or desired separation from England, and the Revolution had taken a shape in the Declaration of Independence to which the mass of the people were doubtless opposed. The Congress of the State had not authorized her delegates to sign that instrument, and the delegates had announced when asked to do so that the people of South Carolina were not prepared for such a step. Then had come England's offer of peace through the commissioners in 1778, which fulfilled the utmost demand which the people of South Carolina had ever made. But the proffer of peace had been anticipated and defeated by the alliance with France, which was in itself hateful to the Carolinians, as shown by the fatal riot of the last September. Having accepted office under the new Constitution, and clothed with almost dictatorial power, Rutledge had in good faith endeavored to rally the people to resistance. But the militia in South Carolina had done as the militia had in Massachusetts, in Connecti- cut, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, and everywhere when called upon, they had refused to abandon their families at the call of a government whose authority was not yet established. General Bull's brigade from the lower part of the State had dwindled to but four hundred without a battle, and the Governor had been able to bring with him from all the rest of the State but six hundred men. No one probably knew better than Rutledge himself that of the seven hundred and eighty militia of Charlestown many were opposed to the whole movement, and many more to the Declaration of Independence and separation from Great Britain. Then, too, was the dread consideration of the evils and horrors of the storm of a town to which Colonel Pré- vost had alluded in his answer to Moultrie's first offer and which, as the Governor and Council reviewed the ill-armed and undisciplined troops upon whom alone they
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had to rely for resistance to a force they believed of twice their numbers, including the very flower of the British army, they could not but fear would be as successful as Colonel Prévost predicted. And to all of this was added the deep feeling and resentment to which Moultrie had alluded, when he declared that the other States would have no reason to complain, as they had abandoned South Caro- lina and left her to her own defence. It was no doubt, as we have before observed, wise in a military view for Washington to turn a deaf ear as he had so far done to all applications for aid. It was no doubt true that Charles- town was so far away, as Washington wrote to the Presi- dent of Congress in the fall of the year, that by the time the Continental troops even in Virginia could reach it they would be so reduced by fatigue, sickness, and desertion that their aid would be of scarcely any con- sideration, and that the march would exhaust the whole detachment.1 But if this was so, if the other colonies, to the assistance of which South Carolina had so liberally contributed of her means, could not come to her aid, though the enemy weakened his forces in their front to assail her, surely she was not to be blamed for taking care of herself. Recollecting the position which her people had taken throughout their struggle, there was nothing in duty or honor to prevent the Governor and Council, if they possessed such a power, from declaring a neutrality between Great Britain and these colonies which desired a separation and independence which South Carolina did not. But when if true the Governor and Council pro- posed that the question whether the State should belong to Great Britain or remain one of the United States should be determined, not by herself, but by the treaty of peace between those two powers, leaving the fate of the State to
1 Washington's Writings, vol. VI, 411.
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be determined by others than her own people, they inflicted a stain upon her history which required all the blood shed in the subsequent struggle to wash away. Whether South Carolina under the circumstances was called upon to con- tinue a struggle upon which she had not voluntarily em- barked, was a fair question for his Excellency and Council. But they abandoned her honor with their own when they proposed, if they did so, to allow that question to be decided by any but her own people. We prefer to believe that the Laurens account of the transaction is the true one.
CHAPTER XVIII
1779
LINCOLN reached Dorchester on the 14th of May, the day after Prévost had made good his escape by way of Ashley Ferry. Having crossed the river, Prevost remained for some days near the Ferry, then retired toward the seacoast and took possession of John's Island, which is separated from the mainland by Stono River. This river or inlet is connected with Ashley by a water- way known as Wappoo Cut, which opens directly opposite the town. The British kept a post on the mainland, cov- ering a ferry across the Stono as well for the security of the island as for the protection of foraging parties. Three redoubts were thrown up for the defence of this post, which were joined by lines of communication, and its rear was covered by the Stono. Across this inlet there was a bridge of sloops and schooners lashed together. The post was thought of so much consequence that for some time the garrison consisted of fifteen hundred men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Prevost. Lin- coln determined to attack this post, and on the 31st of May General Isaac Huger was detached with one thousand foot and Count Pulaski's and Horry's horse for the pur- pose. But Pulaski, on reconnoitring the position, reported the British as too strongly intrenched, and a retreat was ordered.
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