USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780 > Part 44
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ceived it derogatory to the high station in which he was placed to have any concern in the prizes taken; but he nevertheless seems to have regarded it his duty to organize a most complete system of rapine and plunder. From a desire, as he says, of acting upon the most liberal princi- ples with the navy in this matter during the siege, he sent Colonel Webster to inform Admiral Arbuthnot of a con- siderable quantity of stores which had already fallen into their hands, and to offer the navy a share, although he claimed that in strictness they could have no claim, as the stores were not taken on any river or even on any branch of a river which had a communication with the sea. Upon this, after the siege, certain officers of the navy were deputed to meet the field officers of the army to determine their respective shares ; but they could not agree, the navy claiming a full half and the army being only willing to allow them a fourth, as being in proportion to their respec- tive numbers. The dispute thus originating was not ended for years after the war; but with its progress this history is not concerned.1 It is sufficient for the present that Commissioners of Captures were appointed. These were Major Moncreif, Major George Hay, and James Fraser, Esquire. As the Royal army was now much more numerous and extended over the country on all sides and had the convenience of a large fleet on the coast, and more leisure to attend to the business of pillage than had been practicable during Prévost's invasion, it was more thor- oughly systematized and much greater collections were made. Great quantities of silver plate were secured, not sioners to restore peace and good government in the several colonies of North America," in their proclamation of June 1, 1780.
1 Memoranda &c. Respecting Unprecedented Treatment which the Army have met with Respecting plunder taken after a siege. And of which Plunder the Navy serving with the Army Divided More than ample share Now Fourteen Years since, Pamphlet, London, 1794.
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only on the plantations and in Charlestown, but silver was found buried even in Fort Moultrie,1 and a large amount of it was taken in Camden, where it had been sent from the coast for safety.2 Several gentlemen lost in the invasions of 1779 and 1780 each from five hundred to two thousand dollars worth of plate.3 Great quantities of indigo were taken, the value amounting to thousands of dollars. The merchants had sent their commodities out of the town, and stored them often near the water lines. These collections very generally fell into the hands of the British. At Camden were found many hogsheads of indigo and tobacco and stores of all kinds.4 Spoil col- lected in this way was disposed of for the benefit of the Royal army. The quantity brought to market was so great that, though it sold uncommonly low, yet the divi- dend of a major general was upward of £4000 sterling; while the private plunder of individuals on their separate accounts was often more than their proportion of the gen- eral stock.5 Over and above what was sold in Carolina several vessels were sent abroad loaded with rich spoils taken from the inhabitants. Upward of two thousand plundered negroes were shipped off at one embarkation.6 All of this plunder was supposed to have been taken from the rebels; but the Hessians made as little distinction in Carolina between friend and foe as they had in the Jer- seys, and horses and provisions were always taken from one as well as the other. There was, however, some pro-
1 Moore's Diary, vol. II, 274, note.
2 Siege of Charlestown (Munsell), 186.
3 Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 67.
4 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 206.
5 The value of the spoil which was distributed by English and Hes- sian commissaries of captures amounted to about three hundred thousand poun Is sterling. Bancroft, vol. V, 378.
6 Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 66. VOL. III. - 2 N
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vision, though utterly inadequate, made for payment for the latter. When horses or supplies were taken from known Loyalists, receipts were given; but when taken from parties whose principles were not so certainly known, certificates were issued. The distinction between these two classes of paper was that where the word "receipt" was made use of it was intended that the proprietor should be paid upon his presenting the receipt in Charlestown, and many of these receipts were afterward actually paid by orders on the British paymaster general. Where the word "certificate " was made use of, it was intended as an evidence in the hands of the holder of such property having been taken, but its payment was to depend on consequences, that is, on the merit or demerit of the party at the end of the war. Those who obtained certificates were great losers, having to dispose of them to specu- lators, who would take them at an enormous discount.1 This was a cause of great dissatisfaction to the King's friends as well as to his enemies.
As had happened in Prévost's invasion, the negroes flocked to the British encampments, where, crowded together, they were attacked by camp fever; and small- pox, which had appeared in Charlestown and on the coast just before the invasion for the first time in seventeen years, took fast hold among them, spreading very rapidly. From these diseases and the want of proper shelter and care great numbers of these poor creatures died and were left unburied in the woods. A few instances occurred in which infants were found in unfrequented retreats attempting to draw the breasts of their dead mothers.2
In furtherance of the plan "of carrying his Majesty's arms from South to North," Sir Henry Clinton had
1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 206.
2 Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 67.
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expected, with the large force he had taken to Charles- town, to capture the city at once, and then himself to proceed to the Chesapeake, leaving Earl Cornwallis with a sufficient force, not only to hold Charlestown, but to proceed into the interior upon the old idea that the people there, especially the Scotch at Cross Creek, would rise, enable the earl to set up a Royal government, and reën- force his army to an extent which would allow him to proceed into Virginia and Maryland, and there unite with him, Baltimore being their objective point,1 and then to proceed still farther northward.2 But the siege of Charles- town had been protracted; the town would not yield as had been expected, and for some reason Sir Henry Clin- ton would not carry it by storm, as he might easily have done in April. The delay was fatal to the present devel- opment of the proposed campaign. The season was regarded by the British, who dreaded the heat of the Southern climate, as too far advanced for such an under- taking; while with the approaching summer Washing- ton's forces, it was supposed, would be augmented, and he would probably be himself on the move. To add to this, intelligence had been received that a French fleet, consisting of seven sail of the line and five frigates, with a large land force, commanded by M. de Ternay, was to have sailed from France early in the year, so that its arrival on the coast might soon be expected. Sir Henry Clinton was therefore anxious, not only to return to New York himself, but to take with him a large part of the army he had brought thence for the siege of Charlestown.
On the 1st of June Sir Henry, preparing for his return to New York, addressed a letter of instructions to Earl
1 Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy (Stevens), vol. I, 65-102, 144-210, 213-214, 334, 467 ; vol. II, 32.
2 Annual Register (1781), vol. XXIV, 57.
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Cornwallis, who was then in Camden, sketching the plan of campaign he proposed to adopt. He wrote that, as his lordship knew, it was a part of his plans to have gone into Chesapeake Bay, but that from information he had received - no doubt of the coming of the French fleet - it might be necessary to hasten to New York. When his lordship had finished his present campaign, that is, the crushing out any opposition that might remain in the State, he would be better able to judge what would be necessary to secure South Carolina and recover North Carolina. Should his lordship so far succeed in both provinces as to be safe from any attack during the approaching season, after leaving a sufficient force in garrison and such other outpost as he should think necessary, and such troops by way of moving corps as he should think sufficient, added to such pro- vincial and militia corps as he should judge proper to raise, he should wish his lordship to assist in operations which would be carried on on the Chesapeake as soon as Admiral Arbuthnot and himself were relieved for appre- hension of a superior fleet -i.e. of the appearance of a French fleet - and the season would allow. This might happen, he wrote, about September, or, if not earlier, in October. He therefore proposed that his lordship, with what force he could spare at the time from his important posts (which, however, should always be considered as the principal object), should meet the admiral, who would bring with him such additional force as he could spare to the Chesapeake. "Our first object," he wrote, "will probably be the taking posts at Norfolk or Suffolk or near the Hampton Road, and then proceeding up the Chesa- peake to Baltimore."1 There was great controversy sub- sequently over these instructions: Sir Henry Clinton maintaining that the movement across North Carolina into
1 Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy (B. F. Stevens, London), 213-214.
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Virginia was to be dependent upon Earl Cornwallis's suc- cess in South Carolina ; his lordship, on the other hand, insisting that he had been left no discretion but advance, as his part in the grand ministerial plan of campaign of carrying the war from South to North.
The scheme of subduing one part of the Americans by the other, and of establishing such an internal force in each subjugated colony as would be nearly, if not entirely, equal to its future preservation and defence, had been often held out and urged in England as exceedingly practicable, and, indeed, as requiring only adoption to insure its suc- cess. Preceding commanders had been much blamed at home for their supposed negligence in not availing them- selves of means which were represented as so obvious, and which, it was said, would be so decisive of the war.1 The wisdom of the measure depended of course entirely upon the number of persons in the colony so attached to the British government as to be willing, not only to main- tain their own allegiance to the King, but to take up arms against their neighbors, friends, and, in very many instances, kinsmen.
South Carolina, it was supposed, presented a favorable opportunity of trying this plan from which so much was expected; and Sir Henry Clinton determined, therefore, before leaving, to inaugurate the policy. A handbill was published and circulated amongst the inhabitants by which they were reminded that as the commander- in-chief upon his first arrival in the province had taken no steps whatsoever to excite the loyal inhabitants to rise in favor of the Royal government whilst the King's troops, employed in the siege of Charlestown, might be unable to assist them in their efforts, nor had he drawn the King's friends into danger whilst any doubt could
1 Annual Register (1780), vol. XXV, 223.
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remain of their success; now that success was certain he trusted that one and all would heartily join, and, by a general concurrence, give effect to such necessary meas- ures as might from time to time be pointed out. The helping hand of every man, it was said, was wanted to reestablish peace and good government. Those who had families might form a militia to remain at home and pre- serve peace and good order in their own districts, whilst those who were young and had no families, it was expected would be ready to assist the King's troops in driving their oppressors and all persons whatsoever acting under the authority of Congress far from the province. For this purpose they should prepare themselves to serve with the King's troops for any six out of the next twelve months, under officers of their own choice, with the express stipu- lation that they should be allowed when on service the same pay, ammunition, and provisions as the King's troops, and should not be obliged to march beyond North Carolina on the one side or Georgia on the other. Having served for that period, it was said they would have paid their debt to their country, would be freed from all further claims of military service, except the usual militia duty at home, and would be entitled to enjoy undisturbed that peace, liberty, and security of property which they had contributed to establish.1 A proclamation was also issued by the commander-in-chief, on the 22d of May, by which effectual countenance, protection, and support were promised to the King's faithful and peaceable subjects, and the most exemplary severity, with confiscations of property, denounced against those who should hereafter appear in arms within the province against his Majesty's government, or who should attempt to compel others to do so, or who should hinder or intimidate any of the King's
1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 190 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 68, note.
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faithful and loving subjects from joining his forces or performing those duties which their allegiance required. On the 1st of June another proclamation was issued in the names of Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, as commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies, by which a full and free pardon was promised to all those who, having been misled from their duty, should immedi- ately return to their allegiance and a due obedience to the laws, excepting only such as were polluted with the blood of their fellow-citizens, shed under the mock forms of jus- tice, for their loyalty to their sovereign and adherence to the British government. The promise of effectual coun- tenance, protection, and support was renewed to the loyal and well affected, and as soon as the situation of the province would admit of it a reinstalment of the inhabit- ants in the possession of all those rights and immunities which they formerly enjoyed under the British govern- ment; and also an exemption from taxation, except by their own legislation.1
So far no one could complain. Having obtained posses- sion of the country, it was no more than the duty of the military commanders to protect the loyal citizens in the exercise of their rights under the King, and to restore the Royal government. They had the right, also, to call for the military services of those who professed their allegiance to his Majesty. Neutrality in the present condition of affairs was impossible. There could be no halting between the two conditions of men described by Clinton in his dispatches announcing his victory. Every one must choose whether he would be a prisoner or would bear arms for the King. Whether it was wise to call for and enforce such service between friends and neighbors
1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 191-192 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 73- 74; Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 438.
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was a grave question of expediency worthy of the con- queror's most serious consideration. But his right to decide it was beyond question. The promise of pardon to those who had risen in arms to resist taxation without representation, - all that the South Carolinians had ever intended, - coupled with the promise of exemption from future taxation except by their own legislation, was a fair proposition. It gave to the South Carolinians all that they had demanded, and that with full pardon for the rebellious means they had employed to secure it. These measures were well calculated to encourage the loyal, and on the one hand to intimidate, and on the other to soothe, the rebellious, especially in view of the prevalent belief that South Carolina was to be abandoned by Congress. Up to this point everything was in the most prosperous train for the reestablishment of the Royal government. The people generally accepted the proffered terms of peace as they understood them; and all, with few exceptions, on applying, obtained either paroles as prisoners of war or protection as British subjects; the latter were required to subscribe a declaration of their allegiance to the King, but this, however, was frequently omitted in the hurry of business, and the privileges of British subjects were freely bestowed on some without any reciprocal engage- ments.1
Fortunately for the cause of American independence, two events now occurred which checked the growing sen- timent in favor of the King and aroused the deepest resentment and indignation. One of these was the accounts, just received, of Tarleton's barbarous massacre at the Waxhaws; and the other a proclamation issued by Sir Henry Clinton on his departure for New York. Tarle- ton's barbarity, instead of striking terror into the hearts of 1 Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 114; Gordon's Am. War, 385.
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the people, excited rather a thirst for revenge. Clinton's proclamation put an end to all hopes of neutrality.
It has been seen how long Lincoln had stood out to obtain the terms demanded by Gadsden for the militia and citizens ; viz. that they should be secured in their persons and properties and should not be considered as prisoners, and that Sir Henry Clinton had, on the contrary, insisted upon their surrender as prisoners of war. The British commander had prevailed, and the militia and citizens were surrendered upon the terms he demanded. Then had followed the surrender of Williamson and Pickens at Ninety-Six, and of Kershaw at Camden, upon the terms granted the garrison in Charlestown - that is, as pris- oners of war. The same terms had been held out to the people at large, and had been very generally accepted. But now Sir Henry Clinton realized that the condition he had so persistently insisted upon forcing on the people of the State practically precluded the carrying out of the plan of using one part of the inhabitants of the province to hold down the others. By accepting the opponents of the Royal authority as prisoners of war he had, in effect, secured them in their neutrality as long as the war existed. To meet this difficulty Sir Henry determined to alter the con- dition of those who had submitted upon parole, and to require of them the duties of active citizens and loyal sub- jects. For this purpose a proclamation was issued, bear- ing date the 3d of June, declaring that all inhabitants of the province who were prisoners on parole and were not in the military line (those who were in Fort Moultrie and Charlestown at the times of their capitulation and surren- der, or who were then in actual confinement, excepted) should from and after the 20th of that month be freed and exempted from all such paroles and be restored to all the rights and duties of citizens and inhabitants. And by the
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same proclamation it was also declared that all persons under the above description who should afterward neglect to return to their allegiance and a due submission to his Majesty's government should be considered as enemies and rebels to the same, and be treated accordingly. This proclamation was the point upon which the continuance of the Revolution in South Carolina turned.1
It was not long, says Steadman, before the seeds of dis- content appeared, which, when fully matured, produced a counter-revolution in the minds and inclinations of the people as complete and as universal as that which suc- ceeded the fall of Charlestown. Of those originally attached to the American cause who, since the capture of Charlestown, had submitted to the British government either by taking the oath of allegiance or obtaining a parole, some were influenced by the ruinous appearance of American affairs, the despair of ultimate success, and a wish to save the remains of their property that had escaped the ravages and devastations of war; others were influ- enced by the fear of punishment if they persisted longer in maintaining an opposition apparently fruitless; and not a few by the hope of being suffered to live quietly upon their estates as prisoners upon parole and enjoying a kind of neutrality during the remainder of the war. The determination of Congress to send a part of General Washington's army to the assistance of their adherents in South Carolina, though now so late, of which they had just learned, dispelled the apprehensions of the two first
1 Ramsay's Revolution in So. Ca., vol. II, 441 ; Tarleton's Campaigns, 73 ; McCall's Hist. of Georgia, vol. II, 319. " It is remarkable," says Curwen, "that in the rebellion of '98 in Ireland the same plan was adopted and successfully executed by Lord Cornwallis, aided by two at least of those who had been his chief agents in South Carolina - Lord Rawdon, then Earl of Moira, and Colonel Wemyss, then General Wemyss." Curwen's Journal and Letters, 670.
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of these classes, and aroused afresh their hopes. And the last was disgusted by the proclamation of Sir Henry Clin- ton, which, without their consent, abrogated the paroles that had been granted, and in one instant converted them either into loyal subjects or rebels. If it was proper policy, continues this author, at first to hold a middle course between these opposite extremes, the same policy required that it should have been continued for some time longer, and that the conditions of the inhabitants should have been altered rather at their own application, either individually or collectively, than by the arbitrary fiat of the commander-in-chief. In this manner a proper dis- crimination might have been made between the inhabitants who were really loyal and those who were nominally so; but by pursuing the opposite course they were all blended indiscriminately together. Even the violent Revolution- ist, unless he chose to leave the country, was obliged to assume the appearance of loyalty; and thus the foundation of mutual jealousy and distrust was laid amongst the inhabitants themselves. The Revolutionists complained that their condition was altered without their concurrence ; and the Loyalists murmured because notorious rebels, by taking the oath of allegiance and putting on a show of attachment, became entitled to the same privileges with themselves.1
A much less candid view of the situation at this time was presented in an article in the Royal Gazette of the 9th of February, 1782, and by the request -equivalent to an order-of Colonel Balfour, the commandant of the town, republished by Robert Wells & Son, Printers to his Majesty, in each issue of that journal for a fortnight, as containing a true representation of the conduct of the inhabitants, and the treatment those deserved who had 1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 198, 199.
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violated their parole. This paper, detailing at some length the principles upon which paroles and protections were granted, went on to say that the white inhabitants were in this manner divided into two classes, the one of prisoners on parole and the other of voluntary subjects. Then, after a long dissertation on the different modes of treating prisoners in different states of society in order to show that humanity was neither commanded by the law of nature, which authorized the putting to death of ene- mies by every fair means, nor by the law of nations, which vests in the captors an absolute property in the prisoner; and that paroles therefore could never have been demanded as a matter of right, but were given or not agreeably to the opinion entertained of the integrity of the prisoner, the author went on to argue that if this con- fidence was found to have been misplaced and that which was meant as a humane indulgence was converted into a source of injury, the more dangerous as unexpected and unguarded against, reason dictated that the offender should be treated agreeably to this severest right of war, which authorized the death of all persons taken in battle. This paper, thus put out by authority as representing the views of the British commanders, avoided the question in issue, and assumed the whole matter in dispute. And this was simply: Had the British the right to alter the terms they had given to the Americans while the latter had arms in their hands, and on the faith of which they had laid them down? There had been no surrender at discretion ; the surrender had been upon terms - terms, it is true, dictated by the conquerors, but still upon terms. This was not a case in which the conquerors had the pris- oner in possession and might take or spare his life at pleasure. On the contrary, Sir Henry Clinton had obtained the surrender of the garrison of Charlestown
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