USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780 > Part 32
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There existed at this time great disaffection to General Lincoln, and the abandonment of this attack, though it was upon Pulaski's report, added to the dissatisfaction
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with his command. Complaints and reflections against him were very general. His conduct in marching to Augusta, and leaving the Low Country exposed and put- ting Charlestown in such eminent danger, was much criti- cised, not only by the citizens, but by officers under his command.1 Lincoln was aware of his unpopularity and was anxious to be relieved, and the more so as he was suffering in health. On the 13th of May Congress had given him permission to retire and had "resolved that Brig. Gen. Moultrie be commander in the absence of Maj. Gen. Lincoln of the Southern army during its con- tinuance, to the southward of North Carolina, with the allowance of a Major General on a separate command until the further order of Congress," and John Jay, Presi- dent, had communicated this resolution to Moultrie in very flattering terms. But Moultrie loyally and modestly replied, trusting that the present posture of affairs would prevent Lincoln from availing himself of the permission granted him by Congress, and in the same spirit wrote to Lincoln urging him not to leave. Lincoln replied to Moultrie on the 10th of June with equal patriotism but evident mortification. He declared that the same motives which had led him to the State would retain him so long as his health would permit him to act, if there was the same prospect of rendering service to his country as when he took command in the department ; but as it appeared from the unkind declarations thrown out in the capital that he had lost the confidence of the people, whether justly or not, he could render little service to the public and ought to retire. He went on to add that from the attachment of the people to Moultrie, and their confidence in his knowledge, judgment, and experience in military matters, he had great confidence that Moultrie would
1 See Colonel Grimké's letter, Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 495.
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command with honor to himself and with the approbation of his country. Lincoln did not, however, relinquish the command, but continued, without achieving any successes, until he capitulated at Charlestown the year after. Nor is it to be believed that Moultrie would have been more successful had Lincoln turned over the command to him. The truth is, that neither was a great commander. Both were doubtless brave men, but neither was equal to the emergency. Lincoln was brave, active, and vigilant, but he was so very cautious that he would take no step of any consequence without first calling a council of officers to advise with them upon measures- and such councils sel- dom march or fight to any purpose. Under the advice of such a council he had gone to Augusta, and when the emergency arose demanding a prompt and vigorous retrac- ing of his steps, he hesitated until he let slip an oppor- tunity of destroying the enemy, came near losing the town he was especially charged to defend, and lost the confidence of the people. Moultrie, too, was brave- brave to a fault. But he was inactive and careless. Through his neglect and indifference the victory which has immortalized his name came well-nigh being lost, and the same want of energy was now in a few days to lose the fruits of another battle. The military genius of the people had not yet developed itself, nor, indeed, was the spirit which was to inflame that genius yet itself aroused.
On the 15th of June General Lincoln came to town from his camp at Stono to consult with the Governor and Council upon a plan of operations against the British lines. The attack was to be made by his troops, and a strong detachment from Charlestown was to be thrown over to James Island to cooperate with him. This plan was, no doubt, suggested by information of the intended movements of the enemy. On the 16th of June Lieu-
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tenant Colonel Prévost left for Savannah, carrying with him the grenadiers.of the Sixtieth Regiment and all the vessels which had formed the bridge of communication ex- cept an armed flat which contained twenty men. Indeed, it seems to have been determined to evacuate the post, and upon Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, who had succeeded to the command, devolved the duty of carrying out this pur- pose, now rendered both difficult and dangerous by Colonel Prévost's injudicious conduct in carrying away the ves- sels that preserved the communication with John's Island. The 17th, 18th, and 19th days of June were employed by the British in transporting across the inlet the sick and wounded, the negroes and Indians, with the baggage and horses belonging to the garrison, and in destroying all unnecessary huts and buildings. These precautionary measures had become the more necessary because of the reduced condition of the garrison, which now consisted of the first battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment, part of a Hessian regiment, part of the North and South Carolina regiments of provincials, and a detachment of artillery, probably not much exceeding five hundred men effective and fit for duty.1
Lincoln had learned of the weak condition of the British post, but his own force was scarcely better. The South Carolina militia, under General Williamson, were disap- pearing one by one at first ; then a whole company from Colonel Kershaw's regiment - a captain, subaltern, and twenty-seven privates - deserted their post all together. Nor could those who remained be depended upon. The James Island company could not be induced to mount guard, but would content themselves with riding patrols in the day opposite John's Island, nay, some of them at night would go over to the British camp in small canoes.
1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 116.
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It was found necessary to remove the company to Charles- town and put others in their place.1 The time of the North Carolina militia would expire in a few days. Nevertheless, Lincoln determined to attack the British before they withdrew. On the 16th, the day upon which Prévost had left the post, Lincoln instructed Moultrie to hold the garrison of the town in readiness to march on the shortest notice, and to provide one hundred rounds of ammunition to each man. The Governor and Council agreed to allow twelve hundred men to go from the town, and the Governor wrote offering to do anything to assist the movement. On the 19th General Lincoln ordered Moultrie to throw over on James Island at once all the troops which could be spared from the town, and to show them to the enemy on John's Island. Moultrie was to take his boats up Wappoo Cut to enable him to cross to John's Island if opportunity offered. If he heard any firing in the morning at Stono Ferry, and found the enemy re- treating, he was at once to pursue them. Moultrie thus had three days, with the proffered assistance of the Gov- ernor and Council, to provide boats and transportation to take him across from the town to James Island, a distance of about a mile. Had he obeyed Lincoln's orders, and had had everything in readiness, he would have crossed his command of seven hundred men over during the day of the 19th, and would have been in position to cooperate with Lincoln the next morning. But, unfortunately, he had neglected Lincoln's instructions, as he had neglected Lee's, to protect the flank of his fort three years before. A fortunate accident prevented the catastrophe which might have resulted from his neglect of Lee's order ; but none occurred to save him from the consequence of his · neglect of Lincoln's. When called upon to move, the 1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 474, 496.
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boats were not in readiness, and so the next morning before he had got halfway across with the detachment from the town to James Island, he heard Lincoln's guns commencing the attack on the British lines at Stono Ferry, and the battle was entirely over before he arrived at Wappoo Cut.1
Lincoln put his army in motion at midnight of the 19th, and having joined the battalion of light infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, who had been advanced, they arrived about an hour after daybreak before the enemy's works. Lincoln's flanks were covered by two battalions of light infantry, - Lieutenant Colonel Hender- son at the head of one corps, and Colonel Malmedy at the head of the other. The left of the line was composed of Continental troops, under General Huger, with four field- pieces. The brigade of North and South Carolina militia with two field-pieces formed the right, under General Jethro Sumner of North Carolina. In the rear of this body was posted a small party of Virginia militia under General Mason, who had recently arrived. With these were two field-pieces in reserve. The cavalry under Pulaski were posted upon the right of his reserve and rather more retired.
With this cavalry under Pulaski was a small body of North Carolina horsemen, under the command of William Richardson Davie, who was later to become one of the most active and famous partisan officers of the war.
Colonel Lee in his Memoirs commends the formation of Lincoln's line of battle, in that, knowing that the High- landers, the Seventy-first Regiment, would take the enemy's right, he had placed his Continentals on his left, though according to military usage they were entitled to position on the right, as they were the regular troops. The British
1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 490.
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line under Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, an able officer, was composed of the Highlanders on the right and a regiment of Hessians on the left, with the provincial regiment of North and South Carolina in the centre, under Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton. About seven o'clock in the morning the attack was begun upon the British pickets, which gave the first alarm to Colonel Maitland. The garrison was immediately under arms, and two com- panies of the Seventy-first Regiment were sent out to feel the strength of the assailants. The detachment had gone a little more than a quarter of a mile when it fell in with the Continentals on Lincoln's left. An engagement immediately ensued and was so obstinately maintained by the Highlanders that they did not retreat until all their officers were either killed or wounded ; and of the two companies only eleven men were able to make good their retreat. This advantage encouraged the assailants, who were ordered to reserve their fire and to put the issue of the battle on the bayonet. Lincoln's whole line advanced with alacrity. The enemy waiting their approach until within sixty yards of the abatis, they were received with a full fire from the artillery and infantry. Disobeying Lincoln's orders his troops returned the fire, and the action became general. The Hessians on the British left gave way in the face of the North and South Carolina militia under Sumner. Maitland, seeing this, made a quick move- ment with the Seventy-first Regiment from the right to the left of the British line, and stopped Sumner's progress. By the great exertions of Colonel Maitland the Hessians were rallied and again brought into action, and the battle raged with increased fury. Lincoln endeavored to stop the fire, and, finally succeeding, ordered a charge ; but the moment had passed, and the troops could not be got to the work. They renewed the fire, which continued for more than an
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hour, when the British army was seen hastening to the ferry, Moultrie having failed in making the intended diversion. Lincoln now despairing of accomplishing his object, - the destruction of this body, - ordered a retreat, and some confusion ensuing incident thereto, Maitland promptly turned upon him and advanced with his whole line. The cavalry now ordered up (Pulaski was not present) gallantly charged upon the enemy themselves in disorder ; but Maitland closed his ranks as the horse bore upon him, and giving them a full fire from his rear rank, the front, holding its ground with the bayonet, brought this corps, brave but undisciplined, to a halt, and then forced it to retire. Mason now advanced with his Virginia brigade and delivering a heavy fire the enemy drew back, and Lincoln effected a retreat in tolerably good order.1
Thus ended the battle of Stono. Whatever may have been the result had Lincoln's orders to put the issue of the battle upon the bayonet been carried out, and had not his troops in disobedience of his express command stopped to deliver their fire instead of charging the enemy at once, upon Moultrie must rest the blame of its failure. He had been warned to have boats ready to cross three days in ad- vance. The boats were there; for he found the next morn- ing enough of them to move seven hundred men, besides a number of gentlemen volunteers. It was not, therefore, the want of boats, but the delay in collecting them, that prevented his crossing on the evening of the 19th. These seven hundred fresh troops, equal in numbers to the whole of the British force, coming up upon their rear during the action, would have secured the capture or destruction of the whole party. But this great advantage was lost simply
1 Memoirs of the War of 1776, 130, 131; Steadman's Hist. Am. War, vol. II, 116, 118 ; Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 495, 498.
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through Moultrie's want of energy and promptness. Our hero could be trusted for whatever gallantry could accom- plish, but unfortunately he could not be relied upon for exertion.
The action on the Stono had lasted very nearly an hour. The British loss was 129. Of these 3 officers and 23 men were killed, and 10 officers and 93 men wounded and miss- ing.1 The American loss was somewhat more - about 150 killed and wounded. Among the killed was Colonel Owen Roberts, the commander of the Fourth Continental Regiment of South Carolina (artillery). Colonel Roberts had taken an active part in the Revolution from its com- mencement, and had been elected Major of the First Regi- ment by the Provincial Congress upon the organization of the troops which the State afterwards transferred to the Con- tinental service. From that position he had been promoted Lieutenant Colonel of the Fourth (or artillery) Regiment. He had taken part in Howe's expedition to Florida, and had commanded the artillery in Howe's unsuccessful battle at Savannah the December before; indeed, it was through his extraordinary exertions that the British were kept in check on that occasion until the centre of Howe's army had made its escape. His son, who was also in the action, hearing of his father's misfortune, hastened to him. The expiring officer perceiving his son's great sorrow, with great composure, it is said, thus addressed him : " I rejoice, my boy, once more to embrace you. Receive this sword, which has never been tarnished by dishonor, and let it not be inactive while the liberty of your country is endan- gered. Take my last adieu, accept my blessing, and return to your duty."2 Major Ancrum, a volunteer, and William R. Davie, now promoted by Lincoln to Brigade Major of Cavalry, were both severely wounded. The
1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 118. 2 Garden's Anecdotes.
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latter narrowly escaped with his life, and was only saved by the great gallantry of a trooper. The horse of this trooper had been killed, and on his retreat, seeing the eminent danger of his officer, returned at the risk of his life, for the enemy was within a few steps, and with great composure raised Major Davie on his horse, to whose bridle Davie still clung, and safely led him from the battle-field.1 Depositing the Major in safety, this soldier disappeared, nor could Davie upon his recovery, months after, ascertain who was his preserver, though he made the most diligent inquiry. Two years after, at the siege of Ninety-Six, the soldier made himself known to Colonel Davie,- as Davie then was, -and was killed the next day in battle. Among the slightly wounded at Stono were General Isaac Huger, commanding the Continentals, and Colonel Laumoy, the French engineer. Hugh Jackson, a brother of Andrew Jackson the President, who fought in the ranks in Davie's corps, died after the action of heat and fatigue.2
Two days after the battle Moultrie sent three galleys through Wappoo Cut to break up the enemy's communica- tions on the Stono. The three galleys got under way that evening, and coming up with them at Stanyarne's were received with a brisk fire from field-pieces and small arms, which lasted for three-quarters of an hour. The galleys took a schooner from under the guns of the British, which they silenced. They then proceeded farther up the river and attacked another battery of three field-pieces on a bluff, and these they also silenced; but daylight coming on, and the tide having been spent, they came to anchor, and some time after returned, bringing with them their prize schooner. In this affair six men were killed and a number wounded on the galleys.
1 Wheeler's Hist. of No. Ca., 186. 2 Parton's Life of Jackson, 69.
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The British post at Stono was soon after evacuated, and the army retiring along the seacoast passed from island to island until it reached Beaufort. At this place General Prévost established a post, the garrison of which was left under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Maitland. Prévost himself, with the rest of the army, returned to Georgia to rest his troops during the sultry and sickly season in the Low Country, which had now set in.
The only advantages which had been gained by this inroad of the British were first the establishment of the post at Beaufort, which was of strategic importance, as from it they could readily penetrate by means of the inland navigation into any part of the Low Country unmolested by the Carolinians, for the want of a navy; and, secondly, the plunder which they carried off. This last, however, was a much greater advantage to the indi- viduals in the British army themselves than to the King, for it alienated many a loyal subject from his Majesty's cause, and cumbered the army itself with much unnecessary luggage.
Says the historian Ramsay, the incursion into South Carolina and subsequent retreat contributed very little to the advancement of the Royal cause; but it added much to the wealth of the officers, soldiers, and followers of the British army, and still more to the distresses of the inhabitants. The forces under the command of General Prévost marched through the richest settlements of the State, where there are the fewest white inhabitants in pro- portion to the number of slaves. The hapless Africans, allured with hopes of freedom, forsook their owners and repaired in great numbers to the Royal army. They endeavored to recommend themselves to their new mas- ters by discovering where their owners had concealed their property, and assisted in carrying it off. All subordina-
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tion destroyed, they became insolent and rapacious, and, in some instances, exceeded the British in their plunder- ings and devastations. Collected in great crowds near the Royal army, they were seized with camp fever, and great numbers perished. The British carried out of the State, it is supposed, about three thousand slaves, many of whom were shipped from Georgia and East Florida and sold in the West Indies ; the planters lost upwards of four thousand, each of whom was worth two hundred and fifty Spanish dollars. When the British retreated, they had ac- cumulated so much plunder that they had not the means of removing the whole of it. The vicinity of the Ameri- can army made them avoid the mainland and pass in great precipitation from one island to another. Many of the horses which they had taken from the planters were lost in ineffectual attempts to transport them over the rivers and marshes. For want of transportation a num- ber of the negroes were left behind. These had been so thoroughly impressed by the British with the expectation of the severest treatment, and even of certain death from their owners in case of their returning home, that in order to get off with the retreating army they would sometimes cling to the sides of the boats. To prevent this danger to the boats, the hands of some of them were chopped off, and soldiers were posted with cutlasses and bayonets to oblige them to keep at proper distances. Many, laboring under diseases, afraid to return home, forsaken by their new masters, and destitute of the necessaries of life, per- ished in the woods. Those who got off with the army were collected on Otter Island, where the camp fever con- tinued to rage, and hundreds of them expired. Their dead bodies, as they lay exposed in the woods, were devoured by beasts and birds, and to the day when Ramsay wrote, 1785, the island was strewn with their bones. The
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British also carried off with them rice barrels filled with plate and household furniture in large quantities, which they had taken from the inhabitants. They had spread over a considerable extent of country, and small parties visited almost every house, stripping it of whatever was most valuable, and rifling the inhabitants of their money, rings, jewels, and other personal ornaments. The reposi- tories of the dead were in several places broken open and the grave itself searched for hidden treasure. What was destroyed by the soldiers was supposed to be of more value than what they carried off. Feather-beds were ripped open for the sake of ticking. Windows and chinaware were dashed to pieces. Not only the larger domestic ani- mals were cruelly and wantonly shot down, but the licen- tiousness of the soldiery extended so far that in several places nothing within their reach, however small and insignificant, was suffered to live. For this destruction they could not make the plea of necessity, for what was thus killed was frequently not used nor carried away. The gardens, which had been improved with great care and ornamented with many foreign productions, were laid waste, and nicest curiosities destroyed. The houses of planters were seldom burnt, but in every other way the destructions and depredations committed by the British were so enormous that should the whole be particularly related, concludes Ramsay, they who live at a distance would scarcely believe what could be attested by hundreds of eye-witnesses.1 Hundreds of eye-witnesses are living to-day who could attest alike to similar atrocities and robbery committed near eighty years afterwards in the same country by men calling themselves fellow-country- men of the plundered, and under the same pretext of spoiling and punishing rebels. But the British historian
1 Ramsay's Revolution, vol. II, 30-34.
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of the war of the Revolution who wrote after Ramsay offers no excuse in palliation of such conduct. He says the only real advantage gained by this irruption into South Carolina was a supply of provisions for the troops, the want of which had begun to be felt in Georgia, and the establishing a post at Beaufort. But the American accounts, he adds, have charged the army under General Prévost with gaining other advantages of not so honor- able a kind, and with such an appearance of truth that a regard for impartiality obliges us not to pass them over. unnoticed. By these accounts they have been charged with plundering the inhabitants indiscriminately and enriching themselves at their expense - an imputation, if true, of a most disgraceful nature and ruinous tendency not only to the army, but to the interest of the British nation, as such rapacious conduct must have irritated the inhabitants in general against the British army and alien- ated the attachment even of those who were best affected to government. 1
The attack upon Stono was scarcely over, and the retreat of the British to Port Royal was not yet completed, when the militia under Lincoln began to demand their release and to be allowed to return home. On July 3 General Moultrie writes to Governor Rutledge that from William- son's information he finds it impossible to keep his men in the field any longer, and that the expectation of relief for them was entirely vanished, as he had seen a letter from Colonel Lisle and others in that part of the country, to Williamson, informing him he could not get the men to march to the coast. As an excuse, he writes, they have played the old stale game of Cameron's being in the Cherokees with a number of white men and Indians ready to fall on their part of the country, and also the story of 1 Steadman's Am. War, vol. II, 119, 120.
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one thousand Tories coming from North Carolina. He could not tell what to advise unless they could discharge all the back country men and begin some new plan. He had prevailed upon Williamson's men to stay until he could hear from the Governor, when he had no doubt that they would be allowed to return home. Two days after he writes to Lincoln that upon General Williamson's frequent representation that he could not keep his men a day longer in camp, he had issued an order for their returning home that day, the 8th of July. He adds, "I know they would go without my leave, had I not done it (their number 726)." Colonel Pickens's men went off in a body, and the term of the North Carolina and Virginia militia having expired, they also took their departure.1 Fortunately, the heat of the weather prevented any further operations for the season, so Lincoln established himself at Sheldon with about eight hundred Continentals, con- veniently situated to watch the enemy at Beaufort.
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