USA > South Carolina > The history of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775-1780 > Part 42
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General Caswell, with about 700 North Carolina militia, had joined Buford, who had with him a regiment of 350 Continentals and a small party of Washington's horse, and who was then on his march from the Santee to Camden. At Camden the two corps unfortunately separated. Cas- well turned off to the Pedee, while Buford pursued the road leading to Salisbury, North Carolina. Tarleton, neglecting Caswell and his militia, pursued Buford and his Virginians. By pressing horses found on the road in the place of those he lost from the heat, he arrived the
1 Now Stateburg.
2 James's Life of Marion, 38.
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next day at Camden, where he learned that Buford had quitted Rugeley's Mill -some fifteen miles above Camden -and that he was marching with great speed to join reinforcements then upon the road from Salisbury to Charlotte, North Carolina. Tarleton rested here but a few hours, and, with the vigor and celerity for which he was so remarkable, was soon on the road again. Starting at two o'clock on the morning of the 29th, he reached Rugeley's by daylight, where he learned that the Conti- nentals were about twenty miles in front in the Catawba settlement. From Rugeley's Mill he sent in advance an officer with a summons to Colonel Buford to surrender. This, he admits in his memoirs, was a stratagem to delay Buford's march,1 and that in the summons he magnified the number of his men to intimidate Buford, or at least delay him whilst he deliberated on an answer. Tarleton had with him, as we have seen, 270 men in all; and Cornwallis was far away, somewhere between Nelson's Ferry and Clermont. In his summons he represented that resistance was in vain, as Buford was then almost encompassed by a corps of 700 light troops on horse- back, half of which were infantry with artillery, the rest cavalry, and that Lord Cornwallis was within a short march with nine British battalions.2 His summons offered the terms granted the garrison in Charlestown. No excep- tion can be taken to any stratagem nor to any exaggeration or misrepresentation to the enemy of one's strength. By all the ethics of war Tarleton was justified in the use of both, and we do not now dwell upon the statements of this summons to criticise his conduct in resorting to such measures. But when he himself declares that the sum- mons was a mere stratagem to delay Buford, he should not
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 28.
2 Ibid., note L to Chapter I, 77.
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set up its refusal as a justification or palliation of the inhuman butchery which followed. He did not expect Buford to surrender as demanded; but he anticipated that it would delay him until he could get up with the body of his command.
After a march of 154 miles in 54 hours Tarleton came up with Buford in the Waxhaws in what is now Lancaster County, near the North Carolina line, and not far distant from the Waxhaw Church, at about three o'clock in the afternoon.1 There is a material difference between the English and American accounts of what then happened. Tarleton represents that his advance guard overtook and charged a sergeant and four of Buford's cavalry in rear of their infantry and took them prisoners; and that this, happening under the eyes of the two commanders, they respectively prepared their troops for action; that he, having made his arrangement with greater promptness, commenced the battle by a charge of his cavalry, which was fully expected by Buford, whom he heard command his men to retain their fire until the British cavalry were nearer.2 On the other hand, Chief Justice Marshall, who was well acquainted with Buford and is supposed to have received his account from Buford himself, in his Life of Washington states that Tarleton continued to make his dispositions for the assault while flags were passing, and that the instant the truce was over his cavalry made a furious charge on the Americans, who had received no order to engage, and who were uncertain whether to defend themselves or not. That in this state of dismay some threw down their arms and begged for quarter, while others fired on their assailants.3 In an appendix to James's Life of Marion there is an account given by Dr.
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 32. 2 I bid., 29-30.
3 Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. IV, 159-160.
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Robert Brownfield, an eye-witness, which, as that author says, throws more light upon the affair than anything previously written.1
By this account it appears that when Buford received the summons he laid it before a council of his officers with three distinct alternatives from himself: Shall we com- ply with Tarleton's summons? Shall we abandon the baggage and, by a rapid movement, save ourselves ? Or shall we fortify ourselves by the wagons and wait his approach? The first and second were decidedly rejected by the unanimous voice of the council, declaring it to be incompatible with their honor as soldiers or the duty they owed their country either to surrender or abandon their baggage on the bare statement of Tarleton as to his num- bers. The third was also negatived on the ground that, although they might by this means defend themselves against Tarleton and his party, he might, in turn, obtain reinforcements from Cornwallis, against which no effectual resistance could be made. It was determined therefore to continue the march, maintaining the best possible order for the reception of the enemy, hoping to reach Lieu- tenant Colonel Potterfield, who had marched from Vir- ginia in the latter end of April with a corps of horse, foot, and artillery amounting to four hundred men, and who was then approaching the South Carolina line.
In a short time Tarleton's bugle was heard, and a furi- ous attack was made on the rear-guard, commanded by Lieutenant Pearson. Not a man escaped. Pearson was inhumanly mangled as he lay on his back. His nose and lip were bisected obliquely and the lower jaw completely divided. This it will be observed was a repetition of the das- tardly conduct of this same corps at Monck's Corner, when they likewise mutilated Major Vernier after his surrender.
1 James's Life of Marion, 39, 183.
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Buford appears to have been convinced, by this attack, of the truth of Tarleton's declaration as to his numbers. He, however, prepared for action, but upon ground offer- ing no impediment to the enemy's cavalry. Tarleton made his arrangement for the attack with all possible expedi- tion. His right wing, composed of sixty dragoons and nearly as many mounted infantry, -the latter, however, now dismounted, - was under the command of Major Cochrane of the legion. Captains Corbet and Kinloch, with the Seventeenth Dragoons and part of the legion, were to charge the centre of the Americans whilst Tarle- ton, with thirty chosen horse and some infantry, assaulted their right flank and reserve.1 These dispositions having been made without any fire from Buford, the cavalry advanced to the charge. Tarleton states that when within forty paces of the Continental line their infantry presented their pieces, but that he heard their officers command them to retain their fire till the British cavalry were nearer; which they did until his dragoons were within ten paces. This forbearance, as he terms it, Tarleton observes, was a mistake, as it prevented his dragoons fall- ing into confusion on the charge, and likewise deprived the Americans of the use of their ammunition. Some of his officers, men, and horses, however, suffered by their fire ; but Buford's troops were totally broken, and slaughter was commenced before he could remount another horse, his own having been overturned by the volley. Thus, he adds, in a few minutes terminated an affair which might have had a very different result.
On the other hand, from the American account, it appears that the British attack was received with firmness and completely checked until the cavalry were gaining the rear, when Buford, considering further resistance
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 29.
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hopeless, ordered a flag to be hoisted and the arms to be grounded, expecting the usual treatment sanctioned by civilized war. This, however, observes Brownfield, from whom we quote, forined no part of Tarleton's creed. His excuse for the relentless barbarity that ensued was that his horse, having been killed under him just as the flag was raised, his men supposed that he had been slain, and that in the moment of excitement and revenge they com- mitted the slaughter.1 He affected to believe that the fire in which his horse was killed was opened after the flag was raised, and imputed it to treachery on the part of Buford; but in reality, says Brownfield, he availed him- self of a safe opportunity to gratify that thirst for blood which marked his character in every conjuncture that promised probable impunity to himself. Ensign Cruit, who advanced with the flag, was instantly cut down. Consider- ing this as an earnest of what they were to expect, a resump- tion of their arms was attempted by the Americans, that they might sell their lives as dearly as possible; but before this was fully effected Tarleton was in the midst of them, when commenced a scene of indiscriminate carnage never surpassed by the ruthless atrocities of the most barbarous savages. The demand for quarter seldom refused to a vanquished foe was at once found to be in vain, - not a man was spared; it was the concurrent testimony of all survivors, that for fifteen minutes after every man was pros- trate the British went over the ground plunging their bayonets into all that exhibited any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those beneath. An instance of the atrocity of the massacre is given in the case of Captain John Stokes, a native of Pittsylvania 1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 30.
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County, Virginia. Early in the sanguinary conflict he was attacked by a dragoon, who aimed deadly blows at his head, all of which, by the dexterous use of the small sword, he easily parried; when another on the right by one stroke cut off his right hand. He was then assailed by them both, and instinctively attempting to defend his head with his left arm, that was hacked in eight or ten places from the wrist to the shoulder and a finger cut off. His head was laid open almost the whole length of the crown to the eyebrows, and after he fell he received several cuts on the face and shoulders. A soldier, passing on in the work of death, asked if he expected quarter. Stokes answered, "I have not, nor do I mean to ask it; finish me as soon as possible; " whereupon the soldier transfixed him twice with his bayonet. Another asked the same ques- tion and received the same answer; and he also thrust his bayonet twice through his body. Strange to say, Captain Stokes lived through all these wounds, survived the war, and upon the adoption of the Constitution of the United States was rewarded by a seat on the Federal Bench.
Tarleton reported 113 killed outright, 150 so badly wounded as to be paroled on the ground, and 53 prisoners capable of moving. The British whole loss was 5 killed and 14 wounded. The American wounded were taken to the Waxhaw Church, where they were tenderly cared for by the people in the neighborhood who had the courage to remain.1 Most of these wounded died.2 This barbar- ous massacre gave a more sanguinary turn to the war.
1 Howe's Hist. Presbyterian Church in So. Ca., 536. Among those who ministered to these wounded and dying soldiers was Esther Gaston, then about eighteen years of age, who repaired to Waxhaw Church with her married sister Martha, and busied herself day and night ministering to their comfort. After the battle of Hanging Rock she was found there again. Note to Howe's Hist. Presbyterian Church in So. Ca., 537.
2 Memoirs of the War of 1776 (Lee), 165.
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"Tarleton's quarter " became proverbial. The tragedy sank deep into the hearts, not only of the American sol- diers, but of the people of this section who had hitherto had but little to do with the war. It was an event which contributed much to arousing them from an indifference to the contest to the most determined resistance to the British. Tarleton himself recognized the necessity of some explanation of the extraordinary slaughter, and, as is seen, attempted to excuse it because his men supposed him to have fallen. Lord Cornwallis found no fault with the barbarous conduct of his lieutenant; and Sir Henry Clinton reported it with exultation and even with exaggeration as to the number slain,1
But the brutal conduct of Tarleton's dragoons at Monck's Corner and the massacre at the Waxhaws were not the only instances of their cruelty in this campaign; another, which made a deep and lasting impression on the people of this section, was the killing during this expedition of Samuel Wyley, the brother of the sheriff at Camden. This unfortunate man was mistaken for his brother, John Wyley, the sheriff, whom Tarleton had determined to put to death. To perform the deed he dispatched a favorite sergeant, whose name was Hutt, with a sergeant's guard. Going to Wyley's house, two men were left concealed behind the two large gateposts at the entrance of the yard, while Hutt with the rest of the party broke into the house. Hutt demanded Wyley's shoebuckles, and while the defenceless man stooped down to unbuckle them Hutt aimed a stroke at his head. Wyley, seeing the gleam of the sword, parried the blow from his head by his hand, with the loss of some of the fingers; then, springing out of the door, he ran for the
1 Sir Henry Clinton reported to Lord George Germain that the number slain was 172. Tarleton's Campaigns, 80.
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gate, where the two concealed men dispatched him.1 On this expedition, also, the British burned the house of Sumter, near Clermont, and in doing so roused the spirit of a lion.
Tarleton, after Buford's defeat, fell back to join the main army. Cornwallis had not moved more than forty miles from Nelson's Ferry when the first express arrived with the news of Tarleton's success. A few days after- ward Cornwallis reached Camden, and Tarleton joined him there.2 Upon the approach of the British the inhabit- ants of Camden met them with a flag and asked for, and were granted, terms similar to those granted to the inhab- itants of Charlestown, that is, that they were to be con- sidered as prisoners on parole.3
The people of Ninety-Six, learning that the British were advancing to that part of the State also, sent out a flag to the commanding officer, from whom they learned that Sir Henry Clinton had delegated full powers to Captain Richard Pearis, and were advised to treat with him. Articles of capitulation were immediately proposed and soon ratified, by which they were promised the same security for their persons and property which British sub- jects enjoyed. They submitted under the supposition that they were to be either neutrals or prisoners on parole, as had been stipulated at Charlestown.4 The inhabitants in the neighborhood of Beaufort likewise were assured the same terms. 5
It will be recollected that President Lowndes, just before the inauguration of the new government under the
1 The cause of offence was said to have been that John Wyley as sheriff had superintended the execution of some men under the statute at the time against treason. James's Life of Marion, 40 and note.
2 Tarleton's Campaigns, 82.
8 Ramsay's Revolution, vol. II, 111. 4 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
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constitution of 1778, when he was superseded by John Rutledge as Governor, had appointed three brigadier gen- erals of militia, viz. Richard Richardson, Andrew Will- iamson, and Stephen Bull; and it will be remembered that each of these had taken a conspicuous part in the early revolutionary movement. Richardson had con- ducted, with great ability and energy, the famous Snow Campaign in 1775, though he was then over seventy years of age; and the next year, immediately after the victory of Fort Moultrie, Williamson had equally distinguished himself in his campaign against the Indians, in which he so amply avenged the massacre of the Hamptons. Bull had been among the first to take the field and had gone with alacrity to the assistance of the Georgians in 1776. Much was therefore expected of these officers upon the invasion of the State; but no one of them added to his reputation in the campaigns which followed. Bull's militia district was soon in the possession of the British, and we do not find him mentioned after Prévost's invasion in May, 1779. Colonel Laurens wrote, in February, 1780, that General Richardson and Colonel Kershaw were rais- ing the militia at Camden, 1 and Dr. Johnson mentions that he was made a prisoner in the capitulation of Charles- town,2 but he was probably not there. His name does not occur during the siege, nor is he mentioned among the prisoners; and Gervais, who was one of the Council with Governor Rutledge, in a letter dated 28th of April (1780), speaks of collecting the militia "from Pee Dee and Rich- ardson's former brigade - for he resigned long ago."3 He had no doubt resigned because of his infirmities; he was now more than seventy-five years of age, and was soon to die from the effects of a cruel imprisonment because he
1 Tarleton's Campaigns, 34; Siege of Charlestown (Munsell), 48.
2 Traditions, 161. 3 So. Ca. in the Revolution (Simms), 137.
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would not accept the terms proposed to him by the conqueror.
There hangs a heavy cloud over Williamson's conduct at this time - a cloud which overshadows not only his pres- ent, but his past career. Indeed, by many historians he has been called the Benedict Arnold of South Carolina. This probably is unjust, but his character is involved in a.
mystery from which it was never cleared. Whether entertained at the time or an afterthought suggested by his subsequent conduct, suspicions in regard to him are now dated back to Prévost's invasion. Williamson, as we have seen, had then been ordered to invade the south- ern part of Georgia while Lincoln marched directly down upon Savannah, in the hope of thus forcing Prévost to abandon his invasion of South Carolina. But when at length Lincoln was forced to realize that Prévost's move- ment was a real invasion and not a mere feint, he recalled Williamson. With somewhat of his old energy William- son had, in the meanwhile, proceeded upon his expedi- tion, had crossed the Ogeechee and cut a new road for his command, which has ever since been known as the Rebel Road. It is said, however, that Williamson did not with promptness obey Lincoln's recall, that he did not make his appearance as soon as was expected, and that his absence prevented Lincoln's attack upon Prévost when before Charlestown.1 But it is not just to make William- son the scapegoat for Lincoln on this occasion. Lincoln himself did not, as far as we are aware, attempt to put the blame of his delay upon Williamson. Indeed, in his letter of May 10 (1779) to Moultrie there is no complaint of any one. He writes that his men are in full spirits and will do honor to themselves; and on the 12th of May, the day of Moultrie's direst necessity, Lincoln writes that he
1 Johnson's Traditions, 147.
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was in camp on the Edisto.1 Lincoln's dilatoriness and want of energy, whereby he nearly lost the town a year before he eventually did, should not be put to William- son's account. Williamson was certainly at Stono and at the siege of Savannah; but while in neither of these actions did he distinguish himself, his conduct was not criticised by any one associated with him at the time. It is true that he did not come to the aid of Charlestown in 1780; and it is equally true that, had he exercised the capacity, vigor, and courage he had exhibited in his Cherokee expe- dition, he might have inflicted great loss upon the British outposts while they were investing the city. Had he been with Washington at Rantowle's he might have added greatly to that success; or had he been with Huger at Monck's Corner, or with White at Lenuds's Ferry, both of those disasters might have been prevented. On the other hand, it must be observed he was not altogether idle, for strange to say he was then repeating Lincoln's own course the year before. Instead of coming himself or sending Pickens, who was under his command, against the British at Charlestown, he sends Pickens into Georgia to assist Colonel Twiggs in raiding upon the British at Savannah.2 It is not improbable that the dread of the smallpox, which still prevailed on the coast, had something to do with this conduct on the part of Williamson, for it was this fear, as we have seen, which in a measure at least prevented Governor Rutledge from obtaining the militia he had expected for the defence of the town. But however that may be, just before the fall of Charlestown there had been another attempt to concentrate a force of the militia of the upper part of South Carolina and Georgia to make a diver- sion upon the outer posts of the enemy near Savannah,
1 Moultrie's Memoirs, vol. I, 438.
2 McCall's Hist. of Georgia, vol. II, 296.
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with a view to draw away a part of the British force before Charlestown ; but at the end of fifteen days there were not more than two hundred men from Carolina and but a few from Georgia collected, then came the news of the fall of Charlestown, and the enterprise was given up. A council of officers was called to meet near Augusta, Georgia, to determine what should be done. Captain Samuel Ham- mond, recently from Virginia, an officer who bore a faith- ful and prominent part throughout the Revolution, was present at this council, and has left an account of what transpired which is important not only to the reputation of Williamson, but as indicating the condition of public opinion at the time in that part of the State.
There were present at this council Governor Howley of Georgia, his Secretary of State and Council, with Colonels Clarke, Clary, and Dooly, and several other Continental and militia officers from that State, and General William- son and suite with a number of field officers. Williamson presented a copy of the articles of capitulation at Charles- town, which was read; and various plans were proposed and discussed, but none finally resolved upon. Howley and his Council thereupon determined to fly to the North with such of the State papers as could be conveniently carried with them. Williamson decided to discharge the few of his militia then on duty, to retire to his own place, Whitehall, near Cambridge, to call together the field officers of the brigade and the most influential citizens to consult what course should be taken. Colonels Dooly and Clarke promised Williamson to cooperate with him in any plan that should be adopted by the council at Whitehall, either in defence of the lower parts of the two States or to retire with him toward North Carolina.
Williamson went at once to Whitehall and assembled there a large number of officers; and high hopes were VOL. III. - 2 M
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entertained by Captain Hammond before going into the council that the determination would be to move into North Carolina, without loss of time, with all the force collected and all who chose to follow, to join the expected army coming to the South. Williamson had under his command three independent companies of regular in- fantry raised by Carolina, the officers of which were good and the troops well disciplined. There were also present one hundred and fifty to two hundred unorganized men from different parts of the State. Colonel Andrew Pick- ens, then on his march for the lower country, was halted about three miles below Ninety-Six, and with this force Captain Hammond thought a movement into North Caro- lina would have been made safely, as the enemy had no force near them except the disaffected under Pearis, who were neither equal to them in numbers or discipline.
The council met; the terms of capitulation in Charles- town were read; the General commented upon them, took a short view of the situation of the country, and concluded by advising an immediate movement, but said he would be governed by any determination a majority of the council should adopt; that they were friends and well informed that their families and his must be equally exposed or protected by any course that might be adopted. Captain Hammond says that he was struck dumb on finding not more than one officer of the staff, one field officer, and about four or five captains to oppose an immediate accept- ance of the terms stipulated for the militia of the State upon the capitulation of Charlestown. It was then pro- posed and carried that a flag should be sent to Pearis to notify him of their determination and to settle the place and manner of surrender.
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