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The 1646 Synod had hedged on the question in the Cambridge platform, merely saying that the "children of such, who are holy" were to be baptized. The majority report of the Synod of 1662 arranged that a baptized but unconverted child, upon becoming an adult parent and presenting his own child for baptism, should publicly profess assent to the covenant made in his infancy, not in order to partake of the Supper, but in order that his offspring might be externally sealed to the Church. This brought more under the discipline and government of the Church, yet kept control in the hands of the dependable, for the parents were still denied the Lord's Supper and the right to vote in spite of their formal reaffirmation. Neither the idea of voluntary participation
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nor of exclusion had been sacrificed. It was difficult, however, to gain acceptance for the arrangement.50
A minority of clerics, generally composed of the first generation, argued logically on the basis of original concepts against the arrange- ment. The majority of clerics, composed, in general, of second genera- tion Puritans, argued for the arrangement on the basis of a necessity demonstrated by New England experience. On the basis of Cotton Mather's testimony, it would seem that this division was reversed in the case of the laymen, with the first generation members approving of the arrangement in the interest of their grandchildren. The majority of laymen were not professing Christians nor even baptized children of such and supported the minority clerical opinion. Probably their opposition was not because they were "scrupulous about any innova- tion" as Miller accepts, but because the arrangement was expected to confer special privilege on a preferred group. They opposed an arrange- ment that seemed to halt a leveling process.51
In Connecticut, the conflict that ensued was especially violent and was confused with political expediencies. John Davenport at New Haven led the opposition to the half-way covenant and led the congrega- tion to share his antipathy.52 In 1666, the Church of Hartford gave representation to both points of view in its selection of two ministers. Division spread to other churches as they became involved in attempts to moderate the quarrel. At the same time, William Pitkin and six inhabitants of Hartford complained to the General Court that although they had been baptized in England they could not gain admittance for themselves nor baptism for their children in Connecticut. So that this accusation would not be carried to London, the General Court wanted the churches to enlarge the covenant to accept the Synod proposal and Pitkin. An impasse continued, however, and was recognized in the rec- ommendation of the committee of ministers that both ways be allowed. Legislation to this effect was passed in 1669. The divisiveness, rancor, and general confusion was epitomized by the secession of one group of the Hartford Church, which then decided to institute the Half-Way Covenant against which they had begun their revolt.53
After 1671, when Increase Mather, who had been allied with John Davenport, came over to an acceptance of the Synod of 1662, certain
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phases of the controversy ended. The pamphleteering among the clerics ceased and most of the people accepted the arrangement. The issue con- tinued as a power struggle between individual clerics and dissenting members in their congregations for the control of church management. Congregational theory had assumed that the minister would hold a veto as a separate power in a Congregation. Men of influence, creditors or employers, would serve as lay elders or deacons, and thus their possible disaffection would be turned into submissive alliance. This was con- temporaneously described as "a speaking aristocracy in the face of a silent democracy."" When there were large numbers of the congrega- tion in opposition, the Elders tried to eliminate the minister's veto power and reduce his voice to the weight of a single vote. As the Half- Way Covenant gained acceptance and the dissenters found themselves a very small minority, they demanded for themselves the right to block the minister and a majority vote on the grounds of their standing in the community. In many instances, their temporal power actually gave the Elders effective control.55
The ministers had recourse to sermons emphasizing obligations and the consequences of not meeting them. They, also, considered who might be drawn in to improve their power position. By 1680, they were prepared to accept into half-way membership many formerly considered unregenerate. By 1684, it was the general practice to receive into half- way membership any who were willing to be included, if they were of decent conversation and had a competency of knowledge. Admission to this inferior status allowed one the privilege of presenting his children for baptism, and many accepted it. The ministers gained from the obedi- ent support of these half-way members even though they had no vote in the Church. They did make up the inhabitants who voted in the town meeting, and here the minister's salary was determined. Moreover, an ability to influence these votes on issues in town meeting might strengthen a minister's position in church meeting.56
Such an extension of the Half-Way Covenant had not been antici- pated when the compromise was made. Nor had it been anticipated that active interest in the church would diminish even as membership was enlarged. With baptism otherwise assured for their children, few found the privileges of full membership commensurate with its duties
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and services. In several towns the numbers of professing members de- clined until scarcely five or six attended the Lord's Supper. Church au- thority had been extended over large numbers, but their passivity robbed the authority of all power. To stimulate a more active sense of membership and obligation, there was begun the practise of a com- munal renewal of the covenant. Though it became a group chant rather than an individual affirmation, it was still a form of active assent paral- leling an oath before witnesses. It proved to be an effective stimulant and came into general use in King Philip's War. By a resolution of the Synod of May 1680, it became an accepted form.57
The arrangements were made to increase the control of the church and to increase the possibilities of replenishing the supply of saints. It seemed that these would be served by increasing the number of those who voluntarily submitted to church discipline and if many children were baptized and trained in church discipline. In operation, the ar- rangements did not work quite as expected, but they did constitute concessions forced by the social exigencies concomitant with main- taining church rule.58
NOTES-CHAPTER VII
1 Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 16-17; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 11-13, 221.
2 Ibid., pp. 12, 14, 238; Wish, Society and Thought, pp. 6, 16, 20; Brinton, Ideas and Men, pp. 269-71; Dorfman, Economic Mind, pp. 13, 36-37.
3 Brinton, Ideas and Men, pp. 312-13, 356-58; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 11-12, 14; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 3, 11, 21, 265; Marcus Wilson Jernegan, Laboring and Dependent Classes in Colonial America, 1607-1783 (Chicago, c. 1931), p. 64.
4 Miller, New England Mind, p. 14.
5 Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 25-31, 34-37; Conn. Col. Rec., I, pp. 112, note, 250, 355.
6 Jernegan, Laboring and Dependent Classes, pp. 84, 88-89; Conn. Col. Rec., I, pp. 520-21. 7 Ibid., pp. 554-55, and II, p. 312; Jernegan, Laboring and Dependent Classes, pp. 69, 82. 8 Conn. Col. Rec., I, p. 555, II, p. 312; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 66, 86, 95-98.
9 Jernegan, Laboring and Dependent Classes, pp. 97, 102, 104-5.
10 Ibid., pp. 102-3 ff., 234, note, 107-11; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 92-4.
11 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
12 Ibid., pp. 70-73, 87-89.
13 Ibid., pp. 110-123.
14 Ibid., pp. 125 ff.
15 Ibid., pp. 130-2, 136-38, 242.
16 Ibid., pp. 142-43.
17 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 5-6, 8.
18 Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 149-52.
19 Ibid., pp. 152, 161, 165; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 94 ff.
20 Morison, Puritan Pronaos, p. 167; Vernon Louis Parrington, The Colonial Mind, 1620-1800 (New York, C. 1927), p. 62.
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21 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 25-38, 40, 48.
22 Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 173, 179-86.
23 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 151-2; Charles J. Hoadly, Introduction to "Will and Doom" in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III (Hartford, Conn., 1895), pp. 71-73.
24 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 152-53.
25 Ibid., p. 152; Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., I, pp. 57-83.
26 Ibid., III, Hoadly's introduction to "Will and Doom," pp. 74-76; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, p. 197; Miller, New England Mind, p. 152.
27 Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III, Hoadly's Introduction, p. 73.
28 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 135-37, 149-51; Bailyn, "New England Merchants," pp. 127-34, 280-87, 296, 319-20, 351-52, 389-95.
29 Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III, Hoadly's introduction, p. 73.
30 Miller, New England Mind, p. 141; Gershom Bulkeley, "Will and Doom or The Mis- eries of Connecticut by and under an Usurped and Arbitrary Power" (written 1692) in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III, pp. 79 ff .; Bailyn, "New England Merchants," P. 395; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 199-200.
31 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 157-171.
32 Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, The First Americans, 1607-1690, (New York, c. 1927), pp. 142-45; Wish, Society and Thought, pp. 18-19, 41.
33 Wertenbaker, First Americans, pp. 151-55.
34 Miller, New England Mind, pp. 191-208; Wish, Society and Thought, pp. 42-44.
35 Ibid .; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 191-208, esp. 204; Wertenbaker, First Americans. P. 147.
36 Wish, Society and Thought, p. 19; Brinton, Ideas and Men, pp. 312-14, 334 ff., 366-67: Wertenbaker, First Americans, p. 163.
37 Wish, Society and Thought, p. 18.
38 Brinton, Ideas and Men, pp. 337 ff .; Morison, Puritan Pronaos, pp. 242-47.
39 Ibid., pp. 235-38, 240-41, 262; Miller, New England Mind, pp. 142-45.
40 Wertenbaker, First Americans, pp. 165-73; Earle, Home Life, pp. 147-48.
41 Wertenbaker, First Americans, pp. 167, 173-74.
42 Miller, New England Mind, PP. 55-57.
43 Ibid., pp. 55-66.
44 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
45 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
46 Ibid., pp. 11, 71-72.
47 Ibid., p. 76.
48 Ibid., pp. 68-72, 76-80, 87, 104.
49 Ibid., pp. 93-96.
50 Ibid., pp. 90, 94-100.
51 Ibid., pp. 96-99, 105.
52 That the new charter had forcibly untied New Haven and Connecticut did not pro- mote compromise. Davenport left New Haven to accept a ministry in Boston as a better point from which to denounce the Synod of 1662 and stirred up considerable controversy there. See Miller, New England Mind, pp. 106 ff.
53 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
54 Quoted in Ibid., p. 110.
55 Ibid., pp. 95, 106-11. 56 Ibid., pp. 112-13.
57 Ibid., pp. 114-16. 58 Ibid., pp. 82, 87, 90, 104.
Chapter VIII The Legend of Liberty
O ONNECTICUT HAD SECURED a charter and had ab- sorbed New Haven, but neither she nor her neighbors re- garded her boundaries as settled, and her charter rights were challenged as political fortunes and colonial policy changed in Eng- land. Massachusetts regarded the line separating her from Connecticut as indefinite; Rhode Island disputed the eastern line; and Connecticut was unwilling to accept the loss of western territory, which was not only being claimed by the Duke of York, but which The Netherlands intended to reclaim. Undivided attention could not be given to the settlement of these boundary disputes for it was the eve of the blood- iest of the Indian wars and the beginning of the Crown's efforts to ex- ercise the royal prerogative through the instrumentality of a Governor of The Dominion of New England. As Connecticut maintained her part in the solution of these issues, a legend of liberty was born among her people.
Boundary Disputes
Controversy over Connecticut's boundaries extended over two centuries. These controversies originated in dubious land titles, impre- cise boundaries, ambiguous charters, ambition, and avarice. Solution was complicated by the imperial designs of Charles II and intensified by cultural variations and religious differences. Final determination was accomplished by gradual and separate delimitations.
Differences with Rhode Island stemmed from the inclusion in Connecticut's charter of lands claimed by Rhode Island.1 Dr. John Clarke apparently had filed a final petition for the Rhode Island charter
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a few days before Winthrop, Jr., had filed for Connecticut. While the two petitions were under consideration, there were recurrent reports in Rhode Island that Connecticut was seeking his Majesty's consent to enslave its neighbors.2 Historians are far from agreed on the degree of Winthrop's duplicity in arranging the settlement which was favorable for Connecticut. Certainly he secured support for Connecticut from many individuals, and stated that he spent close to 3,000 pounds in securing the charter.3 That part of the Rhode Island claim swallowed in the Connecticut grant was of especial interest to the Atherton Com- pany,4 a land company in which many leaders of New England, in- cluding Winthrop, had a private interest. The Company of Puritans would not have wished to be under the jurisdiction of Rhode Island which they loathed and may have contributed funds for Winthrop's use.
Rhode Island acted promptly to counter the effect of the grant to Connecticut. Its agent in England asked for a recall of Connecticut's charter and opened negotiations with Winthrop, Jr. Arbiters were selected jointly by Winthrop and Clarke and have been referred to as a "fair minded group."" The pressures exerted by the Atherton group remain veiled, but in their employ were individuals adept in political machinations, such as Captain John Scott, whose services, Winthrop wrote his Narragansett partners, would undoubtedly give Connecti- cut an advantage." The arbiters authorized the Atherton group to de- cide for themselves whether to accord allegiance to Rhode Island or to Connecticut.7 The group accepted the Pawcatuck River as the west- ern boundary of Rhode Island. In what appeared to be an attempt to reconcile this settlement with the Connecticut charter, it was suggested that the Pawcatuck be known as the Narragansett River.&
The Connecticut General Court refused to recognize the negotiated settlement. It was contended that Winthrop's agency had terminated when the Connecticut charter was secured and that he was without authority to make agreements with other colonies. Connecticut as- serted a claim to the whole of the Narragansett territory which en- croached not only upon the Rhode Island claim, but, also, upon that of Massachusetts to the Pequot country. The latter Connecticut claimed by right of conquest and prior occupation .?
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The matter was reviewed by the New England Confederation. Rhode Island's protests against Connecticut's legalized robbery met with little sympathy. Rhode Island had been excluded from membership in the New England Confederation because she was "otherwise minded."10
(Courtesy Mills Coll., Conn. State Lib.)
RIDGEFIELD-KEELER TAVERN
Winthrop, when he was pleading for the Connecticut charter, had charged her with encouraging "vileness of opinions and corruptness of Manners."11 Her practice of toleration was regarded with antipathy by other New England states. At least two of the Commissioners of the Confederation, moreover, were members of the Atherton Company, which had already indicated its preference for Connecticut's jurisdic- tion by delivering to it the town of Narragansett. The Confederation, in September, 1664, found that the conduct of Rhode Island in the
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Narragansett territory had been "unneighborly," "unchristian," and "dishonorable to God."12
A royal commission, which arrived in 1665 to adjust all matters of colonial relations, declared the Atherton claims void and gave Rhode Island temporary jurisdiction over the Narragansett territory pending final determination by the Crown. Charles II took no action and the contest continued for more than seven decades.13
The boundary dispute between the "affectionate friends & con- federates," Massachusetts and Connecticut, was caused by the incom- petence of two surveyors, Nathaniel Woodward and Solomon Saffrey. They fixed a point approximately three miles south of the Charles River as the beginning of the southern boundary of Massachusetts. Then they sailed around the Cape and up the Connecticut River to the general vicinity of Windsor. Here they selected a point which they supposed to be at the same degree of latitude as their starting point in Massachusetts. As the boundary was then drawn, its western point was eight miles south of the present northern limits of Connecticut and the eastern point was four miles south of the present limit. Connecticut was quick to discover the error and to appeal, unsuccessfully, to the New England Confederation in 1649. As Connecticut expanded, the line appeared more restrictive and its clarification became a dominant issue. Joint surveys were proposed, but independent surveys invariably were undertaken, and, invariably were followed by remonstrances. As the area became more densely settled, ill feelings were intensified by border raids, thefts, and insults. First Connecticut, and then both colonies, made representations to London, which were answered by efforts to control both more strictly.14
Connecticut was not disposed to accept as final the loss of certain areas included in the grant of the Duke of York and drew support from the inclinations of the residents of those portions. That the rule of New Netherlands was superseded by the control of the Duke of York did not eliminate differences in religion, custom. and political concept between the inhabitants of the English settlements included in the area and the established government. The settlers on Long Island grew apprehensive of the new order only when it was learned that the Duke's laws did not recognize popular consent as the basis of government nor provide for
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any representative assembly. They had expected that the new regime might be, indeed, more liberal than Puritan control. Their desire for a liberalization of certain specific restrictions, however, did not cause them to countenance a basic alteration of institutions. From the begin- ning, there was difficulty in collecting taxes. A levy for fortifications was refused by several towns which had vainly petitioned for an assem- bly on the specific grounds that the levy was "taxation without con- sent." The Duke of York ceased demanding a tax from the eastern towns and asked only a benevolence when war with the Dutch threat- ened. Even to this, five towns submitted only when advised by Hart- ford to do so, and Southampton limited herself to a promise of neutrality.15
When the Dutch were in control, Connecticut continued "to at- tend to what was devolved upon ourselves"16 until reduction of the Long Island towns was threatened. Connecticut then mustered her forces17 and, in Puritan tones, informed the Dutch that she was "tender of the effusion of blood," but would join with the Long Island towns if they were attacked. In a more majestic manner she warned the Dutch further: "if you proceed in provocations to constraine the rising of the English colonies they will not make it their worke to tamper with your peasants about swearing, but deale wth your headquarters."18 Connect- icut was able to reap the blessings of this stand without taxing her sensibilities over the effusion of blood, for the conflict between the Eng- lish and the Dutch was concluded by the treaty of Westminster on February 9, 1674.19 Connecticut yielded to the pleas of the towns and accorded representation in her General Court to Southold, South- ampton, and East Hampton. These petitioned the King for confirma- tion and explained to Sir Edmund Andros, then governor of New York, that Connecticut had aided them in repelling the Dutch and their "sympathies lay across the Sound." Andros was not persuaded to com- pliance with their wishes, and, instead, forced the towns to submit to the reestablished English rule in New York.20
Andros was equally determined to secure the Duke of York's claim to all the territory from the west side of the Connecticut River to the east side of the Delaware, as the grant had been defined when first bestowed upon the Duke of York at the conclusion of the Dutch War
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in 1664.21 At that time, however, the Connecticut General Court had sent the royal commissioners a gift of some fine horses and 500 bushels of corn and instructed its representatives to arrange the bounds be- tween the Duke's patent and Connecticut's "so as in their judgment may be the satisfaction of the court."22 The King's commissioners had been no match for the Puritan emissaries, who pleaded earnestly for moderation of the Duke's claim lest Connecticut be deprived of "her very bowels and principal parts." The commissioners agreed that the claim would ruin Connecticut and that it was obviously a breach of her charter that would "cast dishonor upon his majesty." Perhaps in the be- lief that they were agreeing to a line somewhat similar to that stated in the Treaty of Hartford in 165023 which provided for a boundary be- tween the Dutch and the English well removed from the Hudson, the Royal Commissioners agreed to a line that was to extend to the west slopes of the Catskills in New York. The line was to begin at the Mamaroneck River and to extend north, northwest to an extension of the Massachusetts line.24 This was a more favorable concession for Connecticut than Stuyvesant had made in the Hartford treaty.
After the final expulsion of the Dutch in 1674, the Duke of York had appointed Andros governor under a new patent which once again included all land east to the Connecticut River. When Andros de- manded the territory, Connecticut submitted the terms of her charter of 1662. those of the agreement of 1664, the fact that Connecticut had effectively occupied and defended the territory, and, finally, the interpre- tation that Connecticut did not have power to dispose of any of His Majesty's plantations.25 Andros gave substance to his claim by appear- ing in force before Saybrook in 1675. Connecticut urged the greatest discretion in dealing with him, but moved to block his landing. At just this moment, both colonies were endangered by the outbreak of an Indian war, and Andros withdrew from Saybrook and let matters rest until the conclusion of King Philip's War.26
King Philip's War
Intercolonial disputes yielded precedence to the threat of the In- dian quarrel. There had not been a general Indian uprising since the Pequot war, but the restlessness of the Indians had long been increasing.
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John Easton, in his "Relacion of the Indyan Warre,"27 reported that on the eve of the new outbreak there existed a lack of trust deeply rooted in the years of contact with the white man. Peace hinged upon the determination of an Indian King, Philip, who had pledged his friendship in 1671 and had more recently declared that he would not harm the English. English credence of these reassurances was tem- pered, however, by the information they received that Philip was plot- ting war. Philip indicated that he feared the English would seek retri- bution against him because they believed him implicated in the murder of another Indian, for which crime they had already sentenced three Indians to death. In a sense, any Indian outbreak was defensive, and Philip's statement comes close to an articulation of security as the cause and justification of his war. The English believed war so near that Rhode Island attempted to arbitrate. Philip refused this arbitration and war started the next week.28
In Connecticut, the colony was placed in a state of defense. Cer- tain colonial troops were directed to attempt to track down Philip, and others, under the command of Captain Hutchinson of Massachusetts, were dispatched to attempt to prevent the Narragansetts from rein- forcing Philip.29 Captain Hutchinson's troops moved into Narragansett territory and made contact with the Indians. The so-called Treaty of Narragansett was negotiated on July 15, 1675. Connecticut was repre- sented by Captain Wait Winthrop and Mr. Richard Smith, both of whom were members of the Atherton Company. The Narragansetts agreed to cease war preparations, to deliver any of Philip's men, and to seek out and destroy the enemy.30 The arrangement was short-lived. To assess exact responsibility for its failure is difficult, but certainly its duration was not extended when all but six of the Narragansetts coming voluntarily into an English garrison were sold into slavery, although such expulsion may have made the area more desirable for settlement, and, so, have raised land values and assured an investment return.31
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