USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 29
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and men "in consideration of the Occasional Diminution of Parts of Rations."61 By August provisions began to arrive in good quantity. By then men were lacking to eat them. Washington was embarrassed for want of troops to carry an attack on New York.62
The year 1781 was to be decisive. In May, Washington had met with Rochambeau and his staff at Wethersfield to plan the future campaigns and the disposition of the French troops. There, at the Joseph Webb House with Governor Trumbull serving as official host, the allied com- manders considered the best ways of relieving the Southern Army which was being hard pressed by the British. A direct attack on New York was considered more desirable than a transfer of troops to Virginia in view of the lack of transportation. Rochambeau's troops, which included the Connecticut troops, were moved to the lower Hudson, but colonial troops were so slow in arriving that the most these could do was to carry out a reconnaissance in force before King's Bridge. It was be- lieved, inaccurately, that British ships were reenforcing New York and that pressure on the Southern Army was being lessened. Although New York continued to have strategical importance, the ability to launch a successful attack against it was fading. News was received that 29 war- ships with 3,000 French reenforcements under the command of de Grasse were moving toward Chesapeake Bay where British forces were reportedly building up. That which could be done must be done. Twenty-five hundred of Washington's troops and all of Rochambeau's French troops were transferred to the South in reversal of the Wethers- field decision. Connecticut troops were left to guard the Highlands and the Connecticut shore, but the Hudson was not again the scene of a major effort. "At an earlier period than my most sanguine hope had induced me to expect," wrote Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., on October 19, 1781, "a reduction of the British army under the command of Lord Cornwallis" was effected.63
Although the Hudson was not again the scene of a major effort, an alarm was sounded in New London on the evening of September 5, 1781, that the British fleet was standing off shore. Benedict Arnold had returned to familiar territory to avenge the loss of a valuable British merchant vessel. Defenses were readied during the night and the next morning women and children streamed out of the city to points of
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safety. In a well-planned, coordinated attack, New London and Groton were quickly overrun by the British, who plundered, marauded, and burned as they went. The devastation ended only with nightfall when the British returned to their ships which lay at anchor until the follow- ing morning and then set sail for New York. In addition to the dead, captured, and wounded, the loss to New London included more than 125 buildings of all types, nearly all of the wharfing, and all of the shipping in port except sixteen small vessels which escaped up the river.64
More than a year was to pass before peace was agreed upon on January 20, 1783. In the interim before it became increasingly difficult to keep an army in the field. Officers were retiring from the service and the troops reporting to the field were unfit. Additional Tory estates were confiscated and a weather eye kept open for Loyalists.65 The prob- lems of an inflated currency which had continued to mount during the war reached new heights as the negotiators worked out the details of the peace. Public officials in their public and private capacities were alert to the fluctuating value of the notes. Privately they employed per- sons secretly to inquire of their brokers the rate of exchange between continental money and hard dollars.66 Those who sensed the oppor- tunities of the post-war period had begun to make their adjustments. The first act of the January session of the General Assembly "for the encouragement of Literature and Genius" anticipated the formal an- nouncement of the long hoped-for peace.
Connecticut enjoyed relative security during the American Rev- olution. As in the several Indian Wars dating from the time of King Philip, the colony remained comparatively removed from the theater of war. The reason for this insulation from attack is not readily appar- ent, since the same deterrents did not prevail in 1775 as had existed 100 years previously. Early in the war Connecticut recognized its im- portance as a base of supply.67 Joseph Trumbull, in seeking the support of Silas Deane for appointment as Commissary General, suggested that the appointment should come to him "because Connecticut would have to bear the brunt of supply."68 The British decision to limit their at- tacks on Connecticut to small raids and diversionary thrusts instead of launching a full-scale attack may have been a decisive factor in their
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defeat. The relative safety of the colony permitted it to act with a cer- tain boldness in non-military matters, such as control of loyalists.
By the end of 1775, it was generally agreed that measures to bring the Tories under control were necessary. Connecticut had moved stead- ily, but cautiously, toward this attitude since the firing at Lexington. Those known to be Tories had been placed under surveillance and were made to suffer for non-attendance at liberty pole celebrations and for drinking tea. Uncooperative merchants were boycotted, and even clerics were not exempted from the wrath of the patriot. At this time the Assembly refused to enact general legislation governing the matter and communities and organizations took independent actions. In No- vember, Washington had suggested that something should be done and Trumbull had come to the belief that rules and regulations should be drawn "to prevent the operations of the evil practices and designs of persons inimical to the rights and liberties of the colonies."69
The first Connecticut law against the Tories was passed in the De- cember session of the Assembly. Its provisions, which made it unlawful to write or speak against the established local government or to bear arms against it, were a declaration for the rights of an independent country and anticipated similar action by other colonies and by the Congress. The estates of those who aided the enemy were subject to seizure and their person to imprisonment. For criticizing the govern- ment, an offender was made ineligible for service in any public capacity, civil or military, and might be subject to additional fines, imprison- ment, and disenfranchisement. Town officers and inspection commit- tees were empowered to investigate and disarm Tory suspects, a legal- ization of the current practice. The patriot was thus cast in the role of informer and judge, the loyalist burdened with proof; and advantage to those favoring independence and one which they were not to relinquish. Washington was pleased with the enactment and urged other colonies to adopt similar laws. Under the act, Tories were found in greater num- bers in the western part of the state and were arrested with greatest fre- quency in the first months of 1776.70
More extreme measures were passed against the Tories after inde- pendence had been declared. Treason was punishable by death. Town officials were empowered to confine within limits or to remove to a place
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(Courtesy of the Marine Historical Association, Mystic) MYSTIC SEAPORT-SCHAEFER'S SPOUTER TAVERN AND THE "CHARLES W. MORGAN" AS SEEN THROUGH THE DOORWAY OF THE FISHTOWN CHAPEL
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of safety all persons regarded as dangerous.71 Illustrative of the imple- mentation of this provision is the case of Ralph Isaacs, who was, at first, removed from the New Haven area to Glastonbury where he and his correspondence were kept under strict surveillance. He was later per- mitted to move to Durham to enable him to be nearer his source of food. There he fell under an even closer scrutiny of the Committee of Inspection after he began selling rum and was evidently confined to specified limits. The Governor and Council could overrule the actions of a Committee of Safety, and, after Isaacs was represented by Jared In- gersoll at "a large hearing" he was permitted to return to Wallingford.72 Later, in October, 1777, after he had taken the oath of fidelity, Isaacs was completely released from restriction. It might be suspected that the attempt to concentrate the Tories came to seem overburdening, espe- cially when the main theater of operations shifted to the South. At least, early in the following year, disloyal persons, after they had come to un- derstand "the state of the dispute," were permitted to return to their homes, although they continued to be restricted and were placed under a bail of 1,000 pounds.73 By May, all those who had been considered guilty of treason were granted an indemnity, providing that they would take an oath of allegiance.74 To travel in the state, however, a certificate of identification was required to avoid suspicion.75 This general amnesty seems to have continued throughout the war and seems to have been administered in a liberal spirit.76
Despite the vicissitudes of war, Connecticut was not ready in 1777 to confiscate Tory property. Instead, in October of that year the state seized and leased such properties, arranging that the net proceeds would be paid into the treasury. The properties of the irascible Sam- uel Peters of Hebron were among those of notorious Tories which were seized under this arrangement.77 Connecticut, also, forbade those who refused to take the oath of fidelity to the state to purchase or trans- fer real estate. Later, upon the recommendation of the Continental Congress, procedures were established for the forfeiture of properties owned by those who did not support the interests of the state. The pro- ceeds which remained after costs and creditors were paid were to go to the state. As established, the procedures apparently sought to safe- guard the rights of Tories as well as those of the state and the public,
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for those, whose estates were judged subject to forfeiture, were granted the right of appeal to the superior court.78 At first the sale of estates to the amount of fifty thousand pounds was authorized, and, as the finan- cial affairs of the state worsened, additional authorizations were made. During the course of the war, the state authorized the sale of estates to the value of at least 250,000 pounds. In addition, acceptance of land to the amount of fifty thousand pounds was accepted for officers' or sol- diers' pay.79
It would be difficult to determine the extent to which private for- tune was enhanced by the arrangements for forfeiture. The provision that lands be paid for in silver or gold at the time of purchase or in two equal payments at purchase and at the end of three months limited op- portunities to those with cash.80 At times individuals assessed mortgages against other estates to secure the necessary funds. When these mort- gages seemed to be in danger of default, however, the Assembly per- mitted their liquidation in soldiers' notes or in any other security of the state.81 The scarcity of money in conjunction with the state's mon- etary needs, at times, made the forfeited estates a drag on the market and forced the price lower than might otherwise have been. The situa- tion contributed to the speculative fever and the inflationary tendencies accompanying the war. By the confiscation of Tory estates, however, the government was enabled to acquire much needed funds and the title transfers were guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris.
The procurement of the materials of war required a particular effort during the whole course of the war. Clothing was an especially critical item. A British officer observed that there were few coats among the colonial forces which were not out at the elbows, and "in a whole Regiment, there is scarce a pair of breeches." At the request of the Council of Safety, the Governor ordered the commissaries to forward clothing to the western part of the State to be distributed among the Connecticut troops in accordance with Washington's request.83 Difficul- ties in the procurement of supplies are indicated by the request of Sep- tember, 1777, that each town supply "one shirt, or more if they see fit, either linen or flannel, one hunting shirt or frock, one pair of woolen overalls, one or two pair of stockings, and one pair of shoes for each non-commissioned officer and soldier in the continental army belonging
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to such town."84 The Commissary General of the state was made respon- sible for collecting the clothing, and in December, collectors were sent from town to town paying prices fixed by the Council. To secure wheat and flour, officers of the Commissary were given powers to im- press and seize these items if owners were reluctant to sell.85
The supply of the army offered an opportunity for private gain. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, July, 1780, a full-scale investigation was launched into the activities of the procurement offi- cers. A 14 man committee was given the power of subpoena to examine the officers and their books and was supplied with a series of questions designed to ferret out evidence of misconduct. All citizens having knowledge of misconduct were asked to make the information avail- able.86 That practices judged contrary to the public interest were rather wide-spread is indicated by the fact that only three of those serving as issuing commissaries in August, 1780, were retained in the service of the state.87
Concurrently with efforts at local procurement, attempts were made to secure materials abroad. Silas Deane of Connecticut was sent on a two-fold mission to France in 1776. He was to secure supplies and to determine the willingness of France to extend loans, and, also, to learn France's attitude in the event the colonies "should be forced to form themselves into an independent state." When Deane arrived in Paris in July, he found France cautiously sympathetic toward the Amer- ican cause and learned that the commercial house headed by Beaumar- chais had been organized to forward supplies to America, which os- tensibly would be paid for by the shipment of tobacco from Virginia. Deane's biographer credits him with having supplied eight shiploads of war material by December, 1776, when Franklin reached Paris to serve with Deane and Arthur Lee as the American Commissioners.
Deane's informal accounting methods, however, led to his recall in 1777. He returned to Philadelphia in July, 1778, to face a hostile Congress. Deane not only had enemies in the Continental Congress, but in Pennsylvania and in Connecticut. Although he was not able to give a complete accounting of his activities, no dishonesty was proved, and he was permitted to return to France in 1780. Apparently, he was ready to heed the repeated advice of his brothers and friends to return
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to this country, when he died on shipboard in Deal Harbor, England, September 23, 1789.90
To preserve and increase the supply of essential materials, the state had introduced restrictions against exports immediately upon news of the Battle of Lexington and Concord. The time limitation placed on successive embargo acts until November 1776 indicates that they were regarded as temporary. The adoption of the Declaration of Independ- ence, however, removed any hesitation to enact wartime measures and the needs of the army made controls over commerce urgent. To prevent critical supplies from flowing out of the state, attempts were made to make the embargo effective. Also, the state moved further toward war- time conditions by extending to the Governor and the Council of Safety the prerogative of determining the extent of the embargo or of discon- tinuing it.91 Those transporting listed articles were required to post a bond of five times the value of the products involved as surety that they would be sold within the state. Violators were subject to fines in an amount equalling twice the value of the products. To tighten controls, attention was turned to shipping and regulations extended to include privateers.92
At this time, Connecticut advocated as well a general embargo "on all privateers, and on all shipping whatever, except that which shall be especially permitted by each State for the purpose of bringing such necessaries as are absolutely needed," and recommended this to the delegates of the New England states when they met in Providence in the last days of December, 1776.93 New York protested it vigorously because of the harmful effects it would have on New York's commerce. New York was dependent on imports from the East and the South and pointed out that if the flow of goods from the Eastern states were im- peded she would have to turn to the South. New York also reminded Connecticut of the benefits which had accrued to it from the trade of the New York merchants and argued that it would be unjust if these merchants should not be permitted to forward the articles purchased.94 The Connecticut proposal, although apparently stringent, in fact al- lowed considerable latitude in application. Governor Trumbull was able to reply to New York that permits had been given on application for the transport of articles to New York and that the state agent would
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be instructed "to indulge transporting such quantities for family use in your state as shall appear needful, consistent with the interests of both states."95 By the following July, opinion shifted to a concern with the economic dangers of interference and the delegates to a conference in Springfield recommended to the several legislatures that in the making of laws to regulate commerce care be taken to insure that there would be no unnecessary interruption to a free commercial intercourse be- tween the inhabitants of the several states.96
The proximity of the enemy, the availability of supplies in Con- necticut, the willingness of some to turn a dollar, and the accessibility of water transportation facilitated the movement of goods and supplies between lines. The control of such trade was made the responsibility of the selectmen of the towns in the Winter of 1778. Permits and a bond of four hundred pounds were required of those who wished to enter Long Island or any territory controlled by the enemy. Those convicted of trading illegally were subject to fine, imprisonment, and liability to serve in the defense of the state.97 To gain the guise of legitimacy some traders transported goods into the state and then sold to the enemy. To prevent this, public officials were extended the right of seizure and the privilege of transporting the goods to a locality believed more secure from the enemy. In an attempt to tighten the import trade, the con- tinuance of the bonds required when securing permission to import was made dependent upon the return of a certificate of performance to the authorized official six months after the bond was issued.98 There is reason to believe that these early measures were hesitantly applied, if at all. A year later, Trumbull, in a letter to Washington on December 27, 1779, spoke of measures they were taking "and now putting into execution" to intercept any intercourse whatever with the enemy with- out special permission.99 The need for intelligence of the enemy's ac- tivities made the prevention of such trade more difficult. Agents going into enemy territory had to be given some pretense for their presence and many would undertake such missions only for the emoluments they received.100 The permissions extended to refugees to bring their effects from territory controlled by the enemy were abused and the provision for these was repealed in April 1779.101 The following year all permits to export goods out of the state were revoked and thereafter they were
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to be given only by the Governor and for a limited time.102 Local offi- cials were given the power of seizure of goods suspected of being im- ported from enemy territory, and were permitted to employ armed whale boats and to borrow vessels from the French for use in disrupting the trade.
With the ever present illicit trade, the free flow of goods between states was all but impossible. However, in May, 1780, the Assembly again authorized the Governor to correspond with Governors of neigh- boring states relative to free trade. The latitude sought by some traders is revealed by the necessity of enacting in October of that year a law which required traders first entering the state to apply to the Justice of the Peace of the first town they reached after entering the state for a certificate to proceed.103 The control of the coastwise trade became even more difficult as the theater of war shifted to the south and the dangers correspondingly decreased. The trade between states was specifically limited to overland trade, and, in 1781, the officials of the towns along the shore were instructed to tie up all boats or craft on the sound. When other restrictions on trade were revoked in 1781 the restrictions on trade by water continued. Any vessel engaged in trade outside of the state was required to post bond five times the value of the vessel.104 Efforts to control the trade met with only limited success and became even more difficult as rising prices increased the chances for gain.
As another attempt to assure an adequate supply of the materials of war and the necessaries of life, Connecticut introduced price controls and prevailed upon other colonies to do the same. Those who preferred private gain to public good were regarded as "the great pests of so- ciety." Earlier attempts to control engrossing had failed, and prices had become exorbitant.106 In November, 1776, Connecticut fixed wages paid for farm labor at three shillings a day and pegged other wages to this. Prices were fixed on rum, grain, meat, salt, wool, and flax.
In December, the list was extended in Connecticut to include cer- tain articles of clothing and European imports. It had been charged that wholesalers had been reaping profits of from five to six hundred percent and that retailers enjoyed mark-ups of 40 and 50 percent. It decided that a twenty percent mark-up allowed retailers a just profit on items for which prices were not specifically fixed and that the whole-
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salers should not be permitted more than a 150 percent profit, except on certain fabrics where an additional 25 percent profit was allowed. In the same month, these controls were accepted and even further ex- tended by the delegates from the New England states at their meeting in Providence. A price differential was granted to the northern colonies on most of the articles.107
Risk, insurance, and scarcity are factors in explaining the difference in profits allowed the importer and retail merchants. It is, perhaps, also true that the importers exerted a comparatively greater influence on the lawmakers. Adequate consideration had not been given, however, to the inconveniences of the regulations, reaction of the people, amount of money in circulation, and other economic conditions. "Upon mature deliberation," it was recommended in the Summer of 1777 that the several state legislatures repeal the acts. Connecticut rescinded her acts promptly in August of that year, with the proviso, however, that the several towns should provide the families of the non-commissioned offi- cers and soldiers of the continental army with necessities at prices fixed by the act of the previous December.108
The need for general economic controls was recognized by the Continental Congress in November 1777. Since it felt that the relation of the volume of money in circulation to prices was improperly bal- anced, the states were requested to give consideration to stabilizing the latter at three regional meetings. The states located north of Maryland met in New Haven in January 1778. The delegates at this meeting were aware of the strong opposition of those who believed such controls to be contrary to the principles of liberty. It was recommended, however, that the several states enact price controls as a limitation which a liberty- conscious people would impose upon itself in recognition that the par- tial infringement was necessary to the preservation of the whole.109
Connecticut had repealed its price controls six months earlier and Governor Trumbull believed that price controls would result in depre- ciated supplies of both domestic and foreign articles. Governor Trum- bull seemed unwilling, however, to express direct opposition to the recommendations of the delegates to the regional meeting and to the Continental Congress. He proposed that the matter be considered in town meetings inasmuch as the controls affected the whole body of the
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