History of Connecticut, Volume I, Part 18

Author: Bingham, Harold J., 1911-
Publication date: 1962
Publisher: New York : Lewis Historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 562


USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 18


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erned by an illegal usurpation of power. It is this interpretation which is integral to the legend of liberty.


The center of government under the Andros regime was Boston, and the laws75 enacted there were applicable, except in rare instances, throughout the dominion. Most of Andros' laws reenacted those which had previously prevailed and were concerned with such matters as cat- tle, cornfields, and fences; the fishing trade and fishermen; and the size of staves and boards-matters with which the colony had struggled from the beginning. Other laws were reasonable; the effort to establish a postal system and the establishment of standard weights and measures were efforts which were proper to a maturing society.


A frontier settlement, such as Connecticut constituted near the end of the seventeenth century, necessitated, regardless of the adminis- trative organization, that careful attention be given to defense. Especially was this true since a union of Indians and the French was alike a local danger and a danger to the British empire. A large portion of Andros' attention, therefore, was given to the security of New England, and an Act of Militia and restrictions on expanded settlement were accordingly passed. The Indians were the key to imperial defense, and, with the French lurking in the background, friendly relations with the Indians were doubly important. The policy on Indian lands was obviously based on the premise that unrestrained encroachment upon Indian lands by the colonists was the basis of Indian difficulties. Consequently, permission of Andros was required before any Indian lands could be exchanged. Also, all lands which had been secured from the Indians, upon which no improvements had been made, were closed to settle- ment. Connecticut, as a result of her own ingenious forethought in validating titles, was little affected by real estate regulations, although some tenuous land titles were held from the Indians. Andros' law was designed, not for the protection of the natives, but for that of His Majesty's dominion. Security was of common concern to Connecticut and to the Crown, and the record of the era suggests that the colony cooperated willingly in defense measures against the Indians.


The judicial system, in the main, was similar to that which had functioned in the colony before Andros' time, except for the superior courts. These were empowered to hear all cases involving the Crown.


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to serve as the Court of Appeals from lower courts, and to be the court of origin in all civil cases involving amounts above ten pounds. For a short time, an "understanding" exempted Connecticut from this move toward centralization. The arrangement was applicable in Connecticut, however, after March, when the Judiciary Act was formally passed. The Court of Common Pleas, in Connecticut, could try cases of any amount where the title to land was not involved, providing the defendant should always have the right to remove the case to the higher court if he desired. The judicial structure of the Andros regime seems more clearly defined than under the Charter and laws of Connecticut. The method of appeal, for example, was more precisely outlined. There had no doubt been a basis for the cry of injustice raised against the colonial courts, where magistrates "administered justice according to the Lawes ... and for the want thereof according to the word of God"76-as they arbitrarily interpreted it, encouraging no challenge of its legal validity by any lawyer. Certainly, some preferred the justice dispensed in the royal courts.


The laws governing the distribution of estates was one of the first laws to come under the scrutiny of Andros. English common law pro- vided that the eldest son was the sole heir: he was entitled to the whole of the estate, exclusive of all other children. To encourage the increase of inhabitants, to hold the labor of younger sons, and, perhaps, because of a sense of equity, Connecticut had followed the practice of partible succession, as did the other New England colonies. That is, an estate was to be divided so that equal shares were distributed to each of the heirs, except that the eldest son received a double share. The General Court had ordered in 1639 that estates in Connecticut would be di- vided according to this principle, the rule had been included in the Code of 1630, and in the revision of 1673.77


When Andros took over, there were a number of settlements be- fore the courts. On one, in particular, Secretary Allyn asked the opinion of the government in Boston. A younger brother of Thomas Wells had been killed. The deceased left three brothers older than himself, of whom Thomas was the eldest; one younger; and two sisters. Thomas, the oldest brother, as next of kin in English law, and the youngest, for an indeterminate reason, each claimed the entire estate. The rest of


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the children claimed that the estate should be equally divided according to Connecticut law. Allyn was not alone in seeking the opinion of Boston in resolving this family tangle. Thomas, too, appealed in Bos- ton, and returned from there with a verdict in his favor. In 1690, after the Andros regime fell, the probate court of Hartford reversed the de- cision, and was sustained the next year by the Court of Assistants.78


However valuable the custom was to Connecticut, it was clearly contrary to the laws of England, and resulted in numerous appeals to England up until 1745. Except for the short period of enforcement of conformity under Andros, no clear and final decision was made. Eng- land had grown cautious about enforcing the royal prerogative, since the Andros regime had given some measure of the resistance to be en- countered. Application of the English principle aroused wide dissent in the colony, except among individuals benefiting by the modification.


The order for the encouragement of the Church of England79 was repugnant, also, and aroused latent fears among a people who had suffered persecution in England. Religious toleration of any kind was obnoxious to the Puritan clergy of the latter part of the seventeenth century, and to legislate that the Church of England was to be especially encouraged was anathema. Because of memories of English persecution and because of the arbitrary nature of the Puritan religion, the religious imposition was regarded as tyrannical.


The move to constrict town meetings also challenged an integral element of the Connecticut way of life.80 Inasmuch as the Andros regime did not provide for any general colonial assembly, the town meeting was the only legal assembly left to the people, and it was re- garded by the residents as constituting an instrument of local self gov- ernment. To an English lawyer, this was an illegal pretension. Never- theless, an act was passed which, to some degree at least, seemed to countenance the practice of the colonies. The inhabitants of each town were permitted to elect as many as eight selectmen, of whom half were to have held office in the preceding year, and these were to meet monthly to care for the usual routine of community life. They were, however, specifically under the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace, who were named by the government in Boston, and were intended primarily to assist by levying the rates voted by the Governor and Council, as is in-


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dicated by the fact that the provision for a Commissioner was first made as a subordinate part of an Act Establishing Rates, Duties, and Imposts.


When town meetings were limited to one a year, and restricted to this election of people to implement Andros' taxation, they no longer could serve as a forum for discussion and criticism of the Governor and Council and became merely a means of forcing the populace to become the ally of the government in the collection of taxes. That town meetings were regarded as citadels of freedom seems due as much to the curtailments under Andros as to any existent degree of democratic practice in the pre-Andros days, although their absolute domination by proprietors had been somewhat challenged by the time of Andros.


Taxation, itself, was altered but slightly by the Andros govern- ment. There was an increase in the poll tax, but the principle underly- ing the rating of property was untouched. Only minor changes were made in the powers of tax officials. In the main, Andros continued the economic laws of the colony, and the tonnage duties, which he intro- duced, were continued when charter government was resumed. In Massachusetts, it is recorded that the merchants were for land taxes, and the land owners were for laying all upon the trading party.81 The oppo- sition in Connecticut, too, may have reflected an opposition to the con- tinuance of the tax plan. The objection to taxation was made, however, on the grounds of lack of representation through a general assembly. The failure to provide for a representative assembly gave a doctrinal basis to discontent and provided the accepted justification for opposi- tion-and eventually for resumption of charter government. The power to make laws and to levy and collect taxes continued to rest with the Governor of the Dominion and his Council. Despite much advice and although Andros did not oppose the creation of an assembly, James II steadfastly refused to permit the legislative function to rest with an assembly.82 The withholding of the privilege helped to establish the principle of popular representation as inviolate in Connecticut. When the restrictive franchise of Connecticut is recalled, the question is raised as to whether the principle received more emphasis from magistrates when they were being governed than when they were governing. None- theless, however great the disparity between democratic principle and its autocratic implementation, Connecticut had taken steps toward


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representative government and strides toward a belief in it. Violations of the principle were broad arguments for the resumption of charter government.


Resumption of Charter Government


The first intimations of the revolution in England by which James was deposed sparked revolt in the New England colonies against the Andros government. In Massachusetts, Andros was imprisoned and the previous colonial Governor and Council reinstated. In New York, Jacob Leisler assumed command in behalf of William of Orange. In Connecticut, on May 9, 1689, Governor Robert Treat, Deputy Gov- ernor James Bishop, and former magistrates resumed their offices. In addition, Major General FitzJohn Winthrop was chosen to the magis- tracy to complete the number required by the charter. After news had been received that William and Mary had ascended the throne, a spe- cial assembly was called in Connecticut and on June 13, they were pro- claimed in the colony. The assembly addressed their Majesties hailing their ascension as evidence of God's will to rescue the nation from popery and despotism. Confirmation of Connecticut's charter rights were requested on the grounds that the charter had never been sur- rendered and Andros' power had been an illegal usurpation.83


Not everyone in the colony, however, defined liberty and inde- pendence in terms of the old charter government. There was a large enough element questioning the authority of this revolutionary gov- ernment that there were intimations of difficulty collecting taxes. The Court empowered itself or its listers to rate "will and doom", or at dis- cretion, any person who did not accurately report his personal and real estate. This opposition was disclosed to the Crown by several indi- vidual representations, as well.8+ Shortly after the arrival of Governor Slaughter at New York, Major Edward Palmes of New London, the son-in-law of the first Governor Winthrop, complained of injustice at the hands of a "pretended court" of the colony.85 He was close to Gershom Bulkeley, who contended that Connecticut had consented to the assumption of its government by Andros for the Crown, and that, therefore, the resumption of charter government and the restoration of administrative systems were illegal since they were not specifically


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(Courtesy Conn. State Lib.)


BUCKINGHAM-CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH AND OLD BURIAL GROUND


authorized by the Crown.86 This interpretation appears to be the referent for Palmes' challenge of the courts. He asked Slaughter, as a representative of the Crown, to aid him in securing redress. On May 6, 1691, Slaughter addressed a letter to Colonel Treat, Governor of Con- necticut, in which Slaughter asserted that almost every day he was ad- vised by new complaints of His Majesty's subjects of great hardships and oppressions against their estates and persons. Slaughter advised


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that those who took upon themselves the administration of government use such methods as to make His Majesty's subjects be easy and have no cause of complaint. An undated draft of a letter from Slaughter to Palmes and Bulkeley offered to forward to the King any information they wished to present on colonial affairs and recommended that they transmit a report of wrongs and oppressions. Slaughter promised his interposition on their behalf. Slaughter died suddenly in July, 1691. but the Bulkeley-Palmes group presented their protestations and of- fered their cooperation to the successive representatives of the Crown.87


At the moment the Crown reached no formal decision on the mat- ter of the charter. The ascension of William and Mary to the throne had been followed by an immediate outbreak of war between England and France, which inclined the Crown toward the assumption of con- trol of the military effort of the New England colonies, but which neces- sitated that a working arrangement be maintained. Connecticut used the emergency as a justification of her reestablishment of charter gov- ernment and resisted the Crown's efforts to manage the military.


Connecticut, historically identified with support of an independent course of action, opposed the establishment of a formal, continuing union. The colony voiced a concern about the potential dangers to England of the union, and declared the plan to be subversive to the just rights of government.


NOTES-CHAPTER VIII


1 See above, ch. IV.


2 Andrews, Col. Period of Am. Hist., II, pp. 40-41; Brockunier, Irrepressible Democrat, pp. 394-95.


3 Winthrop's methods in the Winter of 1662 raise some questions of ethics. Historians are far from agreement as to the degree of Winthrop's duplicity. In general, writers on Connecticut have extolled his virtues, and writers on the neighboring colony have not spared criticism. Brockunier, a recent biographer of Roger Williams, states spe- cifically that Winthrop exploited a twisted version of a previous patent of Rhode Island and implies strongly that Winthrop paid off more than one civil servant. (See Irrepressible Democrat, p. 255.) Winthrop, himself, stated that he spent 3,000 pounds in securing the charter. Andrews, after a close analysis, concluded that the charter did not cost Connecticut more than 500 pounds, but, in this, he fails to consider the possibility that the Atherton Company might have contributed to the fund. (See Andrews, Col. Period of Am. Hist., II, pp. 135-36.)


4 When a fine imposed by the United Colonies on the Narragansetts became due at the end of a four year period, the Atherton Company had paid it and had taken a


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mortgage on the Indians' lands. After the expiration of the stated time limit of six months, the company had foreclosed, and, using force as persuasion, had taken formal possession of the land in April, 1662. Ibid., pp. 37-38; Brockunier, Irrepres- sible Democrat, pp. 253-55.


5 Andrews, Colonial Period, II, p. 45.


6 Brockunier, Irrepressible Democrat, pp. 255-56.


7 Ibid., pp. 255-56.


8 Roland M. Hooker, "Boundaries of Connecticut", Conn. Ter. Comm. Publ., pp. 3-4.


9 Ibid., pp. 4-5.


10 Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, X, pp. 320-21.


11 Brockunier, Irrepressible Democrat, p. 255.


12 Hooker, Boundaries, pp. 4-5; Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, II, pp. 320-21.


13 Hooker, Boundaries, pp. 5-6; see below, Ch. IX.


14 Hooker, Boundaries, pp. 15-20.


15 Fox, Yankees and Yorkers, pp. 117-21.


16 Conn. Col. Rec., II, p. 561.


17 Ibid., pp. 205-11, 561-62.


18 Ibid., pp. 561-68; Fox, Yankees and Yorkers, p. 121.


19 Conn. Col. Rec., II, p. 569.


20 Fox, Yankees and Yorkers, p. 122.


21 Conn. Col. Rec., I, p. 427; II, pp. 569-72.


22 Fox, Yankees and Yorkers, p. 29.


23 See above. Ch. IV.


24 Fox, Yankees and Yorkers, pp. 130-31.


25 Conn. Col. Rec., II, pp. 341-42.


26 Ibid., p. 260.


27 Reprinted in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699 (New York: c. 1913), see pp. 7-10.


28 Ibid., Hubbard, I, pp. 53-55.


29 Conn. Col. Rec., II, pp. 216-20, 260-64, 331-35.


30 Hubbard, I, pp. 74-79.


31 Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," in Lincoln, ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, (original narrative of American History), p. 13.


32 Ibid., pp. 35-36, 39, 62-64; Hubbard, I, pp. 10, 107-108; Conn. Col. Rec., II, p. 353. 33 Ibid., pp. 266-72, 377.


34 Ibid., pp. 401, 422-24; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," pp. 46, 56-66, 78-81, 85-86; Hubbard, I, pp. 136-52; G. H. Hollister, The History of Connecticut (New Haven, Conn., 1855), pp. 274-82; Conn. Col. Rec., II, pp. 387-90.


35 Ibid., pp. 404-405; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," pp. 88-89.


36 Ibid., pp. 90-91, 96; Conn. Col. Rec., II, p. 438.


37 Ibid., pp. 273, 279, 296, 433-60; Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre," pp. 104-106. 38 Conn. Col. Rec., II, pp. 289-98.


39 Easton, "Relacion of the Indyan Warre" pp. 4, 21.


40 A further irritant increasing royal impatience with Connecticut was the continued audacity of the Atherton land grabbers. Once peace was restored, conditions were favorable for the resumption of the task of settling the Narragansett territory. Wait Winthrop, the second son of the Connecticut Governor, had moved to Massachusetts since representing Connecticut at the negotiation with the Narragansetts, and now served as a front for the land jobbers. These, with the blessings of Connecticut, ad- vertised the land, whereupon Rhode Island warned that purchasers would be re-


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garded as intruders. It was directed, by order of the King, that the territory remain the King's province while claimants came to England to defend their rights. Conn. Col. Rec., II, p. 544; III, pp. 257, 267, 276.


41 Ibid., II, pp. 560-61.


42 Ibid., Andrews, Col. Period of Am. Hist., IV, p. 150; Adams, Founding of New England, PP. 391-97.


43 Ibid., pp. 394, 408-11, 497; Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 311-12.


44 Adams, Founding of New England, p. 413.


45 Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 207-10, 347-352.


46 Ibid., pp. 207-10, 355-64.


47 Ibid., pp. 365-69. When Connecticut later indicated a preference to be joined with


Massachusetts, Dongan was bitter and wrote "If I thought it so agreeable to yr


Govermt, I should be as forward in endeavouring ye destruction of yor Charter as any person whatever," see Conn. Col. Rec., III, p. 387.


48 Ibid., p. 368-73.


49 Ibid., p. 222; Adams, Founding of New England, pp. 411-12.


50 Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 375-76.


51 Ibid., p. 375.


52 Ibid., pp. 377-78.


53 Ibid., p. 237-38, 384-86.


54 Bulkeley, "Right to Election," in Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., I, p. 1.


55 Ibid.


56 Ibid., p. 67.


57 Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 177, 225, 228.


58 Ibid., pp. 225 ff.


59 Ibid., pp. 237-38.


60 Ibid., note.


61 Ibid., pp. 386-87 and note.


62 Ibid., p. 247.


63 Ibid., p. 383.


64 Ibid., pp. 387-88.


65 Miller, New England Mind, p. 152.


66 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, I, p. 313.


67 George Chalmers, Political Annals of the Present United Colonies from their Settlement to the Peace of 1763, (London, 1780), pp. 297-298.


68 Samuel Peters, General History of Connecticut, from its First Settlement under George Fenwick to its Latest Period of Amity with Great Britain prior to the Revolution. . . (1781), Samuel Jarvis McCormick, ed., (New York, 1877), p. 92.


69 Jedediah Morse, The American Geography (Elizabethtown, New Jersey, 1789), p. 240.


70 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, I, p. 313.


71 State of Conn. Register and Manual (Hartford, 1957), p. 584.


72 Ibid.


73 Conn. Col. Rec., III, p. 390.


74 Bulkeley, "Will and Doom," Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III, p. 149.


75 Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 402-36.


76 See "Fundamental Orders of Connecticut."


77 Andrews, "Intestacy Law."


78 Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 396-97; IV, pp. 57-58.


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79 See Origen Storrs Seymour, "The Beginnings of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut" Ter. Comm. Pam., p. 1.


80 See Adams, Founding of New England, pp. 425-26.


81 Miller, New England Mind, p. 150; Everett Kimball, The Public Life of Joseph Dudley (New York, 1911), p. 47.


82 Adams, Founding of New England, pp. 414-15.


83 Trumbull, History of Connecticut, I, pp. 316-19; Conn. Col. Rec., III, pp. 250-55.


84 Hoadley's Introduction to "Will and Doom," Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., III, pp. 74-75.


85 Ibid., p. 73.


86 Bulkeley, "Right to Election," Collections, Conn. Hist. Soc., I.


87 Hoadley's Introduction to "Will and Doom," pp. 73-74.


Chapter IX The Frontier, 1690-1739


A® FTER THE RESUMPTION of charter government, a measure of tolerance for Connecticut's autonomy was achieved in the years 1689-1739. The continuance of charter government hung more upon the colony's willingness to cooperate in the defense of the empire, which was viewed as synonymous with the security of the colony, than upon the actual ability of the colony to defend its position independently. The comparative security which prevailed after the conclusion of Queen Anne's War allowed a period of expansion in which the remaining land within the borders of the colony was dis- tributed. Land hungry residents, weary of eking out a living from the exhausted soils contested with speculators for title to unsettled land. Concurrently, descendants of proprietors sought to validate their claim to titles in settled areas, while England threatened the titles to all land by challenging the laws of inheritance of the colony. Speculation, easy money, and novel schemes to raise capital were issues of the postwar period.


King William's War


The contest between England and France for world power had been prevented from flaring into formal conflict in America because of an agreement which sought to isolate the American dependencies and their intercolonial quarrels from the contest for security and power in Europe. The strength of a nation was, at the time, generally measured in economic terms, and, as the commercial importance of the overseas possessions increased, they were considered to be of greater consequence to the security of the colonizing nations and assumed


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additional significance as a factor in the policy determinations of the European government.1 A component in the French-English conflict in America was the prefatory border warfare and contest for trading privileges in which the French and English settlers engaged. The offenses of the French colonists against the English settlers in America were stated by King William, who had succeeded to the English throne after the "Glorious Revolution," as a reason for his declaration of war against France. Thereby, he dissented from the previously accepted doctrine that Europe and the New World constituted two separate spheres and bound the security of his North American possessions to that of his empire.2


The English declaration of war against France placed the New England colonies in danger of a French attack from the north which could not be met quickly or effectively. There was not only a general lack of military strength and leaders, but, with the disintegration of the Dominion of New England, there was no existent organization empowered to convene the colonies for concerted action.3 In Connecti- cut, to meet the danger, watches were established in the several towns, taxes were raised, and embargoes on provisions were established. Two companies were ordered to Albany, which was endangered by Frontenac's capture of Schenectady in the winter of 1690. The march of the troops was delayed, however, until the plans of the other colonies could be determined. Frontenac's raid seemed to suggest that New York would be the focal point of the French attack. To check the ad- vance of the enemy, an expedition against Quebec and a land opera- tion against Montreal were planned by Commissioners representing each of the colonies in the Spring of 1690. An attack against the enemy's Canadian bases seemed strategically sound as a means of forcing the withdrawal of troops from New York and avoiding a prolonged and wearing border defense.4


Success of the plan required skilled military leadership and a greater degree of cooperation than usually existed among the colonies. Almost immediately, there was difficulty over the selection of the command. Sir William Phipps, the first Royal Governor of Massa- chusetts, had, also, been appointed to the command of the Connecticut militia.5 Phipps was informed by the dissident element in Connecticut




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