USA > Connecticut > History of Connecticut, Volume I > Part 39
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Ratification indicated the vigor of the Republican Party. The opposition was not strong enough in any of the Wolcott towns to turn the electorate against the constitution, while it was ratified by many towns which had voted for Federalists in 1817. The towns of the state which were known to be centers of dissent voted enthusiastically for ratification. Purcell points out that 16 towns repudiated delegates who had favored the constitution and that "of those towns, whose delegates were divided in the convention, six refused to follow Republican ex- tremists in their opposition, while the rest failed to support their Federalist delegates who had favored the constitution."30 In Hartford, Litchfield and Tolland counties, which opposed ratification, 33 of the 48 towns voted against the document. Opposition was strongest in Litchfield county, where 58 percent of the total number of voters dis- approved. In the five counties which approved ratification, 51 towns voted for and 19 against.
The Republicans were so content with the ratification of the con-
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stitution, that, except for laws outlining the new election procedures31 which were demanded by the constitution, they seldom translated their frequently espoused suggestions for reform into legislative action. The administration was already taking on conservative characteristics which were to characterize it for the next decade. There were few members of the General Assembly who demanded reforms at the price of endanger- ing their position by controversy. The Assembly was so in harmony with that which they had purportedly destroyed that it was difficult to cast off the symbols of the old regime. The Senate continued to be referred to as the "council" and its members as "assistants." The militant re- formers of an earlier day were acquiring the conservative characteristics of political security.32
The Republicans continued their political successes in the Spring election when Wolcott's victory was so complete as to portend his con- tinued election during the next eight years and to permit the conserva- tive Republicans to proceed unchallenged until the 1830s. One staunch Federalist noted that the great ferment did not result in a poisonous brew for the Republicans, but in further defection among the Federal- ists themselves. Wolcott received more than 90 percent of the popular vote and Republicans secured every seat in the Senate and a large ma- jority in the house.33 The deterioration of the Federalists continued to the extent that in 1822, the Republicans ceased to fear the possibility of defeat. Federalism was little more than a social clique.34
Once the Republicans were entrenched in power, their zeal for reform abated and the central theme of their administration became economy in government. The first programs to receive the economy axe were the state's militia, for which appropriations were reduced in 1819 from eleven to five hundred dollars, and Newgate Prison, for which funds were reduced from $30,000 to approximately three-fourths the amount.35 In 1820, the Assembly negatived aid to agriculture and manu- facturing, and limited the state's liability for the poor, by reiterating the instances in which responsibility rested with the towns. In addi- tion, all monies from the school fund in excess of $62,000 were diverted to the Treasury, an economy which saved the state $12,000 a year, but which resulted in a continued deterioration of the educational program. A salary act which reduced the pay of public officials saved approxi-
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mately $7000 and the discontinuance of entertaining the clergy on Elec- tion Day effected a further saving.37
Such economies were made necessities by tax revision which reduced the grand list by more than twenty-five percent. This revision which had long been a part of the Republican platform had been de- layed in 1818. The following Spring Wolcott called for a readjustment of the real estate tax since the growth of urban communities had tended to increase the value of small lots and wealth was measurable in many ways other than land. The special finance committee named to study the problem was composed of farmers in sympathy with Wolcott's conviction that the tax system should reflect the changes in society. Indeed, they stood to gain by the alteration he suggested. Taxes were assessed against stores, banks, and mills at the same rate as against land, 3 percent; against government or corporate stocks at 6 percent; against silver plate at 50 percent; and against a dwelling house and lot at 2 percent. The bill was favored by representatives from poor agricultural towns, while those representing the more prosperous rural towns were split. Only the Federalists opposed the bill, forecasting inaccurately that the tax on stocks and bonds would drive the capital out of the state. Not only was the legislation good politics, but it achieved a beneficial change in the tax base by placing a more equitable tax load on the wealthy. However, the Republicans were afraid to compensate for the overall reduction in the grand list by raising the tax rate. In 1822, the Assembly repealed the tax exemption which the clergy had enjoyed, but for the rest had to effect economies to compensate for the state's reduced income.38
Once the Republicans were in power they revealed too ready a tendency to continue institutions as they were. Ironically this was par- ticularly true in the frequently contested court issue. The constitution dealt only with such general principles as that the judges should be appointed by the legislature and should hold office on good behavior. The Assembly in October 1818 determined the number of judges of the higher court, but left many of the details of court organization un- touched. In 1819, a calendar of times and places at which courts should meet was provided, but the problem of jurisdiction was not touched. The Superior Court, established in 1711, continued to exercise the same
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powers unchanged. The Supreme Court of Errors which had been established in 1784, but abolished in 1806, was revived but its functions were not delineated. Since the same judges constituted both this court and the Superior Court the arrangement merely gave judges the oppor-
(Courtesy Conn. Devel. Comm.)
STONINGTON-OLD STONE LIGHTHOUSE, NO LONGER USED
tunity to review their own cases. County and probate courts, also, were reestablished with the same powers as previously.
The most serious problem was that judicial powers still apper- tained to the legislative branch. The Republicans had long objected to the practice of having members of the Senate act also as justices of the peace. It had been presumed, at least by the radical Republicans, that this would be eliminated in a program of reform. The Federalists now wished to limit this power of the legislature since it now served to en-
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trench Republicans in many localities as justices. The conservative Republicans cited custom as sufficient reason for continuing the policy and tradition once more prevailed. A divorce case which was submitted to the Assembly in May, 1818, before the constitutional convention, provided an opportunity to test the degree to which the Assembly would voluntarily abdicate its judicial powers. This case came up for considera- tion in the October session, after the convention. The Assembly de- cided that it had jurisdiction in the case, thereby indicating that it retained the power of deciding the constitutionality of a law. The spirit of reform, which it was one time charged would result in revolution, was sated by the constitutional convention, and the efforts of two dec- ades were dissipated by a mere interest in maintaining party control.39
There was a discrepancy between constitutional provision and practice in regard to the Governor's veto. In 1820, the Assembly sum- marily overrode Wolcott's veto of a bill defining the qualifications of electors and declared that it was an unwarranted interference in legis- lative affairs. The real test of the veto power came, however, in relation to the steamboat law which provided that no steamboat owned by citi- zens of another state could navigate the waters of Connecticut unless Connecticut citizens were allowed similiar privileges in the former state. The bill grew out of the competition offered Connecticut steam- boat companies by New York companies because of a monopoly which the associates of Robert Fulton had secured for the navigation of New York waters. This privilege was interpreted quite liberally, and, in the minds of some, threatened the growth of steamboat lines in Connecticut. Wolcott held that Congress alone could regulate interstate commerce, and that, therefore, both the New York and the proposed Connecticut law were unconstitutional. He held, too, that one state was not compe- tent to redress the grievances suffered by an individual because of an- other state's actions. He denounced the proposed law as an odious, in- hospitable measure which would be injurious to the state of Connecti- cut. The Assembly, however, did not respect the Governor's wishes and enacted the provision. Although the law came to be regarded as injuri- ous to the state because it interrupted the free flow of traffic with New York, it remained in effect until 1824 when it was made invalid by the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in the Gibbon vs. Ogden case. The
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importance of the veto as a legislative device was still many years re- moved. The traditional fear of a strong executive still outweighed the constitution.40
Wolcott consistently urged reform legislation, which, although moderate, the Republican Assembly generally would not undertake. The depleted state of agriculture was an object of the Governor's at- tention and he called on successive sessions of the legislature to enact bills for the benefit of agriculture. Lack of funds and the rising influence of industry blocked assistance. The view, expressed by John Alsop of Middletown, that is was unjust to tax the more prosperous communi- ties for the benefit of the poorer, gave support to the forces which fa- vored local control. By 1821 the condition of the farmer had so deterio- rated that Connecticut knew not how to help and turned to the national government for assistance. Later efforts to assist the farmer were un- successful.41
Wolcott was equally unsuccessful in his efforts to aid education. He outlined the continuing deterioration of public education, severely criticized the appropriation act of 1820, pointed out that it had been intended that the school fund would supplement, rather than replace, support of schools by taxation, and recommended that local communi- ties raise taxes for the support of their schools. Not only was this not done, but local communities also returned to the Assembly legislators who consistently voted against state aid in any form and education con- tinued to languish for a number of years. Wolcott's recommendations were degrees more liberal than the Republican dominated Assembly was willing to translate into action.
The apparent dichotomy between Republican principle and prac- tice aroused some of the more liberal in the party to protest. The dis- senting element was led by John Milton Niles of the Hartford Times, who believed that the party had not taken advantage of the opportunities made possible by the new constitution. Support for this view came from Henry W. Edwards and from Thomas and Henry Sey- mour. Defections led to the presentation of multiple slates of officers in 1822. The rising influence of the group is indicated by Wolcott's ap- pointment of Edwards to fill the unexpired term of Elijah Boardman in the Senate. The controversy over Edwards' appointment raged for
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two weeks, the conservatives charging that he was a "New Light Re- publican." The Niles group, of course, rallied to his support and se- cured confirmation of the appointment somewhat to the chagrin of the conservatives.42
As predicted, Edwards supported Andrew Jackson in the disputed election of 1824. The Connecticut delegation in the House gave its support to Adams, primarily, it would seem, because the state voters viewed the other candidates as lacking in proper respectability. It was apparently the Jacksonian challenge to respectability which stirred the Federalists to action again. They entered a slate of candidates in the election in 1825 and again in 1826. The 35 towns which they car- ried in their second effort was a respectable showing but did not ap- proach control. Yet this challenge combined with the defection within the Republican party itself warned the Republicans that a party cannot forever sustain itself in power by economy alone and prodded them into giving attention to some of the needs of society.43
A step in the direction of needed social reform was achieved by a law making it possible for an alien to hold land in the state. The power of granting permission for this had rested with the Assembly but was transferred to the Superior Court which was expected to grant this permission after the alien had resided in the country for six months and had established himself as being of good character. Connecticut was immediately more attractive to aliens and the bountiful human re- sources which Connecticut since gained from foreign lands must estab- lish this new provision as one of the most significant legislative acts of any period.44
A law abolishing the imprisonment of women for debt was a step forward in the establishment of humane practices, particularly as it was a precursor of general abolition of imprisonment for debt. It has been hailed, too, as a step toward recognition of rights of women and "the most liberal advance attained by the Republicans since their rise to power."45 Although humanitarian, however, it might be regarded as constituting a limitation of woman's rights. A similar proposal had been defeated in 1823, in fact, as class legislation. In 1826, Samuel Danna of Middletown led the fight for the bill, outlining the tax status of women in other countries and arguing that the incarceration of
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women for debt was contrary to the spirit of Connecticut government and concluding that "in more enlightened countries ... she ought to be exempt, at least, from the degradation of imprisonment for debt." The act prohibited the imprisonment of any woman on a civil process arising from a contract.46 In addition to keeping her out of prison, it possibly, also, operated to eliminate her contractual opportunities.
Further attempts at reform during Wolcott's tenure in office were of no avail. The Assembly ignored his plea in 1825 for an enlargement of the transportation facilities and even abolished his right to issue proclamations requesting funds for charity. At this time sufficient senti- ment developed in favor of increasing the membership of the Senate to twenty-one members who would be elected by counties that the pro- posal secured the approval of the lower house. It became a political issue in the next year's election. Republican leaders shifted their support to opposition to the bill. An anti-district majority was returned to both houses and the amendment failed. The unrestrained circulation of bank notes of many denominations and the failure of the Derby Bank and the Eagle Bank of New Haven made the need for banking legislation ap- parent. Some in the Assembly favored instituting a general banking policy and Wolcott had indicated the necessity of such legislation, the Assembly was content merely to suspend the charter of the Eagle Bank and to revoke that of the Derby Bank. General legislation was post- poned.47
Although Oliver Wolcott had steered a moderate course since his election in 1817, his attempts to translate the principles implicit in the constitution into legislative realities had frequently aroused the antago- nism of the more conservative Assembly. Legislators regarded his exer- cise of the veto as unwarranted meddling in the legislative process and had followed his leadership only when it seemed to accord with their own standards of conservatism or when political realities dictated that they should provide a program which would enable them to continue to mouth the principles of liberalism. In 1827, the Republicans did not renominate Wolcott, but rather Gideon Tomlinson. During office Tom- linson also advocated reforms and his recommendations were also ig- nored by the Assembly. Tomlinson has been characterized as a forerun- ner of Jacksonian democracy. Had he been nominated in order that the
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Republicans could ostensibly sail under the aegis of reform while remaining becalmed in a sea of conservatism? Wolcott and the small coterie of the Niles group had been almost alone as purveyors of new ideas in the period 1817-1827. Those who controlled the legislative process after 1817 indicated scant difference in political philosophy from those whom they replaced. Republican rule had "strengthened many features typical of the earlier period" Morse has said and in illus- tration has pointed to "a love of precedence, subservience of the executive to the legislative, and long tenure of office."48 Nor can the failure to inaugurate more needed reforms be assessed against the poverty of the state. Capital and savings were accumulating during the period. Certainly poverty did not compel the reduction of expenditures, perhaps, as has been suggested the Connecticut Republicans "wor- shipped economy for its own sake."49
NOTES-CHAPTER XVII
1 Frederic Calvin Norton, "The Governors of Connecticut, Being the Third of the Biographies of the Chief Executives of the State," in The Connecticut Magazine, Vol. VII, Series of 1902, No. III-IV, December, pp. 291-94; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 332-34.
2 Ibid., pp. 351-55.
3 Statutes, 1808-20, p. 281.
4 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 355-56; Statutes, 1808-20, p. 282.
5 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 356-57.
6 Ibid., pp. 357-63.
7 Ibid., pp. 361-62.
8 Ibid., p. 363; Statutes, 1808-20, p. 297.
9 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 364.
9a J. Hammond Trumbull, "Historical Notes on the Constitutions of Connecticut and on the Constitutional Convention of 1818" (Hartford, 1901), p. 42.
10 Ibid., p. 43.
10ยช Ibid.
11 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, p. 369.
12 Trumbull, "Notes on the Constitutions of Connecticut," pp. 45-46.
13 Ibid., pp. 46-50.
14 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
15 Ibid., pp. 52-54; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 375-76.
16 "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of Delegates, Convened at Hartford, August 26, 1818, for the Purpose of Forming a Constitution of Civil Government for the People of the State of Connecticut" (Hartford, 1901), pp. 7-16.
17 Ibid., pp. 16-24.
18 Trumbull, "Historical Notes on the Constitutions," p. 56.
19 "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," p. 73.
20 Trumbull, "Historical Notes on the Constitutions," P. 55.
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AN ERA OF POLITICAL TRANSITION, 1817-27
21 Ibid., pp. 55-56; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 381-85; "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," pp. 74-77.
22 Ibid., p. 79; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 386-88.
23 "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," pp. 27-34, 56-57.
24 Ibid., pp. 35-39; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 390-93.
24a "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," p. 82.
25 Ibid., pp. 39-46; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 393-98.
26 "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," pp. 46-47; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 393-98.
27 Ibid., pp. 401-403; "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," p. 67; Bomhoff, "Development of State Support for Teacher Education," p. 17.
28 "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," pp. 54-72; Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 403-409.
29 Ibid., pp. 408-12; "Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention," pp. 58-60.
30 Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, pp. 412-14.
31 Statutes, 1808-20, pp. 131-36.
32 Jarvis Means Morse, A Neglected Period of Connecticut's History, 1818-50 (New Haven, 1933), pp. 36-37.
33 Ibid., pp. 37-38; Increase N. Tarbox, ed., Diary of Thomas Robbins, 1796-1854, 2 vols., (Boston, 1886), Vol. I, p. 779-781.
34 Ibid., pp. 36-39, 46, 54.
35 Ibid., p. 39; Walcraft.
37 Morse, Neglected Period, pp. 47-50; Capen, Poor Laws, p. 139; Bomhoff, "Development of State Support for Teacher Education," p. 19.
38 Ibid .; Statutes, 1808-20, pp. 339-344; Morse, Neglected Period, pp. 39, 51-56.
39 Ibid., pp. 43-46; Statutes, 1808-20, pp. 358-64.
40 Morse, Neglected Period, pp. 56-59, 64, 71.
41 Ibid., pp. 50, 52-53.
42 Ibid., pp. 61-63, 69-71.
43 Ibid., pp. 71-74, 77; Tarbox, ed., Diary of Thomas Robbins, Vol. I, p. 995.
44 Morse, Neglected Period, pp. 71-72.
45 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
46 Statutes, 1808-20, p. 490.
47 Morse, Neglected Period, pp. 74-80.
48 Ibid., p. 86.
49 Ibid., p. 88.
Chapter XVIII The Jacksonian Impression
T HE VOICE OF DISSENT was expressed in the rise of Jack- sonian democracy and Governor Gideon Tomlinson, who had been identified as its advance agent, probably led the state toward as great a break with the past as the climate of opinion would permit. Yet, the beginning of Tomlinson's and the end of Wolcott's term of office did not bring any immediate change in the course of legislation in Connecticut. The influence of John M. Niles and Henry W. Edwards in state politics increased, but changing personalities did not herald changing legislative policy. Economy continued to be prac- ticed, it would seem, for its own sake.
Gideon Tomlinson gained his first public office when he was elected to the state legislature from Fairfield during the Republican uprising in May, 1817. He was chosen Speaker of the House the follow- ing year.1 At the Constitutional Convention, Tomlinson was a member of the drafting committee, but did not participate in the debates on its recommendations. He identified himself as a good party man, voting with the majority on 18 of the 23 recorded votes. He was absent or abstained on two of the votes and voted against the majority only three times. Inasmuch as these three votes all related to the composition of the Senate, however, they distinguished him from the middle-of-the- road Republican.2 The next year he was sent to Congress where he es- tablished a close association with the administration which continued until he returned to Connecticut in 1827. Before he left Washington he fell under the influence of Senator Everett Edwards of Connecticut, who attempted unsuccessfully to turn him into a genuine Democrat. The Senator's persuasiveness and voluminous correspondence did push the
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future Governor a step toward Republicanism.3 Tomlinson's tenure of office extended from 1827 to 1831, but he ran as the nominee of the Union Party in 1828 and of the Independent Party in 1829 and 1839. His return to office then, rather than signifying a triumph for liberal- ism, constituted a stemming of rising tide of Jacksonianism and the postponement of the election of a Democratic Governor.4
Andrew Jackson did not represent that particular type of respecta- bility which Connecticut expected of men in public office. In 1828, the Courant proclaimed that Jackson's election would mean the beginning of tyranny. People were urged to vote the anti-Jackson Reform ticket, if they did not wish to be hanged by the neck without judge or jury or be a mark for an assassin. Copies of the "coffin handbill," which allegedly traced the bloody deeds of General Jackson, were circulated throughout the state.5 Jacksonians were envisaged as a fearsome rabble composed of hordes of slave owners, military adventurers, and grasping office seekers.6 A mob burned the President-elect in effigy in the windows of the State Capitol on January 8, 1829, the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans.7 Even at the close of Jackson's first administration, there remained a strong distrust of him. Connecticut "respectability" did not approve of one whom they charged to be governed by his passions and attuned to the kitchen cabinet, with a lack of integrity and sufficient intelligence to understand the constitution and not usurp the powers of the legislative and judicial branches.8
Despite the anti-Jackson sentiment, Tomlinson, on occasions, talked like a Democrat and sometimes suggested legislation which was in accord with the spirit of reform. In his first message to the legislature, he expounded the idea associated with Jackson that one man was as qualified as any other to hold public office, although without discount- ing his own special talent and ability. In this message, too, he outlined a legislative program touching on the economic and social problems of the state, calling for speedy and impartial justice, facilities for the expansion of industry, and a crusade against poverty and crime. In sub- sequent years he returned to these issues and added pleas for special facilities for juvenile defenders and emphasized the needs of education. By 1830, the Republican Party was beginning to divide into Jackso- nians and Conservatives. By the Spring of that year, the Jacksonians had
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